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Abstract 
 
 
This study has several key purposes.  First, it tests the potential applicability of the 
modern discourses of neuro- and cognitive science to the study of medieval texts and 
languages: more specifically, it does this by using two core methodological tools, 
namely the embodied view of the mind and a theory of metaphor developed 
collaboratively by the linguist, George Lakoff, and the philosopher, Mark Johnson, to 
explore the range of significances which may be drawn from the ways in which 
human life and existence are represented in a sample of twelfth-century Latin texts.   
Second, it challenges the view, held by some modern scholars, that by the medieval 
period Latin was an intrinsically inadequate language for the purposes of self-
expression.  And finally, it problematises the existing discourses in medieval studies 
on the individual, self, and subjectivity, first, by developing a new mode of analysing 
the mental lives of medieval people, and second, by challenging the view that 
advanced forms of self-awareness were “discovered” during the twelfth century.   
By following this course, this study offers a number of fresh insights into 
twelfth-century texts and the phenomena of the individual, self, and subjectivity.  
Most importantly, it shows that the ways in which human life and existence are 
represented in medieval texts are best understood in terms of complex interactions 
between the biological mind and body and their effects in the world (especially their 
“socio-cultural” effects).  From this conclusion, it is argued that the basis of the 
individual, self, or subject must be found, not just in socio-cultural development, but 
also the biological realities of human existence.  Furthermore, this study contributes to 
existing literature on the twelfth century by exploring the range of influences, ancient 
and contemporary, which affected how medieval people thought about themselves 
and other people, while affirming their basis in the interaction between the mind, 
body, and culture.       
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Part I 
 
Chapter One 
 
Introduction  
 
 
1.1: Defining the problems and purposes of this study 
 
This study has four main aims: first, it is intended to make use of theories and 
methods from the modern discourses of neuro- and cognitive science to shed light on 
how the authors relevant to this study experienced and conceptualised themselves and 
the world around them; second, in following this course, this study is intended to 
problematise the existing discourses on “individuality”, “the self”, and “subjectivity” 
in medieval studies by focusing on new methods for exploring the ways in which, as 
just stated, medieval people experienced and conceptualised themselves, their bodies, 
other people, and the world around them; third, this study is intended to explore the 
issues raised by neuro- and cognitive science for how we relate the phenomena of 
society and culture to the embodied existence of medieval people; and fourth, by 
focusing on a sample of Latin texts written by English and French authors in the 
twelfth century, it is intended to show that Latin was an adequate language of self-
expression for those twelfth-century writers who were able to use it.   
The first, second, and third aims of this study are related and more complex 
than the fourth hence they occupy the bulk of this study: particularly from Chapter 
Two onwards.  Before discussing them at length (see sec. 1.3 below) it is necessary to 
outline the relevant debates and historiography to which they respond (see sec. 1.2).  
Furthermore, I do not intend to make any argument in this study to the effect that 
people “discovered” or unwittingly developed “the individual” or “the self” (etc.) 
during the twelfth century.  Instead, I intend to problematise this widely entertained 
assumption about the development of Western European culture during the twelfth 
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century on grounds supplied by neuro- and cognitive science.  Since the nineteen-
nineties, it has been widely argued in these disciplines that self-awareness is an 
ordinary, but also highly variable, feature of human cognition.  Thus, although 
environmental, physical, and socio-cultural factors influence how people interpret 
their experiences of themselves (and develop concepts of “other people”), it seems 
quite certain from the findings of neuro- and cognitive science that people invariably 
develop concepts of themselves and other selves in response to their embodied 
sensory experiences of the world.1  As will be argued in the conclusion to this study, 
this insight should raise serious concerns for historians and literary critics still 
clinging to the idea that individuality or selfhood are inventions of twelfth-century 
Western European societies and cultures.2      
The fourth point raised above will be dealt with in this study separately from 
the previous three.  Thus, since the mid-twentieth century, the twelfth century has 
been widely viewed as a period of economic growth and socio-cultural and political 
development throughout Western Europe, not least thanks to the work of the 
American historian, Charles Haskins, who popularised the notion of the “twelfth-
century renaissance” in the nineteen-twenties.3  A revival in the use of Latin as a 
literary language and renewed interest in the literary and intellectual culture of pagan 
antiquity are often viewed as aspects of the twelfth century renaissance.4  However, 
prejudicial assumptions about the use of Latin in the medieval west have also 
developed alongside this.  As well as witnessing a revival of literary Latin, the twelfth 
century is widely acknowledged as a period in which vernacular literatures became 
established in Western Europe (at least outside of England), and gradually replaced 
                                                 
1 For instance, see the discussions of “the self” in D. C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (New York, 
1991), pp. 412-30, A. Damasio, Descartes’ Error (New York, 1994: repr. London, 1995), pp. 236-44 
(also see pp. 226-35 for relevant background information), and G. Lakoff and L. Johnson, Philosophy 
in the Flesh (New York, 1991), pp. 267-89.  These three works will be discussed in Chapter Two, sec. 
2.1. 
2 See Conclusion, sec. 6.1.  
3 Haskins made his case for his view of the twelfth century as a “renaissance” in his now classic work, 
The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century (Harvard, 1927).  
4 For example, see J. Martin, ‘Classicism and style in Latin literature’ in Renaissance and Renewal in 
the Twelfth Century, ed. J. F. Benton et al (Oxford, 1982), pp. 537-6.  The twelfth century is also 
viewed as a period of economic growth which had a knock-on effect on technological and scientific 
progress (for instance, see B. Stock, ‘Science, Technology, and Economic Progress’ in Science in the 
Middle Ages, ed. D. C. Lindberg (Chicago, 1978), pp. 23-32) and the period during which vernacular 
literatures became established in Western Europe (for instance, see C. Baswell, ‘Latinitas’ in 
Cambridge History of Medieval English Literature, ed. D. Wallace (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 122-51).   
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Latin over its course as the dominant literary tongues of Western Europeans.5  This 
has led some literary critics and historians to view the composition of Latin literature 
from the twelfth century onwards as stylistically and culturally antiquated.6   
It is broadly correct that the composition of original Latin literary texts 
declined as the composition and production of vernacular texts increased during the 
later medieval period.  Nevertheless, it is highly prejudicial to view the Latin 
literature produced during or after the twelfth century (or even post-classical Latin) as 
backwards or of poor quality by comparison with contemporary vernacular literature.7  
In making such judgements, literary critics and historians have often overlooked the 
apparent comfort with which many authors wrote in Latin throughout the twelfth 
century, and continued to do so well into the modern period.  Latin was presumably 
considered an adequate mode of literary expression to many writers who chose to use 
it in the post-classical world.  This view of the relationship between Latin and 
vernacular languages in Western Europe from the twelfth century onwards needs to be 
challenged, particularly in as much as it reflects the assumptions and prejudices of 
modern scholars concerning the development of Western European literature from 
classical antiquity up to the present.  Accordingly, this study focuses on wide variety 
of extracts from a sample of twelfth-century Latin texts which show how their 
respective authors’ were able to make use of Latin as a means of self-expression.   
 
1.2: Historiography and historiographical trends since c.1960 
 
The historiography covered in this section encompasses work published by historians 
and literary critics from the nineteen-sixties up to the present.  The purpose of this is 
to highlight significant changes in the attitudes, mostly of Anglophone medievalists, 
towards medieval people as individual conscious beings.  The late sixties has been 
chosen as a starting point because it was around then that individuality, the self, and 
                                                 
5 For example, see E. Auerbach, Mimesis (originally Bern, 1946), English trans. W. Trask (Princeton, 
1953), pp. 77-122 (especially 88-90), E. R. Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages 
(originally Bern, 1948), English trans. W. Trask (London, 1953) pp. 383-8, Baswell, ‘Latinitas’, and S. 
Spence, Texts and the Self in the Twelfth Century (Cambridge, 1996), p. 2 (and 1-17 for the full 
argument).  The Russian scholar, Mikhail Bakhtin, made an analogous argument for the transition from 
Greek to vernacular languages in Eastern Europe in The Dialogic Imagination (originally Moscow, 
1975), ed. M. Holquist and trans. C. Emerson and M. Holquist (Austin Texas, 1981), pp. 3-40.   
6 See Auerbach, Mimesis, pp. 88-90, Baswell, ‘Latinitas’, Spence, Texts and the Self, p. 2, and P. 
Haidu, The Subject: Medieval / Modern (Stanford Calif., 2004), p. 11.  
7 See references to Auerbach and Haidu in the previous note.  
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subjectivity, inter alia, began appearing in the relevant literature as explicit topics of 
discussion.  An effort is also made in this section to relate these developments to 
broader trends within history and literary criticism from the nineteen-eighties 
onwards, as the so-called linguistic turn began to make a significant impact on history 
and the study of historical languages and texts.  Work relating to the twelfth century is 
given priority in this section.  However, the chronological scope of the works covered 
here ranges from the early medieval period up to the early modern period. 
 
The notion of the individual first became a stated topic of concern in Anglophone 
medieval studies in the second half of the twentieth century.  An early contribution to 
debates on individuality in the medieval west was provided by R. W. Southern in the 
final chapter of his now classic work, The Making of the Middle Ages (1953).8  This 
theme was picked up more explicitly in the late sixties and seventies in works by 
Walter Ullmann, John F. Benton, Peter Dronke, and Colin Morris.9  Southern also 
continued to develop these themes in his later biographical work on St Anselm and 
the impact of humanism on intellectual life and education in eleventh and twelfth-
century Europe.10 
 In light of how debates on individuality in medieval Europe developed in the 
seventies, Ullmann’s work on individuality in his book, The Individual and Society 
(1967), now seems anomalous.  Ullmann confined his gaze to the development of the 
notion of the individual in secular law and Christian theology from late antiquity up to 
late middle ages, with an eye towards understanding the origins of the modern notion 
of the individual as a politico-legal being with inalienable “rights” (especially in 
English Common Law).  By contrast, a very different sense of this term can be found 
in Dronke’s book, Poetic Individuality in the Middle Ages (1970), in which the focus 
is squarely on the active desire of medieval poets to innovate and express themselves 
within the limits of established oral and written poetic traditions as opposed to the 
                                                 
8 The chapter in question is entitled ‘From epic to romance’: see R. W. Southern, The Making of the 
Middle Ages (London, 1953), pp.  209-44.  
9 See W. Ullmann, The Individual and Society (London, 1967), J. F. Benton, Self and Society in 
Medieval France (originally 1970, reprinted Toronto, 1984), P. Dronke, Poetic Individuality in the 
Middle Ages: new departures in poetry, 1100-1150 (Oxford, 1970), C. Morris, The Discovery of the 
Individual 1050-1200 (London, 1972).  
10 R. W. Southern, The Life of St Anselm: Archbishop of Canterbury (London, 1962), Saint Anselm and 
his Biographer: a study of monastic life and thought c.1059-1130 (Cambridge, 1963), and Medieval 
Humanism and Other Studies (Oxford, 1970). 
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individual as a constitutional and legal construct. 11  Also in 1970 Benton published 
two key works.  The first, an article in the journal, Psychoanalytical Review, marked a 
precocious effort in medieval studies to make use of psychoanalysis to explore the 
mind and life of Guibert of Nogent.12   The second relevant publication is the essay 
which fronts his translation of Guibert’s semi-autobiographical work, De Vita Sua 
Sive Monodiarum, in a book entitled, Self and Society in Medieval France (1970).13  
The latter work is perhaps the first major work in Anglophone medieval studies in 
which the term self occurs in the title thus marking the beginning of a trend whereby 
“self” has become the favoured word in medieval studies for describing phenomena 
such as self-awareness and personal expression.14 
Probably the most important contribution made to debates on individuality and 
the self in medieval Europe during the nineteen seventies was made by Morris in his 
book, The Discovery of the Individual 1050-1200 (1972), which builds on the earlier 
work of Southern, as discussed above, in The Making of the Middle Ages.  As the title 
of this work makes clear, Morris’ central claim throughout is that in the period 
c.1050-1200, Western Europeans, or at least those who were well-educated, became 
more aware of themselves and others as individuals: that is, in Morris’ terms, they 
“discovered” individuality.  In support of his argument, Morris stressed the 
occurrence of self-awareness, emotional sensitivity, and autobiographical narratives 
or anecdotes in the large body of clerical literature, mostly written in Latin, during the 
late-eleventh and twelfth centuries: bearing this in mind, it is also noteworthy that 
Morris did not undervalue the contribution of Latin literature to the development of 
trends of self-expression in the medieval west.15  In addition to this, he explored the 
role of French vernacular literatures in the development of ways of expressing self-
awareness in twelfth-century Europe and also greater interest among artists and 
writers in capturing apparently individual likenesses in portraiture and writing.16   
However, in 1980 Caroline Walker Bynum questioned Morris’ supposition 
that the twelfth century discovered the individual in a provocatively titled article, ‘Did 
                                                 
11 Dronke, Poetic Individuality, pp. 1-32.  
12 J. F. Benton, ‘The personality of Guibert of Nogent’ Psychoanalytic Review, 57: 4 (1970), pp. 563-
86. 
13 Benton, Self and Society, pp. 7-33.  
14 Benton followed this up in 1982 with another significant article, ‘Consciousness of Self and 
Perceptions of Individuality’ in Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century, ed. R. L. Benson et 
al (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 263-95.  
15 Morris, The Discovery of the Individual, pp. 64-120.   
16 On vernacular literature see Ibid., pp. 107-20 and on portraiture and likenesses see pp. 86-95.  
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the twelfth century discover the individual?’, in the Journal of Ecclesiastical 
History.17  In response to Morris’ work in The Discovery of the Individual, Bynum 
proposed that the “self” [seipsum] is a more appropriate term for describing the sense 
of self-awareness and personal being that medieval people were supposed to be 
“discovering” at that time.  Furthermore, Bynum argued that in regard to the 
development and expansion of new forms of communal life in Western Europe from 
the late eleventh century onwards the “discovery of the self” should be understood 
within the broader context of the “discovery of the group”.18  Morris published a reply 
to Bynum in the following edition of Journal of Ecclesiastical History in which he 
expressed agreement with Bynum’s claims regarding the importance of new forms of 
group life in the development of Western European cultures and societies over the 
relevant period.19  But he also picked up several points which, he argued, require 
further consideration in order for us to gain a better understanding of how the 
changing socio-cultural conditions of medieval Europe at this time altered the 
conditions of personal being.20   
According to Morris the late eleventh and twelfth century witnessed a rapid 
expansion in the range of life choices available for people on all levels of medieval 
societies, even including to some extent uneducated laypeople.  Most crucial in this 
respect was the possibility of joining different kinds of communal or religious group.  
In this way, people at that time were able to take on greater responsibility for their 
personal well-being and salvation than had typically been the norm in the early 
medieval period.  In this way, Morris argues that the developments of the late 
eleventh and twelfth century cannot be merely a matter of “the discovery of the 
group” (although he acknowledges that this was an important aspect of changes to 
medieval societies over the said period).21  Instead, the period in question witnessed 
developments in both group and personal being which cannot be reduced to either one 
or the other: group being and personal being changed in response to each other.  
Finally, Morris rebuts Bynum’s argument against the use of the label, “individual”, in 
medieval studies, firstly by highlighting inadequacies in the notion of the self as she 
                                                 
17 C. W. Bynum, ‘Did the twelfth century discovery the individual?’ in Journal of Ecclesiastical 
History, 31 (1980), pp. 1-17.  
18 Ibid., p. 15.   
19 C. Morris, ‘Individualism in Twelfth-Century Religion.  Some Further Reflections’ in Journal of 
Ecclesiastical History, 31: 2 (1980), pp. 195-206.  
20 Ibid., 199-206.  
21 Ibid., pp. 201-2.  
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defined it, and secondly by adding some qualifications to define the appropriate usage 
of “individual” in medieval studies while reaffirming its continuing validity through 
repeated use in the conclusions to his article.22   
Bynum followed up her 1980 article in a chapter of her book, Jesus as Mother 
(1982), in which she essentially restates the argument she made in her 1980 article in 
a slightly expanded form.23  More importantly, Bynum published several trend-setting 
books between the nineteen eighties and early nineties: most significant here are the 
aforementioned Jesus as Mother, Holy Feast and holy Fast (1987), and 
Fragmentation and Redemption (1991).  These books have been influential in the 
establishment of the study of gender, women, the body, mysticism, asceticism, and 
piety in medieval studies: their connections with several of these historiographical 
threads are highlighted later in this section.24   Moreover, in these books Bynum 
maintains a balance between analysing medieval people as “individual” people or 
“selves” and as socio-culturally situated beings, the value of which is discussed 
further below.25    
Later, in 1978 Charles Radding published an article in which he argues that 
the psychological theories of the Swiss psychologist, Jean Piaget, best known for his 
work on children, offer a theoretical framework for a mentalities-style history of the 
medieval period.26  Radding went on to realise this proposal in his book, A World 
Made By Men: Cognition and Society, 400-1200 (1985), in which he draws on 
Piaget’s insights into the nature of individual cognition in order to problematise the 
relationship between the individual and community in medieval Europe.27  In this 
respect, Radding’s work has some immediate significance for this study, as will be 
seen in later chapters where the distinction between biology and culture, widely 
upheld, although often unstated, in western academia, is problematised in light of the 
findings of neuro- and cognitive science.28  However, this study also departs from the 
                                                 
22 Morris highlights some limitations of Bynum’s sense of “self” at ibid., p.202 and qualifies the term 
“individual” as he used it and affirms its validity at ibid., pp. 205-6.   
23 C. W. Bynum, Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages (Berkerley, 
1982), pp. 82-109.  
24 See pp. 21-2 below.  
25 See sec. 1.3, pp. 29-30 below.  
26 C. M. Radding, ‘The Evolution of Medieval Mentalities: A Cognitive-Structural Approach’ in 
American Historical Review, 83: 3 (1978), pp. 577-97.      
27 C. M. Radding, A World Made By Men: Cognition and Society, 400-1200 (Chapel Hill, 1985), pp. 
22-30.  
28 For more on this aspect of this study see sec. 1.3, pp. 33-4 below, Chapter Two, sec. 2.1, pp. 44-9, 
and Chapters Four and Five.   
   
 
18 
 
approach taken by Radding in that it makes use of much more recent research into the 
human mind and cognition.  Piaget was undoubtedly a pioneer of modern psychology 
and, as Radding rightly points out, his insights into the human mind still have some 
relevance today.29  However, much has changed in the western sciences of the mind 
since the early to mid-twentieth century when Piaget was active (or indeed, since the 
early-eighties when Radding was active in this area).  Hence one of the aims of this 
study, as stated above, is to explore how the more recent findings of neuro- and 
cognitive science shed light on the mental lives of medieval Europeans.30 
 
From the early nineteen-eighties, as interest in matters of inward being seems to have 
largely slipped out of fashion among historians of the medieval west, students of 
medieval literature began to take an interest in the concepts of the self and subjectivity 
as they related to the cultures and literatures of the medieval west.  This trend should 
be viewed within the wider context of the linguistic turn, as post-modern philosophy 
began to alter how historians and language students viewed historical cultures and 
literatures.  Some notable contributors in this regard include David Aers, Britton J. 
Harwood, Louise O. Fradenburg, Lee Patterson, and Sarah Kay.31  It is also worth 
noting the importance of serial publications and specialised journals in stimulating 
work and debate on subjectivity and self in medieval culture and literature.32   
                                                 
29 Again, see Radding, A World Made By Men, pp. 22-30.  
30 This is stated above in sec. 1.1.  
31 Respectively see D. Aers, ‘The Parliament of Fowls: authority, the knower and the known’ in 
Chaucer Review (1981), pp. 1-17, Community, Gender, and Individual Identity: English Writing 1360-
1430 (London, 1988), and ‘A whisper in the ear of early modernists; or, reflections on literary critics 
writing the “history of the subject”’ in Culture and History, 1350-1600: Essays on English 
Communities, Identities and Writing, ed. D. Aers (Hemel Hempstead, 1992), pp. 177-202’; B. J. 
Harwood, ‘Chaucer's Pardoner: the dialectics of inside and outside’ in Philological Quarterly, 67: 4 
(1988), pp. 409-22, ‘Same-sex desire in the unconscious of Chaucer's Parliament of Fowls’ in 
Exemplaria, 13: 1 (2001), pp. 99-135, and ‘Psychoanalytic politics: Chaucer and two peasants’ in 
Journal of English Literary History, 68: 1 (2001), pp. 1-27; Fradenburg, ‘Spectacular fictions: the body 
politic in Chaucer and Dunbar’ in Poetics Today, 5: 3 (1984), pp. 493-517, and her introduction to an 
edition of the annual publication, New Medieval Literatures, dedicated to the application of 
psychoanalysis to medieval literature, ‘We are not alone: Psychoanalytical Medievalism’ in New 
Medieval Literatures, vol. 2 (Oxford, 1998), pp. 249-76; L. Patterson, ‘“What man artow?”: authorial 
self-definition in The Tale of Sir Thopas and The Tale of Melibee’ in Studies in the Age of Chaucer, 11 
(1989), pp. 117-75, ‘Perpetual motion: alchemy and the technology of the self’, in Studies in the Age of 
Chaucer, 15 (1993), pp. 25-57, and ‘“What is me?”: self and society in the poetry of Thomas 
Hoccleve’ in Studies in the Age of Chaucer, 23 (2001), pp. 437-72; and finally S. Kay, Subjectivity in 
Troubadour Poetry (Cambridge, 1990) and Courtly Contradictions: the emergence of the literary 
object in the twelfth century (Stanford Calif., 2001).  
32 For example see New Medieval Literatures originally published by Oxford University Press, now 
Brepols, and Exemplaria published by Maney, Leeds. 
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Psychoanalysis, and particularly the writings of Freud and Lacan, has proven 
highly influential among students of medieval literature.  For example, Louise 
Fradenburg has been an enthusiastic advocate of Freudian and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis in medieval studies, as has Sarah Kay, albeit more so for Lacanian 
than Freudian theories. 33   Furthermore, Kay’s stance towards Lacan is heavily 
influenced by the work of the philosopher, Slavoj Žižek, who has been an important 
advocate of Lacanian psychoanalysis for the purposes of contemporary cultural 
criticism.  Indeed, Kay has published a general-interest guide to the work of Žižek.34  
The historian, Nancy Partner, has also been influenced by psychoanalysis, as may be 
seen in her work since the nineteen nineties in which she makes use of Freudian and 
more contemporary psychoanalytical theory to examine the mental lives of medieval 
people.35  Meanwhile inveighing against this trend, in 2001 Lee Patterson published 
an extensive critique of the use of psychoanalysis by his peers working on the 
literatures of the medieval west.36  In this article Patterson is highly critical of his 
colleagues for employing psychoanalysis for their own ends without engaging with 
contemporary criticism of it among psychologists and philosophers.37  So-called queer 
theory has also made an impact in this area by problematising the issue of sexuality as 
it relates to the people, societies, and cultures of the medieval west.38  And attention 
should be drawn to articles published by Patterson and Aers in 1990 and 1992 
respectively, in which they both rail against what they see as a failure among students 
of early modern literature and drama to acknowledge the capacity of pre-early-
modern people to engage with themselves or be self-aware or to entertain notions like 
the self.39     
                                                 
33 See Fradenburg, ‘Spectacular Fictions’ and ‘“So that we may speak of them”: Enjoying the Middle 
Ages’ in New Literary History, 28: 2 (1997), pp. 205-30 (the latter of which is focused on modern 
constructions of the middle ages): likewise see Kay, Courtly Contradictions, which turns on Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. 
34 This is Kay, Žižek: A critical introduction (Oxford, 2003): note I have not consulted this work for the 
purposes of this study.  
35 See N. Partner, ‘No Sex, No Gender’ in Speculum, 68: 2 (1993), pp. 419-43, ‘The family romance of 
Guibert of Nogent: his story/her story’ in Medieval Mothering, ed. J. C. Parsons et al (New York, 
1996), pp. 359-79, and ‘The hidden self: psychoanalysis and the textual unconscious’ in Writing 
Medieval History, ed. N. Partner (London, 2005), pp. 42-64.   
36 See Patterson, ‘Chaucer’s Pardoner on the Couch’ in Speculum, 76: 3 (2001), pp. 638-80.  
37 In particular, Patterson draws attention to critiques of psychoanalysis by Frank Cioffi, Malcolm 
MacMillan, and Frederick Crews: ibid., pp. 647-56.   
38 For instance, see Harwood, ‘Same-sex desire in Chaucer's Parliament of Fowls’. 
39 See Patterson, ‘On the margin: postmodernism, ironic history and medieval studies’ in Speculum, 65: 
1 (1990), pp. 87-108 and Aers, ‘A whisper in the ears of early modernists; or, reflections on literary 
critics writing the “history of the subject”’ in Culture and History, 1350-1600: Essays on English 
Communities, Identities and Writing, ed. D. Aers (Hemel Hempstead, 1992), pp. 177-202.   
   
 
20 
 
It is worth highlighting some connections which developed during the 
nineteen eighties and nineties between the approaches of medievalists and early 
modernists towards the various aspects of the personal being of medieval and early 
modern people.  In particular, the influence of the literary critic, Stephen Greenblatt, 
beyond his immediate area of study should be taken into account.  Greenblatt’s 
pioneering approach to historical scholarship, dubbed “new historicism”, and most 
influentially employed in his Renaissance Self-Fashioning (1980) and the later 
Learning to Curse (1990), has been widely influential among cultural historians since 
the eighties.  Greenblatt is especially noteworthy for helping to bring the notion of 
“self” into the limelight of cultural history (particularly by developing his own 
concept of “self-fashioning”) and promoting psychoanalysis as a hermeneutic tool in 
cultural history.40  Moreover, new historicism has found a vocal advocate in medieval 
studies in Gabrielle Spiegel.41  In her Romancing the Past (1993), Spiegel examines 
the use made of the past by the aristocratic elites of thirteenth-century France to 
“fashion” historical identities for themselves.  More recently, Spiegel has attempted to 
evaluate the influence of post-modernism and new historicism on the writing and 
practice of history over the past thirty years: see for instance the volume edited by 
Spiegel, Practicing History: New Directions (2005).  Meanwhile, the notions of 
subjectivity and self were becoming important among students of early modern 
culture and in particular drama by the early eighties.42   
Recent work by certain literary critics, spanning both sides of the supposed 
divide between the medieval and early modern periods, is also significant, particularly 
as part of a broader re-evaluation of culture and society between those periods.  For 
instance, in his Aspects of Subjectivity (2003), Anthony Low examines the 
development of a sense of the “inner self” (his term) in English literature (written in 
Old English, Old French, and Middle English) from the ninth to the sixteenth 
                                                 
40 S. Greenblatt, Learning to Curse (London, 1990), pp. 131-45.  
41 Most notably, Spiegel has trumpeted the benefits of new historicism in ‘History, Historicism, and the 
Social Logic of the Text in the Middle Ages’ in Speculum, 65: 1 (1990), pp. 59-86 and more recently in 
her contributions to Practicing History: new directions in historical writing after the linguistic turn 
(London, 2005), noted shortly in the main text.   
42 Some pertinent works in this regard are Jonathan Dollimore’s Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology, 
and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare and his Contemporaries (Brighton, 1984) and Catherine 
Belsey’s The Subject of Tragedy: Identity and Difference in Renaissance Drama (London, 1985): both 
of these works are criticised by Patterson in ‘On the Margins’ and Aers in ‘A Whisper in the Ear of 
Early Modernists.’   
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century. 43   Of similar interest is the volume, Sixteenth-Century Identities (2001), 
edited by A. J. Piesse.  Importantly, the introductory offering of the volume, by 
Douglas Gray, is titled ‘Finding identity in the middle ages’, thus demonstrating an 
interest among the editor and contributors to the volume in contextualising sixteenth-
century identities in relation to the status quo ante represented by “medieval 
identities”.  Also of interest in this regard is Bruce Smith’s article, ‘Premodern 
Sexualities’ (2000), in which he assesses the meanings and significance of the notion 
of “sexuality” in the late twentieth century and if and how these can be legitimately 
applied to pre-modern literatures (thus demonstrating an interest in continuity and 
discontinuity between premodern and modern concepts of sexuality).44   
 
Meanwhile, in contrast to literary scholars, by the nineteen eighties the interests of 
historians of the medieval west appear to have shifted away from the individual and 
self towards the community.  More specifically, interest shifted from human mental 
life as an individual phenomenon to social or communal manifestations of mental life 
such as memory, identity, sex and sexuality, and perceptions of gender and the body.  
Memory has been a significant area of research and debate among medieval 
historians, particularly since the publication of Michael Clanchy’s From Memory to 
Written Record (1979).  This has been followed in recent years by the work of 
Elisabeth van Houts, as can be seen from her work in Memory and Gender in 
Medieval Europe 900-1200 (1999) and an essay collection edited by her entitled 
Medieval Memories: Men, Women, and the Past, 700-1300 (2001).   
However, sex, gender, and the body have certainly been particularly fast 
growing areas of study among historians of the middle ages since the nineteen-
eighties.  In particular, Bynum, Nancy Partner, and Miri Rubin have all been highly 
active (especially Bynum) in these areas of research and debate.  As noted above, 
Bynum published a series of highly influential studies on the roles of sex, gender, and 
the body, among other things, in the lives of late-medieval women.45  Her broader 
                                                 
43 Low states his case in the preface to the work.  See Low, Aspects of Subjectivity: society and 
individuality from the middle ages to Shakespeare and Milton (Pittsburgh, 2003), pp. ix-xxi: he uses 
the term “inner self” at p. ix.   
44 See D. Gray, ‘Finding identity in the Middle Ages’ in Sixteenth-Century Identities, ed. A. J. Piesse 
(Manchester, 2001), pp. 9-33and B. Smith, ‘Premodern Sexualities’ in PMLA, 115: 3 (2000), pp. 318-
29.  
45 See C. W. Bynum, Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages (Berkeley 
Calif., 1982), Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women 
(Berkeley Calif., 1987), and Fragmentation and Redemption (New York, 1991). 
   
 
22 
 
work on the body in medieval theology is also important.46  Meanwhile, Partner and 
Rubin began publishing work on medieval attitudes towards sex, gender, and the body 
around the early nineties and have continued to do so in recent years.47  In particular, 
in 1993 Partner edited a groundbreaking edition of the journal, Speculum, tellingly 
subtitled ‘Studying Medieval Women: Sex, Gender, Feminism.’48  This was followed 
in 1994 by a further groundbreaking collection of essays concerning the body in the 
medieval west, co-edited by Rubin and Sarah Kay, entitled Framing Medieval 
Bodies.49  And more recently, Nancy Partner has edited a volume primarily concerned 
with method and theory in medieval history, in which sex, gender, and body history 
feature heavily, Writing Medieval History (2005).50   
Once again, it is worth noting that early modernists have followed similar 
trends over approximately the same period.  Some significant contributions in this 
regard include Francis Barker’s The Tremulous Private Body (1984), Michael 
Schoenfeldt’s Bodies and Selves in early modern England (1999), Lyndal Roper’s 
Oedipus and the Devil (1994), in which Freudian psychoanalytical methods are 
applied to perceptions of witchcraft in early modern Europe, and similarly, Diane 
Purkiss’ The Witch in History: Early Modern and Twentieth-Century Representations 
(1996), which explores representations of female bodies and sexuality in early modern 
culture and recent academic studies of witchcraft in early modern Europe.   
Work on formal and informal relationships in the medieval west over the past 
few decades has also contributed to our understanding of what it meant to be an 
individual in medieval Europe.  The work of the German medievalist, Gerd Althoff, 
on gestures and formal relationships, which has recently been published in English as 
                                                 
46 In particular see C. W. Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body in the Christian West 200-1336 (New 
York, 1995). 
47 See Partner, ‘No sex, no gender’, ‘The family romance of Guibert of Nogent’, and ‘The hidden self’; 
M. Rubin, ‘The person in the form: medieval challenges to bodily “order”’ in Framing Medieval 
Bodies, ed. S. Kay et al (Manchester, 1994), pp. 100-22, ‘The body, whole and vulnerable, in fifteenth-
century England’ in Bodies and Disciplines: Intersections of Literature and History in Fifteenth-
Century England, ed. B. A. Hanawalt et al (Minneapolis, 1996), pp. 19-28, and  ‘A decade of studying 
medieval women, 1987-1997’ in History Workshop Journal: A Socialist and Feminist Journal, 46 
(1998), pp. 213-39.  Also available, but which I have not been able to consult, is Rubin, ‘Medieval 
bodies: why now, and how?’ in The Work of Jacques Le Goff and the Challenges of Medieval History, 
ed. M. Rubin (Woodbridge, 1997), pp. 209-19.  
48 That is, Speculum, 68: 2 (1993), pp. 305-390.   
49 See Framing Medieval Bodies¸ ed. S. Kay et al (Manchester, 1994).   
50 See the articles by Partner and David Shaw in Part 1 and all articles in Part 3, subtitled ‘Historicising 
sex and gender’; Writing Medieval History, ed. N. Partner (London, 2005).  
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Family, Friends and Followers (2004), is particularly noteworthy.51  There have also 
been a number of studies of gestures in the medieval west published in English.52  
Meanwhile, work on friendship [amicitia] in medieval Europe has shed light on the 
importance of less formal and emotionally charged relationships in the lives of 
medieval people.  This discussion grew out of earlier work on letters in medieval 
Europe.  Giles Constable’s 1976 contribution to a series of pamphlets on medieval 
source material, Typologie des source du Moyen Âge occidental, namely ‘Letter and 
letter-collections’, gives some thought to letters as a means for making and 
maintaining friendships in the medieval west.  More recently, the editor of Peter of 
Celle’s letters, Julian Haseldine, has edited an essay collection on friendship, 
Friendship in medieval Europe (1999).  Moreover, a recent edition of the journal, 
Viator, which contains a thread on friendship perhaps indicates that this discussion is 
currently gathering pace.53   
Over roughly the past two decades, the notion of identity has also become 
highly visible in Anglophone medieval studies.  Identity has broad significance in as 
much as it is generally understood in relation to, or even as a facet or by-product of 
other phenomena (e.g. it is possible to discuss identity in terms of gender, sexuality, 
ethnicity, religion, nationality, “self-fashioning”, and also how it interacts with other 
aspects of mental life such as memory).54  Hence it is very difficult to treat identity as 
a discrete phenomenon.  A number of works cited in this section are in some sense 
concerned with issues raised by the notion of identity and the ways in which it 
becomes manifest.  For instance, Gabrielle Spiegel’s Romancing the Past concerns 
aristocratic identities in thirteenth-century France, while Elisabeth van Houts’ 
Memory and Gender in Medieval Europe addresses identity as an ethnic and cultural 
issue in England after the Norman Conquest.55  Gender-identity has been covered by 
                                                 
51 G. Althoff, Family, Friends, and Followers: Political and Social Bonds in Medieval Europe, trans. 
C. Carroll (Cambridge, 2004), originally published in German as Verwandte, Freunde und Getreue, 
zum Politischen Stellenwert der Gruppenbindungen im Früheren Mittelalter (Darmstadt, 1990).  
52 See J. C. Schmitt, ‘The rationale of gestures in the West: third to thirteenth centuries’ in A Cultural 
History of Gestures, ed. J. Bremmer et al (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 59-70, J. A. Burrow, Gestures and 
Looks in Medieval Narrative (Cambridge, 2002), C. V. Phythian-Adams, ‘Ritual constructions of 
society’ in A Social History of England 1200-1500, ed. R. Horrox et al (2006), pp. 369-382, and J. 
Kerr, ‘“Welcome the coming and speed the parting guest”: hospitality in twelfth-century England’ in 
Journal of Medieval History, 33:2 (2007), pp. 130-46.  This literature is cited in relation to the 
discussion of gestures in Chapter Four, sec. 4.1, pp. 148-50.    
53 See the thread ‘The Theory and Practice of Friendship in the Middle Ages’ in Viator, 38: 2 (2007).  
54 For a discussion of the conceptual relationship between memory and identity see A. Megill, ‘History, 
memory, identity’ in History of the Human Sciences, 11: 3 (1998), pp. 37-62.   
55 E. M. C. van Houts, Memory and Identity in Medieval Europe 900-1200 (London, 1999), pp. 123-42.   
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van Houts, Bynum, and Partner, among others.56  Rubin has dealt with identity in 
relation to the body and has recently written specifically on identity in late-medieval 
England, addressing, among other things, Greenblatt’s notion of self-fashioning and 
communal identity.57   
Additionally, it is briefly worth noting Karl Steel’s recent article, ‘How to 
Make a Human.’  In this, Steel draws attention to the importance of a paradigm of 
animal existence to the definition of what it means to be human in certain strands of 
medieval and modern western philosophy.  Importantly, he demonstrates a degree of 
continuity between medieval and modern attitudes towards the similarities and 
differences between animals and humans, especially in the respect that both consider 
reason to be an essentially human quality.  Hence Steel’s work is significant here in 
as much as it concerns the ways in which human existence has been defined 
negatively against a paradigm of animal existence in the western philosophical 
tradition.58 
 
There has been a steady shift over the past decade in the attention and attitudes of 
medievalists back towards mental life as a personal or individualistic phenomenon (in 
many respects mirroring attitudes towards mental life around the nineteen-sixties and 
seventies).  To be sure, some medievalists never appear to have abandoned 
individualistic attitudes towards human mental life.  For instance, in spite of her 
argument in favour of situating the individual in relation to the society or community 
in 1980, in many respects Bynum continued to construe her subjects as individuals 
throughout the nineteen-eighties. 59   Elsewhere, Nancy Partner was placing an 
                                                 
56 For example, see van Houts, ibid., Bynum, Jesus as Mother, Holy Feast and Holy Fast, 
Fragmentation and Redemption, and Partner, ‘No Sex, No Gender’, ‘The family romance of Guibert of 
Nogent’ and ‘The hidden self’.   
57 See Rubin, ‘The person in the form’ and ‘Identities’ in A Social History of England 1200-1500, ed. 
R. Horrox et al (Cambridge, 2006), pp.383-412, in the latter of which, self-fashioning is addressed at 
pp. 395-402 and communal identity at pp. 402-12.   
58 Reason or rationality is something of a portmanteau for loosely theorised notions of cognition, self-
reflexion, consciousness, the capacity to foresight that allows organisms to predict, plan, avoid and so 
on and so forth.  It was a prevalent concern amongst Enlightenment philosophers such as Descartes, 
Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Kant.  Steel adds Lacan, Heidegger and Levinas to the list.  Steel also 
points out that reason was considered by medieval Europeans, along Christological lines, as a unique 
endowment amongst terrestrial beings granted to humanity by God  (who, of course, made Adam in his 
image hence, according to orthodox theology, all other living organisms were subject to the will of 
humanity): see K. Steel, ‘How to Make a Human’ in Exemplaria, 20: 1 (2008), pp. 3-27.         
59 Bynum addresses a number of female mystics as individuals in Holy Feast and Holy Fast (see 
chapter five).  
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emphasis on the individual as an important analytical unit in the nineteen-nineties: a 
view that is reinforced in her 2005 article, ‘The hidden self.’60   
Other signs that mental life as a personal phenomenon is again becoming a 
popular topic of discussion include Denis Reveney’s Language, Self, and Love 
(2001), which examines the writing of commentaries on the Song of Songs (or the 
Song of Solomon) as a form of introspective meditation in itself, a chapter on 
selfhood in John Arnold’s Belief and Unbelief in Medieval Europe (2005), Nancy 
Partner’s aforementioned 2005 article, ‘The hidden self’, David Shaw’s 2005 article, 
‘Social selves in medieval England’, and a collaborative work by the psychiatrist, 
Jerome Kroll, and historian, Bernard Bachrach, The Mystic Mind (2005).61   Also 
relevant here is Miri Rubin’s aforementioned 2006 article, ‘Identities’, which, 
although intended as a survey article for a general history book, covers a lot of ground 
and makes many instructive insights into the topics of identity and self.  This trend 
may also be observed in French-language medieval studies.  For instance, 2005 saw 
the publication of an essay collection, edited by Brigitte Miriam Bedos-Rezak and 
Dominique Iogna-Prat and entitled L’individu au moyen age: individuation et 
individualisation avant la modernité.  This volume organises contributions into three 
key topics: les marqueurs de l’individuation, subjets de discours, and individu et 
institution.  In this way, it covers a broad range of topics, including individual 
identity, the variety of modes of expression available to medieval people, and the 
variety of relationships between the individual and the group (or institution).  Also in 
2005 the American Medievalist, Barbara Rosenwein, published an article in the 
French journal, Revue historique, entitled ‹Y avait-il un ‹‹moi›› au haut Moyen Age?› 
[Was there a “me” in the high middle ages?].62    
The continuing work of literary critics on the notions of subjectivity and self 
throughout the nineties and the first decade of the twenty-first century has also been 
influential.  Some particularly significant studies in this regard include Sarah Kay’s 
Subjectivity in Troubadour Poetry (1990), Dana Stewart’s The Arrow of Love: optics, 
gender, and subjectivity in medieval poetry (2003), and A. C. Spearing’s Textual 
                                                 
60 See Partner, ‘No Sex, No Gender’, ‘The family romance of Guibert of Nogent’ and ‘The hidden 
self.’ 
61 Kroll’s and Bachrach’s The Mystic Mind is discussed further in the next section: for a full citation see 
n. 80 below.  
62 L’individu au moyen age: individuation et individualisation avant la modernité, ed. B. M. Bedos-
Rezak et al (Paris, 2005) and B. Rosenwein, ‹Y avait-il un ‹‹moi›› au haut Moyen Age?›, Revue 
historique, 307:1:633 (2005), pp. 31-52. 
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Subjectivity: the encoding of subjectivity in medieval narrative and lyrics (2005).  
These works are all notable for employing the term subjectivity in their titles (as is 
also the case for Anthony Low’s Aspects of Subjectivity, cited above).63  This term is 
frequently used in literary criticism to describe a point of consciousness or sensation 
(relating to characters or narrators) in a text.  Therefore, subjectivity can function as 
an anthropocentric concept in as much as it implies qualities of human mental life and 
consciousness.  For example, Stewart uses subjectivity in this manner to refer to 
points from which lines of sight originate as loci of sensation, consciousness, and 
feedback or action as far as sight is represented in late medieval love poetry.64   
However, subjectivity may also be used in less anthropocentric senses.  For 
instance, Kay takes a “decentred” approach to subjectivity, informed by the discourse 
of deconstructionism, in Subjectivity in Troubadour Poetry.  According to Kay, a 
decentred approach to subjectivity involves appreciation of how existing modes of 
speech and discourse affect how people, qua individuals, use language.  By this view, 
how people speak and write must be taken to reflect how other people have spoken 
and written to the extent that what the individual says and writes may be taken to 
reflect not only their own subjectivity but also the subjectivities of other language-
users.65  Meanwhile, Spearing’s key argument in Textual Subjectivity is that “textual 
subjectivity” need not necessarily mimic human speech and consciousness.  This is to 
say the representation of subjectivity in texts should not necessarily be taken as a 
direct reflection of human consciousness and phenomenology: textual subjectivity 
may bend or distort the possibilities of human experience.66  
 
Finally, the work of Sarah Spence in her book, Texts and the Self in the Twelfth 
Century (1996), is noteworthy here as an example of an approach to the self (and 
equivalent concepts) which sits in sharp contrast to that taken in this study.  Spence 
defines the self, as she sees it occur in twelfth-century French literature, ‘not as an 
autonomous unit but as a complex interaction of body, language, and space.’67  What 
she seems to mean by this is that the self, as it is apparently constructed in certain 
                                                 
63 For citation of Low’s work see n. 43 above.  
64 D. Stewart, The Arrow of Love: optics, gender, and subjectivity in medieval poetry (Lewisburg, 
2003). 
65 S. Kay, Subjectivity in Troubadour Poetry (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 1-2.  
66 A. C. Spearing, Textual Subjectivity: the encoding of subjectivity in medieval narrative and lyrics 
(Oxford, 2005), pp. 17-31.  
67 S. Spence, Texts and the Self in the Twelfth Century (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 1-17.  
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kinds of text, can be viewed as a consequence, or by-product, of the representation of 
the body as an object or space identified with the performer(s) of those texts (e.g. 
voices, narrators, or speakers).  In Spence’s terms “body” is in fact Latin literature: 
hence, according to Spence, Latin, in its capacity as “body”, functions as a ‘rupture of 
the subjective and objective worlds’ out of which the “self” apparently emerged in 
twelfth-century Romance literature.68   Thus, my first major criticism of Spence’s 
work is that her understanding of “the self” depends in part on a neat teleology in 
which Latin is replaced by vernacular languages as the main outlet of literary 
expression in Western Europe over the course of the medieval period: as noted above, 
this study is intended to challenge the view that Latin was somehow an inherently 
inadequate mode of personal expression for medieval people able to use it.69    
My second major criticism of Spence’s work relates to a quotation which she 
gives from the work of the art historian, Michael Ann Holly, apparently without fully 
realising, or at least not properly acknowledging, that it derives from the theoretical 
discourse of phenomenology, which is concerned with people’s immediate 
experiences of the world, rather than literary criticism: ‘[W]e possess a philosophical 
view of the world, of which our rectilinear, spatial system is part and parcel.’70  In 
response to this, Spence makes the following statement: 
 
All of the texts analysed here posit not only a self but a self understood as 
functioning in space, and in particular, taking the body as a frame of reference.  
At the core of this study...lie two assumptions: the fact that the body had come 
to assume a pre-eminence denied them in the early Middle Ages and the 
assertion that space is a crucial and defining aspect of selfhood.71 
 
This statement does not fit with the implications of the preceding quotation from 
Holly.  If people experience the world via a rectilinear spatial system, as Holly states, 
and it is from this that, according to Spence, the self arises, then why should early 
medieval people, or anybody else for that matter, be any less subject to the self than 
people in the latter medieval or modern periods?  Presumably early medieval people 
were just as subject to this rectilinear spatial system, via the embodied conditions of 
                                                 
68 Ibid., p. 4.   
69 See sec. 1.1 above.  
70 Quoted in Spence, Texts and the Self, p. 2.  
71 Ibid. 
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their respective existences, as later medieval and indeed modern people.  If so then 
why shouldn’t early medieval people also be subject to the experience of the self (as 
Spence argues that the body and rectilinear spatial reasoning are crucial to the 
development of the self)?   
Spence’s argument pivots around a teleology in which the literary production 
of the self first becomes possible in Western Europe during the twelfth century as 
Romance languages gradually replaced Latin as the dominant modes of written 
expression.  Accordingly, she is chiefly interested in the verbal representation of a 
particular kind of self or subjectivity: not the phenomena of the self in general and 
certainly not “the self” of colloquial spoken English.  Spence raises the interesting 
point that space and the body are crucial to the figuration of the self.  I agree that 
these are important aspects to how people experience and conceptualise the nature of 
their own personal being and also that of others: I go on to explore them in several 
places in this study.72  But these should not be treated as purely literary matters.     
Spence misuses a phenomenological observation about how people experience 
the world to construct a highly metaphysical theory of how “the self” emerges in 
twelfth-century Romance literature.  In contrast to Spence, I make use of the findings 
of neuro- and cognitive science to explore, not just abstract literary representations in 
themselves, but rather how literary representations of various aspects of human 
existence, abstract and literal, may be related to the conditions of human embodiment 
and placement in the world.73 
 
1.3: The place of this study in the historiography 
 
Over the course of the previous section, I highlighted the use of three major terms in 
the relevant literature: individuality, the self, and subjectivity.  Although these terms 
are to some extent interchangeable, they each highlight reasonably distinct issues.  
First, individuality typically relates to the overall being of somebody (i.e. the 
individual or alternatively the person). On the other hand, self and subjectivity tend to 
relate to aspects of individual psychology although, as stated above, subjectivity may 
also be used in a more “decentred” sense in order to highlight how linguistic, 
communal, and social relations, inter alia, influence individual subjectivity.  
                                                 
72 In particular, see Chapter Three, sec. 3.2 and Chapter Four, sec. 4.2.  
73 The relevant theory is discussed in Chapter Two and applied throughout Part II.  
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Additionally, there is a sense of subjectivity which is not connected to human 
psychology at all.  In some areas of academic discourse, particularly in analytical 
philosophy, subjectivity is often used to mean the condition of being situated: that is 
having a place or being somewhere in the universe (this is as opposed to objectivity 
which is supposed to be the condition of not being situated or having no relationships 
or biases in the world: the proverbial “view from nowhere”).74  Although subjectivity 
is rarely, if ever, used in this way in medieval studies, it is worth noting that it has a 
broader semantic range than is often recognised in medieval studies.  This also 
highlights the core concept underpinning the notion of subjectivity.  Subjectivity is 
essentially about placement: when it is applied to humanity, this sense is modified to 
become about conscious appreciation of placement.    
 As noted above, there has been a terminological dispute between Morris and 
Bynum over the relative appropriateness of “individual” and “self” as labels for how 
medieval people experienced and understood themselves and other people.  The 
outcome of this dispute is inconclusive and, at any rate, it does not seem to have 
achieved any lasting impact.  Self has generally been more popular among 
Anglophone medievalists in recent years.  However, I cannot find any widespread 
hesitation in the use of the term, individual, in recent Anglophone medieval studies 
and certainly in French scholarship, ‹‹l’individu›› is in general use.75  As Morris 
points out in his reply to Bynum’s 1980 article, when it comes to the problems raised 
by applying modern terms to premodern contexts, self is no less problematic than 
individual.76  To be sure, Bynum did claim in her 1980 article that self is equivalent to 
the Latin word, seipsum.77  But this seems to me the weakest point in her argument.  
“Self” (according to modern English usage of that word) cannot just be a direct 
equivalent of Latin for many reasons.  Although self and seipsum share the same root, 
they come from two appreciably different languages and do not share precisely the 
same conditions of use or semantic histories.  However much the meanings and 
                                                 
74 For a pessimistic discussion of the issues raised by the notions of subjectivity and objectivity for 
analytical philosophy see T. Nagel, The View From Nowhere (Oxford, 1986).  
75 As far as I am aware, Bynum is the only Anglophone medievalist to have raised serious objections in 
print to the suitability of “individual” as a means of describing certain aspects of the lives and existence 
of medieval people.  “Individual” was used by Aers in the title of his book, Community, Gender, and 
Individual Identity.  Partner discusses the notion of individuality without fundamentally objecting to its 
use in medieval studies in ‘The hidden self’, p. 44.  Two distinct aspects of the notion of individuality, 
individuation and individualisation, are explored by the recent French essay collection, L’individu au 
moyen age. 
76 Morris, ‘Individualism in Twelfth-Century Religion’, p. 202. 
77 Bynum, ‘Did the twelfth century discovery the individual?’, p. 4.  
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historic conditions of use of these words overlap, they cannot simply be reduced to 
each other in the way that Bynum suggests.  
Bynum is more successful when focusing on selves or individuals without 
discussing the terminological issues.  As stated previously, her work in Jesus as 
Mother, Holy Feast and Holy Fast, and Fragmentation and Redemption is laudable 
for maintaining a good analytical balance between the self (or individual) and society 
and culture.  At various points in these works Bynum focuses on individual people, 
usually female mystics and ascetics, as situated beings, subject to local and more 
widespread socio-cultural contingencies.  This strategy for approaching medieval 
people avoids the problems inherent in treating them as either atomic units or 
reducing their personal being, in a Marxist fashion, to impersonal socio-cultural 
forces.  In short, it is of utmost importance that a balance is struck between 
acknowledging the personal being of medieval people while also remaining aware of 
the socio-cultural pressures affecting their development, experiences, and behaviour 
as individuals.  As will be seen in the following chapters of this study, I have 
attempted to do this by using neuro- and cognitive science to explore the relationship 
between socio-cultural forces and embodiment.   
Next there is the matter of whether there is currently any room for further 
studies of individuality, the self, or indeed subjectivity, in twelfth-century Western 
Europe.  These areas of debate have been well-serviced over the past few decades.     
In contrast, neuro- and cognitive science have so far attracted only a very small 
amount of attention in medieval studies, although very recently a handful of 
significant studies have been published which will be discussed later in this section.  
In this study I aim to adopt a totally different approach to medieval people, qua 
individuals, selves, or whatever else, to what is currently available in the existing 
literature.  In short, my intention is to explore how medieval people may be 
understood, via linguistic records, as embodied biological beings.  It will be seen in 
the next chapter that a theory described here as the embodied view of the mind is 
crucial to my approach to medieval people.78  I do not intend in this way to reject or 
rebut the discourses on individuality, the self, and subjectivity, highlighted in the 
previous section.  Instead, by avoiding these modes of analysis, I aim to provide fresh 
insights into a well-established area of medieval studies.         
                                                 
78 The embodied view of the mind is discussed in detail in Chapter Two, sec. 2.1.  
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Additionally, as will be discussed further below, I intend to make use of 
neuro- and cognitive science in this study to problematise the distinction between 
biology and culture, widely held, but usually unstated, in western academic discourse.  
This is emphatically not to say that I plan to reduce culture to biology in this study.  
Rather, as will be seen in later chapters, I intend to point out that human biology and 
culture share the same plane of existence and affect each other.79   
 
Several works which explore the utility of recent developments in the modern 
biosciences, including neuro- and cognitive science, to studies of people who lived in 
the remote past have recently been published by medievalists.  First, 2005 saw the 
publication of a collaborative work by the psychiatrist, Jerome Kroll, and historian, 
Bernard Bachrach, The Mystic Mind: The Psychology of Medieval Mystics and 
Ascetics; in 2006 the English professor, Michael Drout, published his book, How 
Tradition Works: A Meme-Based Cultural Poetics of the Anglo-Saxon Tenth Century; 
and in 2008, the historian, Daniel Lord Smail, published On Deep History and the 
Brain.80   
Of these books, Kroll’s and Bachrach’s The Mystic Mind is most directly 
relevant to the main topic of this study.  Kroll and Bachrach make use of 
contemporary medical knowledge, including insights provided by neuroscience, to 
shed light on the behaviour and reported experiences of medieval mystics and 
ascetics.  In several chapters they analyse how ascetic and mystical practices are 
likely to have led to altered states of consciousness and the consequences of this for 
the cultures of asceticism and mysticism in medieval Europe.81   In this way, Kroll 
and Bachrach place a good degree of emphasis on the centrality of the embodied 
conditions of human existence in determining how people experience and respond to 
the world.  In the next chapter it will be seen that I take a similar approach to the 
sample of source texts selected for this study, although not with the specific intention 
                                                 
79 This is a major topic of Part II and, as such, is discussed at various places throughout.  For a brief 
summary of the relevant issues see the introduction and conclusion to Chapter Four.  
80 J. Kroll and B. Bachrach, The Mystic Mind: The Psychology of Medieval Mystics and Ascetics 
(London, 2005), M. D. C. Drout, How Tradition Works: A Meme-Based Cultural Poetics of the Anglo-
Saxon Tenth Century (Tempe Ariz., 2006), and D. L. Smail, On Deep History and the Brain (Berkeley 
Calif., 2008). 
81 These topics and “mysticism and altered states of consciousness” are systematically covered in Part I 
of Kroll and Bachrach, The Mystic Mind, pp. 15-87.  
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of analysing ascetic and mystical practices.82  Rather, as will be made clear in the 
Introduction to Part II, my intention is to make use of neuro- and cognitive science to 
explore how medieval people may be studied as embodied beings, whose mental and 
socio-cultural predispositions may be best understood in relation to the conditions of 
their embodiment. 
In contrast, Drout’s work in How Tradition Works is mostly concerned with an 
area of evolutionary psychology known as “memetics” after the term, meme, coined 
by the biologist, Richard Dawkins, to describe a theoretical unit of information 
equivalent to chemical genes in the respect that they show a tendency to replicate 
through unplanned evolutionary processes.  It should be stressed that memetics is an 
extension of evolutionary biology.  The possibility of memes, as Dawkins originally 
conceived of them, is dependent on there being biologically evolved organisms 
capable of harbouring and replicating them.  Most obviously, human beings are one 
such biologically evolved organism, in relation to which memes are better known as 
“thoughts” and “ideas” (which is emphatically not to say that the memetic 
environment should be limited to humanity).  The brain and connected neural 
circuitry is the material on which memes are instantiated and from which they 
“replicate” themselves (i.e. by predisposing people to behave in ways that are likely to 
lead to them being entertained in other people’s minds).83   
Drout’s work in How Tradition Works is noteworthy because it makes 
considerable use of theories stemming from the modern biosciences, including to 
some extent neuro- and cognitive science, to shed light on cultural developments in 
tenth-century England.  Additionally, although Drout does not make it an explicit 
concern, How Tradition Works draws attention to the difficulties inherent in drawing 
a clear distinction between human biology and culture.84  Although I approach this 
problem from a different angle to Drout, I share in common with him a concern for 
how the biological conditions of human existence influence the development of 
                                                 
82 Asceticism and mysticism is discussed to some extent in this study, especially in relation to The Life 
of Christina of Markyate: in particular see Chapter Four, sec. 4.2.1, pp. 151-4 and Chapter Five, sec. 
5.1.3.  
83 For Dawkins’ original proposal regarding memes see R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 30th 
Anniversary Edition (Oxford, 2006), pp. 189-201.  Drout discusses memetics extensively throughout 
chapters one and two of How Tradition Works.   
84 Perhaps the closest Drout gets to acknowledging this is in asserting the stringent materialism of 
memetics and thus his approach to culture: Drout, ibid., p. 59.  
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society and culture as well as how society and culture influence the development of 
human biology.   
Finally, although Smail is a medievalist, his recent book, On Deep History and 
the Brain, aims to tackle a series of issues raised by the modern biosciences for 
historical scholarship: especially the challenges posed by evolutionary biology to the 
long-standing chronological limits of western academic history-writing and also what 
current medical knowledge about the impact of diet, alcohol, and narcotics on human 
behaviour and development can tell us about the historical development of different 
societies and cultures (Smail christens this area of study “psychotrophic” research).85  
In this way, he places much emphasis on the importance of human biochemistry in 
determining how people react to themselves and their local environments and makes it 
clear that he views the development of this biochemistry through evolutionary 
processes as historical processes in themselves.86  Smail’s work in On Deep History 
and the Brain has no direct bearing on this study since it is mostly intended to address 
the consequences of evolutionary biology for traditional historical narratives of 
“Western Civilisation”.  By contrast, I am mainly interested in this study with the 
application of neuro- and cognitive science to medieval texts.  Nevertheless, the scope 
of On Deep History and the Brain is broad enough to make it valuable as a general 
interest guide to the significance of evolutionary biology and the modern biosciences 
in general for historical scholarship. 
It is noteworthy that the method adopted by Kroll and Bachrach three years 
earlier in The Mystic Mind has much in common with Smail’s proposals in On Deep 
History.  For instance, Kroll and Bachrach discuss how self-imposed dietary 
restrictions are likely to have affected the conscious mental lives of medieval 
ascetics.87  Moreover, as with the work of Kroll and Bachrach and Drout noted above, 
Smail’s argument in On Deep History draws attention to the blurred line separating 
the biological body from culture as these phenomena occur in the world.  In doing so, 
Smail is careful to avoid accusations of “reducing” society and culture to biological 
processes.  Instead he draws attention to ways in which biological and socio-cultural 
processes may be seen to influence each other reciprocally:   
 
                                                 
85 On general method see Smail, On Deep History, pp. 112-56, on pre-history, pp. 12-111 and on 
psychotrophy, pp. 157-89. 
86 Ibid., pp. 112-19.  
87 Kroll and Bachrach, The Mystic Mind, chapter six.  
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[T]he body states generated by activities of the brain and the endocrine, even 
those induced by wiring set in place by culture, normally cannot dictate 
behaviour.  Instead, they provide a backdrop of feelings against which people 
evaluate situations, make decisions, and do things...human behavioural norms, 
suitably internalised, allow one to ignore or override the predispositions one 
may have toward doing things or the emotions experienced while doing 
things.88 
 
It will be seen in the next chapter, as well as over the course of Part II of this study, 
that the reciprocal influence of biology and culture on each other is a major concern 
of this study.  Throughout the following chapters I will draw attention to ways in 
which the representation of various aspects of human existence in the sample of 
source texts may be understood in terms of the interacting influences of human 
biology and socio-cultural pressures on how their respective authors experienced and 
reasoned about the world.  Again, it should be noted that I approach this issue from a 
different theoretical direction to Smail: specifically by focusing on embodied theories 
of the mind and language, as will be discussed in Chapter Two.  Nevertheless, in 
following the course laid out in Chapter Two and the Introduction to Part II, this study 
lends support to the conclusions drawn by Smail in the above citation, as will be seen 
at regular intervals throughout Chapters Three-Five.   
 
1.4: Conclusion 
 
To recap, this chapter has outlined a series of objectives for this study: first, to make 
use of the modern discourses of neuro- and cognitive science to shed light on the 
mental lives of medieval people; second, to problematise the existing discourses on 
individuality, the self, and subjectivity in medieval studies by making use of new 
methods for exploring how medieval people experienced and conceptualised 
themselves, other people, and the world around them; third, to explore the issues 
raised by neuro- and cognitive science for how we relate the phenomena of society 
and culture to the embodied existence of medieval people, specifically by making use 
of the embodied view of the mind (as discussed in the next chapter: see sec. 2.1): and 
                                                 
88 Ibid., p. 116.  
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fourth, to call into question the view, held by some literary critics, that at least during 
the medieval period Latin was intrinsically ill-suited to the purposes of self-
expression.  By tackling these four issues together, the overall aim for this study is 
that it makes an original contribution to a well-established area of medieval studies by 
adopting a heretofore untested approach to the relevant subject matter. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Theory and Method 
 
 
This chapter introduces the body of theoretical literature which informs the discussion 
in the three chapters that follow.  It begins, firstly in sec. 2.1, by focusing on what will 
be described henceforth as the embodied view of the mind, which, in short, is the idea 
that the mind is an ordinary physiological function of the body rather than a discrete 
entity, with special physical properties, which occupies it.  As will be seen in 
subsequent chapters, the embodied view of the mind is crucial to the analysis of the 
sample of source texts in Part II of this study in the respect that it provides a means of 
connecting mental states to the body.  By adopting this understanding of the 
relationship between the mind and body it becomes possible to interpret the contents 
of medieval texts in terms of the physical conditions, embodied and environmental, in 
which they were originally composed.  Thus to this end, sec. 2.1 provides summaries 
of the work and arguments of five scholars, two working in collaboration, in favour of 
the embodied view of the mind, and in one case, a more widely situated view of the 
mind, and its broader significance for how we understand the relationship between the 
body and its effects.  The views of these scholars, among others, form part of the core 
theory of Part II of this study.    
Furthermore, sec. 2.1 of this study makes use of the embodied view of the 
mind to shed light on the beliefs and ideas widely held by medieval Europeans about 
the mind-body relationship.89  The embodied view of the mind is usually taken in 
neuro- and cognitive science as a refutation of older western views on the mind: it is 
generally not seen as a means by which to understand them.  Therefore, a brief 
argument is made at the end of sec. 2.1 in favour of using the materialist 
understanding of the mind provided by neuro- and cognitive science to shed light on 
                                                 
89 It will be seen in Chapter Three of this study that well-educated premodern Europeans from antiquity 
up to the twelfth century typically subscribed to a view of the mind logically opposed to the embodied 
perspective now entertained by the great majority of scholars in cognitive and neuroscience.  Broadly 
speaking, they tended to view the mind and cognition as ontologically discrete phenomena, which 
could become separated from the material body in various circumstances (most usually death).  This is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Three, sec. 3.1.  
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the radically different beliefs and ideas of medieval people towards the same 
phenomenon.   
Sec. 2.2 outlines a core method for examining the sample of source texts, 
which will be maintained throughout Part II of this study.  The method in question is 
based on the theory of metaphor developed collaboratively by the Linguist, George 
Lakoff, and philosopher, Mark Johnson, in their book, Metaphors We Live By (1980).  
Lakoff’s and Johnson’s thesis provides a backbone for the analysis of the source texts 
in Part II, strengthened in places by the work of the scholars discussed in sec. 2.1 and 
other notable contributors to neuro- and cognitive science.  Therefore, the purpose of 
sec. 2.2 is to provide a concise summary of the key aspects of Lakoff’s and Johnson’s 
theory of metaphor (as it will be described henceforth) that are relevant to the analysis 
of the source texts in Part II.   
 In following this course, this chapter gives a summary of the theoretical and 
methodological tools and rationale which drive the approach taken towards the 
sample of source texts in Part II.   
 
2.1:  Modern theories of the embodied mind  
 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson begin their 1999 book, Philosophy in the Flesh, 
with a series of bold claims about the consequences of modern neuroscientific 
research for classical western views of the human mind and reason, among which is 
the following: 
 
Reason is not disembodied...but arises from the nature of our brains, bodies, 
and bodily experience.  This is not just the innocuous and obvious claim that 
we need a body to reason; rather it is the striking claim that the very structure 
of reason itself comes from the details of our embodiment.  The same neural 
and cognitive mechanisms that allow us to perceive and move around also 
create our conceptual systems and modes of reason.  Thus, to understand 
reason we must understand the details of our visual system, our motor system, 
and the general mechanisms of neural binding.  In summary, reason is not, in 
any way, a transcendent feature of the universe or of disembodied mind.  
Instead, it is shaped crucially by the peculiarities of our human bodies, by the 
   
 
38 
 
remarkable details of the neural structure of our brains, and by the specifics of 
our everyday functioning in the world.90 
  
This view of the nature of the mind and cognition is emblematic of a broader trend in 
the western sciences of the mind over the past few decades.  Increasingly, scholars 
active in these fields have rejected classical western views of the mind as something 
ontologically and logically discrete from the body in favour of views which tie it 
inextricably to the body and world.   
 My intention in this section is to give an overview of the embodied view of the 
mind as it has been presented since the nineteen eighties by a number of scholars who 
have contributed to the discourses of neuro- and cognitive science.  Incidentally, it is 
briefly worth explaining why here and elsewhere I refer to the discourses, as opposed 
to disciplines, of neuro- and cognitive science.  Although they are considered discrete 
disciplines within the modern academy, the findings of both since the early twentieth 
century have stimulated much broader discussions on the nature of the phenomena 
they cover.  An upshot of this has been that while the empirical side of these 
disciplines is largely limited to people trained within them, discussion and argument 
about their implications are not.  Scholars from a wide range of academic 
backgrounds have made contributions to debates stimulated by their findings.  In 
particular, philosophers trained in the analytical or Anglo-American tradition have 
played a major role in digesting the findings and significances of neuro- and cognitive 
science for a wider audience (myself included).  Some of the scholars discussed below 
fall into this group: Mark Johnson, Daniel Dennett, and Andy Clark.   
In short, therefore, while it is important to acknowledge neuro- and cognitive 
science as discrete disciplines within the modern western sciences, it is equally 
important to acknowledge the breadth of the debate they have encouraged in other 
areas of the academy, particularly outside of the so-called natural sciences.91 
 As stated above, the embodied view of the mind essentially holds that the 
mind is a normal biological function of the body in the same ways as digestion, blood 
circulation, and so forth.  Put differently, the mind is an outcome of the structural and 
behavioural properties of the chemical components of the human body as they interact 
                                                 
90 G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: the embodied mind and its challenge to western 
thought (New York, 1999), p. 4.  
91 A good discussion of the wider impact of neuroscience, as well as evolutionary biology, is provided 
by Smail in chapter four of On Deep History and the Brain.  
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and respond to each other and the ambient environment.  There is now little doubt 
about this in neuro- and cognitive science.  However, this knowledge still leaves 
plenty of room for debate as regards precisely how the body causes the mind and what 
consequences this has for how we understand phenomena like human psychology, 
mental health and well-being, childhood development, education, and criminality, to 
mention but a few of the relevant issues.  For the purposes of this section, I begin by 
outlining how some scholars have tried to account for the mind in terms of the 
physiology of the body as well as environmental factors (for, as will be seen below, 
the embodied view of the mind invites questions regarding how the environment 
affects the mind via the body).  Following this, I shall explain how these views of the 
mind and body may be used to shed light on the mental lives of people who lived in 
the remote past, specifically via textual analysis.      
 
One of the most widely read accounts of how the mind and, in particular, the facet of 
the mind known as consciousness, may be accounted for in terms of the physiology of 
the human body, as well as external stimuli, has been provided by the philosopher, 
Daniel Dennett, in his book, Consciousness Explained (1991).  Dennett’s principal 
concern in this work is to explain the nature of human consciousness in terms of 
physical biological processes, rather than to make a case, per se, in favour of the 
embodied view of the mind.  Nevertheless, the theory of consciousness he proposes, 
the “multiple drafts theory”, is instructive here because it demonstrates how cognitive 
functions of the mind may be accounted for in terms of physiological states in the 
body, and more specifically, the brain.  As he puts it: 
 
According to the Multiple Drafts Model, all varieties of perception—indeed 
all varieties of thought and mental activity—are accomplished in the brain by 
parallel, multitrack processes of interpretation and elaboration of sensory 
inputs.92  
 
Throughout Consciousness Explained, Dennett situates his thesis in opposition 
to a view of consciousness, and the mind more generally, which he labels the 
“Cartesian theatre”.  This is a variation on so-called “homunculus” views of the mind, 
                                                 
92 D. C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (New York, 1991: repr. London, 1993), p. 111.  
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whereby all streams of conscious awareness are supposed to “come together” at some 
central point in the brain where they are merged into a coherent phenomenology that 
human beings, at least, experience as things like consciousness, the mind, or the self.93  
Using the findings of research in cognitive and neuroscience, Dennett convincingly 
debunks this myth in two stages.  Firstly, he highlights some ways in which the mind 
can be seen to perform “editorial work” on multiple, parallel sensory inputs, the 
outcome of which is the illusion in human phenomenology of a single coherent stream 
of consciousness, when, in fact, in various test conditions, human consciousness can 
be shown to be fragmentary.94  Secondly, he posits an alternative hypothesis on the 
nature of human consciousness, which accounts for its fragmentary nature in terms of 
the physical structure and physiological functions of the human brain.  He summarises 
his thesis thus:      
 
There is no single, definitive “stream of consciousness”, because there is no 
central Headquarters, no Cartesian theatre where it all comes together for the 
perusal of a Central Meaner.  Instead of such a single stream (however wide), 
there are multiple channels in which specialist circuits try, in parallel...to do 
their various things, creating multiple drafts as they go.  Most of these 
fragmentary drafts play short-lived roles in the modulation of current activity 
but some get promoted to further functional roles, in swift succession, by the 
activity of a virtual machine in the brain.  The seriality of this machine...is not 
a “hard-wired” design feature, but rather the upshot of a succession of 
coalitions of these specialists.95  
 
It is important to note that Dennett’s view of consciousness is heavily influenced by 
so-called “connectionism”, whose advocates draw attention to the parallel processing 
structure of organic neuronal tissues.  What this essentially means is that the structure 
of animal brains is such that they are geared towards performing multiple processing 
                                                 
93 The prototype for the Cartesian Theatre is the pineal gland, a small sub-organ of the brain, which was 
proposed as the corporeal location of the mind by the seventeenth-century French philosophy and 
scientist, Descartes (hence the name): for more detail on this see ibid., pp. 101-11.   
94 In particular, see ibid., pp. 115-26.  For more detail on what Dennett means by “editorial work” see 
the passage following the quotation given above: ibid., p. 111.  For an alternative, and more detailed 
account of connectionism see S. Pinker, How the Mind Works (New York, 1997: repr. London, 1998), 
chapter two.  
95 Dennett, Consciousness Explained, pp. 253-4.  
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tasks in tandem, without the need for any central, overseeing circuit into which all 
outcomes of processing tasks must be fed before their significance, such as in the 
form of a bodily output (i.e. behaviour), can be determined.96   
The crucial point for present purposes is that Dennett envisions consciousness, 
and by extension, the mind, as macro-physiological states of the body, brought about, 
mostly in the brain, by the continuous occurrence of micro-physiological states, 
which, importantly, are spatially distributed across the matter of the brain rather than 
concentrated at any one point in it, and thus not centrally directed in quite the way 
that our experiences of consciousness might lead us to believe.  What is of utmost 
significance here is not so much the explanation of consciousness given by Dennett, 
which is still significant, but rather how he does it.  In short, Dennett is able to 
account for higher-order functions of the mind (e.g. memory) in terms of multiple 
microscopic, and spatially distributed, physical processes happening in the brain and 
nervous system (although, as will be seen shortly, chemical triggers and sensory 
inputs arising from the body play indispensible roles in modulating the behaviour of 
the brain and thus how people experience themselves).  The upshot of this is that 
Dennett is able to provide a coherent account of conscious mental states in terms of 
physical processes in the body which in no way relies on the older western view of the 
mind as a disembodied consciousness.  According to Dennett, without the body there 
is no possibility of the mind.     
 
Views on the nature of the mind similar to those of Dennett, although broader in 
scope, have been proposed by the neuroscientist, Antonio Damasio, in his book, 
Descartes’ Error (1994).  Drawing on his clinical experiences of patients who have 
suffered from mental impairments late in life following brain damage, Damasio sets 
out to demonstrate the strength of the relationship between the mind and body, and 
the brain and body.  Moreover, he sees the link between reason and the emotions as 
crucial to his case, and as such rests much on showing how reasoning becomes 
defective in the absence of “emotional” inputs.97  The latter part of his case is based 
on his observations of patients whose brain damage has impaired the capacity of their 
brains to elicit certain emotional responses from stimuli while leaving their ability to 
reason logically about those stimuli fully intact.  Sure enough, Damasio’s research 
                                                 
96 See ibid., chapter nine: Dennett provides some caveats on connectionism at pp. 268-9.  
97 I discuss what Damasio means by “emotions” in the next paragraph.   
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into these patients, as well as other studies he cites, seems to confirm that in the 
absence of emotional inputs, the capacity to reason logically in itself does not produce 
what would be thought of, at least from a modern western perspective, as “rational” 
behaviour.98 
 Importantly, Damasio conceives of the emotions, as opposed to feelings (i.e. 
the qualities of emotions that we consciously experience), as biological dispositions, 
or “values”, formed by a combination of innate and culturally contingent factors, 
which lead us unconsciously to prefer, or consciously feel predisposed toward 
(without necessarily quite knowing why), certain responses to stimuli or situations in 
amongst a cacophony of potential options.  This is to say that at some point in 
reasoning processes intended to facilitate choosing the best response to a stimulus, 
snap decisions eventually need to be made in order to force the subject to produce a 
behavioural response.  According to Damasio’s account, abstract, logical, and 
speculative reasoning about how best to respond to a stimulus could go on forever in 
the absence of some strong disposition, or inclination, to favour a particular response 
among a potentially infinite number of alternative options.  This is the job he ascribes 
to the emotions: feelings, on the other hand, are the part of emotions that we 
sometimes consciously experience.99    
Damasio’s account of the relationships between reason and the emotions on 
the one hand, and the faculties of the mind and the brain and body, on the other, 
which he develops in Descartes’ Error, is highly significant here.  Damasio provides 
convincing evidence in favour of the embodied view of the mind via his own, and 
other researchers’, observations on the effects of brain damage on mature patients.  
The strongest point in favour of this is the fact that specific locations of the brain, 
when damaged, lead to near-uniform impairments in the mental lives of individual 
people.  For instance, Damasio discusses how damage to certain areas of the frontal 
lobes predictably leads to the impairment of long-term decision making, grounded in 
an appreciation of socio-cultural concerns, expectations, and so forth.100  Apart from 
                                                 
98 Damasio builds the case for all this throughout Part 1 of Descartes’ Error (New York, 1994: repr. 
London, 1995): see chapter four for a digested version.  On the matter of rationality, while to be sure, 
what counts as rationality is relative to different individuals and socio-cultural circumstances, it is 
nevertheless an indispensible concept in trying to account for why certain forms of behaviour, to a 
greatly predictable degree, work better than others in a given socio-cultural and environmental context.  
For a discussion of relevant issues see chapter eight, ‘Reason’, in G. E. R. Lloyd, Cognitive Variations: 
Reflections on the Unity and Diversity of the Human Mind (Oxford, 2007).  
99 See Damasio, Descartes’ Error, chapter seven. 
100 See ibid., chapters three and four.  
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showing that specific brain areas uniformly specialise in certain functions, this lends 
weight to Dennett’s view that consciousness and the mind are spatially distributed 
throughout the brain and body, and also that mental states almost certainly are 
supervenient on physiological states occurring in the brain and body: in short, there is 
no need to suppose the presence of a transcendent mind with special physical (or 
metaphysical) properties to account for human cognition.     
But in addition to this, Damasio’s account of the human mind takes into 
account the influence of the general physiology of the human body, both as it 
modulates and responds to its own internal physiology and environment stimuli, on 
the brain and thus mind.  Damasio demonstrates the fallacy of the “embrained” view 
of the mind (i.e. the idea that the brain is the sole cause of the mind), firstly by 
discussing how the brain and body are locked in a chemical feedback-loop, whereby 
the brain produces chemicals (hormones) which cause physiological and chemical 
changes in the body which in turn stimulate and thus modify the physiology and 
chemical balance of hormones in the brain.101  In addition to this, external stimuli 
impacting on the body, such as emotive circumstances, or the ingestion of food with 
whatever chemical properties, may also lead to chemical and physiological changes 
that produce further feedbacks in the body, and so on and so forth.  In short, the body 
and brain, and therefore mind, are inextricably interrelated.102 
Finally, Damasio ties this all up in a concept of the self, which he essentially 
conceives as a continuous online representation that the human organism produces of 
itself on the neural substrate of the brain, to which people have varying degrees of 
conscious and unconscious access (and to which his brain damaged patients, he 
hypothesises, have more limited access).103  So put succinctly, Damasio understands 
the self as a continuously renewed series of physiological representations of oneself, 
to which one has degrees of conscious and unconscious access.  Note this is not unlike 
how Dennett conceives of consciousness.104   
 
                                                 
101 Damasio uses the term “embrained” in ibid., p. 118: this term has recently been reproduced with 
similar intentions by N. Murphy and W. Brown in Did My Neurons Make Me Do It? (Oxford, 2007), p. 
12.  
102 See Damasio, Descartes’ Error, pp. 77-8, 144-5, and 160-1.  
103 Ibid., pp. 236-44.  
104 Note also that Dennett supplies a biological definition of the self in Consciousness Explained: see 
chapter thirteen.  I have not noted this here as it is an evolutionary argument, which does not obviously 
inform my reading of the sample of source texts in Part II.   
   
 
44 
 
The above summaries of aspects of Dennett’s and Damasio’s work provide a sample 
of how scholars active in the discourses of cognitive and neuroscience have been able 
to account for the human mind and cognition, and how people experience and act on 
these things, in terms of biological processes located in the body.  This discussion 
now turns to the work of three scholars who have attempted to draw some wider 
significances from the embodied view of the mind, first for the edifice of western 
philosophy, and second for how we relate the phenomena of culture and society to the 
embodied mind.  
 
Firstly, I return to the book with which this section began: Lakoff’s and Johnson’s 
Philosophy in the Flesh.  Taking the embodied view of the mind as a starting point, as 
well as their earlier work in Metaphors We Live By (which will be discussed later in 
sec. 2.3), Lakoff and Johnson make the bold claim that the findings of neuro- and 
cognitive science undermine the foundations of western philosophy in classical 
metaphysics and assorted disembodied views of the human person, or self, reason, the 
mind, and so forth.  What is of most interest here is what they have to say on how 
reason is grounded in the biological realities of the human body rather than an 
objective, metaphysical reality, independent of human existence or mental states. 
 Lakoff and Johnson begin by asserting that all concepts that human beings are 
capable of entertaining are inherently embodied, which is to say they exist in the body 
rather than the outside world (although, to be sure, they are causally related to 
conditions in the outside world).  To illustrate what they mean by this, consider the 
observations they make on how people experience colours and form concepts from 
those experiences.   
 
We see colour, and yet it is false, as false as another thing we see, the moving 
sun rising past the edge of the stationary earth.  Just as astronomy tells us that 
the earth moves around the sun, not the sun around a stationary earth, so 
cognitive science tells us that colours do not exist in the external world.  
Given the world, our bodies and brains have evolved to create colour. 
 Our experience of colour is created by a combination of four factors: 
wave-lengths of reflected light, lighting conditions, and two aspects of our 
bodies: (1) the three kinds of colour cones in our retinas, which absorb light of 
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long, medium, and short wavelengths, and (2) the complex neural circuitry 
connected to those cones.105  [My stress] 
 
Lakoff and Johnson use this particularly stark example to spell out the much broader 
point that the properties of things in the world are not sufficient to account for the 
qualitative and meaningful experiences that people have of them.  The qualities of 
colour experiences are the results of how the body senses and represents certain kinds 
of stimuli to itself in consciousness: we do not have immediate access to the lighting 
conditions and surface reflectance properties of objects in the world, but rather 
mediated representations of how those things seem to the body by virtue of the 
sensory organs and neurophysiology that allow it to sense and process information 
about those phenomena in the first place.106  
 The most important conclusion which can be drawn from this is that western 
metaphysics, as traditionally conceived from classical antiquity well into modernity, 
functions on a false premise.  In a nutshell, western metaphysics proposes that there is 
a transcendent reality beyond human experience, but to which it is possible to gain 
access via certain forms of “rational” enquiry: most usually involving formal logic.107  
It is not necessarily a recent observation that so-called rational modes of enquiry do 
not grant unmediated or necessarily accurate insights into the nature of the world or a 
proposed transcendent reality: this has been a discernable, albeit marginalised, 
position in western philosophy since the philosophical movement known as the 
Sceptics in classical Greece.108  The novelty of Lakoff’s and Johnson’s position is that 
there is an objective reality to how people experience the world which can be studied, 
but that this is provided by the human body rather than a transcendent nature or 
physics.109      
                                                 
105 Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, p.23.  
106 Lakoff and Johnson discuss these issues at length in ibid., chapter three.  
107 For instance, see ibid., chapter 21 on what the authors see as being “wrong” with current analytical 
philosophy.  It is noteworthy that Lakoff has developed this line of argument further in collaboration 
with the mathematician, Rafael Núñez, by attempting to show how mathematical truisms and concepts 
also derive from people’s embodied experiences of the world rather than a transcendent mathematical 
reality: see G. Lakoff and R. E. Núñez, Where Mathematics Comes From: how the embodied mind 
brings mathematics into being (New York, 2000).  
108 For a classic discussion of this group, see E. R. Bevan, Stocis and Sceptics (orig. Oxford, 1913: repr. 
New York, 1979), pp. 121-52.  
109 Of course, the words nature and physic have a shared etymology: however, there is a distinction 
difference between their meanings in modern English, as I use them here.     
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 In Philosophy in the Flesh, Lakoff and Johnson do not really deal with the 
significance of their view of the embodied mind for how we understand the 
phenomena of culture and society.110  This is perhaps understandable as their chief 
concern is with debunking what they see as some cherished fallacies of the whole 
tradition of western philosophy.  But all the same, this seems a noteworthy omission 
from their account of embodied cognition in Philosophy in the Flesh.  By contrast, as 
will be seen below, their theory of metaphor weaves a much more complex account of 
how embodied cognition sits in relation to socio-cultural knowledge and practices.  
For present purposes, Lakoff’s and Johnson’s thesis in Philosophy in the Flesh raises 
important questions, not only about many long-standing assumptions of western 
philosophy, but also about the relationship between human mental life and the outside 
world.  If human concepts and modes of reasoning are expressions of the limited 
capacity of the body to process information about the world, this still leaves open the 
matter of how exactly the phenomena of culture and society influence the meanings or 
symbolic values that people draw from their embodied experiences of the world.  
Lakoff’s and Johnson’s theory of the mind hints at the possibility of a biologically-
informed, cultural theory, which is able to account for variations in how people in 
different cultures and societies experience and understand the world arise from 
matching variations in their embodied experiences of the world.   
In short, there is space within all this, and other embodied theories of the 
mind, to develop embodied accounts of culture and society, which in no way seek to 
reduce these phenomena to innate biological drives and instincts, but rather seek to 
account for them in terms of variations in bodily experience.  Perhaps, for instance, 
when a human body develops in a specific socio-cultural environment, it may lock 
into a positive feedback-loop with that environment.  In this way, embodied 
experiences of the socio-cultural environment may elicit positive feedbacks, which is 
to say mental states and behaviours, which help to reinforce aspects of the socio-
cultural environment as it stands in the world.  This could help to explain the relative 
success of different socio-cultural environments.  The germ of such a theory seems 
already to be present in the area of evolutionary biology known as memetics.111  In 
                                                 
110 That is, beyond some brief statements to the effect that human biology guarantees that certain 
aspects of human culture and society (e.g. the necessity of their being some kind of verbal, spoken 
language) are universal: for instance, see Philosophy in the Flesh, p. 462.  
111 This idea was first articulated, famously, by the ethologist, Richard Dawkins in his now classic 
work The Selfish Gene: see chapter eleven.  As discussed in Chapter One, the English professor, 
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this way and others, it is possible to develop biologically-informed theories of culture 
and society which resort to neither crude forms of biological determinism nor extreme 
cultural relativism, instead presenting a plausible “third way”.   
  
Finally, I turn to the work of the philosopher Andy Clark.  Drawing attention to the 
ways in which humans structure their local environments either deliberately to meet 
their needs and desires, or by accident, Clark has pointed out that they create “cultural 
resources” as a result of such activities.  He gives a variety of examples to illustrate 
this point.  For instance, he refers to Alzheimer’s patients who lead relatively normal 
lives by placing physical reminders around their homes, such as written notices or 
strategically placed objects, in order to jog their memories.112  He also points out that 
the world may be used to enhance the computational abilities of a healthy mind.  For 
example, the burden placed on the biological mind by complex mathematical 
problems can be lessened by using a pen and paper as an external memory device to 
store the results of intermediate calculations and thus in a sense enhancing the human 
capacity to perform complex numerological calculations. 113   For Clark, these 
examples illustrate how the world, mutandis mutatis, can be used as a form of external 
memory to compensate for the failures or limitations of biological memory.114   
As Clark explains: 
 
Our cleverness shows itself in our ability to actively structure and operate 
upon our environment so as to simplify our problem-solving tasks.  This active 
structuring and exploitation extends from the simple use of spatial 
arrangements, through the use of specific transformations…all the way to the 
production of explicit written plans that allow easy reordering and shifting 
focus of attention.  These latter cases involve the use of the special class of 
external structures that constitute maps, codes, languages, and symbols.115   
[My stress] 
                                                                                                                                            
Michael Drout, has recently attempted to apply the theory of memetics to tenth-century Anglo-Saxon 
culture in How Tradition Works.  
112 Ibid., p. 66.  This example is explored further in the article, A. Clark and D. Chalmers, ‘The 
Extended Mind’ in Analysis, 58: 1 (1998), pp. 7-19.  
113 A. Clark, Being There: putting brain, body, and world together again (Cambridge Mass., 1997), pp. 
60-1.  
114 Ibid., pp. 63-7.  
115 Ibid., p. 67.  
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That is, he literally sees cultural resources (the “external structures” noted above) as 
augmentations to the biological intellect, in the sense that they support or enhance 
biological cognition (or, in his terms, they act as “props” or “scaffolding”).116   
Clark has labelled his views on the relationship between the human mind and 
the environment as “the extended-mind theory”, and he often speaks of cognition as 
being “extended” or “leaking” out of the body.117  It should be noted that he opposes 
this to what he sees as the more traditional, western view of the mind in the modern 
biosciences as being either brain-bound or, at most, confined to the limits of the 
biological body.  Although Clark’s contention that the mind extends beyond the body 
has stirred some controversy in cognitive science and analytical philosophy (the 
extended-mind theory is by no means generally accepted), his work nonetheless 
makes the instructive point that the relationship between the mind, body, and culture 
is continuous and fluid.118   
Clark’s account of the mind presents yet further opportunities for a 
biologically-informed understanding of culture and society by allowing for a complex 
interweaving of cause and effect between the mind, body, and a wide range of highly 
contingent environmental and socio-cultural conditions.  In bringing human biology 
into a causal account of the formation of culture and society, Clark does not in any 
way rely on crude forms of biological determinism to account for the relationship 
between these phenomena.  Rather, what his work highlights is that the human body 
and socio-cultural phenomena are in a cause-effect feedback-loop with one another, 
and that as such, an account of one cannot be in any way complete if it excludes the 
other.119     
                                                 
116 Ibid., pp. 45-7 and 53.  
117 Clark most explicitly uses this phrase in Clark and Chalmers, ‘The Extended Mind’.  
118 Clark answers numerous objections to the extended-mind theory in chapter five of A. Clark, 
Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension (Oxford, 2008).  
119 Particularly important in this regard is Clark’s illustration of an “emergent phenomenon” in terms of 
the formation of a termite colony in Being There, pp. 75-6.  The point in this is that by acting on a 
combination of basic biological drives and changes made to the environment by the activity of the 
termite colony as a whole, individual termites contribute towards the creation of a complex of socio-
cultural environment.  This environment is not foreseen by any particular termite and thus planned for.  
It is rather the net product of the behaviour of the termite colony as a whole (i.e. it is an emergent 
phenomenon).  Crucially, it is not just the biological drives of the termites that create the colony: the 
gradual build up of an environment created by the biologically determined behaviour of the termites 
has feedbacks for the subsequent behaviour of the termites so that the environment ends up modifying 
the basic biological behaviour.  This relatively simple illustration helps to give some idea of how the 
far more complex phenomena of human culture and society may come about through a combination of 
basic biological drives and the emergent phenomena that come about from individual behaviour.      
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 Historians have to some extent noticed the apparent continuity between 
biological cognition and cultural resources.  For example, Michael Clanchy has 
pointed out that official record-keeping in medieval England developed partly as a 
response to the need to preserve biological memories in more robust and reliable 
forms.120  Similarly, Elisabeth van Houts has highlighted a number of ways in which 
medieval communities preserved biological memories, including the use of written 
chronicles or annals, physical objects (or “heirlooms”), which, in her terms, could act 
as “pegs” for memories, and oral tradition (again, an example of biological 
memory).121  Clark’s work both validates these approaches to cultural resources and 
their social significances in medieval Europe, and indeed, strongly suggests that they 
should be taken further according to a biologically-informed theory of culture, such as 
was suggested above.    
 
Over the past few decades, neuro- and cognitive science have provided compelling 
evidence showing the impact of the general physiology of the body on the mind.  It 
now seems beyond doubt that mental states are in fact particular kinds of 
physiological states.  The work surveyed in this section provides an overview, by no 
means comprehensive, of the literature and discourse of neuro- and cognitive science 
relevant for the purposes of this study.  Taken together as a body of knowledge and 
argument, it offers a core understanding of how the mind may be understood as a 
function of the body necessary for the purposes of this study.  I shall expand on this 
shortly in sec. 2.2 by outlining a more focused method for applying the embodied 
view of the mind to language.   
Meanwhile, it is important to note that the embodied view of mind sits in 
radical contrast to an older set of beliefs and ideas about the nature of human 
existence in mainstream western thought.  This set of beliefs and ideas is most 
commonly described in current Anglophone academic discourse as soul- or mind-
body dualism (i.e. the idea that individual human beings consist of two core 
components: a material body and a cognitive agent, the latter of which may transcend 
the material conditions of the existence of the body), although this is not always an 
                                                 
120 This is a major concern for Clanchy in his From Memory Written Record: England 1066-1307 
(London, 1979).  As he states: ‘[B]y Edward I’s reign, the king’s attorneys were arguing in many quo 
warranto prosecutions against the magnates that the only sufficient warrant for a privilege was a 
written one and that in the form of a specific statement in a charter.  Memory, whether individual or 
collective, if unsupported by clear written evidence, was ruled out of court’ (ibid., p. 3).  
121 Van Houts, Memory and Gender in Medieval Europe, pp. 93-120.   
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accurate label for what it is supposed to represent.  For the immediate purposes of this 
section, soul-body dualism will be left to stand.  However, as will be noted in Chapter 
Three, it is also common to find triadic versions of this theory in western thought (i.e. 
that human beings consist of a material body, cognitive agent or “the mind”, and a 
life-force, usually “spirit” or “soul”).122   
As noted previously, the purpose of this chapter is to explain how the 
embodied view of the mind will be used in this study to shed light on the older 
western view of the mind and human life.  Importantly, this involves putting the 
embodied view of mind to work on a problem that it was not meant to solve: 
explaining the sense of mind-body dualism in terms of the inherently embodied nature 
of the mind.  Ostensibly this may seem somewhat paradoxical since the embodied 
view of the mind has been taken in the sciences as a refutation of mind-body dualism 
in all its forms.  The embodied view of the mind clearly leaves the prior tradition of 
western thought on the mind looking highly doubtful. 123   However, it also 
problematises the prior tradition in another way, specifically by raising questions 
about how such a set of beliefs and ideas could arise in the first place.  If, as the 
embodied view of the mind proposes, all cognition is embodied, then how could 
people come to the view, on the basis of embodied experiences, that the mind is 
inherently disembodied?    
This is a crucial question to which I shall provide some answers over the 
course of Part II of this study in terms of embodiment: especially in Chapter Three, 
sec. 3.3.  I shall do this by following Lakoff’s and Johnson’s argument, in Metaphors 
We Live By, that people develop beliefs, ideas, and modes of abstract reasoning in 
response to their embodied, or sensorimotor, experiences of the world.124  This is not 
to say that each person in the premodern west experienced the world in such a manner 
that they could only understand the mind and human existence in terms of ideas like 
                                                 
122 I particularly have in mind here triadic views of the nature of human existence which have been 
present in western thought and psychology since at least the earliest Greek writers and philosophers.  
This, among other things, is discussed at length in sec. 3.1.1 of the next chapter.   
123 A classic English-language refutation of mind-body dualism in Anglo-American philosophy is 
Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of the Mind (London, 1949).  It has since become a fairly standard point in 
works on the mind and cognition to offer some kind of refutation of mind-body dualism (typically 
Cartesian “substance dualism”, according to which the whole of existence is supposed to be divided 
into two kinds of substance, res extensa and res cogitans).  For example, see Dennett, Consciousness 
Explained, J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge Mass., 1992), pp. 13-18, Lakoff and 
Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, pp. 16-17 and 400-4 and Murphy and Brown, Did My Neurons Make 
Me Do It?, pp. 15-41.  For a more cautious attitude to mind-body dualism see P. S. Churchland and T. 
J. Sejnowski, The Computational Brain (Cambridge Mass., 1992), pp. 1-2.   
124 This is explained in more detail in the following section.  
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soul- or mind-body dualism.  Socio-cultural predispositions towards belief in such 
ideas undoubtedly played a powerful role in conditioning how medieval Europeans 
thought about the mind and human existence.  As will be seen in the next chapter, by 
the twelfth century, the transcendent nature of the mind and soul had already been 
firmly established in learned western thought for well over a millennium.  I cannot 
say in this study when these ideas originally became established in western thought, 
nor in response to what embodied experiences.  What I will argue, however, is that 
they remained well-established throughout the medieval period because they made a 
certain amounted of embodied sense, which is to say, in certain respects they must 
have accorded with how medieval people experienced the world as inherently 
embodied beings.   
The embodied approach taken in this study towards the mental lives and 
phenomenology of medieval people is not wholly novel.  Certainly, some 
medievalists have argued that the mystical or supernatural experiences and beliefs that 
are reported of, or by, medieval people were in fact responses to the worldly 
conditions in which they lived as embodied beings.125  In this respect, the stance 
adopted here sits firmly within this tradition, although it is informed by a linguistic 
method, which, as far as I am aware, has not explicitly influenced the course of 
previous studies about the mental lives of medieval people.  
 
2.2: Lakoff’s and Johnson’s theory of metaphor 
   
As noted previously, the core method adopted throughout Part II of this study is based 
on Lakoff’s and Johnson’s theory of metaphor.  They developed this in their first co-
authored book, Metaphors We Live By, the main contention of which is that metaphor 
is a necessary aspect of human reason, determined largely by people’s embodied or 
sensorimotor experiences of the world: this is as opposed to the view that metaphor is 
optional, aesthetic, and “merely linguistic” (to use their phrase).126  Therefore, it is 
their view that the conceptual systems that guide human reason in different cultures 
and societies are inherently metaphorical by virtue of the embodied conditions of 
human existence and, moreover, that this is reflected in the metaphors that pervade 
                                                 
125 For instance, see Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast and Kroll and Bachrach, The Mystic Mind.   
126 G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago, 1980), pp. 145-6.  For more on this see 
sec. 2.2.4 below.  
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the everyday language of those cultures and societies.  Hence they argue that the 
metaphorical aspects of everyday language offer important insights into the latent 
structures of human reason.127    
 
2.2.1: Conceptual systems and types of metaphor 
 
An important element of Lakoff and Johnson’s theory is the supposition that 
metaphors cluster together in people’s minds to form conceptual systems which in 
turn underpin the worldviews that they variously entertain.128  They define metaphors 
which exist inside conceptual systems as “conventional” metaphors and those that do 
not as “new” metaphors.  However, this distinction is not absolute in that new 
metaphors may be appropriated into conceptual systems through acceptance and use 
and conventional metaphors may likewise fall out of use in conceptual systems.  
However, the most basic kinds of metaphor (i.e. those most closely tied to the 
conditions of human embodiment and the local environment) are most stable as 
conventional metaphors or even irrevocably so because they are so tightly bound to 
the given biological and environmental conditions that determine how people 
experience the world.  Furthermore, they argue that conceptual systems are 
necessarily prejudicial or discriminatory in that they will be more “accepting” (so to 
speak) of metaphors that logically conform to those already bound-up in them and 
less so to those that either show no logical affinity to, or clash with, them.  For 
instance, if a conceptual system already contains metaphors that associate up with 
good, metaphors outside the system which conform to this worldview are more likely 
to be appropriated into it.  By contrast, the system will be actively prejudicial to 
metaphors that associate up with bad.129   
Lakoff and Johnson identify three main kinds of basic metaphor: structural, 
which impose structures on things (e.g. arguments are like war, theories are like 
buildings); orientational, which impose orientation on things (e.g. more is up, sadness 
is down, the cliff-face); and ontological, whereby things are construed as discrete 
                                                 
127 Giles Constable has recently written on metaphors in medieval Latin (more on this shortly in sec. 
2.2.6).  He mentions Lakoff’s and Johnson’s work, but does not explore it in any detail: see G. 
Constable, ‘Medieval Latin Metaphors’ in Viator, 38: 2 (2007), pp. 1-20.  
128 Lakoff’s and Johnson’s views on the extent to which metaphors “construct” people’s experiences of 
are discussed in sec. 2.2.4 below.  
129 For more on this see sec. 2.2.2 below: for direct reference see Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We 
Live By, chapters 9-11.   
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physical objects, substances, or containers with clearly defined boundaries (e.g. the 
cloud is shaped like a house, the French-German border, in the forest).130  The basic 
aspects of these metaphors are determined by conditions in the world, including those 
given by the human body.  For example, given the approximately “flat” surface of the 
earth and the form of the body, people typically walk forward with an upright posture.  
Hence, according to Lakoff’s and Johnson’s argument, these “worldly” conditions 
provide the basis for metaphorical reasoning and, more specifically in this case, 
orientational metaphors.  In this way, the orientational metaphors, up is good and 
down is bad, could be related to people’s experiences of the upright posture of their 
bodies: in anticipation of the following chapters, perhaps this is because the sense 
organs are mostly concentrated in the head, thus making people more sympathetic to 
the highest point of the body, and thus relatively less so to the lower areas.131  Or 
similarly, forward is the future and backward is the past could arise as responses to 
the forward-facing movements of the body (maybe because the body typically faces 
where it will go while its back is turned on where it has been).   
Importantly, many, if not most, instances of these basic metaphors would not 
be viewed as metaphorical in any ordinary sense.  For instance, none of the following 
statements would be considered metaphorical in everyday language:  
 
1. I am feeling down.  
 
2. The cliff faces northwest.  
 
3. The lake is in the forest. 
 
4. That cloud is changing shape.  
 
5. That man is stick-thin.   
 
But all, in different senses, count as metaphors according to Lakoff’s and Johnson’s 
theory because they impose properties like structure (2, 3, 4, 5), orientation (1, 2), and 
substance (2, 3, 4, 5) on things in the world.  That is, they provide understanding of 
                                                 
130 Ibid., chapters 2, 4, and 6 respectively.  
131 For more on this see Chapter Four, sec. 4.3.  
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one thing by reference to another.  And moreover, it is from these kinds of basic 
metaphor that more complex and socio-culturally determined metaphors are 
constructed.  This, in turn, draws attention to an important aspect of Lakoff’s and 
Johnson’s theory, which is of utmost importance in the subsequent chapters of this 
study: namely, the human tendency to view the world as a logically structured 
place.132   
Throughout Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson draw attention to the 
ways in which the human mind imposes structures on the world.  Most obviously, 
these structures are geographical (e.g. land, sea, sky, mountains, hills, rivers), 
ecological (e.g. forests, jungles, deserts, cities, fields), biological (e.g. animals, birds, 
fish, plants), and socio-cultural (e.g. communities, languages, cultures, societies).  We 
view these things as either cohering substances (e.g. land, sea, sky), categories, which 
are coherent according to set criteria (e.g. animals, birds, fish, and plants), or super-
structures, involving the interactions of multiple components (e.g. communities, 
languages, cultures).  And additionally, we may infer from these things further 
substances, categories, or structures which are not immediately available to our senses 
and even imaginary (e.g. heaven, hell, an immaterial soul, spirit, or “fifth 
element”).133  Indeed, it will be argued below that structure is a highly important, if 
not crucial, aspect to how the authors of the sampled source texts understood the 
nature of human existence. 
 
2.2.2: Entailments and partial coherence among metaphors  
 
Lakoff and Johnson also point out that metaphors have entailments which logically 
follow from them.  For instance, to use their example, love is a collaborative work of 
art, the following entailments logically follow: love is work, love is active, and love 
involves shared responsibility.134  These entailments may be metaphors, as in the first 
two examples, or not, as in the last.  Moreover, entailments will almost invariably 
have further entailments which logically follow and so on.  Accordingly, conceptual 
                                                 
132 Cf. with Mary Douglas’ take on the human tendency to organise the world in Purity and Danger 
(orig. London, 1966: repr. 2002), pp. 2-3 and 45-50.   
133 Chapter Three is most specifically concerned with these issues: in particular, see sec. 3.1.   
134 The examples given in the text have been taken from Lakoff’s and Johnson’s list of twenty five 
possible entailments to the love is a collaborative work of art metaphor: see Lakoff and Johnson, 
Metaphors We Live By, p. 140.  
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systems will at least be partly structured by the coherent networks of entailments that 
follow from the metaphors that they accommodate and so forth.  However, by the 
same token, metaphors invariably highlight certain aspects of our experiences while 
concealing, or even suppressing others.  Hence metaphors and their entailments are 
only ever partially coherent among each other. 135   For example, love is a 
collaborative work of art highlights aspects of love that are active or involve joint 
responsibility, suppresses passive or individualistic aspects of love, and conceals 
alternative views of love, such as love is blind which presents a very different view of 
love.136  This, in turn, brings us back to the earlier point that conceptual systems are 
necessarily exclusive.137 
 None of this is to say that networks of entailments are static.  The meanings of 
words invariably shift over time, and some words fall out of use while others, 
“neologisms”, are coined in a variety of socio-cultural contexts.  Networks of 
entailments can be expected to shift and become reconfigured with the meanings of 
specific words.  Moreover, a minor semantic shift in the meaning of one word may 
conceivably have a ripple effect on the network of entailments to which it is 
connected, thereby bringing about much wider changes in its associated conceptual 
system.  The range of possibilities for shift and change within networks of entailments 
and thus conceptual systems is vast.  However, it should still be stressed that perhaps 
what is most remarkable about these phenomena is not that they change over time, 
which is invariably the case, but rather that they change so little and slowly.  
Conceptual systems and networks of entailments may change, but almost always only 
gradually, because systems and networks, qua systems and networks, also have a 
stabilising effect on the relationships between their components.    
 
2.2.3: Metonymy and synecdoche 
 
In addition to metaphor, Lakoff and Johnson discuss the importance of metonymy and 
synecdoche to human reason in Metaphors We Live By.  Although they note that these 
are significantly different processes to metaphor in that they perform a largely 
representative function (i.e. the part for the whole) whereas metaphor conceptualises 
                                                 
135 Ibid., chapters 9-11.  
136 Ibid., pp. 140-1.  
137 Noted in sec. 2.2.1 above.  
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one thing in terms of another, they highlight similarities in how they impose 
understanding on the world.  To use their example, the metonymic statement, we need 
some good heads on the project, provides understanding by exaggerating an aspect of 
the thing that is being referred to by the metonymy (viz. people).  Hence, in this case, 
good heads is not merely intended to represent people in general.  It is also intended 
to highlight intelligence as an aspect or capability of people.  Thus, because in modern 
western culture, intelligence tends to be associated with the head, using the head to 
represent people in their entirety has the function of exaggerating intelligence as an 
aspect of the being of those people.138  Moreover, it connotes, or has the entailment, 
that intelligence is a greater aspect of some people than of others in that there are 
presumably also people who are “bad heads”, and hence would be less desirable to 
have on the project.139   
Therefore, metonymy and synecdoche can be seen to provide understanding in 
a manner similar to metaphor in that they highlight certain aspects of something 
which in turn can be expected to conceal others and suppress still others (in the 
manner described in the previous section).  And moreover, they have entailments in 
that they have different connotations depending on which aspect of their subject they 
highlight (as was also described above).  This can also be related to Andy Clark’s 
observation that language tends to ‘reduce the descriptive complexity of the 
environment’, which is to say language tends to focus on the most prominent aspects 
of the environment.140  Clark relates this to research on human spatial perception 
which suggests that people tend to reason and interact with the environment in ways 
that reduce its complexity for their purposes (e.g. it is easier to count a large quantity 
of eggs if they are arranged into half dozens rather than a single continuous quantity).  
He draws a strong parallel between these two aspects of human reasoning, arguing 
that they mutually reinforce each other in that both involve focusing on salient 
features of the world as we experience it (and when possible, manipulating the world 
to provide them).141   
                                                 
138 However, it will be seen in Chapter Four that this is not the only view of the relationship between 
the human body and intelligence in western culture: although intelligence or reason was typically 
associated with the head in western medieval thought, there was also a tendency, as indeed there still is, 
at least in figurative terms, to associate certain mental faculties with the heart.  This issue is explored in 
detail in sec. 4.3.   
139 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, chapter 8.  
140 Clark, Supersizing the Mind, p. 65.  
141 Ibid., pp. 64-65.  
   
 
57 
 
 
2.2.4: Living by metaphors 
 
Finally, it is worth drawing attention to perhaps the largest claim made by Lakoff and 
Johnson in Metaphors We Live By: 
 
The idea that metaphors can create realities goes against most traditional 
views of metaphor.  The reason is that metaphor has traditionally been viewed 
as a matter of mere language rather than primarily as a means of structuring 
our conceptual system and the kinds of everyday activities we perform.  It is 
reasonable enough to assume that words alone don’t change reality.  But 
changes in our conceptual system do change what is real for us and affect how 
we perceive the world and act upon those perceptions.142 
 
This should be related back to the opening passages of this discussion, where, firstly, 
it was noted that Lakoff and Johnson view metaphor as a necessary aspect of human 
reason, and secondly, that they consider sensorimotor experience to be a key influence 
on metaphorical reasoning.143  For present purposes, the above quotation shows how 
they take these points further, arguing that the metaphorical attitudes that people 
develop or adopt towards the world (i.e. “by which they live”) alter their perception of 
the world to the extent that they can affect how they behave.  As they put it: 
 
We see this as…the power of metaphor to create a reality rather than simply to 
give us a way of conceptualising a preexisting reality.144 
 
Therefore, the key point here is that the metaphorical attitudes that people develop 
towards the world are real enough for them to guide how they perceive it and behave 
in it.  This casts metaphorical reasoning in a feedback-loop with the world, whereby 
the given conditions of the world influence the metaphorical attitudes that people 
develop towards it, which, in turn, influence how they act in it (including how they 
                                                 
142 Ibid., pp. 145-6.  
143 Also see the discussion of Lakoff’s and Johnson’s later work in sec. 2.1, pp. 44-6 above.  
144 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, p. 144 (this quotation originally refers back to a given 
example hence the ellipsis represents ‘a clear case’). 
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manipulate it).  Furthermore, this view of metaphor allows for a complex reciprocal 
relationship between the mind, body, and culture since by this account culturally 
contingent adaptations of the environment may influence metaphorical reasoning 
(which is earthed in the biological body).  This point dovetails with the main concern 
of Part II of this study: namely how the representation of human existence in the 
sample of source texts can be seen to reflect the entwined and reciprocal influences of 
mind, body, and culture.145         
 
2.2.5: How does Lakoff’s and Johnson’s work compare with medieval 
theories of metaphor? 
 
Medieval scholars inherited entrenched views on metaphors [metaphora] and 
linguistic tropes and figures in general from classical grammarians.  Metaphor was 
understood according to this tradition in two related ways.  Firstly, it was seen as a 
process of deliberately distorting the meanings of words for rhetorical and stylistic 
ends, and secondly, as a transference [translatio] of words from a significance (or 
meaning) that is intrinsic to them to a likeness [similitudo] that is not.  This view of 
metaphor was widely known to medieval scholars, not least thanks to the Ars Maior 
of the fourth-century Roman Grammarian, Donatus, and later texts in which Donatus’ 
views were repeated. 146 Furthermore, many medieval scholars would likely have been 
aware of Donatus’ claim that metaphor proceeds in four distinct ways:  
 
Metaphor is a transferring of things and words.  This occurs in four ways: 
from animate to animate, from inanimate to inanimate, from animate to 
inanimate from inanimate to animate.147  
 
This is to say, metaphors work either by transferring qualities of one living thing to 
another, one lifeless thing to another, or from a living thing to a lifeless thing and a 
lifeless thing to a living thing. I shall briefly discuss this with reference to some 
                                                 
145 For more detail on the aims of Part II see the Introduction to P art II, pp. 63-5. 
146 For a discussion of this see Medieval Grammar and Rhetoric: Language Arts and Literary Theory 
AD 300-1475, ed. R. Copeland and I. Sluiter (Oxford, 2009), pp. 28-38.   
147 Quoted in ibid., p. 29.  This is repeated, almost verbatim, by Isidore of Seville in Etymologiae, i: 37 
(2-4): note bibliographical details of the Latin and English editions of this text cited throughout this 
study are provided in the list of abbreviations.     
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examples of these four types of metaphor given by Isidore of Seville in his 
Etymologiae as they highlight some important differences between premodern and 
modern understandings of metaphor.   
Thus, Isidore provides the follow examples and explanations: 
 
 [F]rom animate [animalis] to animate, as: 
   
  He mounted winged horses; 
  
speaking metaphorically [metaphorice loquens] it associates [misceo] the 
wings of a bird with a quadruped...From the inanimate [inanimalis] to the 
inanimate, as: 
 
 The pine-wood plows [sic.] the sea, the lofty keel cuts a furrow; 
 
this associates the use of land with water, since plowing [sic.] and cutting a 
furrow have to do with land, not the sea.  From inanimate to animate, as 
“blooming youth”; this associates inanimate flowers with youth, which is 
living.  From animate to inanimate, as: 
 
You, father Neptune, whose white temples, wreathed with crashing 
brine, resound; to whom the great Ocean flows forth as your eternal 
beard, and in whose hair rivers wander.  
 
For ‘beard’, ‘temples’, and ‘hair’ pertain not to the Ocean but to men.148      
 
The key thing to notice here is that Isidore only stresses transference of meaning: not 
the understanding that metaphors provide of the object onto which the transference 
has been projected, nor indeed of the transferred subject.  It is also noteworthy that 
rather than “associate”, as in the translation, Isidore uses the verb “to mix” [misceo] to 
describe the nature of a metaphorical relationship: hence the process he describes is 
more circumscribed than Barney and his collaborators’ translation suggests.  Mixing 
                                                 
148 Isidore, Etymologiae, i: 37 (2-4).  
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two things together, as in a “winged horse”, is a more discrete process than 
association, which tends to suggest greater fluidity and less containment.  Indeed, by 
Isidore’s standards the mixing of two ideas, via verbal signifiers, seems to have been 
sufficient to constitute a metaphor.  This does not necessarily follow in modern 
theories of metaphor.  By current standards, the idea of a winged horse is not 
necessarily in itself a metaphor: it is only a metaphor if it has some symbolic value or 
meaning beyond what it immediately represents (e.g. the wings represent the 
swiftness of horses).   
Premodern theories of metaphor stand in stark contrast to Lakoff’s and 
Johnson’s modern equivalent.  Lakoff and Johnson place utmost emphasis on the 
understanding that metaphor provides both of its parts (i.e. the “vehicle”) and the idea 
or thing it is supposed represent (“tenor”).  By contrast, Isidore has almost nothing to 
say about the understanding provided by metaphors.  This is surely not surprising, for 
as noted earlier, classical grammarians tended to view metaphor as a perversion of 
language (i.e. solecism).  It was typically considered an ornamental or stylistic device, 
useful to rhetoricians and poets, but also suspicious because, as a perversion of 
language, it could be used for the ends of concealment or evasion.149  This is not to 
say that metaphor was necessarily viewed in a negative light in medieval intellectual 
life.  It was certainly put to positive ends in biblical exegesis as an aspect of one of the 
four methods for reading the Bible, namely allegory, and it was also recommended in 
manuals on creative writing.150  But all the same, premodern theories of metaphor 
construed it chiefly as a stylistic perversion of language, not as a means of providing 
understanding.  
 Therefore, the most important point to take away from this is that Lakoff’s and 
Johnson’s theory of metaphor stands in diametric opposition to medieval theories of 
metaphor in two key ways: first, for Lakoff and Johnson metaphor is a necessary 
rather than optional part of human language (or rather, cognition, hence its 
prominence in language); second, metaphor provides understanding, not concealment 
                                                 
149 For an instructive medieval guide on how to add ornamentation, including metaphor, to texts, see 
the extract from Geoffrey of Vinsauf’s Poetria Nova, ed. & trans. Copeland and Sluiter in Medieval 
Grammar and Rhetoric, pp. 602-6.  Suspicion about highly ornamented language was common in the 
medieval west, often because of its associations with pagan writers.  For example, Guibert of Nogent, 
one of the subjects of this study, describes how he was led astray as a young adult by the subversive 
pleasures of classical pagan poetry in De Vita Sua, i: 17.    
150 On exegesis see B. Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages (Oxford, 1952), pp. 26-36: 
also see the previous note for a positive medieval guide to adding metaphor to language.   
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or obfuscation, of whatever it is putatively about and often also of its parts; if it does 
not achieve such ends then it is either not a metaphor or, in a utilitarian sense, a “bad” 
metaphor.  In this way, we can see how a modern theory of metaphor, not shared, at 
least explicitly, by medieval thinkers, can nevertheless help to shed light on how 
medieval people represented their experiences and thought about the world in texts.      
 
2.2.6: Genderless metaphors 
 
Finally, in regard to Lakoff’s and Johnson’s work on metaphor the issue of gender is 
raised in the conclusion to this study, specifically in regard to the fact that concepts of 
sex or gender often do not obviously influence the representation of human existence 
in the sample of source texts.151  That is, the body is frequently represented in the 
relevant source texts in gender-neutral terms, even though Latin nouns and adjectives 
are all gendered.  Gender is a relatively flexible aspect of Latin grammar in that many 
words have male, female, and neuter forms which can be used to achieve language-
world fit: for example, servus for a male slave and serva for a female slave.  
However, gender is often also conventional in that the gendering of many Latin words 
does not reflect a language-world fit: so for instance, the female vagina and breasts 
can be referred to, respectively, by the masculine nouns, cunnus and pectus.  
Therefore grammatical gender, at least in Latin, cannot necessarily be viewed as an 
expression of gender concepts in human cognition.   
Lakoff and Johnson discuss an important conceptual tool in Metaphors We 
Live By, namely the notion of prototypes, which, as will be discussed in the 
conclusion to this study, is of some help in determining the extent to which gender 
concepts influenced the representation of the body in the relevant source texts.152  In 
brief, Lakoff and Johnson define prototypes as strictly conceptual examples of typical 
members of categories.  Hence a prototypical chair (from a western perspective) has a 
rigid back, seat, and four legs and is intended for sitting on, whereby things in the 
world may be defined as “chairs” according to how they relate to this prototype.153  
This helps to explain why people rarely have trouble deciding whether things are 
                                                 
151 This topic is picked up in the Conclusion, sec. 6.3. 
152 See Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, pp. 122-4 and 162-66: cf. Pinker, How the Mind 
Works, pp. 306-313.  This idea is briefly recapped in the Conclusion, sec. 6.3. 
153 Ibid., pp. 122-24.  Lakoff and Johnson take the concept of prototypes from the psychologist, Eleanor 
Rosch.   
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chairs or not, regardless of the wide range of possible variations on what physically 
and conceptually counts as a chair in the world according to western norms.  It is 
largely a matter of deciding whether an object meets certain prototypical criteria for 
being a chair (e.g. is it a raised platform which can be sat on?).  Accordingly, the 
conclusion to this study will make use of the notion of prototypes to examine the 
possibility that much of the conceptualisation of the body in the sample of source 
texts is in fact gender-neutral.   
 
2.3: Conclusion 
 
Over the course of this chapter I have outlined a series of core concepts which inform 
the analysis of the sample of source texts in Part II of this study.  The embodied view 
of the mind, the relationship between the environment, body, and mental life, and 
Lakoff’s and Johnson’s theory of metaphor all impinge in various ways and at 
different points in the three chapters which follow.  My key aim in these chapters is to 
analyse how human existence is represented in the sample of source texts in terms of 
the ways in which the body interacts with the mind and the local environment.  The 
influence of the body on consciousness, perception, reasoning, communication, and so 
forth is of utmost importance.  However, it should be stressed that by taking this 
approach, this study does not opt for crude forms of biological determinism.  Rather, 
as will be discussed in the following chapters, neuro- and cognitive science strongly 
suggest that human existence, in all its complexity, involves reciprocal interactions 
between the mind, body, and environmental conditions (including socio-cultural 
factors and context).  As will be argued throughout the remainder of this study, 
understanding how these facets of human existence interact is crucial to 
understanding how and why human existence is represented in the sample of source 
texts in the ways which are discussed in the following chapters.     
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Part II 
 
Introduction 
 
Part II of this study proceeds in three main chapters which are intended to build on 
each other towards an analytical synthesis of mind, body, and culture as they are 
represented in the sample of source texts.  There is still a strong tendency in western 
thought, caught up in some very ancient assumptions about the nature of the world, to 
analyse these aspects of human existence as though they are logically, perhaps 
sometimes even ontologically, discrete from one another.  However, as discussed in 
Chapter Two, this view of the relationships between the mind, body, and culture is no 
longer tenable in light of the recent findings of neuro- and cognitive science.  While 
there is some superficial sense in treating them as logically discrete subjects of human 
thought and enquiry, the phenomena we subsume under these labels should be 
understood as interconnected: this is to say, the separation is an analytical conceit, not 
a reflection of reality.  The major argument which I will make in the chapters which 
follow is that in order for medievalists to gather a well-rounded understanding of 
medieval people, both as individuals and situated beings, they must take stock of how 
the existence and development of each of these three facets of human existence is 
dependent on the existence and development of each of the others.  The chapters 
which comprise Part II of this study develop towards this end as follows.   
Chapter Three begins by examining the concept of the mind inherited in the 
medieval west through ancient religion, philosophy, science, and theology, and late 
antique Christian thought.  This helps to highlight some of the culturally transmitted 
assumptions that underpinned the attitudes of well-educated Western Christians in 
medieval Europe towards the human mind and cognition and which may be seen to 
recur frequently throughout the sample of twelfth-century texts examined by this 
study.  I have applied Lakoff’s and Johnson’s theory of metaphor and the embodied 
view of the mind over this background in order to highlight how, in the relevant 
sample of texts, cultural assumptions about the mind can be seen to intermingle with 
sensorimotor concepts derived from the ways in which the relevant authors 
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experienced the world and themselves via the sensorimotor faculties of their bodies.  
In this way, Chapter Three begins to build a picture of the intimacy of the relationship 
between the mind, body, and culture by showing how even when thinking of the mind 
explicitly in terms of a disembodied entity or agent (i.e. the soul), an idea they 
inherited from the ancient past, the relevant authors invariably conceptualised it in 
terms of their embodied experiences of themselves and the world around them.     
Chapter Four adds to this picture by exploring the representation of the body 
in the sample of source texts.  It begins by analysing the basic reasoning that 
underpins how the body is conceptualised as a material entity: that is, as a cohering 
and organised mass of parts and substances.  It develops this by showing how the 
representation of the body was influenced not only by the relevant authors’ immediate 
sensorimotor experiences of it, but also by a wide range of culturally contingent ideas 
regarding, in particular, how and where it is situated in the world, who is potentially 
observing it, and the nature of its relationship with the mind.  This chapter is heavily 
informed by an argument made by the multidisciplinary scholar, G. E. R. Lloyd, in his 
book, Cognitive Variations: Reflections on the Unity and Diversity of the Human 
Mind (2007), concerning the validity of the distinction in western thought between 
nature and culture.154  In light of Lloyd’s views I will argue that the body is neither 
ontologically nor logically separable from its effects in the world (as might be 
supposed according to the nature-culture distinction).  The socio-cultural phenomena 
caused by the behaviour of human bodies (especially how different bodies interact 
with each other) are continuous with the biological body, in which regard they should 
not be treated in analytical isolation.  The biological body and society and culture 
share the same plain of existence and influence each other’s development.       
Finally, Chapter Five completes the picture built up over the courses of the 
previous two chapters by offering a series of snapshots of the lived experiences of the 
authors of the sample of source texts: namely, the ways in which they experienced 
pain and suffering, the aging process, and sex and excretion.  The purpose of this is to 
explore how an embodied view of the mind and culture can help to explain the ways 
in which people’s experiences of their existence in the world become value-laden.  
This point comes from Lakoff’s and Johnson’s views in Philosophy in the Flesh.  I 
will argue in line with these authors that the body deserves a central place in analysis 
                                                 
154 See Lloyd, Cognitive Variations, chapter seven.  
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of the mind and culture, as indeed mind and culture deserve a central place in analysis 
of the body.  I am not in any way proposing that any of these phenomena are 
reducible to one another.  What am I proposing is that while it is possible to adopt 
modes of enquiry that place greater or lesser emphasis on one or another of them, 
looking beyond this it is important for us to recognise that they are in fact mutually 
entwined facets of the broader macro-phenomenon of human existence.     
 
 
The Authors and Source Texts 
 
 
This study is concerned with the culture of Latinity in twelfth-century Europe, 
specifically in England and Northern France (i.e. the use of Latin as a second 
language by the suitably well-educated denizens of either area).  In this tempo-
geographical context, knowledge of Latin is an obvious mark of education and, 
particularly from the eleventh century onwards, of a humanist education modelled on 
the school curricula of the late Roman world.155  Furthermore, as the Western Church 
was the largest and wealthiest sponsor of this kind of education in the twelfth century, 
the vast majority of people who were able to use Latin in twelfth-century England and 
Northern France would have had ties of one kind or another to the Church.156  This is 
reflected by the authors of the texts examined here, all of whom were either monks or 
secular clergy: Guibert, Orderic, Peter and the author of The Life of Christina were 
monks and John and Walter were clerics.  
                                                 
155 As early as the ninth century, the works of classical Grammarians were being used as the basis for 
teaching Latin in cathedral and monastic schools and later the universities: see C. Mews, ‘Philosophy 
and Theology 1100-1150: the search for harmony’ in Le XIIe siècle: Mutations et renouveau en France 
dans la première moitié du XIIe siècle, ed. Françoise Gasparri (Paris, 1994), pp. 159-203, E. J. 
Ashworth, ‘Language and logic’ in The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge, 
2003), pp. 73-96 and R. W. Southern, ‘The schools of Paris and the school of Chartres’ in Renaissance 
and Renewal in the Twelfth Century, ed. J. F. Benton et al (Oxford, 1982), pp 113-37.  On monastic 
education in the earlier part of the twelfth century see M. Chibnall, The World of Orderic Vitalis 
(Oxford, 1984), pp. 86-114.  Although Orderic is the immediate point of reference for Chibnall’s work, 
her focus is much broader, offering a more general account of monastic education around the time of 
Orderic’s life.    
156 See the four articles in part ii of Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century, ed. J. F. Benton 
et al (Oxford, 1982).   There are a number of good articles by Constant Mews on education in northern 
France around the twelfth century in the Variorum edition of his essays, Reason and Belief in the Age 
of Roscelin and Abelard (Aldershot, 2002).   
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In approximately chronological order according to the date of the composition, 
the texts used for this study are: Guibert of Nogent’s De Vita Sua Sive Monodiarum 
(composed c.1115); 157  the epilogue to Orderic Vitalis’ Historia Ecclesiastica 
(c.1137);158 De S. Theodora, Virgine, Quae et Christina Dicitur or as it is better 
known, The Life of Christina of Markyate, composed by an unknown monk of St 
Albans (c.1155-66);159 the letter collections of John of Salisbury, which have been 
preserved in two distinct collections since the Middle Ages (c.1153-61 and 1161-
80);160 the letter collection of Peter of Celle (c.1145-81161); and Walter Map’s De 
Nugis Curialium (c.1180-93). 162   These texts offer a fairly broad sample of the 
surviving Latin literature of the twelfth century in terms of genre, content, style, and 
to some extent the quality of the Latin prose.  They range in genre from hagiography 
(The Life of Christina), something approximating to “autobiography” (De Vita Sua 
and Orderic’s epilogue), and letters, to a compendium of autobiographical, moral, and 
supernatural anecdotes, pseudo-history, and several homiletic tracts (De Nugis).163   
It is clear from their surviving works that each of these authors nurtured highly 
personal literary and intellectual tastes and interests.  For example, Guibert’s 
surviving works include a number of biblical commentaries (Moralia in Genesin, 
                                                 
157 Benton reckons 1115 to be a reasonably precise date for the composition of De Vita Sua: see 
appendix 1 in Benton, Self and Society, p. 237.  Note bibliographical details of the versions of the 
texts sampled for the purposes of Part II of this study can be found in the list of abbreviations: 
see pp. 8-10 above.     
158 Chibnall has proposed 1137 as the year of the Epilogue’s composition, while the work as a whole, 
she suggests, was composed c.1114-37.  On these dates see Chibnall’s introduction to Orderic, 
Historia, i., pp. 31-5.  
159 On this dating see Talbot’s introduction to The Life of Christina, p. 10.   
160 The earlier collection consists of letters composed between 1153 and 1161 while John was in the 
employment of the then archbishop of Canterbury, Theobald of Bec (1139-61).  The second collection 
consists of letters composed after Theobald’s death in 1161 up to John’s death in 1180.  The tradition 
of dividing John’s letters into two distinct collections is preserved in modern editions.  For 
bibliographical information on the editions used here see the List of Abbreviations.  On the manuscript 
traditions for John’s letters see John, Letters, i, pp. lvii-lxii and ii, pp. xlvii-lxiii.   
161 These are the years Julian Haseldine gives as the earliest and latest possible dates for the 
composition of Peter’s surviving letters (their significance being the beginning of Peter’s abbacy at 
Montier-la-Celle in 1145 and his election as bishop of Chartres in 1181): see Peter, Letters, pp. xxxiv-
xxxvi.     
162 On the complexity of dating De Nugis see James’ introduction, pp. xxiv-xxx.  
163 I hesitate to use autobiography because the concept of autobiography is itself distinctly modern.  
Even though there are some clear examples of ancient texts which ostensibly fit this mould 
(Augustine’s Confessions often being cited as the preeminent example), these were not identified as 
such by their authors, and in many respects have different styles and aims to modern autobiographies.  
For instance, Augustine’s Confessions closes with philosophical and theological musings on the nature 
of time and the Book of Genesis.  These are only the most explicit indicators of the fact that his 
Confessions was intended to address theological and philosophical concerns as much as to provide a 
record of Augustine’s early life (i.e. “autobiography”).  For a good, if now old, discussion of 
autobiography as a genre, see J. Olney, Metaphors of Self: the meaning of autobiography (Princeton 
NJ. 1972).   
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Tropologiae in Prophetas Osee et Amos ac Lamentationes Ieremiae), sermons and 
moral treatises (Sermo In Illud Sapientiae and Tractatus de Incarnatione Contra 
Iudaeos, Liber de Laude Sanctae Mariae), histories (Gesta Dei per Francos and De 
Vita Sua which, after book one, largely focuses on contemporary events of 
significance in and around the town of Laon) and a critique of superstitions attached 
to saints’ relics that were popular his own times (De Pignoribus Sanctorum).164     
By contrast, Orderic’s literary efforts seem to have been mainly channelled 
into recording the history of the Norman abbey of Saint-Évroul, where he had been 
inducted as an oblate when he was ten years old, and the surrounding areas of north-
western France.165  Hence it is known that Orderic contributed to the composition of 
the Abbey’s annals and made a redaction of William of Jumièges’ Normannorum 
Ducum, which was originally written around the time of Orderic’s birth. 166   In 
addition to this, he is also known to have written vitae of the English saints, 
Æthelwold and Guthlac.167  The special significance of the epilogue to his Historia is 
its dominantly autobiographical theme.  In a relatively short space Orderic offers a 
narrative of significant events in his life, from his baptism and early childhood in 
England shortly after the Norman Conquest in 1066, up to the point at which he was 
adding the finishing touches to the Historia c.1137.  Although, it has been noted that 
Orderic’s epilogue imitates the epilogue to Bede’s Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis 
Anglorum, the autobiographical content of Orderic’s is extensive and highly personal 
by comparison with Bede’s minimal account of his ecclesiastical career and literary 
achievements.168   
Peter’s surviving writings include ninety-six sermons and five biblical 
commentaries such as tracts on the significance of bread in the Bible (De Panibus) 
and on the tabernacle of Moses (Mosaici Tabernaculi Mystica et Moralis 
                                                 
164 The works noted are printed in PL, vol. 156.  Heather Blurton has suggested that the sudden shift in 
De Vita Sua from being a personal memoir in book one to becoming a record of events occurring in 
and around Laon during Guibert’s time as abbot of Nogent was triggered by his election as abbot of 
Nogent in 1104: see H. Blurton, ‘Guibert of Nogent and the subject of history’ in Exemplaria, 15: 1 
(2003), pp. 111-31.   
165 On Orderic’s activities as a historian see Chibnall, The World of Orderic Vitalis, pp. 169-220.  
166 On Orderic’s contributions to the abbey’s annals and his redaction of William of Jumièges’ Gesta 
Normannorum Ducum see Orderic, Historia, i, pp. 29-31.   
167 These are catalogued in R. Sharpe, A Handlist of the Latin Writers of Great Britain and Ireland 
Before 1540 (Turnhout, 2001), p. 406.  
168 See Bede, Ecclesiastical History, pp. 566-71.  
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Expositio). 169   Peter’s biblical interests are clearly reflected in his letters, which 
abound with biblical citations and allusions.170  Also of interest is a series of letters 
exchanged between Peter and Nicholas of Clairvaux, in which the natures of the body 
and soul are discussed in explicitly Platonic terms.171  In these letters Peter shows 
some familiarity with Calcidius’ translation of a part of Plato’s Timaeus (17a-53e), 
which, as will be seen in the next chapter, is important for this study in as much as the 
portion of it which was available to medieval scholars contained alternative accounts 
of the natures of human existence and Creation to those available in the Book of 
Genesis.172  Calcidius’ translation (and his commentary on the part of the text that he 
translated) was highly influential in certain intellectual circles in Western Europe 
during the eleventh and twelfth centuries.173   
The Life of Christina is the only work that is known to have been written by its 
anonymous author.174  This work is unusual in some important respects which make it 
an interesting text for present purposes.  Firstly, there is the matter of the female 
perspective from which it was written, even if composed by a male author.  Moreover, 
and as Nancy Partner has stressed, Christina was a woman who got her own way in a 
male-dominated society. 175   Christina’s defiant attitude towards her parents’ 
(particularly her father’s) wish that she should be married and her strong spiritual 
authority over the abbot of St Albans, Geoffrey, who is a frequent participant in the 
later half of her vita, mark her out as an impressive female figure.  Additionally, 
Christina appears to have still been alive when her vita was being written and hence to 
have been personally consulted by the author on the events of her life.176  In these 
                                                 
169 De Panibus and Mosaici Tabernaculi are printed in PL, vol. 202.  For references to printed editions 
of some of Peter’s sermons see Haseldine’s introduction to Peter, Letters, p. xxxiv 
170 Ibid., p. xxiii. 
171 On the relevant letters see Appendix 7 in ibid., pp. 706-11.  The Nicholas in question was a monk at 
Clairvaux from 1146 until his expulsion in 1152 for misuse of St Bernard’s seal (to whom he acted as 
secretary): for relevant references see Haseldine’s n. 1 to Peter, Letters, 49.   
172 The influence of the Timaeus in Western Europe between the ninth and twelfth centuries is 
discussed in Chapter Three of this study: see sec. 3.1.3, pp. 89-92.   
173 Particularly at the school of Chartres: see W. Wetherbee, ‘Philosophy, cosmology, and the twelfth-
century Renaissance’ in A History of Twelfth-Century Philosophy, ed. P. Dronke (Cambridge, 1988), 
pp. 21-53, and also R. McKitterick, ‘Knowledge of Plato’s Timaeus in the ninth century’ in From 
Athens to Chartres: Neoplatonism and medieval thought, ed. H. J. Westra (Leiden, 1992), pp. 85-95 
and A. Somfai, ‘The eleventh-century shift in the reception of Plato’s Timaeus and Calcidius’s 
Commentary’ in Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 65 (2002), pp. 1-21.   
174 On what little can be said about the author of Christina’s vita see Talbot’s introduction to The Life of 
Christina, pp. 5-10.   
175 See Partner, ‘The hidden self’. 
176 This seems to be indicated at the beginning of the work: see The Life of Christina, ¶ 1 (references to 
the text relate to paragraphs in the OMT edition) and Talbot’s introduction, pp. 6-7.   
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respects, The Life of Christina is an idiosyncratic text which may offer some valuable 
insights into the mental lives both of its author and Christina herself.         
John of Salisbury’s surviving works are numerous and impressive in the style 
and breadth of their content.  They include lives of Saints Anselm and Thomas 
Becket, a history of the popes (Historia Pontificalis), a book on the liberal arts (i.e. 
the trivium) and education (Metalogicon), political philosophy (Policraticus) and a 
poetic work on the doctrines of philosophers (Entheticus de Dogmate Philosophorum) 
in which John, unusually for this period, shows an awareness of Stoic philosophy.177  
Of these, the Metalogicon and Policraticus will be of especial concern throughout this 
study because they give many clues as to the scope of John’s education and his 
reading habits and tastes, neither of which come across so strongly in his letters.  It 
can be seen from both works that John was very well-acquainted with the logical 
works of Aristotle, including the so-called “new logical” works (the Posterior 
Analytics, Topics, and Sophistical Refutations178) which first became available in 
Western Europe around the late eleventh or early twelfth century.179  Moreover, in the 
Metalogicon and Policraticus John is able to identify the three main schools of 
classical philosophy (i.e. Academics, Peripatetics, and Stoics), and at times, ascribe 
views to them. 180   John was exceptionally well-read for his time in classical 
philosophy hence he may be expected to have had broader and perhaps somewhat 
                                                 
177 All of the works listed, except the Historia Pontificalis, can be found in PL, vol. 190.  Very little 
was known of classical Stoicism throughout the Middle Ages.  Most of what was known came from 
Roman authors who either followed Stoicism (e.g. Seneca) or admired aspects of its teachings (e.g. 
Cicero).  Anyway, Stoicism was only known to western Christians through Latin authors: it was 
unknown in its original Greek context.  For a discussion of this see M. Lapidge, ‘The Stoic inheritance’ 
in A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy, ed. Dronke (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 81-112.  The 
Historia Pontificalis has been published as John of Salisbury, Historia Pontificalis, ed. and trans. M. 
Chibnall (Oxford, 1986).  
178 John uses all of these works in the Metalogicon: for bibliographical details of editions used here see 
list of abbreviations.  For references see McGarry’s index to his edition of the Metalogicon, pp. 297-8.  
Ashworth notes that John’s use of these works c.1159, in the Metalogicon, gives an indication of when 
they first became available in Western Europe: see Ashworth, ‘Language and Logic’, p.  75.   
179 On Aristotle’s logical works during the middle ages see Chapter Three, sec. 3.1, pp. 73-4.  
180 John gives his views on the academics in Policraticus, vii: 1-2: again, for bibliographical details of 
editions used here see list of abbreviations.  For his views on what it meant to him to be a philosopher 
see John, Policraticus, vii: 11.  He also discusses the origins of the disciplines of classical philosophy 
(physics, ethics, and logic in John’s terms) and the Peripatetic school in the John, Metalogicon, ii: 2.  
Additionally, for a discussion of truth see Policraticus, iv: 36,  where John contrasts the views of the 
Platonists and Peripatetics.  The Stoics, Epicurians, and the names of individual Presocratic 
philosophers also appear in the Metalogicon and Policraticus.  For instance, see John, Policraticus, vii: 
1 on the Stoics and Epicurians, and John, Metalogicon, ii: 2, in which he gives a report of the views of 
Apuleius, Augustine, and Isidore on Parmenides, Phythagoras, and Socrates (also see McGarry’s notes 
on pp. 76-7).   
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atypical views on the nature of human existence and mental life, at least by 
comparison with those of his near-contemporaries examined here.    
Finally, De Nugis is the only work that can be ascribed to Walter Map with 
any certainty.181  It is eclectic in its content, but briefly, it includes autobiographical 
episodes, a moral treatise against marriage, polemics against the institutional practices 
of the Cistercians, a variety of humorous anecdotes, pseudo-historical and 
supernatural tales (or “fabulae”), and ethnographic observations on the Welsh (with 
whom Walter somewhat ambivalently identifies himself).182  It is reasonably clear 
from the content and style of De Nugis that Walter wished to advertise his literary 
learning: especially the pagan classics, of which he shows considerable knowledge.183  
Walter’s subversion of traditional genre boundaries in De Nugis may reflect the 
influence of analogous literature from the classic Roman world (in particular, Aulus 
Gellius’ Noctes Atticae, Pliny’s De Rerum Natura, and Macrobius’ Saturnalia).184  To 
be sure, Pliny’s De Rerum is an encyclopaedia of ancient wisdom hence it is not a 
genre-less work.  And likewise, Gellius’ Noctes Atticae and Macrobius’ Saturnalia fit 
into the so-called “dinner party” genre of classical Roman literature, which is to say, 
they revolve around the recital of anecdotes among guests at a fictitious banquet 
setting.185  However, it is not so much in regard to the genre, but rather the lack of a 
clear structure and the anecdotal content of these works that it seems reasonable to 
suppose that they may have influenced the composition of De Nugis.  Like the 
aforementioned works, De Nugis consists mostly of anecdotes, which do not seem to 
have been arranged according to any overall purpose or structure, and, moreover, 
serve no clear purpose beyond entertainment.   
However, in regard to the latter point, Carl Watkins has recently argued that 
the eclectic and often seemingly subversive content of De Nugis is in fact best viewed 
as moral entertainment.186  This view seems sensible, not least as Walter does offer 
some cryptic clues of his intentions for De Nugis in that work, which seem to 
                                                 
181 It seems that a large number of works were erroneously ascribed to Walter during the Middle Ages 
including a large quantity of Latin poetry and some references to a probably fictitious exemplar cited as 
the source for certain parts of the Romance Arthurian cycle: see James’ introduction to Walter, De 
Nugis, pp. xx-xxi.    
182 Walter, De Nugis, ii: 20.  
183 See index to allusions and citations in Walter, De Nugis, pp. 524-6.  
184 Carl Watkins has recently noted the ‘heterogeneous’ content of De nugis: see C. Watkins, History 
and the Supernatural in Medieval England (Cambridge, 2007), p. 27.  
185 For more detail see Martianus Capella and the Seven Liberal Arts, vol. 1, ed. and trans. W. Harris-
Stahl et al (New York, 1971), pp. 26-7.  
186 Watkins, History and the Supernatural, pp. 202-8.  
   
 
71 
 
correspond to Watkins’ argument.187  Moreover, Watkins rightly situates De Nugis 
among a group of Latin texts from the twelfth century whose authors seem to have 
shared an interest in miscellaneous storytelling.  In spite of all this, however, De 
Nugis remains a highly idiosyncratic work which appears to have been shaped in 
terms of both style and content by Walter’s caprice more than any effort to write 
within the boundaries of more conventional forms of literary expression.  If De Nugis 
was intended to be morally instructive, as seems to have been the case, it is still 
significant that Walter did not choose a more conventional genre such as, say, biblical 
commentary or sermons, to express such ends.  Meanwhile, the playful nature and 
often excessive classicism of this work point to the influence of classical exempla of a 
similarly playful and eclectic style.  
These texts offer a fairly broad sample of twelfth-century Latin literature, 
representing a variety of genres and styles of writing.  Furthermore, they are all 
appropriate for the purposes of this study in that they all describe and discuss a wide 
range of aspects of human life and experience in ways that are susceptible to the 
modes of analysis outlined in the previous chapter, as will be seen throughout the 
remainder of this study.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
187 For example, see Walter, De Nugis, ii: 13 and 32.  
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Chapter Three 
 
The Mind, Soul, and “Cognitive Phenomena” 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the relationship between embodiment and 
abstract thought, specifically in regard to the representation of the mind, cognition, 
and the mind-body relationship in the sample of source texts.  In this way, it will be 
shown in this chapter that the relevant authors’ embodied experiences of themselves 
and the world impinged on how they conceptualised and understood the nature of the 
mind and human existence.   
This chapter proceeds in three main sections.  First, sec. 3.1 examines the 
roots of premodern “western psychology” in ancient Greek philosophy and the course 
of its development and transmission into the intellectual life of the medieval west.188  
This provides background information which is relevant to the subsequent analyses of 
how the mind and cognition are represented in the sample of source texts because, as 
discussed in sec. 3.1, well-educated medieval Europeans received a well-established 
tradition of western psychology from the ancient past which significantly influenced 
how they thought about the mind, cognition, and the mind-body relationship.  In this 
way, sec. 3.1 provides a summary of the cultural background to medieval western 
psychology which is related in the following two sections to the more direct embodied 
influences on how the relevant authors represented and conceptualised the mind and 
cognition.  Thus, sec. 3.2 makes use of Lakoff’s and Johnson’s theory of metaphor to 
shed light on the influence of embodied experiences of the external world on how the 
mind and cognition are represented in the source texts; and finally, sec. 3.3 makes use 
of the embodied theory of the mind to tackle the key matter of how, or in what ways, 
                                                 
188 I will often refer in this study to “psychology” in premodern contexts.  This label is commonly used 
by classicists to describe ancient thought on the mind.  It should be noted from the outset that in 
premodern contexts “psychology” is meant its older sense: i.e. a rational discourse on the nature of the 
human mind or soul (from the Greek words for soul and speech, particularly eloquent and reasoned 
speech, ψυχή [psuchê] and λογικός [logikos] respectively).     
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the kinds of beliefs and ideas about the mind and cognition entertained by the relevant 
authors made embodied sense.189   
 
3.1: The intellectual context  
 
This section firstly looks at how the ideas of the soul, spirit, and mind were 
formulated in early Greek thought and particularly the influence of Plato (d. 347 
BCE) on this.190  Plato’s thought and writings have been crucially important to the 
popularisation and dissemination of the idea of soul-body dualism in western thought: 
as will be seen in sections 3.2-3 of this chapter, the idea that the mind or soul and 
body, or the mind, soul, and body are ontologically discrete and separable facets of 
human existence recurs throughout the source texts used in this study.191  Yet with the 
exception of a partial Latin translation of the Timaeus, Plato’s writings were largely 
unknown in Western Europe between the sixth and thirteenth centuries hence it is 
important here to highlight the means of transmission for Plato’s ideas from late 
antiquity into the medieval west. 192   The dominance of so-called Neoplatonic 
philosophy in late antiquity and the influence that it had on late antique Christian 
writers is hugely important to the transmission of Platonic ideas into early Christian 
thought and also to the development of the theological doctrines of the Western and 
Eastern Churches.193  Therefore, the middle and latter parts of this section focus on 
                                                 
189 I will discuss the italicised term further in the introductory paragraphs to sec. 3.3.  
190 The necessity of this course was explained in the introductory paragraphs to this chapter.  
191 As will be noted below in this section, the mind and soul should not necessarily be treated as 
synonymous in ancient thought and language: although premodern western psychology is now often 
thought of as being “dualistic”, it is in many ways “triadic”, for there is often an appreciable separation 
between, mind, body, and soul to the extent that human existence is conceptualised as being triadic.  
For more on thread see K. Ware, ‘The soul in Greek Christianity’ in From Soul to Self, ed. M. James C. 
Crabbe (London, 1999), pp. 49-69.   
192 Some of Plato’s writings were translated in the twelfth century, but little read: see J. Marenbon, 
Medieval Philosophy: an historical and philosophical introduction (London, 2007), pp. 211-12, R. 
Kiblansky, The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition and Plato’s Parmenides in the Middle Ages (repr. 
London, 1981), pp. 21-31and 51-3, and J. T. Muckle, ‘Greek Works Translated Directly into Latin 
Before 1350’ in Medieval Studies, 5 (1943), s.n. Plato.  Platonic philosophy in the twelfth century was 
mostly received through the works of Neoplatonic intermediaries: see R. W. Southern, ‘The schools of 
Paris and the school of Chartres’ in Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century, ed. J. F. Benton 
et al (Oxford, 1982), pp 113-37, C. Mews, ‘Philosophy and Theology 1100-1150: the search for 
harmony’ in Le XIIe siècle: Mutations et renouveau en France dans la première moitié du XIIe siècle, 
ed. Françoise Gasparri (Paris, 1994), pp. 159-203and Marenbon, Medieval Philosophy, pp. 161-3. 
193 For a broad discussion see Andresen, ‘The integration of Platonism’.  Also see Marenbon, Medieval 
Philosophy, pp. 28-33, P. F. Beatruce, ‘L’Union de l’âme et du corps: Némésius d’Émèse lecteur de 
Porphyre’ in Les Pères de l’Église face à la science medicale de leur temps, ed. V. Boudon-Millot et al 
(Paris, 2005), pp. 251-85, D. Bertrand, ‘Origine de l’âme et animation du corps humain’ in Les Pères 
de l’Église face à la science médicale de leur temps, ed. V. Boudon-Millot et al (Paris, 2005), pp. 299-
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the influence of Platonism via late antique Christian authors (especially Augustine, 
Boethius, and Pseudo-Dionysius) on how the ideas of the soul, spirit, and mind were 
received and understood by well-educated scholars in the Christian west.194 
It should be stressed here that the emphasis placed on Platonic thought and 
soul-body dualism in this chapter comes at the expense of discussing other important 
facets of ancient wisdom and philosophy: most notably the writings of Aristotle, 
Galen, and later, their followers in the Islamic world.  Firstly, of the works of 
Aristotle, only his logical works are known to have survived antiquity in the west.  
Certainly, his Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Sophistical Refutations, 
and perhaps the Topics survived and circulated through Boethius’ Latin translations 
and commentaries. 195   By contrast, his natural scientific works were not widely 
available to Latin readers in Western Europe until the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries.196  His De Anima, in particular, which certainly had an impact on how the 
soul was understood by medieval scholars, was not available in the west until the 
early thirteenth century.197  Thus, Aristotle’s influence on medieval thought from the 
                                                                                                                                            
320, and M. O. Boulnois, ‘L’Union de l’âme et du corps comme modèle Christologique, de Némésius 
de Émèse à la controverse Nestorienne’ in Les Pères de l’Église face à la science medicale de leur 
temps, ed. V. Boudon-Millot et al (Paris, 2005), pp. 451-75.  On Augustine’s Platonism see G. 
Matthews ‘Internalist reasoning in Augustine for mind-body dualism’ in Psyche and Soma, ed. J. P. 
Wright et al (Oxford, 2002), pp. 133-45 and P. Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self: The 
Legacy of a Christian Platonist (Oxford, 2000).   
194 See secs 3.1.1-2. 
195 See D. C. Lindberg, ‘The Transmission of Greek and Arabic Learning to the West’ in Science in the 
Middle Ages, ed. D. C. Lindberg (Chicago, 1978), p. 53, J. Barnes, ‘Boethius and the Study of Logic’ 
in Boethius: His Life, Thought, and Influence, ed. M. Gibson (Oxford, 1981), pp. 73-5, and more 
recently Marenbon, Boethius, pp. 17-18.  Aristotle’s old logic enjoyed a late flowering in the first half 
of the twelfth century through scholastic authors such as Peter Abelard: see Mews, ‘Philosophy and 
Theology’.  
196 See Lindberg, ‘The transmission of Greek and Arabic learning’, pp. 66-7. 
197 Again, on the influence of De Anima from the thirteenth century, onwards, see the essays collected 
in the recent volume, Mind, Cognition, and Representation: the tradition of commentaries on 
Aristotle’s De Anima, ed. P. J. J. M. Bakker et al (Aldershot, 2007).  Also for a more contextualised 
discussion see R. Pasnau, ‘Human nature’ in The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy, ed. 
A. S. McGrade (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 208-30.  On Aristotle’s views on the nature of human mental 
life and the soul-body nexus see T. H. Irwin, ‘Aristotle’s philosophy of the mind’ in Companions to 
Ancient Thought 2: Psychology, ed. S. Everson (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 56-83.  On the impact of 
Aristotle’s natural scientific works in the thirteenth century and onwards see E. Maccagnolo, ‘David of 
Dinant and the beginnings of Aristotelianism in Paris’ in A History of Twelfth-Century Western 
Philosophy, ed. P. Dronke (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 429-42, S. P. Marrone, ‘Medieval philosophy in 
context’ in The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy, A. S. McGrade (Cambridge, 2003), 
pp. 32-6 and E. Dudley Sylla, ‘Creation and nature’, in The Cambridge Companion to Medieval 
Philosophy, ed. A. S. McGrade (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 179-93.    
   
 
75 
 
Carolingian renaissance up to the early twelfth century was largely restricted to 
logic.198   
Galen, on the other hand, presents a different set of problems.  In one respect, 
his views on the nature of human existence are derived from Platonism.  For instance, 
he strongly favoured Plato’s notion of the tri-partite soul as it is outlined in the 
Republic.  Moreover, Galen erroneously supposed Plato to have proven this, using 
empirical techniques of a sort that he could have approved as a physician.  In fact, 
Plato asserted in the Republic that his account of the tri-partite soul was only “likely” 
[εἰκος: eikos] and as such did not claim absolute authority for it.199  Still, Galen’s 
concerns with respect to the relationship between the soul and body differed 
significantly from those of Plato.  Whereas Plato’s writings on the soul had been 
motivated chiefly by ethical and political concerns relevant to his contemporary 
Athens, Galen was principally concerned with demonstrating the anatomical locations 
of the three parts of the soul identified by Plato and their physiological utility with 
regard to the soul-body relationship.  He was strongly influenced by Plato’s and 
Aristotle’s metaphysics (especially teleology), but he upheld Plato’s identification of 
the rational part of the soul with the brain over that of Aristotle and the Stoics, who 
believed that the heart was the seat of reason in the human body.  However, in terms 
of his working methods, Galen was a rigorous follower of the empirical methods that 
Aristotle developed in his natural scientific works.200  
As this chapter is not specifically focused on medical writings or contexts, it 
does not seem necessary to place much emphasis on the influence of Galen or his 
followers (Latin, Greek, or Arabic-speaking) on how human existence or the soul-
body relationship were understood in the medieval west.  Given that Galen tended to 
favour the Platonic view of the soul-body relationship (even while preferring 
Aristotelian methodology), it seems reasonable for the purposes of this chapter to treat 
                                                 
198 Marenbon has noted the influence of Aristotelian categories on Alcuin working at the court of 
Charlemagne when writing the first significant textbook on logic written since antiquity: Medieval 
Philosophy, pp. 70-2.  On the influence of Boethius’ translations of Aristotle’s old logic see Barnes, 
‘Boethius and the Study of Logic’, O. Lewry, ‘Boethian Logic in the Medieval West’ in Boethius: His 
Life, Thought, and Influence, ed. M. Gibson (Oxford, 1981), pp. 90-134, and Marenbon, Boethius, pp. 
17-42.   
199 See P. Donini, ‘Psychology’, trans. R. J. Hankinson, in The Cambridge Companion to Galen, ed. R. 
J. Hankinson (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 185-7.  Also see the Plato, Republic, 435b-435b and 439d-441a.   
200 Donini, Ibid., pp. 184-201.  
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the representation of the soul-body relationship in the Galenic corpus as part of the 
broader success of Platonic views on human existence in late antiquity.201   
There are two possible modes of transmission for the ideas discussed in this 
section from classical antiquity up to the period in question.  Firstly, they may have 
been transmitted up to the twelfth century through relatively continuous use in 
scholarly or popular culture.  Or alternatively they may have been (re)introduced into 
the intellectual culture of the medieval west through texts and knowledge migrating 
westwards (or more specifically from the Greek and Islamic east to the Christian 
west).202  Furthermore, it should be noted that formal education steadily improved and 
became more widely available in Western Europe from the ninth century onwards.203  
The twelfth century in particular witnessed important developments in western 
education, including the reception of Greek and Arabic texts which had been 
unknown or unavailable in Western Europe since late antiquity and expansion in the 
teaching of the liberal and mathematical arts (the trivium and quadrivium) through the 
growth of university education.204  In regard to this, formal education is perhaps best 
seen as reinforcing both forms of transmission, firstly, in the respect that it will have 
reinforced established ways of thinking about the nature of the soul and mental life in 
the Christian west, and secondly, in that it provided environments (intellectual and 
institutional) in which texts and ideas migrating from the Greek and Islamic worlds 
could be engaged and appropriated into western thought. 
 
3.1.1: The soul, spirit, and mind in early Greek thought and Plato 
 
To begin, I shall briefly outline what kinds of ideas on the nature of human existence 
Plato inherited from his predecessors.  These are important here not only because they 
                                                 
201 Ibid. 
202 For more detail on this and relevant references see sec. 3.1.3 below.  
203 R. McKitterick, The Frankish Church and the Carolingian Reforms 789-895 (London, 1977).  
Specifically on book production, see R. McKitterick, ‘Script and book production’ in Carolingian 
Culture: Emulation and Innovation, ed. R. McKitterick (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 221-47.  Also see M. 
Gibson, ‘The continuity of learning c.850-c.1050’ in Viator (1975), pp. 1-13.   
204 On education over this period see Southern, ‘The schools of Paris’, R. H. Rouse and M. A. Rouse, 
‘Statim Invenire: Schools preachers, and new attitudes to the page’ in Renaissance and Renewal in the 
Twelfth Century, pp. 201-25, C. Mews, ‘Orality, Literacy, and Authority in the Twelfth-Century 
Schools’ in Exemplaria, 2 (1990), pp. 475-500, and part five of Marenbon’s Medieval Philosophy, pp. 
131-71.  On the teaching of the trivium and quadrivium in the eleventh and twelfth centuries see D. 
Luscombe, ‘Thought and Learning’ in The New Cambridge Medieval History IV, c.1024-1198, ed. D. 
Luscombe (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 461-98.  
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influenced Plato but also because they have had an important bearing on the later 
development of western concepts of the mind and cognition.  As will be seen below, 
aspects of early Greek thought on the mind can be discerned in the source texts 
examined in this study.205   
Among the earliest Greek philosophers, the so-called Presocratics (c.640-440 
BCE), a distinction seems to have been commonly held between the soul [ψυχή: 
psuchê] and mind [νούς: nous], as well as between the body [σῶµα: sôma], soul, and 
mind.206  The crucial difference between soul and mind seems to be that psuchê was 
understood as a life-force animating living bodies whereas nous was something 
special to human beings (i.e. it is what makes us rational unlike, it was believed, 
plants and other animals).  Accordingly, nous was something additional to psuchê.207  
It is also worth noting the significance attached to the midriff [φρήν: phrên] and heart 
[καρδία: kardia], which had associations with aspects of human cognition in Greek 
thought prior even to the Presocratics: these terms will be discussed more fully in the 
next chapter where similarities to their Latin and modern English equivalents are 
drawn.208    
There are some important parallels between these terms and their Latin and 
English equivalents which should be noted here.  Firstly, psuchê and nous roughly 
correspond to the Latin anima and mens and English soul and mind respectively.  In 
its older Greek sense of “life”, psuchê is also strongly analogous to the Latin spiritus.  
Firstly, it was believed to be a rarefied or highly dilute substance able to move freely 
throughout the bodies of living beings, and secondly, it was associated with the 
respiratory functions of animal bodies in that it was believed to consist of elemental 
air and have the quality of dryness (hence the phrase “breath of life” [πνεῦµα βίου: 
                                                 
205 In particular, see the concluding paragraphs to sec. 3.2.3 (pp. 122-3), and sec. 3.3.1. 
206 This tri-partite distinction survives quite explicitly in Greek Christianity: see Ware, ‘The soul in 
Greek Christianity’. 
207 See Liddell and Scott, s.n. yuxh and nous (accessed 13 / 5 / 09): “life” is given as the primary sense 
of psuchê and “immaterial and immortal soul” as a tertiary sense.  Liddell and Scott give as the primary 
sense of nous, ‘mind, as employed in perceiving and thinking, sense, wit’ [original italics], s.n. nous 
(accessed 13 / 11 / 09): for some more specific details see J. Warren, Presocratics (Stocksfield, 2007), 
pp. 36-8 and 130-4. Please note that in giving references to words in Liddell and Scott, I give the 
transliterated forms of Greek words in Latin letters which produce the relevant results on the 
current online version of the Greek-English Lexicon (hence yuxh rather than psuchê to represent 
ψυχή).  
208 See Chapter Four, sec. 4.3.2: on phrên and kardia see Liddell and Short, s.n. frhn and kardia 
respectively (accessed 13 / 5 / 09).   
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pnuema biou]).209  It should be stressed that in these respects, psuchê was understood 
to be a material phenomenon in that it was viewed as reducible to elemental air and 
played a physiological role in human and animal life.  Likewise, nous was also 
viewed by some Presocratics as a material phenomenon.  For instance, Empedocles 
associated thought and sensation with elemental water and the quality of wetness in 
that he believed that these, and thus nous, were physiological functions of the blood. 
210   
It seems that nous and psuchê became much closer in later Greek thought as 
nous gradually came to be seen as a facet or function of psuchê.211  Furthermore, the 
idea developed that psuchê consisted of some celestial or immaterial substance, unlike 
the conventional four elements (fire, air, water, and earth).  This eventually came to 
be viewed as a fifth element or “quintessence”, sometimes named aithêr [αἰθήρ] in 
Greek and aether in Latin, although it is worth noting that this label may have been an 
extrapolation from the older elemental association of the soul with air [cf. αἐρ: 
aêr].212  These views on psuchê are perhaps attributable to the ancient Pythagoreans 
and also the popular belief-system in ancient Greece known as Orphism.  To be sure, 
Plato, who played a crucial role in popularising these ideas in later Greek and Roman 
science and philosophy, appears to have been inspired by aspects of each kind of 
thought about the nature of the soul and human existence.213   
Plato strongly identified the mind with the soul in his written works and 
unambiguously posed the existence of a fifth element from which souls are formed in 
                                                 
209 Cf. with the medical sense of spiritus: see J. J. Bono, ‘Medical Spirits and the Medieval Languages 
of Life’ in Traditio, xl (1984), pp. 91-130.  Like psuchê, spiritus was also originally connected to 
breath: see Lewis and Short, s.n. spiritus (accessed 13 / 11 / 09): on “breath of life”, see Liddell and 
Scott, s.n. pneuma (accessed 13 / 11 / 09) and also see Warren, Presocratics, p. 36. 
210 See A. Laks, ‘Soul, sensation, and thought’ in The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek 
Philosophy, ed. A. A. Long (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 250-70, and Warren, Presocratics, esp. pp. 36-8, 
74-6, and 130-4.   
211 Particularly in the thought of Plato which will be discussed shortly.   
212 See Liddell and Scott, s.n. aiqhr and aer (accessed 14 / 11 / 09) and Lewis and Short, s.n. aether, 
(accessed 14 / 11 / 09).  Aristotle suggests ἀεὶ θεῖν [“runs away”] as an etymology for aithêr in On the 
Heavens, trans. W. K. C. Guthrie (Cambridge Mass., 1939), 270b21-5.  For a recent discussion of the 
early sense of aithêr see P. Kingsley, Ancient Philosophy, Mystery, and Magic (Oxford, 1995), pp. 15-
35: also see R. P. Multhauf, ‘The Science of Matter’ in Science in the Middle Ages, ed. D. C. Linberg 
(Chicago, 1978), pp. 369-70.      
213 For a concise accounts of Plato’s views on the soul and human mental life see T. M. Robinson, ‘The 
defining features of mind-body dualism in the writings of Plato’ in Psyche and Soma, ed. J. P. Wright 
et al (Oxford, 2000), pp.37-55and S. Lovibond, ‘Plato’s theory of mind’ in Companions to Ancient 
Thought 2: Psychology, ed. S. Everson (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 35-55.  Orphism and the Pythagoreans 
are credited with the notions of metempsychosis (or in more modern terms, “transmigration” or 
“reincarnation”) and of the body as “prison-house” of the soul: Robinson discusses the influence of 
these ideas on Plato in the article cited here.  Also, on Pythagoras and his most significant follower, 
Philolaus, see Warren, Presocratics, pp. 37-9 and 175-7.     
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his Timaeus (see 55c).214  This in turn allowed him to claim special properties and 
behaviour for the soul: most importantly, immortality and a capacity to transmigrate 
from one material body to another following death [µετεµφύχωσις: metempsychosis] 
(i.e. “reincarnation” in more modern terms).215   
It has been argued that Plato’s thought has been pivotal to the development of 
the modern western concept of the mind and psychology.  For instance, Sabina 
Lovibond has stated:        
 
‘[I]t would hardly be an exaggeration to say that Plato invented the idea of 
“mind” with which modern European languages operate, and that it is his 
writings which have made this idea available to the Western philosophical 
tradition.  It is Plato, more than any other thinker, who is responsible for the 
pervasive intellectualism of that tradition—for the entrenched tendency to 
posit “mind” (or in certain contexts, “soul”) as a substantial component of our 
nature, and to revere this as our most precious possession. (A relative 
devaluation of the opposed term, “body”, follows automatically from this 
move.)’216  [Original italics]   
 
Whether so much authority can be placed solely on Plato’s shoulders is 
questionable.217  Nevertheless, his works provide us with the earliest well-rounded 
theory of the human mind and its relationship to the body to have survived from 
classical antiquity.  
Plato consistently argues in his works that the body and soul are 
fundamentally different kinds of thing which separate at the point of death and that 
the existence of the soul is prior to that of the body (i.e. the soul is not born with the 
body).218  However, he also tweaked his views on these matters over the course of his 
                                                 
214 The standard system for referencing the works of Plato is used throughout this chapter, often in 
brackets in the main body of the text. 
215 On transmigration see Plato, Timaeus, 41d-426: Liddell and Scott, s.n. metemyuxwsis (accessed 14 / 
11 / 09)  
216 Lovibond, ‘Plato’s theory of mind’, p. 35.  
217 Again, the influence of Orphism and the Pythagoreans should be taken into account: see Robinson, 
‘The defining features of mind-body dualism in Plato’.  
218 For example, see Plato’s “myth of Er” at the end of the Republic, 614a-21d.  
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life, arriving at increasingly sophisticated, but also ambiguous conclusions.219  For 
instance, at one extreme in the Phaedo, Plato has Socrates subscribe to the Orphic 
view of the soul as a “prisoner” of the body (Phaedo, 82e).  By contrast, in the later 
Republic, he moves Socrates to a near-opposite position, arguing instead that the body 
is merely a passive vessel which the soul may freely manipulate and control, and 
thereby interface with the material world.  Hence he moves from a view of the body 
as an active to a passive container of the soul, in the former case inhibiting its 
activities or tendencies, and in the latter case, facilitating them.220   
Plato is perhaps best known for his psychological ideas.  These revolved 
around his view of the soul as divisible into parts, each with distinct and to some 
extent conflicting natures or tendencies.  He most commonly identified two parts of 
the soul, “reason” [λογιστικός: logistikos] and “desire” [ἐπιθυµητικός: epithumêtikos].  
However, in the Republic and Timaeus he added a third part, “spiritedness” or 
“passion” [θυµοειδής: thumoeidês], thus giving a tripartite schema of the soul.221  The 
importance of this is that he identified conflicts in the mind with the competing 
tendencies of these different parts of the soul.  It should be noted that in his earlier 
works, he tended to identify conflict mostly as the result of the competing tendencies 
of the body and soul.  It is mostly in his later works, including the Republic and 
Timaeus that he began to identify different aspects of human psychology with the 
parts of the soul, and in particular, conflicting emotions, desires, needs, and so forth 
with their competing tendencies.  As Robinson has stated: ‘[The] tensions we all feel 
                                                 
219 What follows is a précis of the development of Plato’s views on these matters.  For more detailed 
accounts see Lovibond, ‘Plato’s theory of mind’ and Robinson, ‘Mind-body dualism in the writings of 
Plato.’ 
220 For instance, see Plato, Republic, trans. R. Waterfield (Oxford, 2008), 510b-511c and 523a-525a on 
the mechanisms of sense-perception.  The Greek text printed in the Loeb edition of the Republic was 
used for this study: see Plato, Republic, 2 vols. trans. P. Shorey (Cambridge Mass., 1930 and 1935).   
221 He developed this theory in the Republic (see especially 435b-435b and 439d-441a), probably for 
the purposes of contrast to his tri-partite schema of the state (guardians, soldiers, and workers).  Also 
cf. Plato, Timaeus, trans. R. Waterfield (Oxford, 2008), 69c-70c and 89e.  The Greek text printed in the 
Loeb edition of the Timaeus was used for this study: see Plato, Timaeus, trans. R. G. Bury (Cambridge 
Mass., 1929).  In the aforesaid portion of the Timaeus, Plato posits a mortal part of the soul in addition 
to the immortal part; he then goes on to divide the mortal part into competitive and appetitive parts.  
While this tripartite schema is not quite as clear as that of the Republic, it is nonetheless a tripartite 
schema.  I have given the standard inflected forms of logistikos, epithumêtikos, and thumoeidês, all of 
which may be found in Liddell and Short.  For direct reference, see Republic, 441a.  Lloyd notes the 
significance of these terms among others in Cognitive Variations, pp. 69-74 (Lloyd’s work is discussed 
in more detail in the next chapter).      
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are not, after all, as the Phaedo might have led us to suppose, tensions between the 
body and soul, but tensions within the soul itself [his italics].’222   
Until the twelfth century, the only work by Plato available in Western Europe 
was the Timaeus in two partial Latin translations (the most complete and popular of 
these covered roughly the first third of the work: 17a-53e).  Because of the popularity 
of this work in the west from the ninth century onwards, it is worth giving a brief 
summary of some of the more significant ideas about the natures of the cosmos, soul, 
and matter which are likely to have gained wide circulation. 223   Throughout the 
Timaeus, Plato asserts a macrocosm-microcosm relationship between the cosmos and 
sentient beings (especially human beings) whereby the former is presented in form 
and nature as a macrocosm of the latter and the latter as microcosms of the former 
(Timaeus, 44d-45a).  We are told that the cosmos is endowed with a body and soul 
(i.e. the so-called “world soul”: 30b) and that the cosmic soul is prior and senior to the 
cosmic body (36e).  The cosmos is explicitly likened to an animal [ζῷον: zôon] (33c-
d), albeit, the most beautiful and perfect kind of animal (30b).  Finally, it is stated that 
the world soul is senior and prior to (i.e. created before) material creation (36e), thus 
following the order of the creation of the bodies and souls of earth-bound creatures.   
Plato claims that Creation is the work of a craftsman-god or “demiurge” 
[δηµιουργός: demiourgos], who fashioned the universe from an initial chaotic state, in 
which only raw materials and pure “ideas” or “forms” [ἰδέαι or εἰδοι: ideai or eidoi] 
existed (34a-b).  The cosmos itself contains four kinds of ensouled beings, whose 
individual souls are constructed of the same stuff as the world soul (41d).  These are 
the gods (which are equated with the celestial bodies), and things that fly, walk, and 
swim (39e-40a).  Later he also adds to these the vegetative soul (77a-c).  A major 
claim of the Timaeus is that the demiurge is inherently good because he is only 
capable of thinking good thoughts and doing good deeds.  Accordingly, all of his 
thoughts and actions are ipso facto good.  He is incapable of being bad (29e-30a, 
42d).  As a consequence of this, the demiurge leaves the task of fashioning the 
material bodies of the three latter kinds of ensouled beings (those that fly, walk, and 
swim) to a series of intermediate gods (or at least, immortal beings) because, as he 
                                                 
222 Robinson, ‘Mind-body dualism in the writings of Plato’, p. 45: for more detail on this see 
Robinson’s article in full and Lovibond, ‘Plato’s theory of mind’.  
223 On the availability and influence of the Timaeus in the early to high middle ages see Somfai, ‘The 
reception of Plato’s Timaeus’, pp. 1-21 and W. Wetherbee ‘Philosophy, cosmology, and the twelfth-
century Renaissance’ in A History of Twelfth-Century Philosophy, ed. P. Dronke (Cambridge, 1988), 
pp. 21-53.  The reception of the Timaeus is discussed further below at pp. 90-2. 
   
 
82 
 
explains in a lengthy lecture to them, he cannot be responsible for any evil in the 
cosmos, such as those beings or the gods might themselves create (41a-d).   
 
3.1.2: Models for the Platonic view of the soul available in the medieval 
west: Augustine and Boethius 
 
Among the Latin Church Fathers, Augustine has perhaps been the most influential 
exponent of Platonic ideas about the nature of the soul, the mind, and its (or their) 
relationship with the material body.  Certainly, he worked hard to appropriate aspects 
of Platonic thought into his theological works.224  Indeed, in his De Vera Religione he 
seems to suggest that Platonism is largely commensurable with Christianity: 
 
Therefore, if we have been able to drive ourselves away from the poison of 
this life, they [the pagan philosophers], seeing the ease by which they could 
become authorities by the counsel of men (and only a few of their words need 
be changed in order to bring about Christian beliefs), have thus made the 
majority of our recent times Platonic.  [My italics]     
 
Itaque si hanc vitam illi viri nobiscum rursum agere potuissent, viderent 
profecto cuius auctoritate facilius consuleretur hominibus, et paucis mutatis 
verbis atque sententiis christiani fierent, sicut plerique recentiorum 
nostrorumque temporum Platonici fecerunt.225 
 
Modern commentators have tended to view Augustine’s mixing of Neoplatonism and 
Christian theology with greater scepticism.  For example, Philip Cary has described 
this as a “shotgun marriage” (albeit a productive one).  This is particularly true of the 
Confessiones in which Augustine weaves aspects of Neoplatonic mysticism into an 
ideal of Christian meditation (i.e. of the soul looking inwards upon itself in order to 
                                                 
224 On Augustine and Platonism see B. Stock, Augustine: the Reader (Cambridge Mass., 1996), pp. 65-
74 and Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self.   
225 My translation: Augustine, De Vera Religione, iv: 7.  R. Crouse notes the significance of this phrase 
in ‘“Paucis mutatis verbis”: St Augustine’s Platonism’ in Augustine and his Critics, ed. R. Dodaro et al 
(London, 2000), pp. 42-3.  Also of interest is Augustine, City of God, viii: 10-11 and xxii: 26-8 and 
Confessiones, viii: 3.  
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achieve a vision of divinity). 226   Elsewhere, the influence of Neoplatonism on 
Augustine has proven controversial among modern theologians, some of whom have 
questioned the validity of his theological works to Christianity.227  
Augustine’s works are significant in terms of their role in preserving and 
disseminating Platonic ideas on human existence and mental life in medieval Europe.  
From the end of antiquity up to the thirteenth century, very few Platonic writings were 
available in Western Europe, either in Latin or Arabic translations or the original 
Greek.228  Hence, it is absolutely necessary to look to the writings of late-antique 
Christian authors who were influenced by the Platonism of their times in order to gain 
some understanding of how Platonic views on matters such as the nature of human 
existence filtered through to the intellectual and literary cultures and modes of thought 
of medieval Europeans.   
Augustine is often credited with being the author of an original concept of the 
human mind (the view of the mind as an inner, “private” space) via his fusion of 
Neoplatonic and Christian mysticism in the Confessiones.229  It should be noted that 
the originality of Augustine’s theology or his views on human existence are not at 
stake in this chapter.  Rather, Augustine’s works are viewed here as important stylistic 
and conceptual models for the representation of cognitive phenomena to twelfth-
century writers, and by extension, conduits for Platonic modes of thought.  For 
instance, take the following extract from the Confessions: 
 
My heart vehemently protested against all the physical images in my mind, 
and by this single blow I attempted to expel from my mind’s eye the swarm of 
unpurified notions flying about there. 
 
                                                 
226 Cary puts this thesis forward in Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, of which see in particular, 
pp. 45-60 and 63-6.   
227 See Crouse, ‘St. Augustine’s Platonism’, pp. 37-50.  
228 Some Greek texts were available in Western Europe over this period and a small number of Western 
Europeans were certainly able to read Greek (most notably, Eriugena in the ninth century): nevertheless 
these exceptions tend to prove the rule.  For available texts see Muckle, ‘Greek Works’.  Also on texts, 
knowledge, and education see and the papers collected in Sacred Nectar of the Greeks, ed. M. W. 
Herren (London, 1988). 
229 For example see Stock, Augustine: the Reader and Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self. 
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Clamabat violenter cor meum adversus omnia phantasmata mea, et hoc uno 
ictu conabar abigere circumvolantem turbam immunditiae ab acie mentis 
meae.230  
 
In this excerpt, Augustine draws upon a variety of metaphors in order to represent his 
experiences of his own mental life.  Thus, his heart is protesting against another part 
of his being while his mind is a container in which images [phantasmata] are flying 
around [circumvolans] and from which they can be expelled.  And furthermore, the 
mind has a sight organ [acies mentis], with which it is presumably able to view the 
aforesaid images that it contains. 231   This short excerpt contains two significant 
Platonic themes.  Firstly, Augustine uses the notion of an internal rift or conflict 
within the soul or mind (hence the heart can protest against the contents of the 
mind).232  Secondly, the notion of the mind’s eye [acies mentis] had its roots in 
Neoplatonic philosophy. 233   And additionally, Augustine’s use of the concept of 
phantasmata (that is, images, visions or apparitions) echoes Aristotle’s discussion of 
cognition in De Anima.234  
 The influence of Boethius (c.475-524-6) on the transmission of Platonic ideas 
about the natures of the soul and body should also be noted here.  Boethius may be 
justifiably viewed as the last significant exponent of classical Greek science and 
philosophy in the Christian west, probably at least until Eriugena in the ninth 
century.235  He was born into a wealthy and politically influential Roman family and 
brought up as a Christian and educated in the Greek and Roman classics.  Moreover, 
as he was fluent in Greek, he knew the works of Plato and other Greek authors 
directly rather than through Latin translations or intermediate works.236  This is highly 
important as regards the contribution he made to preserving parts of classical Greek 
and Roman thought for the medieval west.  Although Latin translations of Greek texts 
were available to him, he seems to have found them inadequate as he tended to 
                                                 
230 Augustine, Confessions, trans. H. Chadwick (Oxford, 1998), vii: 1: Latin text from Confessiones in 
Patrologiae Cursus Completus, vol. 32, ed. J. P. Migne (Paris, 1845), cols. 0657-868.  
231 Acies literally refers to the tip or blade of a sword, dagger, or other sharp implement and it may also 
refer to the front echelon of an army.  However, in this context it can be taken to be referring to sight 
(especially keenness of sight): see Lewis and Short s.n. acies (cf. acer) (accessed 4 / 6/ 09) 
232 See the earlier quotation of Robinson at n. 35 above.   
233 See Wetherbee, ‘Philosophy, Cosmology, and the Twelfth-Century Renaissance’, pp. 30-1.  
234 Aristotle, De Anima, books II and III, with passages from book I, ed. and trans. D. W. Hamlyn 
(Oxford, 1968), iii: 7.  
235 On whom, see D. Carabine, John Scottus Eriugena (Oxford, 2000).  
236 For biographical details see J. Marenbon, Boethius (Oxford, 2003), pp. 7-10.  
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produce and work from his own, many of which survived into the middle ages.  As 
was noted previously, Boethius’ translations of at least five of Aristotle’s logical 
works were available in the ninth century as well as his translation of the Isagoge 
(intended as an introduction to Aristotle’s Categories) by the fourth-century 
Neoplatonist, Porphyry.237   
Importantly, Boethius intended his translations of Greek texts to form part of a 
much grander project: to reconcile the thought of Plato and Aristotle.  In this respect, 
as John Marenbon has pointed out, he was essentially following in the footsteps of 
Porphyry and the project of Neoplatonism as it had been defined by him in the fourth 
century.238  Like Porphyry before him, Boethius believed that Plato and Aristotle were 
fundamentally in agreement on all important philosophical and scientific matters and 
he declared it his intention to demonstrate this.  Boethius’ work and thought may thus 
be viewed as an important bridge between a living tradition of Greek philosophical 
and scientific learning and the early medieval west in which knowledge of the Greek 
language and texts was severely limited.     
Boethius’ best known and most original work, De Consolatione Philosophiae 
(henceforth Consolatio), was written in the final year of his life (probably 524) while 
under house arrest awaiting execution.239   It strongly reflects Boethius’ conciliatory 
agenda, not only between Platonic and Aristotelian thought, but also between classical 
pagan thought and literature in general and Christianity ethics and theology.  And in 
this respect, and others, it was highly influential in Western Europe from the ninth-
century onwards.240  The Consolatio is a deeply introspective and to some extent 
                                                 
237 On Boethius’ translations of Aristotle’s logical works see Marenbon, Boethius, pp. 17-18.  On 
Boethius’ interest in the Isagoge see Barnes, ‘Boethius and the Study of Logic’ and Marenbon, 
Boethius, pp. 17-42. 
238 See Marenbon, Boethius, p. 20.  On the influence of Porphyry on Boethius and his translation of the 
Isagoge, see Marenbon, Boethius, pp. 20-32.  Also see J. A. Weisheip, ‘The Nature, Scope, and 
Classification of the Sciences’ in Science in the Middle Ages, ed. D. C. Lindberg (Chicago, 1978), pp. 
461-82, pp. 470-1 and Barnes, ‘Boethius and the Study of Logic’, pp. 74-5.  
239 The circumstances of Boethius’ arrest are obscure, although there has been much speculation: for a 
brief summary of possibilities see P. G. Walsh’s introduction to his translation of the Oxford classics 
edition of the Consolatio, pp. xvi-xx and Marenbon, Boethius (Oxford, 2008), pp. 9-10. 
240 The Consolatio was not widely known between the sixth and eighth centuries.  It first comes on the 
radar in medieval Europe around the beginning of the ninth century, possibly after the English monk, 
Alcuin, brought a copy to the court of Charlemagne after a trip to Italy.  For more on this see J. 
Beaumont, ‘The Latin tradition of the De Consolatione Philosophiae’ in Boethius, ed. M. Gibson 
(Oxford, 1981), pp. 279-82 and M. Gibson, ‘Boethius in the Carolingian schools’ in Boethius, ed. M. 
Gibson (Oxford, 1981), pp. 43-56.  On its impact in Northern Europe from the ninth century onwards 
see Beaumont, ibid., pp. 278-305, N. F. Palmer, ‘‘Latin and Vernacular in the Northern European 
Tradition of the De Consolatione Philosophiae’ in Boethius¸ ed. M. Gibson (Oxford, 1981), pp. 362-
409 and Marenbon, Boethius, pp. 172-82.  The Consolatio was also translated into English, probably in 
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autobiographical work (comparisons have been drawn to Augustine’s 
Confessiones). 241   Much of it is written in the first-person idiom and the 
phenomenology of the author is a key theme throughout as the progression of the 
narrative follows a change in Boethius’ mental life and behaviour from depression 
and bewailing the injustice of his fate (i.e. to be executed on, he claims, trumped up 
charges) to happiness and contentment with his lot in life.   
The Consolatio is possibly best viewed as a Neoplatonic meditation on the 
causes and justice of human suffering.  Boethius’ religious sympathies have long been 
held in question: was he a Christian or closet Neoplatonist?  It is now broadly 
accepted that he was a Christian throughout his life.  The survival of a number of his 
Christian theological works has helped to confirm this. 242   However, Boethius’ 
sympathies with Greco-Roman pagan and especially Platonic thought should 
obviously not be overlooked, not least given the form and content of the Consolatio.  
The latter work includes a number of Platonic ideas about the nature of the cosmos 
and humanity which are not strictly commensurable with orthodox Christian theology.  
For example, pressing problems are raised by the closing poem to chapter nine of 
book three which gives a description of the nature and the movements of the cosmos, 
lifted, as Boethius makes fairly clear, from the Timaeus (hence it includes elements 
such as the “world soul” [anima]).243  Accordingly, while Boethius’ sincerity as a 
Christian should not be in doubt, it is difficult to reach any satisfying conclusions in 
regard to precisely how he felt the more heterodox aspects of Neoplatonism (such as, 
say, the world soul) could be married with orthodox Christianity in the west.244   
The more immediate importance of Boethius’ Consolatio here is that it 
transmitted a variety of classical Greek ideas about the human mind to its medieval 
readers, for whom there may have been few if any other sources available on such 
                                                                                                                                            
Alfredian England (871-99), although the exact dating is presently in dispute.  For broadly accepted 
details on this see The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Anglo-Saxon England, ed. M. Lapidge et al 
(Malden, 1999), pp. 29-30.    
241 See H. Chadwick, Introduction to Boethius, ed. M. Gibson (Oxford, 1981), p. 10 and A. Crabbe, 
‘Literary design in the De Consolatione Philosophiae’ in Boethius, ed. M. Gibson (Oxford, 1981), pp. 
256-63.  
242 Boethius’ authorship of the theological tracts now ascribed to him was in question until the 
nineteenth century.  As it is now agreed that these works were penned by the author of the Consolatio, 
it is also agreed that the author of the Consolatio was a Christian who sympathised with aspects of 
Platonic and Neoplatonic thought.  For a summary of this see Marenbon, Boethius, pp. 154-6.   
243 Cf. Consolatio, iii: 9.17-24 / Walsh, p. 56 and Timaeus, 34b. 
244 For a recent summary and argument on this matter see Marenbon, Boethius, pp. 154-63.  Also see 
Chadwick, Introduction to Boethius, pp. 10-12 and H. Chadwick, The Consolations of Music, Logic, 
Theology, and Philosophy (Oxford, 1981), pp. 247-53 (especially p. 249).    
   
 
87 
 
matters.245  Therefore, it is briefly worth highlighting the psychological subject matter 
of the Consolatio by considering some relevant excerpts.  And in particular, it is 
important to note the medical theme that runs throughout the work, in which respect 
the Consolatio clearly presented its early medieval readership with a strong concept of 
mental illness, although to what extent this was recognised is another matter.246       
The first prose section of the Consolatio (which, incidentally, is written in 
prosimetric form) opens with the appearance of the goddess Philosophy before 
Boethius in his cell. 247   Up to that point Boethius states that he had been kept 
occupied by the Muses (i.e. writing the poem that opens the work).  However 
Philosophy dismisses them, declaring: 
 
These ladies with their thorns of emotions choke the life from the fruitful 
harvest of reason.  They do not expel the disease from men’s minds 
[hominumque mentes assuefaciunt morbo], but merely inure them to its 
presence.248 
 
This sets up a major theme of the work, namely that Philosophy is a physician, 
administering medical care to Boethius’ diseased [morbidus] mind.  The doctor-
patient relationship between Philosophy and Boethius (respectively) runs throughout 
the work: 
 
So will you first allow me to ask you a few simple questions, so as to probe 
and investigate your mental state [statum tuae mentis]?  By this means I can 
decide upon your cure [curatio].249   
 
                                                 
245 Although, it is should be noted, Isidore’s Etymologiae and some of Augustine’s are analogous in 
this regard.   
246 There was certainly a concept of mental illness in ancient Greek thought and culture, although it 
certainly differed from modern western ideas about mental health.  See C. Gill ‘Ancient 
Psychotherapy’ in Journal of the History of Ideas, 46 (l985), pp. 307-25 and B. Gundert, ‘Soma and 
psyche in Hippocratic medicine’ in Pscyhe and Soma, ed. J. P. Wright et al (Oxford, 2000), pp. 13-35. 
247 That is, each prose section is introduced and closed by verse sections.   
248 Boethius, Consolatio, i: 1.9-10: the Latin edition of the text used here is printed in PL, vol. 63, ed. J. 
P. Migne (Paris, 1847), cols 0579d-0870a.   
249 Ibid., i: 6.1.   
   
 
88 
 
In this way, Boethius’ presents himself in the Consolatio as suffering from an illness 
of the mind [mens] which may only be cured by philosophy, in respect of which 
Philosophy is cast as a physician goddess.   
This is significant here for two reasons.  Firstly, it demonstrates, quite 
decisively, that the distinction between mental and bodily illness in western thought 
and medicine has its roots in the ancient past: the concept of mental illness was not 
born with modern psychiatry, but rather developed from, and along with, ancient 
ideas and beliefs about the nature of the human mind and existence.250  Secondly, the 
Consolatio, which, as noted previously, was widely read and reproduced in Western 
Europe from the ninth century onwards, presented its medieval audience with a very 
clear concept of mental illness derived from Greek medicine: and the Consolatio was 
by no means the only classical text available in the medieval west that contained a 
concept of mental illness, although it was certainly one of the most widely read.251  
The crucial point to take away from this is, once again, that modern distinctions 
between the mind and body, or even between brain and body, are rooted in the ancient 
past of western thought: we should be mindful, therefore, of how far our modern 
western habits of thought about the natures of the human mind, body, life, and so 
forth, are founded on an ancient set of ideas about those things, even if we no longer 
consciously accept these ideas as describing facts in the world.252      
The mind is represented in the Consolatio in terms consonant with Platonic 
soul-body dualism.  Most importantly, it is cast as an internal source of reason or 
intelligence, as in the following excerpt where it is likened to a library: 
 
What I look for is not library walls adorned with ivory and glass, but your 
mind’s [mens] abode; for I have installed there not books, but what gives 
books their value, the doctrine found in my writings of old [quondam meorum 
sententias collocavi].253  [My italics] 
 
                                                 
250 See references in n. 59 above.  
251 For instance, see the descriptions of epilepsy [epilemsia], madness [mania], and melancholy 
[melancholia] in Isidore, Etymologies, iv: 7 (5-9).   
252 Damasio makes a distinction between brain and body or viscera, which he explicitly flags up as a 
convenience rather than statement of some real distinction between those two things: see Damasio, 
Descartes’ Error, p. 86.    
253 Boethius, Consolatio, i: 5.6.  
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The doctrine in Philosophy’s “writings of old” [quondam…sententias] is perhaps 
intended to allude to the theories of the mind presented in the works of Plato, 
Aristotle, and other Greek philosophers.  Importantly, the strength of the mind in this 
respect is contrasted by Boethius against the weaknesses of the body:  
 
Yet if you consider physique [corpus] alone, can you lay eyes on anything 
feebler than that of humans?  Why, even mere flies, if they bite you or creep 
into some inward part, can kill you!  How can a person exercise rights over 
any other, except over his body [corpus] and that which ranks below his body, 
namely his fortune?  You can exercise no dominion whatever, can you, over a 
free mind [liber animum]?  Or disturb from its natural serenity a mind [mens] 
at one with itself through the steadying influence of reason [ratio]?254 
 
In this way, it can be seen that the basic concepts underlying Platonic soul-body 
dualism and classical Greek and Roman psychology in general were preserved and 
transmitted into the early medieval west through texts such as the Consolatio.  The 
Consolatio was by no means the only path for such ideas into medieval thought and it 
should be kept in mind that other texts conveying similar ideas were discovered or 
imported into the Christian west as the middle ages progressed.  Original works on 
Greek thought were also written by western Christian scholars (e.g. Eriugena’s 
Periphyseon [On Nature], written in the mid-ninth century).  This should not, 
however, detract from the importance of the Consolatio in these and other respects.  It 
was widely available and read in Western Europe from the ninth century onwards and 
thus provided important insights into ancient and Platonic psychology for its medieval 
readers.255    
     
3.1.3: The period c.550-1200 
 
The period between the end of antiquity and the mid-eleventh century has often been 
characterised as a time of consolidation and reproduction of existing materials (i.e. 
whatever survived the collapse of Roman civilisation or filtered into the Christian 
                                                 
254 Ibid., ii: 6.5-7.  
255 On the transmission and reception of the Consolatio see n. 53 above.  
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west from the Greek and Islamic worlds) rather than original thought.  For instance, 
Constant Mews states:  
 
The cultural flowering of the ninth century under Charlemagne, Louis the 
German and Charles the Bald was, by and large, the activity of a small 
monastic elite, more concerned to rescue the past from oblivion than to 
question its legitimacy.256   
 
To an extent, this is undoubtedly correct, particularly during the ninth century 
when the religious and educational reforms of the so-called Carolingian renaissance 
revived and cemented aspects of classical learning in the Christian west.257  Still, it 
should be stressed that this period was not without original thinkers, some of whom 
had a lasting impact on the ways in which future generations of Western Europeans 
were educated and thus thought.258  Moreover, the ninth century should be viewed as 
an important intermediary point in the transmission of Platonic soul-body dualism and 
ancient psychology from late antiquity up to the twelfth century, not least because it 
witnessed the most significant efforts to systematise learning and the reproduction and 
dissemination of texts in Western Europe since the collapse of Roman authority in 
North-Western Europe. 
It is beyond the scope of this study to give an extensive analysis of the 
transmission of Platonic texts and ideas between the ninth and twelfth centuries.  
However, it is worth stressing that the manuscript survival record for some of the 
most significant sources of Platonic and Greek thought in the early medieval west 
begins in the ninth century.  This is not to say these texts were not known or available 
prior to then: only that very little or virtually nothing is now known of their existence 
prior to the early ninth century.259  It has already been noted that the earliest surviving 
copies of Boethius’ Consolatio are from the early ninth century (possibly after the 
                                                 
256 Mews, ‘Philosophy and Theology’, p. 159.  Also see Stock, ‘Science, technology, and economic 
progress’ and Gibson, ‘The continuity of learning’, pp. 1-13.  Also note that Morris used the year 1050 
in the title of his influential work, The Discovery of the Individual 1050-1200. 
257 See the essays collected in Carolingian Culture: emulation and innovation, ed. R. McKitterick 
(Cambridge, 1994), especially J. Marenbon, ‘Carolingian thought’, pp. 171-92.  
258 Most notably Alcuin and Eriugena.  For a brief summary of the achievements of these two men see 
Marenbon, Medieval Philosophy, pp. 70-8.  Considerably more work has been done on Eriugena, 
including the recent biography and study of his thought by Deidre Carabine, John Scottus Eriugena, as 
part of the Oxford Great Medieval Thinkers series.  
259 McKitterick, ‘Knowledge of Plato’s Timaeus’, pp. 85-95, pp. 89-90.  
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English scholar, Alcuin, brought a copy from Italy to the court of Charlemagne).260  In 
addition to this, the earliest surviving copy of the more complete of the two versions 
of the Timaeus available in early medieval Europe, a fourth-century Latin translation 
and commentary by Calcidius, was made around the beginning of the ninth century.261  
The other, a heavily abridged version by Cicero, which often circulated under the title 
De Mundi Constitutione,  is preserved in a late-antique collection of his works, after 
which, the next surviving copy was also produced in the ninth century.262  
Importantly, of the 129 surviving copies of Calcidius’ version of the Timaeus 
produced between the ninth and fifteenth centuries, fifty were made during the twelfth 
century (sixteen copies of Cicero’s version survive from the same period). 263  
However, the eleventh century sees the sharpest rise in the number of surviving 
copies: twenty two compared with two surviving from the tenth and three from the 
ninth century.264  Setting aside concerns about the likelihood of the survival of texts 
between the ninth to the twelfth centuries, this indicates that by the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries the Timaeus was regularly being copied, widely circulated, and read, 
and also that it was valued as a source of knowledge and ideas about the nature of 
God, the cosmos, matter, and humanity (inter alia).265  This was certainly the case, 
particularly among a group of thinkers associated with the school of Chartres in the 
late eleventh and early twelfth century.266   
It seems that the Timaeus appealed widely to its medieval Christian readers 
because it offered them a concise literary cipher for the nature of the cosmos which 
could be unpacked by means of a scientific approach to literature (such as was 
                                                 
260 For relevant information see n. 53 above.  
261 See McKitterick, ‘Knowledge of Plato’s Timaeus’, pp. 85-95, Somfai, ‘Reception of Plato’s 
Timaeus’ and for more general details on the transmission of the Platonic corpus, including the 
Timaeus, see Klibansky, Continuity of the Platonic Tradition, pp. 21-31 and 51-3.  Also, on Calcidius’ 
Commentary see B. S. Eastwood, ‘Invention and Reform in Latin Planetary Astronomy’ in Latin 
Culture in the Eleventh Century, 2 vols. ed. M. W. Herren et al (Turnhout, 2002), vol. 1, pp. 282-90.       
262 See Somfai, ibid., p. 6.  
263 Ibid., p. 8.  
264 Ibid. 
265 This is not to say the it was not widely circulated or valued in the ninth and tenth centuries.  Indeed, 
note that Rosamond McKitterick has rejected Margaret Gibson’s view that the Timaeus was venerated 
as a curiosity rather than used and understood, at least until the eleventh and twelfth centuries: see 
McKitterick, ‘Knowledge of Plato’s Timaeus’, p. 85 
266 On whom see Wetherbee, ‘Philosophy, Cosmology, and Twelfth-Century Philosophy’ and Mews, 
‘Philosophy and Theology’, pp. 173-80 and P. Dronke, ‘Thierry of Chartres’ in A History of Twelfth-
Century Western Philosophy, ed. P. Dronke (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 371-2 and 379, and on the school 
at Chartres see R. W. Southern, Medieval Humanism and Other Studies (Oxford, 1970), pp. 77 and 79-
80 and Southern, ‘The schools of Paris and Chartres’. 
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popular at the time via the influence of Aristotle’s old logic 267 ).  As Winthrop 
Wetherbee has stated: 
 
If the effect of the new scientific literacy of the twelfth century was to make 
men view nature in light of ‘a ratio synonymous with the inner logic of texts’, 
[then] the Timaeus is surely the example par excellence of the authoritative 
text.  To study nature was in effect to decode the Timaeus, and as a result the 
literary character of that text had tremendous influence on the thinking to 
which it gave rise.268 
   
Additionally, the Timaeus was widely regarded as an ethical work in as far as nature, 
of which it gives an account, was often understood by learned medieval Christians to 
reflect the Will of God and hence the nature of morality itself.269   
However, as an account of the creation of the cosmos, the Timaeus could 
potentially also have been seen as a rival to the book of Genesis by its medieval 
readership.  Bearing this in mind, it seems somewhat surprising that the Timaeus did 
not prove especially controversial during the middle ages, not least, as Constant Mews 
has pointed out, because the focus on physical processes in the Timaeus could divert 
attention away from the Augustinian emphasis on reading the biblical account of 
Creation as an allegory of divine wisdom and morality.270  Stephen Jaeger has noted 
an eleventh-century polemic by Manegold of Lautenbach, against the use made of the 
Timaeus by his contemporary, Wolfhelm of Brauweiler.  However, Manegold was 
strictly concerned with the possibility that the study of the Timaeus might go beyond 
cosmology and ethics into theology.  Otherwise, he explicitly condoned its use for the 
teaching of ethics to the clergy in regard to administrative matters.271  Apparently, the 
Timaeus was acceptable as an expression of secular ethical conduct, even in the 
                                                 
267 C. Burnett, ‘Scientific Speculations’ in A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy, ed. P. 
Dronke (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 151-76 and Mews, ‘Philosophy and Theology’ and C. Mews, 
‘Nominalism and theology before Abelard: new light on Roscelin of Compiègne’ in Vivarium, 30: 1 
(1992), pp. 4-33. 
268 Wetherbee, ‘Philosophy, Cosmology, and the Twelfth-Century Renaissance’, p. 33.  Wetherbee’s 
quotation is from Southern, Medieval Humanism, p. 78.  
269 See S. Jaeger, The Envy of Angels: Cathedral Schools and Social Ideals in Medieval Europe, 950-
1200 (Philadelphia, 1994), pp. 172-9.  
270 Mews, ‘Philosophy and Theology’, p. 176.  Augustine gave his views on the book of Genesis in 
book thirteen of the Confessions and De Genesi ad Litteram.   Also see Wetherbee, ‘Philosophy, 
cosmology, and the Renaissance’, pp. 38-9.  
271 Jaeger, The Envy of Angels, pp. 176-7.  
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administration of the “divine republic [divinus res publicus]”, but not as an article of 
faith in itself.  This seems odd given that it has so much to say on the nature of God 
(or the dêmiourgos) and the creation of the cosmos, supernatural beings, man, 
animals, and so forth.     
The Timaeus is likely to have benefitted from the widespread desire among 
medieval scholars to highlight (or even engineer) harmony and suppress disagreement 
among revered texts.  As such, there is likely to have been a strong tendency among 
some medieval readers of the Timaeus to smother potentially dangerous pagan ideas 
by either association or reduction to aspects of orthodox Christian belief.  This 
certainly seems to have been the manner in which the Chartres masters approached 
the portion of the work available to them.272     
The works of a number of other late-antique writers and their influence in the 
medieval west should also be noted.  Firstly, the works written by someone claiming 
the pseudonym of Dionysius the Areopagite (now known as the “Pseudo-Dionysius”) 
first became available in the ninth century thanks to connections between the 
Carolingian and Byzantine courts.273  These works, written in Greek, probably by a 
Syrian monk in the early sixth century (before 532), were heavily influenced by the 
thought of the fifth-century Athenian Neoplatonist (and pagan), Proclus, and went on 
to be hugely influential among western theologians: indeed, they have been described 
as the most influential works of Christian theology between Augustine and 
Aquinas.274  The works of Pseudo-Dionysius are significant in as far as they presented 
medieval theologians from the ninth century onwards with a fusion of Neoplatonic 
thought and Christian theology: this is true both for the Latin-speaking west and 
Greek-speaking east.275  Moreover, his works are remarkable for being known from 
                                                 
272 John Marenbon notes this in regard to William of Conches: see Medieval Philosophy, p. 151.  
273 That is, St Paul’s Athenian convert (see Acts 17: 16-34).  The works in question were sent as a gift 
by the Byzantine Emperor, Michael the Stammerer, to Charlemagne’s son and successor, Louis the 
Pious.  They were first translated into Latin by Hilduin, the Abbot of Saint Denis in the reign of Louis 
and later by Eriugena at the request of Louis’ son and successor, Charles the Bald: on Eriugena’s 
translation see Carabine, John Scottus Eriugena, pp. 16-20 and Marenbon, Medieval Philosophy, pp. 
73-8.   
274 R. Boenig, ‘Pseudo-Dionysius and the via towards England’ in Mysticism and Spirituality in 
Medieval England, ed. W. F. Pollard et al (Woodbridge, 1997), p. 21 and also see the article as a whole 
(pp. 21-27).  On the thought and influence of the works of the Pseudo-Dionysius, also see W. 
Beierwaltes, ‘Unity and trinity in Dionysius and Eriugena’ in Hermathena, 157 (1994), pp. 1-20, C. 
Andresen, ‘The integration of Platonism into Early Christian Theology’ in Studia Patristica, vol. xv, 
ed. E. A. Livingstone (Berlin, 1984), pp. 403-5, and on continuity through Plotinus, Porphyry, and 
Proclus, Carabine, John Scottus Eriugena, pp. 16-26, and Marenbon, Medieval Philosophy, pp. 50-1 
and 73-8.   
275 Again see Andresen, ibid., Boenig, ibid., and Beierwaltes, ibid.   
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original Greek texts in the ninth century when they were first received in the west.  
While relatively few medieval scholars were able to read Greek, those who could, 
most notably Eriugena, were thereby granted the opportunity to engage directly with 
Neoplatonism in its original linguistic context.276   
In addition to this, works by two Latin writers of the early-fifth century, 
Macrobius and Martianus Capella, both of whom were almost certainly pagans, were 
widely read in Western Europe from the ninth century onwards.  Macrobius was 
known through his Saturnalia and Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, the subject of 
the latter of which is Cicero’s Somnium Scipionis (which in turn formed the final two 
books of his now mostly lost work, De Re Publica).  Of these, the Commentary is of 
particular interest due to its focus on the nature of the soul (specifically in regard to 
the causation of dreams) and cosmology.277   More specifically, his discussion of 
dreams in the Commentary focuses on the validity of somniferous visions as a form of 
communication with the celestial sphere, in respect to which the soul’s capacity to 
receive the images viewed as dreams (or in some cases, cause bogus visions) is of 
particular interest.278   
Meanwhile, Martianus is of note for his De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii 
(c.410-39), which was widely read throughout the middle ages, mainly as a literary 
introduction to the seven liberal arts of the trivium and quadrivium.279  It was mostly 
of interest as a school text to its medieval readership, mainly, because it dealt with 
education, and also because of the use of made of classical allegory by its author.  In 
addition to this, De nuptiis dealt with Neoplatonic themes which would have been 
current in the early-fifth century, although it should be noted that Martianus was 
probably not a follower of Neoplatonism.280  More to the point, De nuptiis should be 
viewed as yet another important source of Platonic and Neoplatonic themes and ideas 
for medieval readers on a wide variety of topics related to the seven disciplines 
covered by the work.   
                                                 
276 See Carabine on Eriugena’s use of the works of Pseudo-Dionysius and also Maximus Confessor: 
John Scottus Eriugena, especially, pp. 22-6.  
277 On Macrobius’ discussion of dreams in his Commentary see A. Peden, ‘Macrobius and medieval 
dream literature’ in Medium Aevum, 54: 1 (1985), pp. 59-73 and on interest in Macrobius’ 
cosmological arguments during the early middle ages see Eastwood, ‘Invention and Reform in Latin 
Planetary Astronomy’, pp. 277-82.       
278 Peden, ibid., p. 60.  
279 On the reading and influence of De nupttis in the medieval west see Martianus Capella and the 
Seven Liberal Arts, vol. 1, ed. and trans. W. Harris-Stahl et al (New York, 1971), pp. 55-71 and on the 
somewhat difficult dating of the text see pp. 12-16.      
280 Ibid., p. 10.  
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 Finally, with the maturation of scholasticism in Western Europe between the 
late eleventh and thirteenth centuries, new questions began to be asked about the 
nature of the soul and the composition of the human organism.  This trend is 
exemplified by Peter Lombard’s Four Books of Sentences [Libri Quattuor 
Sententiarum] (c.1150) or The Sentences for short, which, later in the thirteenth 
century, became a set teaching text and standard model for writers of theological 
commentaries.  These books essentially form a compendium, described by one editor 
as being like a “legal casebook”, of potential questions and answers to an extensive 
range of theological issues relevant to Western Christianity.281 
Specifically as regards the soul, Peter considers how it was created by God, 
whether it was made in or outside of the body and, if in the latter case, how it got into 
the body, and whether it has foreknowledge of its future deeds.282  Peter mostly poses 
these questions in response to a sentence in the Book of Genesis about the creation of 
Adam, [E]t inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae [And He [God] blew in his face 
the breath of life] (Gen. 2: 7).  For Peter, as for previous Christian writers, this 
passage raised important questions regarding whether it should be read literally or 
figuratively: most importantly, whether God should be understood to have blown, in a 
corporal sense, the breath of life into Adam, or alternatively whether this is a 
metaphor for God’s processes of willing and commanding: Peter, with Bede as his 
authority, siding firmly with the latter opinion.283  For Peter, the aforesaid sentence 
also raised the question of whether God created the souls and bodies of men apart and 
then fused them at a later moment, or instead created the soul in the body.  After 
briefly noting the opposing views of St Augustine and certain unnamed “others” on 
this matter, Peter draws the conclusion that while Adam may present an exceptional 
case, for all subsequent men the soul must have been created in the body (thus 
inviting, but not tackling, the question of whether the body develops soulless for some 
length of time before the soul is created in it).284   
A number of the authors whose works are discussed below were influenced 
by, or educated in, the developing tradition of scholasticism.  Accordingly, the 
influence of scholasticism can be seen in some of the excerpts examined below: 
                                                 
281 See the introduction to Peter Lombard, The Sentences, Book 2, trans. G. Silano (Ontario, 2008), p. 
vii.   
282 Ibid., dist. xvii: 1-2 (96-7).  
283 Ibid., dist. xvii: 1.2-5.  
284 Ibid., dist. xvii: 2.1-5.  
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especially in sec. 3.3.2, the chief focus of which is report in Guibert’s De Vita Sua of 
a theory of the composition and nature of the soul credited to the early scholastic 
theologian, Anselm of Bec (1033-1109).  It should be stressed that the kind of self-
conscious reflection on the nature of the mind, soul, and cognition typical of 
scholasticism is not of immediate concern in this chapter.  I am mainly interested here 
in the more unthinking assumptions, beliefs, and ideas of the relevant authors on the 
mind, soul, and cognition.  In as far as scholasticism, along with the broader tradition 
of ancient western psychology, can be seen to have influenced, or reflect, these 
aspects of the relevant authors’ thought it is relevant to the subsequent discussion: but 
it is not immediately relevant in itself.       
 
3.1.4: Conclusion 
 
There have been two main purposes of this section: firstly, to give an overview of 
some of the more important aspects of classical Greek thought on the nature of human 
existence, and secondly, to discuss some of the key authors and texts by which these 
ideas were preserved and passed on into medieval thought and belief.   
 There has been a bias in this section towards certain aspects of ancient Greek 
thought, which has inevitably come at the expense of others (e.g. Aristotelian logic or 
Galenic medicine).285  It should also be stressed that minimal consideration has been 
given here to the impact of the Bible and Semitic thought (Jewish or Christian) on 
western thought during the middle ages.  Needless to say, Christianity had the greatest 
impact on the thought, beliefs, lives, and so forth of the majority of people in the 
medieval west.  However, as has been noted above, Christianity was heavily 
influenced by classical Greek thought as early as within a half-century of Jesus’ 
Crucifixion.286   By the early middle ages, aspects of classical Greek and Roman 
thought had been appropriated into orthodox Christian thought and theology in the 
east and west, as can be seen from the writings of the Church Fathers (including 
Augustine, Boethius, and Pseudo-Dionysius among others).  In short, by the 
beginning of the medieval period, Western Christianity can be seen to reflect a mixed 
                                                 
285 See above, sec. 3.1, pp. 73-4.  
286 See P. Brown, Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity 
(London, 1989), pp. 48-50 and T. K. Heckel, ‘Body and soul in Saint Paul’ in Psyche and Soma, ed. J. 
P. Wright et al (Oxford, 2002), pp. 117-31. 
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Semitic and Greco-Roman intellectual heritage.  Hence mainstream Christian thought 
included aspects of classical Greek religion, such as soul-body dualism, which gelled 
awkwardly at best with Old Testament theology on the nature of human existence and 
embodiment.287  
The relevance of this section will become clearer in section 3.3 which focuses 
on the relationship between the body and soul as it is represented in the sample of 
source texts.  For now it will suffice to note that many of the ideas that can be found 
in medieval European texts on the nature of human mental life and existence have 
their roots in classical Greek philosophy.  Among these is the idea that the human 
body is animated by an ontologically independent agent (e.g. the soul [psuchê / 
anima] or spirit [pneuma / spiritus]), which is materially separable from it: according 
to certain accounts, it may also be able to freely manipulate the body and outlive it, or 
at least, from a Judaeo-Christian perspective, survive apart from the body up to the 
moment of the Resurrection.   
 
It will be seen below that ideas like these, inter alia, influenced how the authors of the 
sample of source texts conceptualised and represented human mental life and 
existence hence the relevance of the contextual discussion given above.  It is also 
important to take note of the revival of Platonism in the schools of eleventh and 
twelfth century Europe, especially at Chartres, and to some extent Paris too.288   
John of Salisbury and Peter of Celle can be explicitly linked to this trend from 
their surviving writings.  John was well aware of the teachings of the scholars 
associated with Chartres between the late 1000s up to c.1150, as is clear from his 
Metalogicon.  He also shows extensive knowledge of philosophical works by classical 
pagan authors in the Metalogicon, including Boethius’ translations of Aristotle’s 
logical works. 289  In the Policraticus John shows some knowledge of Plato’s Republic 
via Cicero’s De Officiis and also discusses the three main branches of classical Greek 
                                                 
287 For instance, on tensions between the Hellenic focus on the soul and the Semitic focus on the 
material body as the “true” manifestation of “personal being” (so to speak) see Bynum The 
Resurrection of the Body, pp. 7-17 and F. Vidal ‘Brains, bodies, selves, and science: anthropologies of 
identity and the resurrection of the body’ in Critical Enquiry, 28 (2002), pp. 930-74. 
288 See Wetherbee, ‘Philosophy, cosmology, and the twelfth-century renaissance’ and Mews, 
‘Philosophy and Theology’. 
289 See index (especially s.n. Aristotle) to McGarry’s edition of the Metalogicon, pp. 297-305.  On the 
John’s relationships with the Chartres masters, see ibid., pp. xvi-xvii (including notes) and McGarry’s 
index references to Bernard of Chartres, Thierry of Chartres, William of Conches, Robert Melun, 
Richard L’Evêque, and Gilbert of Poitiers (alt. de la Porrée), all of whom John mentions at various 
places throughout the Metalogicon.  Also see Mews, ‘Philosophy and Theology’, pp. 173-80. 
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philosophy, the Academics (followers of Plato), the Peripatetics (followers of 
Aristotle), and the Stoics (followers of Zeno), and the Greek concept of philosophy in 
general.290  And furthermore, John describes himself as a “philosopher” [philosophus] 
a number of times in his surviving letters and discusses what this meant to him.291  
Meanwhile, Peter of Celle exchanged a series of letters with Nicholas of Clairvaux in 
which he discusses a number of Neoplatonic themes.292  Guibert, Orderic, and the 
author of The Life of Christina show relatively little interest in Greek philosophy or 
indeed the pagan classics.  Walter cites the same passage of Boethius’ translation of 
Porphyry’s Isagoge three times in De Nugis.293  Otherwise, he shows little interest or 
knowledge of Greek philosophy, although by contrast he was able to cite a wide range 
of pagan Roman authors in the work.     
Finally, it should be noted that Orderic’s Epilogue is not considered in this 
chapter.  This is because he does not use terms or concepts in it that are relevant here.  
The Epilogue represents a relatively small portion of Orderic’s Historia hence some 
time could have been spent here on its broader text as opposed to just the epilogue.  
However, given that the other source texts have provided this chapter with an 
abundance of relevant material, it seems unnecessary at this stage to examine the text 
of Orderic’s Historia more fully. 
 
3.2: Taking an embodied approach to the mind 
 
The following discussion focuses on how the authors relevant to this study 
represented the properties and behaviour of cognitive phenomena.  More specifically, 
it draws attention to a perceived tendency to represent mental life and cognitive 
phenomena as though they are unremarkable material objects.  The three subsections 
that follow highlight a number of different aspects to this: space, proportion, 
materiality, weight, and motion.  These topics are of interest for two reasons: firstly, 
they suggest that the relevant authors viewed things like the mind, thoughts, beliefs, 
and so forth as though they viewed them as material objects, and secondly, it brings 
                                                 
290 On the academics see John, Policraticus, vii: 1: on the schools of philosophy, vii: 8; on true 
philosophers, vii: 11 (this theme is echoed in John’s letters 158-9).  The republic is a perennial theme 
throughout the Policraticus: however see in particular books v (on heads of state) and vi (on military 
service).  John also makes use of Aristotle’s old logic at iv: 4 / p. 36 and metaphysics at iv: 5 / p. 39 
and Cicero’s use of Plato’s Republic at v: 11 / p. 93.   
291 See John, Letters, ii: 158-9. 
292 See Peter, Letters, 50-1.   
293 Walter, De Nugis, i: 1, i: 25, and v: 7. 
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into focus problems with the Platonic idea that the human mind is an immaterial and 
transcendent phenomenon.  In particular, it shows that even if the authors notionally 
accepted the Platonic idea of the mind (or soul), they either found it very hard or 
impossible to conceptualise it as the kind of entity that Platonism supposes it is.  
 As discussed in Chapter Two, human reason, abstract or not, is embodied and, 
as such, invariably makes use of the perceptual data made available to it by the body.  
The human body is equipped to experience and respond to natural phenomena like 
space, proportion, weight, materiality, and so on (including the space it occupies, its 
own proportion, weight, materiality, etc.), but not to conditions like immateriality, 
ubiquity, or transcendence.  The world or cosmos may in fact contain immaterial, 
ubiquitous, or transcendent beings or entities, and some people may at times believe 
that they have in fact experienced such things: but as far as we can possibly be sure at 
present, people do not directly experience such things as immateriality, etc., but rather 
derive abstract concepts like immateriality from their immediate perceptual 
experiences of the world.  In short, people can only make sense of abstract ideas like 
immateriality in terms of their immediate, embodied experiences of the world. 
  
I will henceforth use my term cognitive phenomena to refer to aspects of human 
mental life as they occur in the relevant sample of source texts.  This term needs to be 
discussed further here, particularly because a distinction is made below between 
primary and secondary cognitive phenomena.   
Firstly, cognitive phenomena may be active or passive, and secondly, the 
conditions of their existence may differ in the respect that the existence of certain 
kinds of cognitive phenomena (e.g. the mind) may be construed as prior to that of 
others (e.g. the existence of things like beliefs or desires is conditional on the 
existence of the mind).  So for the purposes of this chapter, cognitive phenomena are 
primary if they are represented as wilful and ontologically autonomous agents.  This 
does not mean that they cannot be acted on: rather, what it means is that they are 
potentially able to act by their own volition (or some other such force) and also that 
their existence is not conditional upon the prior existence of something else (e.g. a 
soul does not necessarily need a body to exist).  On the other hand, cognitive 
phenomena are viewed here as secondary if they are passive in that they are 
apparently unable to act on their own accord, and also if their existence is conditional 
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upon the existence of something else (e.g. beliefs exist if and only if there are things 
in the world that have the capacity to believe).   
 The significance of this distinction should become clearer as this chapter 
progresses.  At present, suffice to say that although the criteria given here are rough 
and also that determining the status of cognitive phenomena as they occur in the 
relevant source texts is not always straightforward or immediately obvious, I feel that 
this distinction reflects something fundamental about the ways in which the authors of 
the texts chosen here conceptualised human mental life.  It is possible to think of 
human mental life in terms of substance, so what it actually is, and also in terms of 
functions, processes, and properties, so what it does and what it is like.  What the 
primary-secondary distinction does here is draw into focus how different aspects of 
human mental life, as people conceptualise it (i.e. in terms of souls, minds, beliefs, 
desires, and so forth), relate to how they understand substance (being), functionality 
and causation (processes), and properties (qualities pertaining to things).   
In this way, primary cognitive phenomena may be viewed as things that 
consist of robust materials and perform functions and initiate processes by their own 
volition, in which respects they can be conceptualised as having the properties of 
robustness, agency, and being ontologically autonomous (i.e. they exist in their own 
right).  By contrast, secondary cognitive phenomena may consist of more ephemeral 
substances and may themselves be functions or outcomes of processes, in which 
respect they are passive products of other things.  And thus, their properties include 
fragility or instability in terms of their substantial forms, and being passive and 
products of other things in the world.   
For ease of reference, primary and secondary cognitive phenomena will 
henceforth be identified by the rubrics Φ1 and Φ2
 in brackets (Φ, “phi”, being the 
Greek letter represented in the Latin alphabet by ph): for example, anima [soul] may 
be followed by (Φ1), thus identifying anima as a primary cognitive phenomenon, 
whereas sententia [opinion] may be followed by (Φ2), thus identifying sententia as a 
secondary cognitive phenomenon.  This convention will be maintained as and when 
clarity is needed (most often in tying down the status of secondary cognitive 
phenomena): accordingly, it will often only be necessary to highlight the status of 
many terms once. 
It must be stressed that the excerpts considered below are largely metaphorical 
hence they should not necessarily be taken to express the realities of human cognition 
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as their respective authors saw it.  The justification for this approach was given 
previously in Chapter Two.  However, it seems worth restating the main premise 
underlying this method as it is stated by Lakoff and Johnson in Metaphors We Live 
By: 
 
The idea that metaphors can create realities goes against most traditional 
views of metaphor.  The reason is that metaphor has traditionally been viewed 
as a matter of mere language rather than primarily as a means of structuring 
our conceptual system and the kinds of everyday activities we perform.  It is 
reasonable enough to assume that words alone don’t change reality.  But 
changes in our conceptual system do change what is real for us and affect how 
we perceive the world and act upon those perceptions.294 
 
The important point to take away from this is that while metaphors are by definition 
stylised, it does not necessarily follow that they are “unrealistic”.  Much of what 
follows is certainly metaphorical.  However, by blurring the boundary between 
traditional views of metaphor and literal language, Lakoff and Johnson have shown 
that metaphors cannot simply be fanciful representations of things.  A given metaphor 
invariably must represent something “real” about the personal phenomenology of 
whoever uses it at least in the respect that that person has been subject to a mental 
state that has recommended that metaphor to them as a useful way of understanding 
some other aspect of their phenomenology (which may be a perceptual experience of 
something in the world, a feeling elsewhere in the body, or another abstract mental 
state: what this other thing is doesn’t really matter here as what counts most is the 
experience of a logical connection or similarity between these two things which may 
find expression as a metaphor in language or however else).295  So in brief, the crucial 
point here is that metaphors represent real mental states that in turn represent how 
people experience the world as embodied beings.    
 
 
 
                                                 
294 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, pp. 145-6.  
295 On what these mental states might be in terms of the physical substance of the brain and nervous 
system, see Damasio, Decartes’ Error, pp. 83-113.  
   
 
102 
 
 
3.2.1: Space and proportion 
 
Space is defined here as a medium in which objects may be extended and move (note 
that in this sense, space does not necessarily have to be a vacuum as in modern 
physics).  There are two respects in which space is significant for this study.  Firstly, 
cognitive phenomena are represented in the source texts as objects moving through 
space, and secondly, as containers or media capable of containing other things: it also 
seems implicit from this that they occupy space.  In the latter case, primary cognitive 
phenomena (e.g. anima) are often represented as containers of secondary cognitive 
phenomena (e.g. spes [hope]).  Something also needs to be said here about 
dimensions.  An object in a space will be extended across all dimensions of that 
space.  Thus, an object in a three-dimensional space will be extended across all three 
of its dimensions (i.e. up-down, forwards-backwards, left-right: although note that 
orientation, covered below in sec. 3.2.3, is needed to determine what counts as “up”, 
“down”, and so forth).296    
The assumption here is that the authors of the chosen source texts reasoned 
about cognitive phenomena in relation to their experiences of the three-dimensional 
spatial environment in which they lived.  There is, of course, no means by which this 
can be proven.  Nevertheless, it is necessary in this chapter to adopt a working 
hypothesis regarding what kinds of spaces the authors of the chosen source texts 
conceptualised cognitive phenomena as inhabiting.  Accordingly, it is reckoned here 
that the authors of the relevant texts conceptualised cognitive phenomena as 
inhabiting three-dimensional spaces (thus making them three-dimensional objects) in 
as far as the overwhelming majority of their experiences of the world will have 
involved three-dimensional spaces and objects. 297   By contrast, experiences of 
notionally two-dimensional environments, such as say, writing on the flat surface of 
parchment, will have been relatively infrequent, even among seasoned writers such as 
the authors being considered here. 
                                                 
296 Issues like these were discussed in Greek philosophy (e.g. see Aristotle, On the Heavens, 248b6-
286a36) and may also have been discussed by some medieval thinkers: at any rate, these are certainly 
not modern observations on the nature of space.  
297 For a recent discussion of how people experience space see Lloyd, Cognitive Variations, chapter 
two.  
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 The following two examples illustrate how cognitive phenomena were 
construed by the author of the Life of Christina (item 1) and John of Salisbury (item 
2) as objects moving through a space (incidentally, because these examples involve 
motion, they will be discussed further in sec. 3.2.3).  Relevant nouns and verbs have 
been highlighted: 
 
1. But when her [Christina’s] mind roamed freely… 
  
 Cum vero mens eius liberius evolaret…298 
 
2. That my soul may go forth with greater joy from the prison house of the flesh 
into the sight of the most high… 
 
Verum ut anima de carnis ergastulo laetior exeat ad conspectum 
Altissimi…299  
 
In item 1, mens (Φ1) is the direct subject of the active verb, evolvo.  Accordingly, 
mens is represented as “roaming” by its own accord (or, put differently, mens is the 
source of its movement).300  Meanwhile, in item 2, anima (Φ1) is also represented as 
the source of its own movement (that is, it is the direct object of the active verb, exeo).  
However, in this case anima is also leaving a container: namely a fleshy prison-house 
[carnis ergastuli] (it was noted above that this metaphor has its roots in Presocratic 
philosophy and religion and was famously used by Plato in the Phaedo).301  Although 
no direct source has been identified for this passage, the view of the body as a 
constraint on the soul was certainly widespread in medieval Europe, not least via the 
Pauline Epistles in which the natures of the flesh [σάρξ: sarx / caro] and spirit 
[pneuma /  spiritus] are regularly opposed.302   
Guibert uses a similar metaphor to that in item 2 to describe the relationship 
between the body [corpus] and mind [intellectus]:        
 
                                                 
298 Life of Christina, ¶ 75. 
299 John, Letters, i: 8.  
300 Also see Steven Pinker’s discussion of the role of a concept of an internal source of motion in 
human reasoning about objects in How the Mind Works, pp. 321-3.  
301 See sec. 3.1.1, pp. 78-9.  
302 See Brown, Body and Society, pp. 48-50 and Heckel, ‘Body and soul in St Paul’.  
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3. It is therefore necessary to treat the mind with greater moderation while it is 
still being burdened with its bodily covering. 
 
Necesse est igitur involucro adhuc corporis aggravatum agere temperatius 
intellectum.303  
 
In addition to the sense of the body as a restrictive container for the soul, Guibert’s 
formula makes use of the concept of weight [aggravatus], whereby corpus “burdens” 
or “weighs down” intellectus (Φ1).  Weight will be discussed along with mass in the 
next section.  Presently, it should be noted that items 2 and 3 employ the concept of a 
container in relation to cognitive phenomena (i.e. mens and intellectus are construed 
as contents of the body).  In this regard, items 2 and 3 also imply that mens and 
intellectus are smaller than their respective containers, caro ergastuli and corpus.  
Thus, it is necessary to explore further this aspect of the representation of cognitive 
phenomena, specifically in relation to the concepts container and proportion.      
 Importantly, proportion is meant here to describe experiences of the relative 
sizes and shapes of objects and enclosed spaces.  It is being assumed that the authors 
of the chosen source texts experienced the relationships between objects and enclosed 
or well-defined spaces in the natural environment in ways that allowed them to make 
judgements about the relative sizes and shapes of those objects and spaces.  
Accordingly, they are likely to have been aware of the concepts of proportion 
[proportio] and measurement [mensura] and how these can be applied to objects and 
spaces in the natural environment.  The following examples illustrate how they 
applied these senses to abstract concepts:          
 
4. I doubt not a large space is kept for me in your heart. 
 
 [N]ec dubito quin in pectore tuo reservatus sit amplissimus locus.304 
  
5. Turn over these points and their like in your minds. 
  
 Versentur haec et similia in animis.305 
                                                 
303 Guibert, De Vita Sua, i: 5.  
304 John, Letters, ii: 147.  
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6. She, as usual, was slow to reply, but in her heart she did not approve of the 
undertaking. 
 
Illa sicut semper non preceps in respondendo, corde solum reclamit agendis. 
 
7. Likewise Thou didst bring into my wretched heart [alt. “to my wretched 
heart”] perhaps not hope so much as the shadow of hope [alt. “likeness of 
hope”]. 
  
Induxisti pariter et misero cordi meo nescio si spem ut similitudinem spei.306 
 
8. She began to examine more often and more closely into the depths [secrets] 
of her heart whether anyone can love another more than himself… 
 
[I]n cordis sui secreta scrutinio frequencius studiosiusque cepit discutere, 
utrumnam quis alium quam se...307 
 
In one way or another all of these excerpts cast primary cognitive phenomena as 
spaces in which things may be placed or kept (4, 5 and possibly 7), acted on (5, 8), 
moved around (5), examined (7), or as hiding places or concealed locations of 
thoughts (8 and also 6 if we accept the use of “in” in the translation).  A wide range of 
objects may be placed in these cognitive spaces: a person or friend (4), thoughts about 
something (5), disapproval of something (6), the likeness of hope [similitudo spei] 
(Φ2), and answers (8).  Additionally, the containers may all be viewed as primary 
cognitive phenomena (i.e. pectus (4), anima (5), and cor (6-8)).  Item 7 is of especial 
interest because cor is construed as a container for similitudo spei: hence a primary 
cognitive phenomenon, cor, is acting as a container for a secondary cognitive 
phenomenon, similitudo spei.  From this, it follows that the heart is an enclosed space 
of sufficient space and size to contain a likeness of hope.  Therefore, cor is 
proportionally larger than similitudo spei (or qua a space, exactly the same size and 
                                                                                                                                            
305 Ibid., ii: 292.  
306 Guibert, De Vita Sua, i: 3.  
307 Life of Christina, ¶ 79.  
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shape) and similitudo spei is proportionally smaller than cor (or qua an object, exactly 
the right size and shape to fit into cor).308  
 These entailments do not obviously conflict with the ancient-medieval idea of 
transubstantiation: i.e. that one distinct substance may transmute into another (e.g. 
elemental water may transmute into elemental air if exposed to the right 
conditions).309  Furthermore, it does not make sense in these items for the contained or 
acted upon objects to be merely “accidental” [cf. συµβεβηκός: sumbebêkos] 
properties of the containers or actors.310  There is no question in any of the above 
excerpts of either the container, contained, or area enclosed or bounded by the 
container being transmutations or different qualities of the same things.  In item 7, for 
example, the container, cor, and contained, similitudo spei, are clearly supposed to be 
discrete entities: the thing contained is not a transmutation or accidental property of 
the container (otherwise the container could not logically be a container for it because 
they would be the same thing).  Neither is similitudo spei construed as an accidental 
state or property of cor (in the same way that, say, being white can be said to be an 
accidental state of Socrates): cor and similitudo spei clearly are discrete entities in this 
instance, although I could conceive of circumstances in which similitudo spei might 
explicitly be represented as a supervenient state of cor (and it would be necessary to 
represent this explicitly as similitudo and spes both tend to behave as substantive 
nouns).  To be sure, the accidental properties of being a place and being a container 
may be said to supervene on the set of objects construed as being places or containers 
in items 4-8: but this is exactly the point of the discussion.  Abstract ideas about 
entities whose ontological states and properties are uncertain are being described in 
terms more obviously applicable to unremarkable physical objects.         
 
                                                 
308 Aristotle’s discussion of these issues in book four of his Physics was known by the twelfth-century: 
see in particular, Aristotle, Physics, iv: 3.  On knowledge and reception of the Physics from the twelfth 
century onwards see Murdoch and Sylla, ‘The Science of Motion’, especially pp. 206-22.  
309 For instance, an “atomic” theory of transmutations between the elements may be found in Plato, 
Timaeus, 53e-57d.  For a broader and more openly polemical discussion of the nature of change see 
Aristotle, De Generatione et Corruptione in The Works of Aristotle Translated into English, vol. ii, 
trans. H. H. Joachim (Oxford, 1947): specifically as regards transmutation between the elements see 
ibid., ii: 4 (331a6-332a1).      
310 Συµβεβηκός was originally used in this technical sense by Aristotle to describe the non-essential 
properties of things: for example, it is used in this sense in Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. H. Tredennick 
(Cambridge Mass., 1933), Ζ, 1026b.  This word, sometimes rendered accidentalis in medieval Latin 
(from the root verb, accido), was used in a similar sense by medieval scholars to describe the 
perceptible qualities of things.  Συµβεβηκός is cognate to the verb, συµβαίνω [sumbainô], one sense of 
which is to come to pass: see Liddell and Scott, s.n. sumbainw (accessed 21 / 5 / 2010); see entry iv for 
definitions of συµβεβηκός.  
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The examples cited above go some way towards demonstrating the influence of 
embodied concepts, namely space and proportion, on how the authors of the source 
texts conceptualised and reasoned about mental life in abstraction.  None of this 
requires that any of them really believed that cognitive phenomena exist and behave 
as though they are material objects or that they ascribed properties like size, shape, 
and being a container to them.  The crucial point here is rather that they reasoned 
about them as though they were material objects with properties like size, shape, or 
being a container because the embodied experiences that people have of the world are 
likely to predispose them towards thinking in those terms, even when worldly 
properties such as size and shape are not supposed to apply to the objects of thought.   
Furthermore, when I say that these authors ascribed properties like size or 
shape to cognitive phenomena, I mean this in a very loose and flexible sense.  
Conceiving of an object in abstract thought with properties like size and shape does 
not necessarily commit us to defining precisely how big and what shape we suppose it 
to be.  I may form an abstract image in my mind of a mind as a physical container 
without also committing myself to tackling concerns like whether it is closer in shape 
and size to a tin can or wine bottle or whatever else.  Considerations such as these are 
simply not necessary in abstract thought in which it is possible to entertain purely 
conceptual, if somewhat indistinct, representations of size and shape, which describe 
categories of phenomena that we are able to experience in the world, but not any 
particular instantiations of them (i.e. what Plato called idéai).  However, while we can 
entertain these concepts in abstraction from how they occur in the world, they are 
nonetheless products of the relationship between our bodies and the world.  Once we 
have acquired the concept of size from our experiences of the world, we can use it 
freely in abstract thought: but we would not be able to do this if our bodies did not 
have the capacity to experience and form mental representations of such a thing as 
size in the world.     
 
3.2.2: Materiality and weight  
 
Materiality is used here as a way of describing the phenomenon and property of 
“being material” (i.e. consisting of material substance(s)).  Materiality can be 
contrasted with “matter” which is taken to mean the base units of the material that 
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objects consist of (i.e. “atoms”, derived from the Greek, ἄτοµος [atomos], literally 
meaning “uncuttable”).311   Furthermore, it is important to note that certain other 
phenomena or properties pertaining to objects are assumed here to arise from 
materiality: most importantly, the size and weight of objects (other properties such as 
shape, colour, density, etc., are not important here).  The size and weight of objects 
are presumably determined by the quantity and kind of matter pertaining to them 
hence they will be discussed here as aspects of the phenomenon of materiality.       
Medieval scholars inherited part of Plato’s theory of matter through the 
Timaeus.  Plato’s account of the base components of material things in the Timaeus 
(47e-68d) owed much to the thought of the atomists (particularly Leucippis and 
Democritus), although his account of the creation and formation of matter by the 
demiurge was probably intended as a critique of the atomists who argued that the 
cosmos was the result of accidental collisions among atoms.312  All of this would have 
been lost to medieval readers of the Timaeus who tended to view it as a verbal cipher 
for the nature of the cosmos.313  However, the special ontological status ascribed to 
souls in the Timaeus would not have been lost on its medieval readers, not least as 
they are likely to have been familiar with late-antique Neoplatonism via writers such 
as Augustine, Boethius, Macrobius, Martianus, Pseudo-Dionysius and so forth.314   
In the portions of the Timaeus available in the medieval west (mostly through 
Calcidius’ translation315), Plato argues that souls consist of a substance which was not 
any of the four conventional elements (cf. 32e-33a, 34c-35b, and 36e-d): the passage 
in which Plato explicitly proposes a fifth element (55c) was not available to medieval 
readers, although by the late twelfth century many would have known of Aristotle’s 
even more forceful views on the existence and nature of the fifth element, aithêr, in 
his De Caelo (On the Heavens).316  The Timaeus shows the difficulties involved in 
conceptualising “immateriality” as a state of being.  Plato was only able to describe 
the creation of souls in terms of substance.  It is thus significant that medieval thinkers 
inherited not only an intellectual tradition that categorised things into two states of 
being, materiality [corporalis] and immateriality [incorporalis], but also a canonical 
                                                 
311 See Liddell and Scott, s.n. “atomos” (accessed 11 / 06 / 09) 
312 See Andrew Gregory’s introduction to Waterfield’s translation of the Timaeus, pp. xix-xxii.  
313 See sec. 3.1.3, pp. 89-90 above.  
314 On which, see sec. 3.1.2-3 above.    
315 Calcidius’ translation was far more widely available than Cicero’s: see Somfai, ‘Reception of 
Plato’s Timaeus’.  
316 For the relevant passages see Aristotle, On the Heavens, 269b18-270b32. 
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text that describes the creation of supposedly immaterial things in material terms.  
There is no suggestion here that the authors relevant to this study all knew the 
Timaeus (although John and Peter certainly knew parts of it).317  There is a strong 
degree of continuity between classical and medieval thought on the nature of human 
existence and the Platonic account of soul-body dualism proved to be especially 
successful in this regard.318   Furthermore, medieval writers inherited the intrinsic 
problems of the concept of immateriality (most importantly, how being can be a 
property of immateriality).319  Accordingly, we can expect medieval writers, including 
the authors of the texts chosen for this study, to reflect the problems raised by the 
ontological status and behaviour of cognitive phenomena in their texts.             
Thus, consider the following examples:           
 
1. This, holding my soul in the fingers of its hand, warned me with its own voice 
not to turn away from it. 
  
Hec digito manus sue tenens animam meam, voce propria monuit ne 
declinarem ab ea.320 
 
2. [S]o deep an impression did his manner leave on their hearts, so much 
sweetness did he instil in them.  
 
[I]n earum cordibus sui moris impressit memoriam, tantem infudit 
dulcedinem.321  
 
In item 1 Peter construes his soul [anima] as an object in the hand of God, while in 
item 2 the author of the Life of Christina describes the impact of the behaviour of a 
mysterious visitor on the nuns at Christina’s convent in terms of an impression on 
their hearts [cordes].  In item 1 anima is handled like a solid object (indeed, it is held 
between the fingers of the hand), which tends to suggest that the soul is a relatively 
small object in relation to the hand in question.  This also suggests that, in this case, 
                                                 
317 See John, Letters, i: 111 and Metalogicon, iv: 17.  Also see Peter, Letters, 50-1.  
318 This was argued throughout sec. 3.1 and subsections above.    
319 Indeed, Plato is unable to resolve the problems posed for his account of matter by the possibility of 
voids: See Plato, Timaeus 79a-c and 80c.  
320 Peter, Letters, 51.  
321 The Life of Christina, ¶ 80.  
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anima is of a certain size, perhaps shape, and certainly, consistency (i.e. it is solid 
enough to be comfortably handled), which, in the present sense, implies that anima is 
subject to mass.  Meanwhile, item 2 implies that the nuns’ cordes (Φ1) are solid but 
also soft.  More specifically, they are soft enough to be marked if pressure is applied 
to them, but also solid or stable enough to retain the impressions left on them (unlike, 
say, water which does not retain impressions for an appreciable length of time).  The 
author may have had something in mind like the mark left in heated wax by a seal or 
signet ring, although the range of experiences that could have informed this metaphor 
should not be limited to this.322 
 The main point here is that in these excerpts the cognitive phenomena in 
question behave as though they are “ordinary” material objects not least in the respect 
that properties can be imputed to the materials of which they appear to consist.  Most 
obviously, solidity can be ascribed to anima in item 1 and solidity, softness, and 
receptiveness to impressions to cordes in item 2.  This allows us to think about anima 
and cordes, in these instances of their use, in terms of familiar objects in the natural 
world.  For example, we could think of anima in item 1 as being handled like a 
marble and we could think of cordes as being like heated wax or clay.  More to the 
point, excerpts 1 and 2 demonstrate a tendency among their respective authors to 
represent cognitive phenomena in terms of objects and materials that would have been 
familiar to them from their respective environments. 
 Moreover, to use Lakoff’s and Johnson’s term, a range of entailments follow 
from the ways in which the soul and hearts are represented in these excerpts.323  
Firstly, the relationship between the soul and hand in item 1 is most probably intended 
to stand for the relationship between Peter and the Word of God. 324   Hence in 
beholding the beauty of the Word or God’s Creation, Peter is disinclined to leave its 
sight, in this case in order to correct what he considered to be Nicholas of Clairvaux’s 
erroneous views on the nature of Creation, although he is already resigned to doing 
so.  But more significantly, through this hand metaphor, Peter appears to be 
suggesting his own vulnerability in the hands of God (so to speak): God is freely able 
to manipulate (in both senses) Peter, who presumably thus considered himself to be at 
God’s mercy.  To be sure, the hand most directly represents the Word or Creation, the 
                                                 
322 Constable notes the significance of wax and seal metaphors in ‘Medieval Latin Metaphors’, pp. 8-9.  
323 For a discussion of what Lakoff and Johnson mean by “entailment” see Chapter Two, sec. 2.2.2. 
324 In the broader context of the passage in question, the subject of h<a>ec is something like the beauty 
of God’s Creation or the Word.  Of course, indirectly, God is ultimately the subject of all this.    
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truth of which recommends itself to Peter as a voice (perhaps the Word itself) which 
warns him not to turn away from it (perhaps as Peter believed Nicholas had done): but 
the source of the voice, or the Word, is more obviously God’s, qua the Creator.   
Item 2 also revolves around the relationship between God and humanity, 
although in this case the metaphor is about reform of character whereas in item 1 it 
was more about maintaining good character.  The impression on the hearts of the nuns 
is left by a mysterious visitor, who, although we cannot be sure as The Life cuts short 
before the episode concludes satisfactorily, seems to have been intended as a cipher 
for Jesus.  In any case, it is clear that what the physical change in the form of the 
nuns’ hearts represents is an unobservable change in their minds brought about by the 
example of His exemplary character and behaviour at the convent.  Or to pose the 
matter in different terms, the metaphor draws on embodied experiences of phenomena 
like softness, malleability, and pressure to conceptualise changes in people’s mental 
dispositions towards thought and behaviour.    
  
These points can be pursued further by considering the role of weight in the 
representation of cognitive phenomena in the source texts.  Cognitive phenomena are 
frequently ascribed the quality of weight.  Moreover, they are often represented as 
affecting other things by virtue of their weight: for instance, weighing things down 
(see items 4, 6, and 7 below).  However, determining precisely what is meant by 
“weight” in this context is problematic.  In modern physics weight is considered to be 
a force and is calculated in relation to the gravitational pull of a large body of matter 
(such as the earth).  By contrast, in the “science of weights” [scientia de ponderibus] 
which medieval scholars inherited from classical antiquity, weight was understood to 
reflect the tendency of matter towards a natural state of rest.325  Motion and rest were 
viewed as fundamentally different states of being and matter was believed to have an 
innate tendency towards rest (this idea is related to Aristotelian cosmology in which 
the four elements are supposed to move towards their natural places in the cosmos).326  
Accordingly, the weight of an object was considered an effect of the strength of its 
tendency towards rest (determined by the elements of which it consisted) and caused 
by its movement towards its natural place in the cosmos.  As a consequence of this, in 
                                                 
325 See J. E. Brown. ‘The Science of Weights’ in Science in the Middle Ages, ed. D. C. Lindberg 
(Chicago, 1978), pp. 179-205, p. 179.  Also see Aristotle, Physics, 211a4-5 and 212b29-35. 
326 For example, see Aristotle, Physics, iv: 4, 210b32 and iv: 5, 212b29.   
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the context of medieval science and philosophy, the Latin words for weight, pondus, 
and heaviness, gravitas, were used to denote different aspects of the phenomenon of 
weight: pondus to describe the weight of an object at rest (“still-weight”) and gravis 
to describe the weight of an object moving towards its natural place.327   
Some work has been done on the perception of weight in medieval Europe as a 
natural phenomenon and weight as a measurement, such as in numismatics, and its 
economic significance. 328   However, nothing appears to have been published on 
popular or intuitive perceptions of weight among medieval Europeans.  The medieval 
science of weights is not especially relevant to the argument being made here for two 
key reasons: firstly, there is no clear evidence that any of the relevant authors were 
learned or interested in it; secondly, this section is primarily concerned with how 
immediate, “intuitive”, sensory experiences of weight informed the conceptualisation 
of the mind and cognitive phenomena in the sample of source texts. 
In light of the findings of neuro- and cognitive science, as discussed in 
Chapter Two, it seems reasonable to suppose that intuitive ideas about weight do not 
develop separately from sensory experiences of weight in the world: rather, abstract 
ideas develop in response to sensory experiences.329  Furthermore, abstract ideas can 
affect people’s sensory experiences in various ways.  As Clark has pointed out, people 
and many animals have a tendency to reconstruct the environment to make it fit with 
abstract concepts, attitudes, or assumptions: e.g. that certain materials like, say, gold 
or silver, have intrinsic value which can be measured in weight.330  Accordingly, we 
should remain mindful of the fact that the built environment almost certainly 
influences people’s experiences of weight.  The availability of scales, standardised 
measures, and products or things that needed to be weighed in twelfth-century Europe 
can be expected, inter alia, to have informed how the authors relevant here 
experienced and conceptualised weight.  Therefore, sensation and abstract thought do 
not just overlap in human reason: they respond to each other and thus develop in 
tandem.331  In this way, neuro- and cognitive science tell us that we should treat 
                                                 
327 Brown, ‘The Science of Weights’, pp. 179-80.  
328 On the science of weights, see ibid.  There is some literature on weight in medieval numismatics, 
but otherwise little else.  
329 Lakoff and Johnson are particularly relevant in this regard: see Chapter Two, sec. 2.1, pp. 44-5 and 
sec. 2.2.4.  
330 For a discussion of Clark see Chapter Two, sec. 2.1, pp. 46-9. 
331 The cue for this conclusion is mainly taken from Lakoff and Johnson: see Philosophy in the Flesh, 
especially pp. 3-8.  
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weight, as it occurs in the sample of source texts, not just as a matter of abstract 
representation, but rather as a reflection of how abstract thought interacts with 
people’s immediate embodied experiences of the world.   
 
The following excerpts demonstrate the application of weight to cognitive 
phenomena, either as a property or as a force exerted by an object (which may also be 
a cognitive phenomenon) upon them:    
 
3. I myself as mediator urge each of you to repay the honour due and I urge you 
to weigh on equal scales the honesty of the character and the case which he 
has brought before you, and to give honour to the character and judgement in 
the case. 
 
[U]trumque ad debitum honorem rependendum medius ipse commoneo vos ut 
honestatem persone et iustitiam quam habet ad vos equa liberatione 
appendatis, et persone honorem, causa iudicium reddatis.332 
 
4. When palace officials come down from palace business, wearied with the 
range of the affairs of monarchs, they like to stoop to talk with commoners, 
and to lighten with pleasantry the weight of serious thoughts. 
 
Cum a palacii descendunt palatine negociis, regalium operum inmensitate 
defessi, placet eis ad humilium inclinari colloquia, ludicrisque levare pondera 
seriorum.333  
 
5. They do not accurately weigh the loss of conscience or good name.  
 
Nam iacturam conscientiae aut famae nequaquam subtiliter pensant.334   
 
6. [W]hen she burdened the many secret places of her heart with sorrow for 
her past life.   
                                                 
332 Peter, Letters, 36.  
333 Walter. De Nugis, iii: 1.  
334 John, Letters, ii: 190.  
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 [I]nnumeros cordis angulos ad praeteritae deplorationem vitae congessit.335 
 
7. [T]he mind of an honourable man is weighed down as often as lack of 
resources or a temporary crisis has made him a debtor to a man to whom 
grounds of honour and manners forbid him to respect or love. 
 
[E]t honesti viri grauatur animus quotiens eum aut rei familiaris angustia aut 
articulus temporis illi constituit debitorem, quem ratio honestatis et morum 
titulus coli prohibet vel amari.336 
 
In items 3, 4, and 5 weight is clearly construed as a property of cognitive phenomena.  
In item 3 this applies to persona (Φ1) and to serii (Φ2) in item 4 (translated above as 
“serious thoughts” although “gravities” may be a good alternative).  In item 5, the loss 
[iactura] of fama [reputation] and conscientia [conscience] is construed as a 
weighable object.  However, this seems a roundabout way of saying that fama and 
conscientia are weighable objects in as much as their loss from something will affect 
its weight (hence fama and conscientia, in this context, must be weighable in 
themselves).  Furthermore, although iactura is the subject of the verb, penso [to 
weigh], in the wider context of this letter it is clear that iactura is a stand-in or 
metonym for another subject, namely people, or at least, grammatically speaking, 
whatever part(s) of a person their fama and conscientia belong to.337  John’s concern 
in this letter is ‘certain friends [quidam amici]’ who (or so he thought) showed too 
much concern for the loss of worldly possessions (including reputation) and not 
enough for the loss of virtue [i.e. “conscientia”] or approval [i.e. “fama”] for their life 
(to God and perhaps “good” men).338  Thus, it seems reasonable to treat fama and 
conscientia in this instance as objects of a certain weight (as their loss from something 
else will affect the weight of whatever it is).   
                                                 
335 Guibert, i: 7.  
336 John, Letters, ii: 192.  
337 It becomes apparent as this letter progresses that John probably was thinking of anima as the part of 
the person from which fama and conscientia can be lost.  The cited excerpt follows the current item 5 
in letter 190.  
338 John, Letters, ii: 192.      
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Still, can they be treated as cognitive phenomena?  Firstly, regarding fama it is 
worth reconsidering Andy Clark’s theory of the extended mind.339  Clark has argued 
that cognitive processes are extended from the mind into the environment (which 
includes other people with their own minds).  As a phenomenon, reputation occurs 
across a wide area and time and involves participation by multiple individuals (among 
whom, God could presumably be counted).  In this regard, it is significant that weight 
should be attributed to fama.  Furthermore, it is reasonable to treat fama as a 
secondary cognitive phenomenon in as far as the phenomenon of reputation requires 
participation from multiple minds (i.e. it is a result of cognitive processes across a 
wide spatial and temporal area).  Regarding conscientia, this could be viewed as a 
primary or secondary cognitive phenomenon depending on the circumstances of its 
use (i.e. whether it indicates a discrete object [“conscience”] or cognitive processes).  
In its classical sense, conscientia indicates shared knowledge rather than a specific 
facet of human mental life [i.e. conscience].  Thus, given its use with fama, another 
communal phenomenon, it seems reasonable to assume that in this instance John 
intended conscientia to mean shared knowledge (i.e. among a community of 
individuals or even between an individual and God).340  
 Having established the status of fama and conscientia for current purposes, it 
can be noted that weight is directly and indirectly given as a property pertaining to all 
of the bulked nouns in items 3-7.  That is, directly in item 4, in which serii are said to 
be pondus [heavy] and indirectly in item 3, in which persona is construed as a 
weighable substance in that it is the subject of the verb, appendo.  In item 5, 
conscientia and fama are subject to weight in as far as their loss can be weighed.  In 
contrast to this, items 6 and 7 involve cognitive phenomena (cor in item 6 and animus 
(Φ1) in item 7) being weighed down or burdened by other things.  In item 6 cor is 
burdened [congero] by deploratio (Φ2), while in item 7, animus is weighed down 
[gravo] by a set of circumstances that involve, among other things, being indebted to 
an undesirable or perhaps unscrupulous debtor.  With regard to items 6 and 7, it 
should be noted that in order for it to be possible for cor and animus to be weighed 
down, they must have some substance of their own.  Furthermore, being “weighed 
                                                 
339 On which see Chapter Two, sec. 2.1, pp. 46-9.  
340 Lewis and Short, s.n. conscientia; def. 1 A joint knowledge of something, a being privy to, a 
knowing along with others, privity, cognizance (accessed 16 / 06 / 09).  Also, John uses a similar 
formula in Letters, ii: 297: ‘[E]xemplo pernicioso, et quod sicut vestram conscientiam laedit, sic non 
modice denigrat et famam…’ 
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down” implies that cor and animus are in some sense hindered (perhaps hindered 
from a passive tendency, such as buoyancy, or from an action, such as moving freely).  
Additionally, it is significant that in item 6, the burden on Christina’s cor is none 
other than its own action (viz. being sorrowful [deploratio]).  The result of this is a 
situation in which a secondary cognitive phenomenon acts as a weight on a primary 
cognitive phenomenon (which also happens to be the source of the former). 
 These metaphors are rich with entailments relating to the realms of society, 
culture, and individual phenomenology: most prominently, they provide reflections on 
the natures of good character, reputation, conscientiousness, the seriousness of 
thoughts, and indebtedness.  For instance, items 4 and 6 carry the entailment that 
certain kinds of mental activity are laborious whereas others are more overtly 
pleasurable (the latter point is explicit in item 4 and implicit in 6) by drawing the 
relationship between weight and work or burden [congero].341  In this way, we are 
invited not merely to think about certain kinds of mental activity in terms of weight, 
but also about the moral connotations of work and production and how these can 
apply to human mental life in additional to physical labour.  By contrast, items 3, 5, 
and 7 focus on the usefulness of weight as a means by which to judge the value of 
something (e.g. the quantity or quality of a valuable material), in which respect they 
seem to draw on the domains of economics and trade.  In this way, they provide tidy 
metaphors for describing how one might go about judging the value of something of 
no clear substance, in this case good character and reputation: that is, they provide a 
means for describing with relative brevity and simplicity the nature of a very complex 
and diffuse sociological phenomena (reputation) and the complex evaluative mental 
processes whereby people judge good character.        
 
The excerpts examined in this section help to shed light on how people’s embodied 
experiences of the world influence how they conceptualise and reason about 
phenomena in it which either lack any apparent substance (e.g. social phenomena like 
reputation or mental processes) or that they believe to be substantive, but yet cannot 
be clearly understood as ordinary material objects (e.g. the soul and mind).  Over the 
course of this section, cognitive and social phenomena have been seen to be described 
as though they are unremarkable material objects with properties like weight, mass, 
                                                 
341 Again, note that “entailment” is a term used by Lakoff and Johnson: see Chapter Two, sec. 2.2.2. 
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size, solidity, malleability, receptivity to impressions, and so on.  Of course, none of 
this is to say that the authors relevant here really believed that the soul or cognitive 
phenomena are material objects and hence subject to properties like weight, mass, and 
so on.  As stated above, the point of this discussion is to show how metaphors reflect 
people’s embodied experiences of the world, as Lakoff and Johnson have argued and, 
moreover, the integral role that the body plays in human mental and social life as 
shown by neuro- and cognitive science.  Perhaps most importantly, it is about 
breaking down the ancient barrier in western thought that has traditionally separated 
the body from the mind and culture, which in turn may be taken as an aspect of the 
nature-culture dichotomy.342  
 
3.2.3: Motion, direction, and speed  
 
This section focuses on the ways in which motion and related phenomena (i.e. 
direction and speed) are used to represent cognitive phenomena in the source texts.  
Again, the purpose of this discussion is to examine how the representation of banal 
worldly phenomena in the sample of source texts may be seen to reflect the 
relationship, as documented by neuro- and cognitive science, between embodied 
sensory experiences and abstract thought.343   
Motion was a major concern in medieval science from the twelfth century 
onwards when Aristotelian texts dealing with it became available in the Christian west 
(most notably Aristotle’s Physics which was translated into Latin around the mid-
twelfth century).344  There are no obvious reasons to believe that any of the authors 
relevant to this study either knew Aristotle’s Physics or had any interest in the 
theories of motion that he offered in it or in his natural science writings in general.  
Orderic, Guibert, Peter, and the author of The Life of Christina do not show any clear 
interest in Aristotelian natural science in the works relevant to this study or in their 
                                                 
342 For a critique of the nature-culture dichotomy see Lloyd, Cognitive Variations, pp. 131-50.  
343 As discussed in Chapter Two, a wide range of evidence has been gathered by scholars working in 
neuro- and cognitive science which convincingly shows that sensation and abstract thought are 
intimately connected in human reason and strongly influence each other.   
344 A full translation of the Physics was ascribed to Gerard of Cremona (c.1114-87) by his students: see 
Lindberg, ‘The transmission of Greek and Arabic Learning to the West’, pp. 65-6.  Also see Murdoch 
and Sylla, ‘The Science of Motion’.  
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other surviving writings.345 Walter does not show any interest in Aristotelian science 
in De Nugis.  However, he was educated at Paris in mid-twelfth century and he shows 
some knowledge and understanding of Aristotelian logic via his use of Porphyry’s 
Isagoge in De Nugis.346  Whether Walter’s knowledge of Aristotle extended to any of 
his natural science writings is a matter for speculation, although given the time frame 
(Walter was at Paris by 1154 and may have studied there on and off until the early 
1170s347), he probably would not have come across the Physics.348  John, who was 
certainly the best read of the authors being considered here, must have had some 
understanding of Aristotelian natural science.  He knew a good number of Aristotle’s 
logical works, as is evident from the Metalogicon and he also seems to have known 
parts of the Metaphysics, parts of which supplemented Aristotle’s argument in the 
Physics.349  However, his interest in Aristotle, as might be expected of a writer of the 
mid-twelfth century, appears to have been mostly limited to the contribution of his 
logical works to the teaching of the trivium.350   
 Importantly, motion implies a number of other phenomena: most notably 
orientation or direction (being / going “up” or “down”, “facing” “left” or “right”, “this 
way” or “that way” and so on) and speed (rate of change in position, or “velocity” in 
modern physics). 351   Additionally, motion implies a space, area, or “receptacle” 
[ὑποδοχή: hupodochê] (see Timaeus, 49a), in which objects can be in a state of 
motion.  As was noted in the previous section (3.2.2), movement and rest were 
understood to be fundamentally different states of being in medieval science.352  It 
may be reasonable to extend this assumption to the authors under consideration here 
in as far as it seems strongly intuitive to suppose that motion and rest are opposites.  
This is strictly a matter of speculation.  However, it is worth noting the Newtonian 
alternative that the speed of an object “at rest” is constant (i.e. in equilibrium).  Hence 
                                                 
345 For a brief discussion of some of the other surviving works of Orderic, Guibert, and Peter see the 
discussion of the source texts in the Introduction to Part II, pp. 66-8 above.  
346 See Walter, De Nugis, i: 1 / pp. 2-3, i: 25 / pp. 86-7 and v: 7 / pp. 500-1.  
347 See introduction to James’ edition of De Nugis, pp. xv-xvi.  
348 While this text may have been translated in the second half of the twelfth century by Gerard of 
Cremona, Brian Stock has noted that it was not widely available as a whole until the end of the century: 
see ‘Science, Technology, and Economic Progress’, p. 40. 
349 For John using the Metaphysics see Nederman’s edition of the Policraticus, p. 39, n. 12.  
350 As was noted above (see p. 201), prior to the thirteenth century, Aristotle’s influence on learning in 
the medieval west was largely limited to logic.  Most of his scientific works were not widely available 
until the thirteenth century.  The editorial subtitle used by McGarry for his translation of the 
Metalogicon is A Twelfth-Century Defense of the Verbal and Logical Arts of the Trivium.   
351 For a discussion of spatial cognition see Lloyd, Cognitive Variations, pp. 23-38. 
352 See p. 110 above.  
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in Newtonian mechanics, “rest” in the intuitive sense of the word is impossible.353  
This view of motion was of course not available to medieval scholars.  In its absence, 
it is hard to see how else medieval people could have understood the relationship 
between motion and rest other than in terms of opposites (this understanding would 
have been reinforced by the Physics, in which Aristotle argues that opposition is a 
principle of nature).354   Presumably people’s quotidian experiences of the natural 
world would lead them to this view if nothing else.     
There is also an important point to be made here about agency.  The 
psychologist, Steven Pinker, has argued that people tend to think of moving objects in 
terms of agency, including when moving objects are purely abstract (Pinker cites dots 
moving around on a blank screen as an example).355  Moreover, he has stressed the 
importance of apparently self-propelled objects in human reasoning about agency and 
movement:            
 
People construe certain objects as animate agents.  Agents are recognized by 
their ability to violate intuitive physics by starting, stopping, swerving, or 
speeding up without an external nudge, especially when they persistently 
approach or avoid some other object.  The agents are thought to have an 
internal and renewable source of energy, force, impetus, or oomph, which they 
use to propel themselves, usually in the service of a goal.356 
 
This is relevant here in as far as in some of the excerpts cited below cognitive 
phenomena are construed as wilful agents determining their own movements and 
sometimes those of other objects (e.g. as transporters in item 5).  As Pinker puts it, 
they are able to “violate intuitive physics” by moving around of their own accord.  
The fact that the authors of the source texts were able to conceptualise cognitive 
phenomena not only in terms of material existence but also as independent agents is 
significant and worthy of inclusion in the following discussion.     
Thus, consider the following excerpts in which cognitive phenomena are 
construed as sources of their own movements: 
                                                 
353 Brown notes this in ‘The Science of Weights’, p. 179.  This view of motion is summarised in 
Newton’s first law of motion or “law of inertia”.   
354 See Aristotle, Physics, 1: 5, 188a19-189a9. 
355 Pinker, How the Mind Works, pp. 321-3.  
356 Ibid., p. 322.  
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1. But when her [Christina’s] mind roamed freely, sometimes she saw one, 
more often three lights shining with equal brilliance and splendour. 
  
Cum vero mens eius liberius evolaret: aliquando num tria sepius videbat 
lumina equo splendore luceque radiancia.357 
 
2. That my soul may go forth with greater joy from the prison house of the 
flesh into the sight of the most high… 
 
Verum ut anima de carnis ergastulo laetior exeat ad conspectum 
Altissimi…358  
 
3. [A]nd again we pour forth a prayer to God for you [Archbishop Eskil of Lund] 
that your holiest soul may find again at its going out the treasures which it 
has laid up in heaven through the hands of the poor, and that, replenished with 
the good things of the house of God, it may rejoice with the holy angels in 
eternal delight. 
 
[E]t pro vobis orationem fundimus ad Deum ut sanctissima anima vestra 
thesauros quos in celo posuit per manus pauperum in exitu suo reperiat, et 
bonis domus Dei repleta cum sanctis angelis eterna letitia congaudeat.359 
 
In items 1, 2, and 3 cognitive phenomena are represented as being able to move by 
their own volition or at least some internal source of motion (e.g. a passive tendency 
towards rest or their natural place in the cosmos).360  In item 1, Christina’s mens is 
said to have “roamed freely” [liberius evolaret], although “freely flew away” may be 
a better translation of this phrase as the verb evolo is related to flight.361  Hence, it 
seems likely that the sense of this passage is that Christina’s mens freely moved 
                                                 
357 Life of Christina, ¶ 75: this was cited previously as item 1 in sec. 3.2.1 above. 
358 John, Letters, i: 8.  
359 Peter, Letters, 95.  
360 It seems relevant to note that in Aristotelian cosmology, the elements are supposed to have a passive 
tendency to move towards their natural places in the cosmos: for example, see Aristotle, Physics, iv: 4, 
210b40-2 and iv: 6, 212a 7-13.  
361 Lewis and Short give ‘to fly out or forth, to fly away, to fly up’ for evolo (accessed 18 / 06 / 09) 
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upwards.  This, along with the three bright lights that she saw while in this state, is 
presumably meant to indicate that her mens moved closer to the place of God or 
Heaven.  It may also be that Christina’s biographer understood the soul to have a 
passive tendency to move upwards (i.e. towards Heaven and God).  Meanwhile, items 
2 and 3 ascribe the action of leaving [exeo] to anima (the supine form, exitus, is used 
in item 3).  In item 2, it is clear that anima is leaving the body, which John describes 
using the Platonic phrase, “prison-house of the flesh” [ergastulo carnis], whereas in 
item 3 it is not entirely clear what anima is supposed to be leaving.  However, given 
the content of the passage as a whole (whatever anima is leaving, it is certainly 
departing for heaven [caelus] or the house of God [domus Dei]), it seems reasonable 
to suppose that Peter here means that Eskil’s anima will leave his body at the point of 
death and travel to caelus and domus Dei.  Accordingly, items 1-3 project remarkably 
similar images of the soul or mind actively moving upwards, certainly towards 
Heaven and God in item 3, and probably also in items 1 and 2. 
 Meanwhile, the following two excerpts, both taken from Walter’s De Nugis, 
raise different issues regarding the capacity of cognitive phenomena to undergo 
motion of their own accord:       
  
4. Ah, would that I could obtain some such respite!  As it is, I fear the confusion 
of a mind which has to diffuse itself in all directions may lead me into 
solecisms.   
 
He michi utinam inducie, ne per multos diffuse mentis radios error 
soloecismum faciat.362  
 
5. He burst through ranks of iron, walls and towers, and the spirit which carried 
him to all his victories became effeminated, nay, infeminated by himself, 
since it passed into the weakness of a woman.  
  
Vincit ferratas acies, muros et turres, et qui transuehit ipsum animus ad 
omnes victorias a seipso effeminatur, sed infeminatur, quoniam in femineam 
transit impotenciam.363 
                                                 
362 Walter, De Nugis, i: 13.  
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In item 4, mens is said to be able to spread [diffusus] its rays [radii] outwards, the 
result of which is errors in speech, or, as seems more appropriate here, written style 
(i.e. solecisms).364  There are two aspects to the movement of mens in item 4.  Firstly, 
it is supposed to be projecting rays, which are presumably either of the same or a 
similar substance to itself, outwards.  In this way, it can be viewed as expanding or 
stretching itself out in a medium or container, or projecting parts of itself through a 
medium.  Secondly, error, taken in its immediate sense of “wandering” or “going 
astray”, implies that mens is able to go off without any clear purpose or in any 
determinate direction.  On the other hand, in item 5 animus acts as a mode of 
transportation for its owner: [Q]ui transuehit ipsum animus ad omnes victorias.  Thus, 
animus is capable of moving not only itself but also other objects such as a rider (e.g. 
we might think of animus as a mounted horse).  Furthermore, animus is here said to 
have become effeminated [seipso effeminatur] in as much as it passed or crossed over 
[transeo] to a state of female impotence.  So, to draw some inferences from the 
metaphor, animus moved from a place representative of male strength to another 
place representative of female weakness, in which respect it clearly draws on gender 
stereotypes current in twelfth-century Europe.    
 Finally, the notion of a wandering soul is used more explicitly by Guibert in 
the following excerpt:  
 
6. Thou didst fence in my wandering soul [or mind; cf. anima / animus] with 
rising misfortune against me for such work and with great adversity, and Thou 
didst hold me down with bodily infirmity.  
 
Emergentibus enim contra me super tali opera infortuniis, et multa animum 
evagantum [sic.] adversitate cinxisti, et corporis infirmitate perssisti [sic.].365  
 
Note that Guibert’s mind [animus] is fenced in [cingo] by God in order to prevent it 
from going astray or wandering off [evagor].366  Cingo has a wide range of possible 
                                                                                                                                            
363 Ibid., iii: 5.  
364 In the passage in question Walter is making an unfavourable comparison between his own style and 
that of a certain Guichard, a monk of Cluny (d.1137), whom Walter describes as “the Homer of the 
laity [laicorum Homerus fuit]”: see ibid, iii: 5, n. 4.   
365 Guibert, De Vita Sua, i: 17.  
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meanings, including to wrap a girdle around a body or to fortify something (i.e. by 
building a defensive barrier around it).  However, in all senses cingo carries the basic 
concept of placing a physical barrier or constraint around something.  Hence in item 
6 the movement of animus is supposed to be restricted by a physical barrier.  
Furthermore, like mens in item 4, animus is able to wander off [evagor] which tends 
to suggest movement at a leisurely pace with no clear direction or purpose.  Guibert 
may also be drawing on the common Judaeo-Christian metaphor of the faithful as the 
flock of the God, the shepherd (especially in Psalm 22(23)).367  Therefore, Guibert’s 
animus can be viewed as a sheep in God’s flock that has been set boundaries (i.e. 
bodily weakness [corporis infirmitate]) by Him.  This prevents Guibert going astray 
(i.e. reading pagan literature), or speaking metaphorically, he has been herded by God 
in the right direction or place (e.g. into a pen).                
 Primary cognitive phenomena are doing the moving in all of the excerpts cited 
above (i.e. anima, animus, and mens).  The importance of this is that it shows that at 
times the authors of these excerpts conceptualised things like the soul or mind as 
agents in the environment, capable of moving by their own volition (i.e. external force 
is not necessary to move them).  Further investigation would be necessary to 
determine whether they thought about secondary cognitive phenomena, qua products 
of primary cognitive phenomena, in similar ways (e.g. can hope, sorrow, passion, and 
so on move themselves?).  However, based on the material cited in this and the 
previous two subsections, to the extent that they are secondary to primary cognitive 
phenomena (or perhaps something else), to be capable of movement by their own 
volition would not be particularly consistent with their status as products.   
In regard to all this, it is briefly worth returning to Steven Pinker’s assertion, 
noted previously, that people have a tendency to view self-propelled objects as 
animals.368  I would not suggest that the relevant authors literally viewed the soul or 
mind as animals.  However, it is worth bearing in mind the etymological root of the 
word, animal [animalis], in anima, which is left over from the ancient belief that 
lifeless matter is animated by an immaterial or highly rarefied soul or spirit (e.g. 
psuchê): we might also bear in mind that the Greek word for animal, ζῷον [zôon], is 
                                                                                                                                            
366 Lewis and Short, s.n. cingo (accessed 19 / 06 / 09) 
367 The phrase, ‘Dominus pascit me’ is usually translated into English as ‘The Lord is my shepherd’ 
(this can be inferred from pasco, which means to graze or feed).    
368 See p. 118 above.  Pinker goes on to note, ‘[t]hese agents are animals, of course, including humans’: 
How the Mind Works, p. 322.  Chapter six of Lloyd’s Cognitive Variations is also relevant on this 
point.  
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cognate to the word for life, ζωή [zôê], which perhaps reflects an older association 
between self-propelled matter and life.369   
It is clear that in western thought there has long been a tendency towards 
conceptualising life as something separate from the matter of living beings, such as 
the soul or spirit, or even a life [ἡ ζωή / vita]: hence an animal is an animated or living 
being in so far as it consists of materia plus anima (i.e. the animal is the compound 
product of these two things).  Aristotle demonstrates this kind of reasoning for us 
nicely when he states in De Generatione Animalium [On the Generation of Animals], 
‘the animal is a body with soul or life’, and also in De Partibus Animalium [On the 
Parts of Animals], ‘when the soul has departed [the body] there is no longer an 
animal.’ 370   This is all relevant in that it highlights a set of etymological and 
conceptual associations in classical western thought which are to some extent still 
with us in the present: e.g. materia + anima = (animalis + vita).  And in light of this, it 
should not be even remotely surprising to us that the soul and mind feature in ancient, 
medieval, and even modern western thought as ostensibly autonomous agents in the 
world, capable of doing things by their own free will, such as inanimate matter is 
clearly not able to do.  This is entirely consistent with the ancient belief that animals 
(inter alia) are the results of a merger between lifeless matter and a vitalising or 
animating force or substance.  Indeed, the concepts of a vitalising force or substance, 
such as the psuchê, anima, spiritus, soul, or ghost, were evidently conceived, in 
response to embodied experiences like seeing self-propelled blobs of matter in the 
world, as means of rationalising the phenomenon of life itself.     
 
3.2.4: Conclusion 
 
Modern neuroscience and cognitive science present us with compelling reasons for 
believing that the human brain provides the substrate for any such representations, 
and moreover, that the sensory access that these representations provide us to the 
world is very much mediated via the sensory faculties of the body: in short, we 
experience the world via our bodies in the terms in which they present the world to us, 
                                                 
369 For more detail see the earlier discussion in sec. 3.1.1, p. 76 above.  
370 Aristotle, De Generatione Animalium, 738b20 and On the Parts of Animals, 641a19-20 respectively.  
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among which may be included our experiences of things like space, proportion, 
weight, motion, and so on.371   
This has important consequences for what I am proposing here.  It has been 
seen in this section that mental representations of embodied experiences of the world 
are not only of value in human mental life as practical knowledge about the workings 
of the environment: they are also potentially of value in abstract and imaginative 
mental processes such as metaphor.  This fits in with the view of metaphor presented 
by Lakoff and Johnson in Metaphors We Live By: i.e. as a category of cognitive 
processes, defined by associative reasoning, that are necessarily shaped by individual 
embodied experiences of the world (natural and cultural).  More to the point, this 
provides us with a method for relating the human body to abstract mental processes 
and thereby to representations of abstract and speculative thought figured in cultural 
artefacts such as texts.   
The above discussion has been pertinent in this regard in that it has drawn 
attention to connections between embodied experiences of natural phenomena and 
abstract ideas and modes of reasoning about the natures of human mental life, social 
life, and the relationship between humanity and God.  This section has shown that 
even though the authors relevant here may have believed that the mind, soul, and 
cognitive phenomena were subject to metaphysical properties such as immateriality or 
transcendence, they were only able to conceptualise these ideas in terms of their 
embodied experiences of the world.  In this way, we are to some extent able to link 
the authors of the sample of source texts back to the embodied conditions of their 
respective existences: we can think of them as more than just names attached to texts.       
 
3.3: Taking an embodied approach to the mind-body relationship372   
 
Having provided an account of how embodied experiences inform and shape abstract 
and speculative reasoning on human mental life in the sample of source texts, this 
chapter now turns to consider the most fundamental concern of classical western 
                                                 
371 The literature relevant here was surveyed in Chapter Two. 
372 As stated previously in Chapter Two, sec. 2.2, “mind-body dualism” is a somewhat simplistic label 
for a fairly broad range of beliefs about the nature of human existence (a range of which were 
documented in sec. 3.1 of this chapter).  I have used mind in the title and subtitles of this section: it 
should be noted, however, that sometimes “soul”, “spirit”, or some other term may be more appropriate 
labels for the topic of discussion. 
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psychology as regards the nature of human existence: namely the relationship 
between the mind (or soul) and body.  I should reiterate that it is important here to 
take the idea of soul-body dualism seriously as a reasoned view or belief about the 
nature of human existence.373  For whatever reasons, the western concept of soul-body 
dualism is often treated by proponents of cognitive science as though it is an 
inherently irrational idea: it is rarely considered in its historical context and it is 
frequently linked to the seventeenth-century French philosopher, Descartes, as though 
he alone was responsible for its prevalence in western thought up to the early 
twentieth century.374   
 In this section, I intend to investigate the embodied logic or “sense” of belief 
in the set of ideas which are now usually crammed under the umbrella-term, mind-
body dualism, as they occur in the sample of source texts.  My key argument in this 
section is that for medieval Europeans, such as the authors relevant here, mind-body 
dualism must have made a degree of embodied sense.  That is, mind-body dualism 
could not have made sense to medieval people just on the level of abstract reasoning.  
As discussed in Chapter Two, the findings of neuro- and cognitive science show that 
abstract ideas, like mind-body dualism, must have some basis in embodied sensory 
experiences of the “ordinary” world.375  I am not ruling out abstract thought in this 
account.  Instead, as in previous section, my key argument here is that the relevant 
authors conceptualised the mind-body relationship in response to the interplay 
between their embodied experiences of the world and the abstract modes of reasoning 
by which they conceptualised and thought about those experiences.       
 
3.3.1: The separateness of mind, body, and soul 
 
I shall begin by tackling the matter of the separateness of the main components of the 
human organism as it was conceptualised in premodern western thought: the mind, 
body, and soul (which, as noted above, is not necessarily the same thing as the 
                                                 
373 For an earlier discussion of this issue see Chapter Two, sec. 2.1, pp. 49-51.  
374 For example, see Dennett, Consciousness Explained, pp. 33-5, Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, 
p. 13, and Damasio, Descartes’ Error, pp. 247-52.  Pinker notes the unfair treatment of Descartes by 
modern scientists in How the Mind Works, pp. 77.  
375 In particular, I take my cue here from the work of Lakoff and Johnson in Philosophy in the Flesh, 
discussed in Chapter Two, sec. 2.1, pp. 44-7.   The whole of Chapter Two is relevant in this regard.   
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mind).376  To begin, consider the following set of excerpts (the first four have been 
cited previously) in which the mind, body, and soul, or facets of them, are represented 
in various ways as self-standing entities: 
 
1. But when her [Christina’s] mind [mens] roamed freely…377 
 
2. That my soul [anima] may go forth with greater joy from the prison house of 
the flesh [carnis ergastulum] into the sight of the most high.378 
   
3. Thou didst fence in my wandering soul [animus] with rising misfortune 
against me for such work and with great adversity, and Thou didst hold me 
down with bodily infirmity.379  
 
4. [M]y spirit threatens its departure, yet still cleaves to my limbs in the desire 
and hope of your coming. 
 
[R]ecessum minatur spiritus, haeret tamen membris in desiderio et spe 
adventus vestri.380 
 
5. I have a firm intention, with God’s help and so far as he grants, to follow 
procedure which virtue prescribes and not to lose my soul’s salvation in the 
market of the world by selling it for any temporal gain. 
 
Fixum est michi, Deo auctore, propositum, quatenus ipse dederit, honestatis 
formulam sequi et animae salutem in mundi commercio non distrahere ad 
boni cuiuscumque precium temporalis.381 
 
6. The victory of the flesh is against reason, for man desires the things of God 
little and those of the world much.  But reason, when it is held to, is the 
                                                 
376 See sec. 3.1.1, pp. 76-7 and sec. 3.2.3, pp. 122-3 above.  
377 Life of Christina, ¶ 75: cited previously as item 1 in sec. 3.2.1. 
378 John, Letters, i: 8: cited previously as item 2 in sec. 3.2.1.  
379 Guibert, De Vita Sua, i: 17: cited previously as item 6 in sec. 3.2.3.   
380 John, Letters, i: 121. 
381 John, Letters, i: 190.  
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triumph of the soul, for it renders to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and to 
God the things that are God’s. 
 
Victoria carnis est adversus racionem, quod que Dei sunt minus appétit homo, 
que mundi maxime.  Racio vero, cum tenetur, anime triumphus est; reddit que 
Cesaris Cesari, Deique Deo.382 
 
7. But the winter nights confer by their length not aversion or boredom but 
sometimes a double blessing.  For they afford the body rest and renew the 
time-worn soul.  On top of this they add the liberty to look again upon 
heavenly things, to inquire into one’s own inner depths and also to call friends 
to mind again…They also conduct souls in their peace and silence ‘even to the 
third heaven’ [2 Cor. 12: 2], while they carry holy desires forth beyond the 
world, beyond the flesh, above the soul, to the regal bodies of the omnipotent 
Word. 
 
Hiemales autem noctes sua prolixitate non fastidium aut tedium sed interdum 
duplex beneficium conferunt.  Tribuunt etenim corpori requiem et anime 
renouant vetustatem.  Addunt insuper licentiam revisendi celestia, sua 
penetralia inquirendi, nec non et amicorum reminiscendi…Ducunt etiam sua 
quiete et silentio animas ‘usque ad tertium celum’, dum extra mundum, extra 
carnem, supra animam, ad regales sedes omnipotentis Verbi sancta desideria 
prouehunt.383 
 
There are numerous things going on in these excerpts which make them relevant here.  
Firstly, the spirit [spiritus] and soul [anima] are able to leave the limbs [membra] or 
flesh [caro] (items 2 and 4 respectively).  The spirit, soul, and mind [mens / animus] 
are able to move around freely (items 1-4).  In item 6, the flesh [caro] is said to 
inveigh against the soul [anima] in as far as it goes against reason [ratio] which is 
apparently an inherent quality or possession of the soul [animae triumphus est].  
Therefore, the body and soul can be viewed as having incompatible tendencies.  And 
finally in item 7 (and in contrast to item 6), rest [requies] is said to be beneficial to the 
                                                 
382 Walter, De Nugis, ii: 1.   
383 Peter, Letters, 128.  
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body [corpus] and soul [anima], in which case the natures of the body and soul are 
compatible although they are still discrete entities.  
Given the importance of the body in the scheme of Christian Salvation, item 5 
is somewhat problematic.  For present purposes, the key point of this excerpt is that 
John names the soul [anima] as the beneficiary of salvation: that is, it is the soul, 
rather than the body or person as a whole, which is subject to salvation (and 
presumably also damnation).  It is extremely doubtful that John in any way saw this 
statement as deviating from orthodox Western Christian interpretations of the doctrine 
of the Resurrection.384  As the Resurrection will happen at the end of time, there is no 
need for the body to have an afterlife until that moment.   Prior to the end of time, as 
fashionable scholastic debates had it, only the soul need reside in heaven, hell, and 
later in purgatory.  Accordingly, John’s view that the salvation of the soul occurs 
separately from the salvation of the body is firmly in kilter with contemporary and 
later scholastic thought.385   What is most revealing about this here is that, according 
to John’s thinking, the soul could be saved, or damned, and have a separate existence 
in heaven, or hell, long before either possibility became open to the body.   
 Thus, in all of these excerpts (items 1-7) cognitive phenomena are represented 
as logically or ontologically discrete things.  This may be in as much as they are able 
to move freely (items 1-4), separate themselves from the body or flesh (items 2 and 
4), be saved independently of the body (item 5), subject to their own nature which is 
different and indeed goes against that of the flesh (item 6), and gain different benefits 
from rest to those of the body (item 7).  In each case they are conceptualised as things 
with natures, tendencies, and properties that are their own: i.e. not shared with the 
body or anything else.     
Bearing this in mind, as well as the ways in which cognitive phenomena are 
often represented in the sample of source texts as self-propelled wilful agents, it 
seems quite possible that the relevant authors’ beliefs and ideas about the mind and 
cognition were influenced by their embodied experiences of living beings in the 
world.386  This is not to say that these authors (or anybody else) innately formed the 
concepts of the soul, spirit, or mind-body dualism in response to their first 
                                                 
384 On the Resurrection of the body see Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body, Vidal ‘Brains, Bodies, 
Selves, and Science’, and Morrison, Excrement in the Middle Ages, pp. 41-4.  
385 On the afterlife of the soul see E. Cohen, The Modulated Scream: Pain in late Medieval Culture 
(Chicago, 2010), pp. 180-7.  
386 See the earlier discussion at sec. 3.2.3, pp. 122-3. 
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experiences of living beings.  The set of ideas that they entertained about the nature of 
the mind and its relationship with the body clearly developed in western thought over 
many centuries, becoming increasingly sophisticated and abstract (as discussed in sec. 
3.1).  Instead, my argument here is that the range of beliefs and ideas about the mind, 
cognition, and the mind-body relationship which can be found in the sample of source 
texts may be accounted for in terms of interplay between socio-cultural biases 
favouring those ideas in the first place and embodied experiences of self-propelled, 
and apparently wilful, living beings.  Furthermore, according to this account, the said 
socio-cultural biases must have developed in the first place in response to embodied 
experiences of self-moving things in the world.  It seems a small logical step to 
advance from noticing that some things in the world move by themselves while others 
don’t to the conclusion that self-moving things must have something that non-self-
moving things don’t: i.e. a source of agency; viz. “mind”, “spirit”, or “soul”.   
In this way, a reasonably strong case can be made for grounding key ideas 
within the ancient tradition of western psychology, such as the soul, spirit, and mind-
body dualism, in people’s embodied experiences of the world.  Contrary to the 
teachings of premodern western psychology, the basis of ideas like the soul, spirit, 
and mind-body dualism may thus be seen to be in the embodied conditions of human 
existence rather than a supposed capacity of human beings to engage directly with a 
transcendent and eternal reality through strictly abstract modes of rational thought.387   
 
3.3.2: Partitioning the mind 
    
In light of the findings of the previous section, I shall now discuss an anecdote from 
Guibert’s De Vita Sua in which, recounting a period when he studied at the abbey of 
Bec under St Anselm (1033-1109), he imputes the following views on the structure of 
the mind [spiritus] to Anselm: 
 
1. His teaching was to divide the mind in a threefold or fourfold way, to treat the 
operations of the whole interior mystery under the headings of appetite, will, 
reason, and intellect. 
                                                 
387 This argument is strongly influenced by the work of Lakoff and Johson in Philosophy in the Flesh 
(as discussed in Chapter Two, sec. 2.1) and also Lakoff’s collaborative work with Núñez in Where 
Mathematics Comes From.  
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Is itaque tripartito aut quadripartito mentem modo distinguere docens, sub 
affectu, sub voluntate, sub ratione, sub intellectu commercia totius interni 
mysterii tractare.388  
 
Anselm’s way of dividing spiritus (Φ1) into parts sits firmly within the tradition of 
Platonic psychology: indeed, Guibert makes it clear that the schema noted in item 1 
was not Anselm’s own.389   
The main point of interest about this schema for present purposes is its utility, 
both for Anselm (assuming Guibert’s report is accurate) and Guibert who describes it 
with approval.  Thus, to state the key question bluntly, why would Anselm believe, or 
teach, his students that the human spirit can be divided into three or four parts: 
affectus, voluntus, ratio, and intellectus (all Φ1)?  Firstly, it is necessary to determine 
whether Anselm or Guibert believed that this schema reflected the reality of the spirit 
(i.e. that it really is or can be divided into three or four parts) or rather that it was a 
conceptually useful way of thinking about the spirit, but not representative of its 
actual existence: i.e. the spirit is a homogenous entity, which, for certain intellectual 
purposes, can be divided into distinct segments.   
This matter becomes clearer as Guibert’s account progresses: 
 
2. By a resolution, based on clear analyses, of what I and many others thought to 
be one, he showed that appetite and will are not identical, although it is 
established by evident assertions that in the presence of reason or intellect they 
are practically the same. 
 
[E]t quae una a plerisque et a me ipso putabantur certis divisionibus resoluta, 
non idem duo prima fore monstrabat, quae tamen accedentibus quarto vel 
tertio eadem mox esse promptis assertionibus constat.390 
 
                                                 
388 Guibert, De Vita Sua¸i: 17.  
389 ‘[I]t was plain however, that he did not originate this, but got it from books at hand which did not so 
explicitly deal with these matters [quae tamen non ex se, sed ex quibusdam contiguis voluminibus, at 
minus patenter quidem ista tractantibus eum habuisse constaret]’: Guibert, De Vita Sua, i: 17 / Benton, 
p. 90.  Platonic psychology was discussed previously in sec. 3.1.1.    
390 Ibid., i: 17.  
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It seems reasonably clear from this that Anselm, and eventually Guibert, believed that 
the spirit could in reality be divided into parts at least in as far as these could be 
discerned by scholastic analysis.  But additionally, in order for these labels to have 
made embodied sense they must somehow have correlated with Theobald’s and 
Guibert’s conscious experiences of themselves and other people in the world.        
It is significant that this schema allowed Anselm and Guibert to identify a set 
of cognitive phenomena as the causes of their manifestations in human consciousness 
and behaviour.  So, for instance, by this account a part of the human spirit, which can 
be named voluntas, is sufficient to account for conscious experiences of the will and 
observable instances of wilful behaviour in the world.  In other words, wilful 
behaviour is caused by a discrete entity in the world, namely will, which can be 
treated as synonymous with the phenomena that it causes.  Therefore, the embodied 
basis of this idea may be seen, at the very least, in conscious experiences of free will 
and also in observations of other people or animals apparently exercising their free 
will.  This can be tied in with the point made earlier that the ideas of the soul, spirit, 
and mind-body dualism may have an embodied basis in observations of self-propelled 
objects.391  Hence it may be that it was not only conscious experiences of their own 
affection, will, reason, and intellect that led Anselm and Guibert to accept the utility 
of partitioning the soul along these lines, but also observation of other beings in the 
world which exhibit behaviour which is best understood in terms of them also having 
affection, will, reason, and intellect: i.e. other people and to a lesser extent some 
animals.   
If this is the case, however, then Anselm’s tri- or quadripartite schema raises 
some difficult questions regarding precisely how it accounts for phenomena that it 
does not name.  For instance, how could it account for spes without identifying a part 
of spiritus with or as spes?  Presumably Anselm and Guibert would have accepted 
that there are such things as hopes in the world so why not also a part of the spirit that 
specifically causes hopes?  Or would they have charged one of the four named facets 
of the spirit with responsibility for the production of hopes in the world?  Perhaps 
Anselm would have tackled this difficulty in the latter manner by drawing a 
distinction similar to that posed here between primary and secondary cognitive 
phenomena: hence affectus, voluntus, ratio, and intellectus could be construed as Φ1 
                                                 
391 See sec. 3.2.3, pp. 118 and 122-3, and also sec. 3.3.1, pp. 128-9. 
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and all other qualitative mental phenomena as Φ2 because the former cause the latter.  
These issues cannot be resolved here: however, it is worth noting that they were 
pointed out in antiquity by Aristotle in De Anima in criticism of Plato’s theories of the 
soul.392  Additionally, in posing a tri- or quadripartite schema of the human spirit, 
Anselm was probably also influenced by attitudes towards those numbers in medieval 
philosophy, science, medicine, and theology.393       
 Another issue that this schema appears to have addressed for Anselm and 
Guibert is their concerns about the correct management of the person as whole, 
including the body.  Thus, prior to items 1 and 2 Guibert states: 
 
3. While he was still prior at Bec, he admitted me to his acquaintance, and 
though I was a mere child of most tender age and knowledge, he readily 
offered to teach me to manage my inner self [alt. my inner man / person], how 
to consult the laws of reason in the government of the body. 
 
Qui cum in prioratu praelibati coenobii adhuc ageret, suae me cognitioni 
ascivit, et omnino puerulum, et in summa et aetatis et sensus teneritudine 
positum, qualiter interiorem meum hominem agerem, qualiter super regimine 
corpusculi, rationis jura consulerem, multa me docere intentione proposuit.394   
 
In light of this, the meaning and purpose of Anselm’s theory on the composition of 
spiritus alters somewhat.  Firstly, knowing the composition of spiritus is apparently 
advantageous in as far as it improves “management” or “conduct” [ago] of, as Guibert 
puts it, one’s “inner humanity” [hominem interiorem]: note that this was probably 
intended as an agrarian metaphor in that ago immediately means to drive or herd 
animals hence interiorem hominem is being driven or impelled like a domesticated 
                                                 
392 See Aristotle, De Anima, 432a22-432b6.  Although this text was not widely known or available in 
Western Europe until the thirteenth century, the objection in question seems a fairly “common-sense” 
one and as such, we should not rule out the possibility, or perhaps even likelihood, that it occurred to 
many medieval thinkers who had not read or picked it up from De Anima.    
393 The numbers three and four were most obviously significant in medieval Europe as the numbers of 
the Trinity and the four elements and humours respectively: these could also be associated with the 
number of angles pertaining to the two most basic geometrical shapes, the triangle and square.  There 
has been a relatively continuous tradition of numerological mysticism in Europe from the Greeks up to 
the present: see s. n. “numerology”, Dictionary of Gnosis and Western Esotericism.  Additionally, 
Esther Cohen independently makes the same observation in regard to attitudes towards pain in late 
medieval medical discourse in The Modulated Scream, pp. 156-7.      
394 Guibert, De Vita Sua, i: 17.  The Anselm in question was prior and then abbot at Bec between 1063-
1093 and Archbishop of Canterbury 1093-1109. 
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animal.  Furthermore, it follows from items 1 and 3 that Anselm had taught that ratio 
was the best judge of bodily conduct, presumably by contrast with intellectus, 
affectus, and voluntas.  If so, this sets up an important, metaphorical relationship 
between the body and spiritus: namely, that the body is under the “government” 
[regimen] of the spirit.  We might go further by stating that the spirit is, in effect, ruler 
or king [rex] of the body.  These issues will be explored further in following chapter 
in regard to the “body politic” metaphor.395   
At present, it will suffice to note that Anselm and Guibert clearly viewed 
bodily control as a function of the spirit in as far as they construed it as a collective of 
functioning parts, each responsible for overseeing different aspects of cognition and 
behaviour.  As such, terms ordinarily used to describe control as a phenomenon 
extended across areas wider than the individual human organism (e.g. “driving” 
[agens], “consulting” or “advising” [consulens], “controlling” or “governing” 
[regens]) could be appropriately used by Guibert to discuss the internal mechanisms 
controlling the overall behaviour of the individual human organism.  The parts of the 
spirit are able to apply force to control the individual [ago]: they can be consulted or 
sought out as advisors [consulo] (the wording of item 3 implies that there is an 
exteriorem hominem which should, although need not necessarily, consult its 
counterpart, the interiorem hominem).  Finally, the parts of the spiritus, individually 
or together, are able to control the individual in an organised fashion [regimen] as 
opposed to, say, randomly exerting force with no guiding or overall purpose.  There is 
also a strong trace of ancient Stoic thought in this, specifically as regards the 
separation of the appetite and will, such as was recommended by the Stoics in order 
for the individual to obtain an ultimate form of embodied freedom from the trappings 
of the world.396   
Although Anselm’s theory of the composition of the soul has a clear basis in 
western psychology from the Greeks onwards (particularly in Platonism), it can also 
be understood in terms of Anselm’s more direct experiences of his own mental life.  
The embodied view of the mind, discussed in Chapter Two, strongly suggests that 
Anselm would not have identified affectus, voluntas, ratio, and intellectus as the parts 
of the soul if he did not have embodied experiences of things to which he could apply 
                                                 
395 See Chapter Four, sec. 4.3. 
396 On the influence of Stoic thought in the medieval west see Lapidge, ‘The Stoic inheritance’.  
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these labels.397  As noted above, this theory of the soul was not originally Anselm’s.  
Neither were the labels affectus, voluntas, ratio, and intellectus, the conceptual and 
semantic histories of which stretch back far beyond the late eleventh century.    
Nevertheless, Anselm and Guibert both found value in this theory, undoubtedly 
because it in some way fitted with their consciousness experiences of themselves and 
probably also their perceptions of the behaviour of other people.  Furthermore, it 
clearly had useful applications in the world for both men, especially as a means of 
improving self-control, in which regard it was not merely an abstract theory: it was a 
means of self-improvement.      
 
3.3.3: Conclusion 
 
In brief, my argument in this section is that premodern western beliefs and ideas about 
the nature of the mind and the composition of the human organism had a partial basis 
in people’s embodied experiences of the world.  I am in no way suggesting that any of 
the beliefs and ideas discussed in this section are innate.  It should be clear from the 
content of sec. 3.1 that the views of the authors considered here on the mind, 
cognition, and mind-body relationship were to a significant degree underpinned by an 
ancient tradition of western psychology.398  Neither embodied reasoning nor cultural 
biases are sufficient to account for the development of the range of beliefs and ideas 
that constitute what I have described in this chapter as premodern western 
psychology.  Instead, what is needed is an appreciation of how these two elements 
influence each other and so develop in tandem.  The mutual influence of embodied 
reasoning and cultural biases is nicely exemplified by Anselm’s theory of the soul 
discussed above.  In this case, Anselm can be seen to be borrowing terms and 
concepts from well-established traditions of thought on the nature of the mind because 
he could relate them to his experiences of his own mental life.  Anselm’s choice of 
terms and concepts, and the theory which he spun from them, however derivative, 
must have had some basis in his immediate conscious experiences of himself and the 
world.     
 I shall explore the link between mind, body, and culture further in the next two 
chapters.  At present, it will suffice to conclude that the various beliefs, ideas, and 
                                                 
397 For relevant discussion see Chapter Two, sec. 2.1.  
398 I clarified the sense in which I use the term, “psychology”, in n. 1 of this chapter.   
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theories about the mind that have been surveyed in this section provide insights into 
how the authors of the sample of texts experienced their own minds and bodies, and 
the world around them.  These beliefs, ideas, and theories undoubtedly had a wide 
range of potential applications and significances in the socio-cultural environment of 
twelfth-century Europe, only some of which can be recovered by modern historical 
scholarship.  To this, it can be added that beliefs and ideas about the mind such as 
these are probably advantageous in that they provide people with representations of 
mental processes and the mind which can help them to form theories about their own 
and other people’s minds which have potentially useful applications in human social 
life as well as in helping people to manage and modify their own behaviour and habits 
in relation to their personal morality and goals and also those of the societies in which 
they live.  This at least explicitly fits with Anselm’s theory of the spirit as it is related 
by Guibert and it also accords with Dennett’s view that the human mind makes use of 
self-stimulating cognitive and behavioural (especially linguistic) routines to improve 
problem-solving reasoning.399      
 
3.4: Final conclusion     
 
Throughout the history of western thought, beginning with the Greeks, there has been 
a strong tendency to conceptualise, describe, and discuss human cognition in 
abstraction from the body and the wider world.  Today it is still normal in everyday 
language to talk about the mind or “psyche” as though these things are logically, and 
even physically, discrete from the body even though modern neuro- and cognitive 
science have shown that neither can be the case.  Rather, as discussed in Chapter Two, 
these disciplines have shown that the material and structural properties of the human 
body, along with environmental stimuli, are causally sufficient and necessary to bring 
about human mental life.  Accordingly, it is no longer intellectually tenable to think of 
the mind (including its functions and effects) as being logically, and even less 
physically, discrete from the body and environment.  Instead we need to have some 
understanding of how the mind and body develop in tandem with each other, and to 
some extent in response to environmental stimuli, and the consequences of this for 
human reason.   
                                                 
399 See Dennett, Consciousness Explained, pp. 193-99 and 275-80.  
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Therefore, it is now necessary to turn the dualism of premodern western 
psychology on its head by asking how people’s embodied experiences of the mind 
could lead them to entertain the view that the mind is physically discrete and 
separable from the body.  I have tried to supply some of the answers in this chapter, 
firstly by outlining the development and transmission of the set of ideas underpinning 
soul-body dualism in western thought from Greek antiquity up to the twelfth century 
(sec. 3.1), secondly by examining how cognitive phenomena are represented in the 
sample of source texts in terms of how the body experiences and represents the world 
to itself (sec. 3.2), and thirdly by considering the embodied rationality of soul-body 
dualism in the context of twelfth-century Western Europe (sec. 3.3).  In taking this 
course, it has been shown that the dualistic concept of the mind integral to premodern 
western psychology arose from complex interactions between people’s embodied 
experiences of the mind and a socio-cultural environment which predisposed them to 
view the mind as a self-standing entity, logically and ontologically separable from the 
body.   
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Chapter Four 
 
The Body 
 
 
This chapter builds on the findings of the previous one by examining how the body is 
represented and conceptualised in abstraction from, and in relation to, the mind and 
cognition in the sample of source texts.  The purpose of following this course is to 
explore the interacting influences of mind and body on the representation and 
conceptualisation of human existence in the source texts.  I shall make use of relevant 
theory from neuro- and cognitive science to help to illustrate this point.400   
This chapter also deals with the socio-cultural significance of the body, 
particularly as regards the culture of gesturing in the medieval west and other forms of 
non-verbal communication, including potentially unwitting forms of bodily 
communication such as facial expressions and posture.  As will be discussed below, 
one way in which the mind, body, and culture can be seen to interact is through 
witting and unwitting “body language” of this sort.  In this way, this chapter draws 
into question the validity of the distinction, often widely held but unstated in western 
academic literature, between biology and nature, on the one hand, and society and 
culture on the other.  As noted previously, I take my cue here from the 
multidisciplinary scholar, Lloyd, who has recently challenged the validity of these 
distinctions as they occur in modern western thought in his book, Cognitive 
Variations (2007).401  I shall have more to say on Lloyd’s work in the conclusion to 
this chapter.  For now, it will suffice to say that in addition to problematising the 
distinction between mind and body, I also intend this chapter to problematise the 
distinction between biology and culture as it is commonly entertained in modern 
western thought.  This sets up the key theme of the next and final chapter of this 
study, which explores the interplay between mind, body, and culture in the sample of 
source texts.                
                                                 
400 Much of the relevant theory was discussed in Chapter Two.  Some supplementary work is also cited 
accordingly.   
401 This was noted earlier in the Introduction to Part II.  For direct reference see Lloyd, Cognitive 
Variations, chapter seven.  
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4.1: Body parts    
 
This section focuses on the representation and conceptualisation of the make-up of the 
body.  A key point which will be made here is that the make-up of the body is 
conceptualised in the source texts in terms of two categories of things: discrete 
structures (e.g. limbs, bones, and the body itself) and continuous substances (e.g. 
flesh, blood, or the spirit).  In order to demonstrate this, I shall make use of a 
distinction held in modern linguistics between “mass” and “count” nouns, the 
significance of which will be discussed below shortly (see p. 141).402  This distinction 
helps to account for a feature of Western European languages in terms of a non-
conscious cognitive tendency which leads speakers of those languages (at least) to 
conceptualise their experiences of things in the world as being either discrete 
structures or continuous substances.  The value of this approach is that it offers a way 
of connecting the ways in which the body is represented in the sample of source texts 
to their respective authors’ cognitive responses to their experiences of the body in the 
world.  In this way, it will be seen below that the relevant authors most frequently, if 
not invariably, thought about the composition and nature of the body, and by 
extension the human person, in terms of structures and substances which, additionally, 
perform various functions by virtue of their properties qua structures and substances.  
The findings of this section will be explored further in the next, sec. 4.2, which 
focuses on how the representation of the body in spatial environments carries socio-
culturally significant messages or symbolism. 
   
The following excerpt is taken from a letter ascribed to Theobald, the archbishop of 
Canterbury (1139-61), and addressed to Henry II:  
 
1. And if I may speak of my own case, be moved also by my desolation; for by 
reason of my age and infirmity, I shall not be able to wait for your coming that 
I yearn for, “for my flesh is wasted and my bone cleaves to my skin”; my 
spirit threatens its departure, yet still cleaves to my limbs in the desire and 
hope of your coming.  It waits and hopes and turns a deaf ear meanwhile to the 
                                                 
402 My source for this distinction is Steven Pinker who discusses it in The Stuff of Thought (New York, 
2007), pp. 167-74.  
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summons of nature; it refuses to close its eyes till it has seen your face.  The 
sum of my prayers and my desires is that you will return as soon as is 
conveniently possible. [My italics]  
 
[N]e propriam praetereamus moveat animum vestrum desolate mea; qui prae 
aetate et aegritudine desideratum adventum vestrum diu non potero expectare.  
“Pelli meae consumptis carnibus adhaesit os meum” [cf. Job, 19: 20403]; 
recessum minatur spiritus, haeret tamen membris in desiderio et spe adventus 
vestri; expectat quidem et sperat, et interim aurem surdam praestat vocanti 
naturae et recusant oculos claudere nisi praevisa facie vestra.  Summa itaque 
precum et desiderii mei est ut quam cito opportune poteritis redaetis.404 
 
This letter is followed by another in a similar vein: 
  
2. My flesh is worn away and my limbs are exhausted by age and toil, while long 
and grievous sickness tells me that my end is very near.  I hoped to look upon 
your face, desired so long, before I die, and had resolved myself in person, 
with God who knows my inmost heart for witness, to commend to you those 
whom He had entrusted to my charge here in your realm [alt. and those in 
your realm whom God had entrusted to me, Himself overseer and witness 
of this, I had resolved to commend to you in your presence].  But seeing 
that I am summoned so quickly to His judgement, before whose tribunal I 
shall soon stand one and all, bowing my heart low before your royal feet, I 
address your serene highness in these letters before God the judge of all, and 
earnestly entreat you that you will deign to hear your faithful servant, whose 
loyalty towards you has never grown cold, now at the hour of his death.  [My 
italics]    
  
Attrita est caro ea et tam aetate quam laboribus prefatigati sunt artus, et 
aegritudo gravis et diuturna dierum meorum finem in brevi adesse denuntiat.  
Desideratam diu faciem vestram videre sperabam antequam moriar, et eos 
                                                 
403 Iob 19: 20: ‘[P]elli meae consumptis carnibus adhesit os meum et derelicta sunt tantummodo labia 
circa dentes meos…’ 
404 John, Letters, i: 121.   
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quos meae custodiae in regno vestro commendaverat Deus, ipso inspectore 
et teste, vobis praesentialiter decreveram commendare.  Sed quia ad eius 
examen citius vocor, ante cuius tribunal in brevi stabimus omnes, serenitatem 
vestram, regios corde provulutus ad pedes, litteris coram Deo iudice omnium 
praesentibus alloquor, attentius supplicans ut fidelem vestrum, cuius in vos 
numquam devotione tepuit, agentem in extremis dignemini exaudire.405 
 
Both excerpts contain a wide range of ideas about the nature of the body as well as 
presenting a striking image of the dualistic nature of human life and existence: 
specifically, that the body is animated by a transcendent spirit which leaves it at the 
point of death.   
For present purposes, the sentences that stand out the most are: 
 
[F]or by reason of my age and infirmity [aegritudine], I shall not be able to 
wait for your coming that I yearn for, “for my flesh is wasted and my bone 
cleaves to my skin [Pelli meae consumptis carnibus adhaesit os meum—Job, 
19: 20].  [Item 1] 
 
My spirit threatens its departure, yet still cleaves to my limbs [membra] in the 
desire and hope of your coming.406  [Item 1] 
 
‘My flesh [caro] is worn away and my limbs are [praefatigati sunt artus] 
exhausted by age and toil, while long and grievous sickness tells me that my 
end is very near.’  (Item 2) 
 
Theobald or perhaps John’s choice of biblical citation is particularly significant and 
discussed further in the next chapter.407  Of more immediate interest are the senses of 
cohesion and wasting in these excerpts.  This is particularly clear from the use of the 
verbs adhaesio and haereo, which give the impression of different materials cohering 
to form complex structures.  In this way, the skin [pellis], flesh [caro], bone [os], and 
spirit [spiritus] of the text can be viewed as cohering among each other to form 
                                                 
405 Ibid., i: 135.  
406 This excerpt was cited and discussed earlier as item 4 in sec. 3.3.1.  
407 See Chapter Five, sec. 5.2, pp. 222 and 226 below.
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complex structures such as Theobald’s limbs [membrae and arti], his body, and also 
his very person (i.e. Theobald, the individual).  
As noted above, a distinction made in modern linguistics between “count” and 
“mass” nouns can shed light on this.408  Mass nouns refer to things that are viewed as 
continuous and measurable (e.g. by weight, size, or mass) substances and count nouns 
to things that are viewed as discrete and countable (i.e. by number) structures.  So, for 
example, in modern English “water” is a mass noun because water is generally 
viewed as a measurable substance rather than a kind of structure in the world: hence if 
two quantities of water are added together we are left with “water” or “more water” 
rather than “waters” or “two waters”.  By contrast, a count noun is used to describe a 
glass of water because the glass is viewed as a particular kind of structure: or in other 
words, the glass is a glass by virtue of it having certain structural properties (e.g. 
being a water-tight container).  Therefore, if one glass of water is added to another, 
then there are “glasses of water” or “two glasses of water” because the focus is on the 
glass as a discrete structure rather than water as a continuous substance.  This 
distinction is useful here because it helps to highlight an underlying cognitive basis to 
linguistic conventions grounded in people’s immediate experiences of the material 
world (keeping in mind that the body is very much a part of the material world).   
Considered in these terms, membra and artus [praefatigati sunt artus] seem to 
behave as count nouns in items 1 and 2, which is to say they are conceptualised as 
discrete objects as opposed to continuous substances.  Structure and function are the 
crucial factors here.  Discrete objects, such as limbs, tend to be viewed as what they 
are by virtue of them having structural and functional properties.  For instance, we do 
not view part of a hand as some hand, presumably because it has neither the structural 
nor functional properties of a hand (e.g. it does not have four fingers and an opposable 
thumb and it cannot pick things up).  Accordingly, we would view it as a substance 
rather than a hand (e.g. flesh or bone), even though it previously formed part of a 
hand, because it lacks crucial properties that pertain to hands as we view them.  
Spiritus in item 1 is probably also intended to behave as a count noun, like membra 
and arti above, in that it is construed as an autonomous cognizant agent (Φ1) which is 
actively cohering with the substance of Theobald’s body for a preconceived purpose: 
namely, in hope of witnessing Henry’s return to England.    
                                                 
408 Again, for more information on this distinction see Pinker, The Stuff of Thought, pp. 167-74. 
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In this way, as highlighted in the last chapter, the spirit is discrete in this 
excerpt for a similar reason to why animals tend to be thought of in western thought 
as discrete individuals (i.e. countable objects): namely, because they are able to act on 
their own volition, or more specifically in this case, make reasoned decisions about 
whether to move or keep themselves still. 409   There is no suggestion here that 
Theobald believed that his spirit would leave his body following his death as a 
material object or in some other kind of embodied state: but certainly this is how he 
conceptualised the movement (i.e. in terms of a material object moving itself around 
in the world) even if he believed to the contrary that disembodied spirits were 
completely free of the material conditions of existence.   
By contrast, caro and os, as they occur in items 1 and 2, seem to behave as 
mass nouns in that they are construed as substances cohesive unto themselves.  Hence 
a quantity of one of them can be added to, or subtracted from, an initial quantity of the 
same substance without affecting the ontological status of the resulting object.  For 
example, if more caro is added to an initial quantity of caro, then we still have caro 
(as opposed to duo caro or carnes).  The Latin os (like the English “bone”) may act as 
a mass or count noun depending on context.  In this case, however, Millor and Brooke 
seem to have translated the os in the Job citation as a mass noun (i.e. “my bone 
cleaves to my skin”), hence this is the sense taken here.   
The mass- and count-noun distinction bears similarities to Lakoff’s and 
Johnson’s notions of ontological and structural metaphor.410  Considered along these 
lines, mass nouns may be thought of as expressions of ontological metaphor in that 
they construe certain kinds of thing in the world as cohesive substances, albeit with no 
clearly defined boundaries.  Meanwhile, count nouns may be viewed as structural 
metaphors in that they imbue their referents with structural properties which in turn 
have clear functional entailments (e.g. hands have functional properties, such as being 
able to carry objects, by virtue of their structural properties).411  Mutability is also 
important to this in that mass nouns are not fussy about the size, shape, mass, or 
functionality of their referents, while count nouns are strictly so.  And furthermore, 
they roughly correspond to analogue and digital modes of quantification: i.e. mass 
                                                 
409 The relationship between conceptual thought on animals and cognitive phenomena was discussed in 
Chapter Three, sec. 3.2.3, pp. 118 and 122-3, and also 3.3.1, pp. 128-9. 
410 See Chapter Two, sec. 2.2.1.  
411 Again, note that “entailment” is Lakoff’s and Johnson’s term: it is explained in Chapter Two, sec. 
2.2.2. 
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nouns relate to things which are quantified by measurement along a continuous scale 
(e.g. weight, size, or mass) whereas count nouns relate to objects which are quantified 
numerically as discrete units.  In this way, the mass and count noun distinction helps 
to show how a non-conscious cognitive tendency to conceptualise the material 
contents of the world in terms of two categories of “stuff” influenced how John and 
Theobald conceptualised and represented the human body in language.   
Furthermore, the count and mass noun distinction sheds light on a conceptual 
link in item 1 between the health [sanus] of the body and its substances and 
structures.  This excerpt indicates that the cohesion of the body as a whole, namely as 
the structure identifiable as the individual, Theobald, is crucial to the health of the 
latter.  The loss of cohesiveness among the body’s structures and substances results in 
a decline in Theobald’s health or well-being.  Hence item 1 indicates strong 
conceptual links between wholeness and health and, conversely, dispersal and 
death.412   This is particularly apparent from the emphasis placed on the wasting 
[consumptus] of skin and flesh in the text.  Citing Job 19: 20, Theobald associates the 
loss of body mass, or weight (which had left his skin clinging closely to his bones: 
“[F]or my flesh is wasted [consumptus] and my bone cleaves to my skin [caro]”) with 
poor health, pain, and proximity to death.  There may be an experiential element in 
Theobald’s choice of biblical metaphor since in this context consumptus (from the 
verb to swallow, consumo) suggests that weight loss is like being consumed or eaten: 
hence here it has the metaphorical entailment, losing weight is like being eaten up.413  
To be sure, this formula is not Theobald’s: the Latin, in particular, is Jerome’s.  
However, this does not reduce the need to consider why Theobald (or John) chose this 
metaphor, to express Theobald’s experiences of weight-loss and his aging body.   
The experiential element of Lakoff’s and Johnson’s theory of metaphor is 
potentially helpful here.414  Theobald’s letter (item 1) suggests that he conceptualised 
the wasting of his body in terms of eating (i.e. losing weight is like being eaten away).  
So it seems entirely possible that the meaningfulness of this metaphor to Theobald 
was based on similarities between his experiences of eating, weight loss, and 
presumably also aging.  For example, body mass that has been lost for whatever 
                                                 
412 This fits with the later Aristotelian tradition of attributing pain to ruptures in the continuity of 
human existence (bodily and spiritual): see Cohen, The Modulated Scream, p. 175.  Also note that the 
notions of health and “well-being” are explored in more detail in Chapter 5, sec. 5.1.3, pp. 209-12.  
413 On metaphorical entailments see the discussion of Lakoff and Johnson in Chapter Two, sec. 2.2.2.  
414 See Chapter Two, sec. 2.2 and subsections and Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 
chapters 15 and 29.  
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reasons and food that has been swallowed or eaten could both seem to disappear (i.e. 
moved out of sight).  In this way, experiences of disappearance and weight loss may 
potentially “cross wires” thereby making metaphors that link them together valid 
among people for whom this experiential parallel has at some point become apparent 
(which is not to discount other possible common entailments from weight loss and 
eating).   
Again, it should be stressed that this metaphor is borrowed from the Vulgate 
Bible which provides many precedents for using consumo or consumptus in this 
way. 415   The force of the metaphor in question could hardly have escaped the 
competent Latinist who composed the passage presently of concern, so it is 
reasonable to consider why he (John or Theobald) selected it with the intention of 
using it to express weight loss and proximity to death.  Yet again, a plausible answer 
to this is provided by Lakoff and Johnson, this time with their notion of conceptual 
systems.  The metaphorical links in item 1 between weight loss, nearness to death, 
and consumption were clearly well-established in the dominant conceptual systems of 
the medieval west because they are used repeatedly in the Bible.416  Therefore, it is 
possible to account for the significance of this metaphor, firstly, in terms of how it 
reflected the user’s experiences of the world, and secondly, in terms of how it fitted 
into the dominant conceptual system(s) of their society.  In this way, the 
meaningfulness of this metaphor can be seen to be dependent on both the biological 
realities of human embodiment and the socio-cultural conditions and discourses to 
which the minds attached to individual bodies are exposed over the course of their 
lives.  By following this course, we are able to move beyond accounting for human 
reason in either strictly culturalist or biological terms, instead working towards a 
fusion of both.       
In addition to this, it was noted above that spatial separation between the body 
and spirit is construed as a cause or consequence of death in item 1: 
 
                                                 
415 For example, consumptus is used a number of times throughout the Book of Job to imply death or 
destruction of the body: see 4: 9, 7: 6, 10: 18, 14: 10, 19: 20, and 30: 24.  It is used similarly in the 
Psalms: for example, Ps. 6: 8(6: 7), 38: 12(39: 11), 72: 26(73: 26), and 89: 7(90: 7) (references in 
brackets are to the corresponding King James text). 
416 On conceptual systems see Chapter Two, sec. 2.2.1 and Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 
chapters 1 and 2.    
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My spirit threatens its departure, yet still cleaves to my limbs in the desire and 
hope of your coming [[R]ecessum minatur spiritus, haeret tamen membris in 
desiderio et spe adventus vestri].  
 
Some significant details regarding how Theobald and John understood the physical 
nature of the body can be gleaned from this.  Firstly, spiritus is represented as a thing 
actively cohering [haereo] to membra: hence it would seem that these two things are 
solid objects held together by the effort of the spirit.  Secondly, spatial proximity 
between the spirit and body or limbs is construed as a matter of life and death: 
closeness to the point of contact is necessary and perhaps also sufficient to sustain the 
life of the organism whereas death is either a cause or consequence of them becoming 
spatially separated.  Therefore, it can be seen that ideas about the kinds of 
relationships that may possibly inhere between objects in a spatial environment, as 
well as by virtue of their physical properties (e.g. “stickiness”: cf. haereo; adhaesio), 
are relevant to this excerpt.   
The broader significance of this is that it shows the relevant author(s) drawing 
on embodied experiences of relatively concrete phenomena in the world to provide 
understanding of less certain aspects of human existence: in this case the phenomena 
of life and death.  The difference between life and death is partially elucidated in 
terms of the difference between two or more objects or substances being or not being 
in contact with each other in a spatial environment.  Attendant to this is the idea that 
body parts or substances are sticky, or at least have a natural tendency to stick or 
adhere to one another.  To be sure, the spirit is not conventionally thought of as a 
“body part”.  However, it is helpful here to consider the significance of what it means 
for the spirit to adhere to the material body.  I suggest that this echoes the Pre-Platonic 
belief in western psychology that the matter of living things is vitalised by a life-
inducing substance or physical presence (soul, spirit, pneuma, aithêr, aer, or whatever 
else): that is, emphatically not an active cognitive agent, such as we now tend to think 
of things like the spirit, soul or mind, but rather a thing or stuff which has the passive 
property of causing matter to live by virtue of it being present in or through it.417  As 
noted above, Theobald and John appear to have been thinking of the spirit as a 
discrete, and probably also immaterial [incorporalis], entity rather than continuous 
                                                 
417 For a discussion of this idea see Chapter Three, sec. 3.1.1. 
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substance.  Nevertheless, in representing the spirit as something vital for the 
sustenance of the life of the body, they do seem to be drawing on the perhaps more 
“primitive” idea that matter is animated by a substance, material, or element with 
special life-inducing properties.418   
 
The excerpts given above as items 1 and 2 provide a variety of insights into how their 
author(s) conceptualised and understood the human body: particularly the material 
nature of the body, the causes of its life and death.  An important conclusion which 
can be drawn from this is that these writers’ abstract reasoning about the human body 
is not isolated from their everyday experiences of it.  On the contrary, neuro- and 
cognitive science help to demonstrate the extent to which abstract thought and banal 
experiences of the body are entwined and feed off each other in the relevant texts.  
The mass and count noun distinction in particular helps to show how abstract 
conceptualisation of the body is continuous with experience of it: people experience 
the body as a collection of cohering substances (e.g. flesh and blood) and structures 
(e.g. bones and organs) and so reason about it in those terms.  In the next section it 
will be seen that the interplay between abstract reasoning and direct experiences of 
the world influenced how the relevant authors interpreted their experiences of the 
body in the socio-cultural contexts which applied to them.     
 
4.2: The situated body 
 
As the philosopher Charles Taylor has pointed out, people’s behaviour in relation to 
the environment is heavily influenced by the realisation that these spaces contain 
other people who will perceive, interpret, and respond to their behaviour in different 
ways: 
 
The very way we walk, move, gesture, speak is shaped from our earliest 
moments by our awareness that we appear before others, that we stand in 
public space, and that this space is potentially one of respect or contempt, of 
pride or shame.419 
                                                 
418 Again, the issues relevant here were discussed in the previous chapter: see in particular sec. 3.1.1, 
pp. 76-7 and 3.2.3, pp. 118 and 122-3.  
419 C. Taylor, Sources of the Self: the making of modern identity (Cambridge Mass., 1989), p. 15.   
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As Taylor points out, people tend to modify their behaviour in relation to “public” 
spaces in order to elicit desirable or intended responses from other people.  This 
section concentrates on how these sociological processes are figured via the 
representation of the body in the sample of source texts.  It will be shown that the 
ways in which the body is represented in the relevant texts frequently carry abstract 
symbolic significances which can only be properly understood if we take into account 
the interacting influences on the texts’ respective authors of, on the one hand, socio-
culturally-constructed attitudes towards the body, and on the other, immediate sensory 
experiences of bodies in the world.  From this finding, it will be concluded that 
mental processes, the body itself, and socio-culturally contingent attitudes towards the 
body are inextricably entangled and, therefore, that the representation of the body in 
the sample of source texts must be understood in terms of the interplay between these 
three elements: that is, mind, body, and culture.          
 
4.2.1: Time, space, and the social world 
 
To begin, relevant examples were discussed previously in sec. 4.1: namely Theobald’s 
gesture to Henry II.  Thus, reconsider the following two excerpts:  
 
1. [B]owing my heart low before your royal feet.  
 
[R]egios corde provulutus ad pedes.420 
 
2. Therefore prostrate at the feet of your clemency and with the utmost devotion 
I beseech you to regard him as one commended to yourself by me. 
 
Ad pedes ergo clementiae vestrae provulutus quanta possum devotione 
supplico ut eum commendatum habeatis ipsique.421 
 
Socio-cultural context is provided here by the systems of gestures used by the elite 
social groups of twelfth-century Europe to express various kinds of social, cultural, 
                                                 
420 John, Letters, i: 135.  
421 Ibid., i: 126.  
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political, and religious message. 422   The specific gesture in question is almost 
certainly prostration in that in both cases Theobald is laying himself flat on the ground 
in front of Henry’s feet.  Both descriptions of this act are clearly intended to invoke a 
common understanding of the meaning of such a gesture, in light of the more specific 
circumstances in which it was notionally being made, between the letter-writer and 
recipient.  Hence Theobald’s act of prostration, as described in the text, was 
presumably intended to carry the same significance as an actual vis-à-vis performance 
would have: that is, Theobald presumably wished to express politeness, loyalty, 
obedience, and trust towards Henry.423  Therefore, at the very least this sentence can 
be seen to express and reinforce a social relationship between Theobald and Henry 
(i.e. Theobald is Henry’s social inferior, at least in secular contexts).       
 These two excerpts carry some common metaphorical entailments which are 
explicitly discussed by Lakoff and Johnson in Metaphors We live By:  thus, to use 
their phrases, having control or force is up; being subject to control or force is 
down.424   This draws our attention to some points in both excerpts at which everyday 
experiences and abstract conceptualisation of the body cross paths.  The symbolic 
relationship between height and the body in both excerpts could conceivably follow 
from everyday experiences of the body in a variety of obvious ways.  Firstly, smaller 
people (or even animals) tend to be less physically powerful than larger people.  
Secondly, by prostrating himself before Henry, Theobald is making himself more 
vulnerable to attack or assault by Henry.  Thirdly, Henry is able, merely by his 
presence or status, to compel Theobald to lay down in front of him without any 
exertion.  Henry does not cause Theobald to do this, but Theobald presumably does it, 
at least in this literary context, because he knows that Henry has the power to cause 
him to do it (or to cause him greater harm if he doesn’t).  What this all serves to show 
is that the conceptual link between height and power in these excerpts is not merely 
an abstract, or disembodied, idea: it is intimately linked to the ways in which 
Theobald, inter alia, experienced the embodied conditions of his and other people’s 
existences.     
                                                 
422 On gestures in medieval Europe see Althoff, Family, Friends, and Followers, pp. 136-59, Burrow, 
Gestures and Looks, pp. 11-68, Schmitt, ‘The rationale of gestures in the West’, Phythian-Adams, 
‘Ritual constructions of society’, and Kerr, ‘Hospitality in twelfth-century England’.     
423 On prostration see Burrow, Gestures and Looks, pp. 18-19.  
424 See Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, pp. 14-15.  
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It is also important to take account of the symbolic significances attached to 
pedes and cor in items 1 and 2 in twelfth-century Anglo-French culture.  Firstly, the 
feet are quite literally the most abject part of the human body.  They are closest to the 
ground and thus dirt, and furthest away from the head, which was most commonly 
identified in post-classical Europe as the seat of reason.425  What is more, the feet are 
symbolically important in the Bible in a number of ways.  References to Jewish mores 
concerning the cleanliness of the feet, especially in people’s houses, are frequent in 
the Bible, and carry with them powerful moral implications.  There are also numerous 
episodes involving typically lowly people falling at, and even kissing or licking, the 
feet of more powerful or revered persons, as signs of submission or respect: for 
instance, the rabbi Jairus falling at Jesus’ feet as a sign of respect.426   It seems 
reasonable to assume that literate medieval Christians would have been able and even 
inclined to relate contemporary gestures such as prostration or bowing down to the 
feet to similar gestures described in the Bible and vice versa.  Therefore, it may be 
concluded that the conceptual significance of the feet is not only tied to people’s 
everyday experiences of feet in the world.  Received wisdom about the abstract 
significance of the feet may also influence how people conceptualise the feet and thus 
feedback onto their everyday experiences of the feet in the world.  Abstract reasoning, 
everyday experiences, and inherited wisdom all interact to such a degree that their 
relative influences on how people experience and conceptualise the world are 
inextricable: in short, they should be taken as a package rather than isolated facets of 
human life.       
The symbolic value of cor in item 1 is more difficult to determine for a 
number of reasons.  The “heart” of premodern western language and discourse is not 
necessarily the same “heart” of modern western language and discourse in at least two 
important respects.  Firstly, in premodern western psychology the heart was often 
understood as a cognitive agent (hence Φ1)
427 or at least a locus of cognitive activity 
in the body.428  It may have been thought of as a transcendent entity, much like the 
soul or mind, or alternatively as a seat of the mind or parts of it (particularly the 
                                                 
425 The location of reason in the human body is the topic of the next section (4.3).  
426 For Jairus’ gesture see Mark 5: 22: an extensive list of episodes in which feet play a significant role 
in the Bible may be found at http://www.bible-topics.com/Feet-The.html (accessed 1 / 06 / 2010) 
427 For an explanation of the Φ rubrics see Chapter Three, sec. 3.2.  
428 What I mean by “premodern western psychology” was defined in Chapter Three, n. 1.  
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emotions [passiones]).429  In any case, “mind” is often a reasonable translation of cor 
as it occurs in Latin texts and kardia as it occurs in ancient Greek texts.  Secondly, 
heart may function in Latin as a catch-all label for the internal organs or viscera 
around the midriff, which itself, as noted in the previous chapter, had associations 
with cognition lingering from early Greek thought [i.e. phrên].430  It is probably for 
this reason that the modern English word, “core”, derives from the Latin and 
Romance words for heart, cor and cœur, etc.  Because of this variety of meanings the 
heart presents some very specific issues which will be addressed in some detail in the 
next section of this chapter (sec. 4.3).   
It is important to note that the supine used in both excerpts, provulutus [to lay 
oneself flat or prostrate], represents an action which necessarily occurs in space and 
time: that is, Theobald lays himself, or his heart in abstraction, flat on the ground, in 
some sense towards [ad] Henry during a finite period of time (or “time frame” as it 
will be described here).  The space and time that I am referring to here is not the space 
and time of everyday life. It is rather the concepts of these phenomena that people 
invariably develop in response to their embodied experiences of them and how they 
are interpreted and represented in different socio-cultural and linguistic 
environments.431  As regards space, the up-down and forward-backward dimensions 
are crucial to the meaning of the gesture as it is represented in relevant excerpts.  The 
act of lowering oneself is symbolic, most probably of Theobald’s loyalty and 
submission (at least on non-religious matters) to Henry’s authority as king of 
England. 432  Furthermore, in directing the gesture towards Henry’s feet, and thus 
presumably also his body, Theobald makes it clear that the symbolic force of the act 
of prostration holds between him and Henry: that is, as opposed to Theobald just 
doing the gesture in relation to nobody.433   
                                                 
429 The association between the heart and emotions in classical western thought (especially Stoic 
thought) is briefly discussed in sec. 4.3.  
430 See the discussion of phrên in Chapter Three, sec. 3.1.1, p. 76.  
431 There is a substantial literature in cognitive science on the concepts of space and time, among other 
things, which people develop in response to their experiences of those phenomena in the world: for 
broad discussions of how people perceive and reason about the world see Dennett, Consciousness 
Explained, chapter eleven and Pinker, How the Mind Works, chapter four and The Stuff of Thought, 
chapter four.   
432 Prostration is discussed by Burrow in Gestures and Looks, pp. 17-18.  
433 It seems worth noting that modern research into non-verbal communication has shown that spatial 
relationships between bodies carry symbolic significances which vary between different cultures and 
language groups: see M. Argyle, Bodily Communication, 2nd edn. (London, 1990), pp. 168-87.  
   
 
152 
 
Another significant example of how the body can be used to represent inter-
personal relationships may be found in The Life of Christina.  The following excerpt 
illustrates how different facets of the body can be used to express or reinforce 
strength, closeness, and love, among other things, as aspects of inter-personal 
relationships: 
 
3. Meanwhile, the maiden looked closely in front of her, and saw an upper 
chamber, lofty and quiet, which could be reached only by a series of steps, 
steep and difficult for anyone wishing to climb.  Christina had a great desire to 
climb up, but as she hesitated on account of its difficulty, the queen whom she 
had seen just a short time before helped her, and so she mounted the upper 
chamber.  And as she sat there enjoying the beauty of the place, behold, the 
aforesaid queen came and laid her head in her lap as if she wished to rest, with 
her face turned away.  This turning away of her face was a source of disquiet 
to Christina, and not daring to speak she said inwardly: “O, if only I were 
allowed to gaze upon your face.” Straightway the empress turned her face 
towards her and said with winning kindness: “You may look now; and 
afterwards when I shall bring both you and Judith also into my chamber, you 
can gaze to your full content.” 
 
Interea virgo prope prospiciebat et videbat quasi solarium unum altum et 
quietum. ad quod ascendere volenti: per interpositos gradus arduus et gravis 
patebat ascensus.  Huc eciam Christine habenti magnam ascendendi 
voluntatem. sed hesitanti propter ascensus difficultatem: subito regina quam 
paulo ante viderat ministrabatur adiutorium et sic ascendebat in solarium.  
Cumque resideret ibidem delectata loco.  Ecce predicta regina veniebat.  Et 
instar quiescere volentis.  Caput sum reclinabat in gremio sedentis: sed 
adversa facie.  Cuius adversionis Christinam non mediocriter tedebat et non 
ausa loqui: tantum in corde suo dicebat: “O si licuisset michi vultum tuum 
comtemplari.” Et continuo convertit vultum tuum imperatrix illa dixitque 
blanda affabilitate: Et licet et contemplare contemplativa postmodum ad 
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sacietatem: quando introduxero te in thalamum meum te et Iudith una 
tecum.434 
 
This passage relates one of Christina’s dreams or visions in which she meets the 
Virgin Mary.  In this case, the meeting between Christina and Mary (i.e. the “queen” 
[regina]) occurs in what would seem to be Mary’s private space (the solarium): hence 
their relationship is not merely intimate in terms of the closeness of their bodies in a 
generic physical space.  Intimacy is also implied by the social significance attached to 
the specific kind of place that a solarium is (or was considered to be in twelfth-
century Europe).  It is also significant that in order for Christina to fulfil her desire to 
meet the queen, she must exert herself by climbing [ascendo] the steep steps to the 
chamber.  She achieves this goal with the help of Mary, thus casting their relationship 
in a cooperative, as well as amicable, light.  Nevertheless, Mary’s superior status is 
always clear as she is identified as a queen.  This aspect of their relationship also 
seems to be reinforced by Mary’s beneficent attitude towards Christina: she helps 
Christina fulfil her desire to meet her and the meeting takes place in what seems to be 
Mary’s private space.   
In addition to this, while Christina sits admiring the room, Mary rests her head 
[caput] on Christina’s lap or breast [gremio], albeit turned away [adversa facie] from 
some part of Christina [cuius adversionis Christinam].  In what respect Mary’s face is 
turned away from Christina is not stated in the passage.  Nevertheless, given that this 
circumstance stirs in Christina a desire to gaze directly on Mary’s face [O si licuisset 
michi vultum tuum comtemplari], it can at least be inferred that there is no direct line 
of sight between Christina’s and Mary’s faces.  It may thus be that Mary’s face is 
adversus in relation to Christina’s.  This is, however, an intuitive assumption rather 
than a definite fact about the situation related by Christina’s biographer.  The lack of a 
line of sight between faces is not in itself a sufficient condition for them to be viewed 
as adversus.  Being turned away from each other requires some kind of intent or 
attitude, which is to say either Mary intended to turn her face from Christina or 
Christina believed that Mary’s face was turned away from hers.  Therefore, at the very 
least it can be concluded from the text that Mary’s face is adversus from Christina in 
as far as Mary intended it to be and / or Christina viewed it as such.  Furthermore, the 
                                                 
434 The Life of Christina, ¶ 25.  
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fact that Mary soon repositions her face, thus fulfilling Christina’s desire to gaze on it, 
reinforces the already intimate and amicable qualities of their relationship at that 
moment.435    
Space and orientation play important roles in the representation of the 
interpersonal relationship between Christina and Mary.  Firstly, the proximity of 
Christina’s and Mary’s bodies in a space is indicative of the closeness of their socio-
religious relationship: it may be legitimate to view this, in Lakoff’s and Johnson’s 
terms, as an orientational metaphor in as much as intimacy or friendliness are 
construed as being like being in close contact.436  The reasoning here is perhaps 
analogous to that which leads modern English speakers to describe intimate or 
friendly relationships as “close”: closeness provides understanding of these aspects of 
relationships even though it is not in fact a guarantee or even reliable measure of 
intimacy or friendship (e.g. complete strangers or even enemies may often be in close 
contact, although perhaps rarely in direct physical contact).  Secondly, the orientation 
of Christina’s and Mary’s faces in relation to each other is also construed as a 
significant measure of the intimacy and good-nature of their relationship.  This may 
also be viewed as an orientational metaphor, although it perhaps has a stronger 
experiential element than the latter case in that the faces of people on friendly, or a 
fortiori amorous, terms are more likely to meet each other’s gaze, to do so more 
frequently, and to hold it for longer than people who are either unacquainted or on 
poor terms.  By contrast, aversion of gaze (“looking askance”), as in item 3, may be 
interpreted as a negative sign, although certain forms of gaze, such as glaring, are 
explicitly intended to be interpreted as negative signs.437 
Again, item 3 represents a situation in which mind, body, and culture can be 
seen to interact to such a degree that their respective influences on the relevant 
phenomenon, namely Christina’s and Mary’s friendship, are inextricably linked.  
Christina’s and Mary’s mental states, the positioning of their bodies or parts of it 
(especially the face) in relation to each other, and the socio-cultural significance in a 
medieval Western Christian society of being visited in a dream by the Mother of God, 
even invited by her into her personal space (i.e. the solarium), all contribute to the 
                                                 
435 For more on this see the following section on faces (sec. 4.4).  
436 See Chapter Two, sec. 2.2.1 or for direct reference, Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 
chapter 4.  
437 Burrow discusses amorous gazes at length in Gestures and Looks: in particular, see pp. 91-8: he also 
notes the significance of looking askance (ibid., pp. 98-9) and disapproving gazes (ibid., pp. 99-101).  
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representation of the friendship pertaining between Christina and Mary. 438   The 
content of item 3 is informed by the interplay between these three aspects of human 
existence: that is, the mind, body, and culture.         
 
4.2.2: Conclusion 
 
This section has examined the entanglement of mind, body, and culture through 
representations of bodies situated and interacting in spatial and socio-cultural 
environments.  It is necessary to take account of the relative influences of mental 
states (e.g. consciousness, beliefs, attitudes, preferences, likes and dislikes), the 
posture and expression of the body (i.e. non-verbal communication or “body 
language”), and the socio-cultural environment in order to provide well-rounded 
accounts of the contents and significance of the three excerpts given above (items 1-
3): each of these three elements needs to be acknowledged and the interplay between 
them studied.  We cannot properly understand why people have beliefs and attitudes 
about the body, or why the body and parts of it accrue different symbolic 
significances in different socio-cultural contexts, if we do not first accept that people 
are embodied beings who experience the world through the sensory media provided 
by their bodies.  Likewise, we cannot properly understand the highly variable 
symbolic significance of the body if we do not take account of how different socio-
cultural circumstances influence how people interpret their experiences of their 
bodies.  Moreover, we cannot properly understand embodiment or socio-culturally 
contingent interpretations of the body and human life in general if we do not take 
account of people’s individual mental lives. 
 Finally, the importance of spatial reasoning was highlighted in this section.  
Much research has been done in cognitive science on the influence of people’s 
experiences of space on how they conceptualise and understand the world.439  For 
present purposes, what needs to be stressed here is that people invariably experience 
the world as a three-dimensional space with three-dimensional contents.  People’s 
experiences of everything in the world are in some way subject to their experiences of 
space.  For instance, in item 3 Mary’s solarium cannot just be conceptualised as a 
                                                 
438 On greetings and reception into private spaces see Kerr, ‘Hospitality in twelfth-century England’.  
439 Relevant references were given above in n. 32.  Also, Lloyd discusses spatial reasoning in Cognitive 
Variations, chapter two.  
   
 
156 
 
purely abstract social thing: it must be conceptualised as a space of some kind.  
Likewise, Theobald’s prostration towards Henry in items 1 and 2 cannot be thought of 
in purely abstract terms: it must also be conceptualised as happening in some kind of 
spatial environment.                  
 
4.3: The mind-body relationship in John of Salisbury’s “body politic” 
metaphors  
 
This section explores how the mind-body relationship was understood in twelfth-
century Europe by examining a series of body politic metaphors composed by John of 
Salisbury in some of his letters and the Policraticus.440  Part of the motivation for 
doing this is to address the issues raised by the overlapping language of mind and 
body in premodern western thought (this was highlighted in the previous section with 
regard to the heart [cor]).441  In addition to this, John’s body politic metaphors are of 
interest in themselves because they involve an explicit metaphorical conflation of 
mind and body.  By examining the logic underpinning this conflation, this section is 
intended to shed some light on John’s beliefs and understanding of the mind-body 
relationship.  Furthermore, in following this course this section will highlight a 
significant conceptual difference between modern and premodern western ideas about 
the nature of the mind-body relationship: specifically that whereas in modern thought, 
the mind tends to be located in one discrete organ (viz. the brain), in premodern 
thought the mind was often thought to be spread more widely throughout the body.  
 
* * * 
 
 
                                                 
440
 The body politic metaphor has been widely studied by medievalists, particularly as it became 
popular from the thirteenth century onwards with the absorption of Aristotle’s political writings into 
Western European academic life.  See for example, T. Shogimen, ‘“Head or Heart?” Revisited: 
physiology and political thought in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries’ in History of Political 
Thought, xxviii: 2 (2007), pp. 208-229, A. Alexander, ‘Heart and soul of the state’ in The World of 
Marsilius of Padua, ed. G. Moreno-Riano (Turnhout, 2002), pp. 163-86 or Nederman, ‘The living body 
politic’ in Healing the Body Politic: the political thought of Christine de Pizan, ed. K. Green et al 
(Brepols, 2005), pp. 19-33.  A collection of translated and abridged source material has also been 
published as Medieval Political Theory – A Reader: The Quest for the Body Politic 1100-1400, ed. and 
trans. C. J. Nederman et al (London, 1993).   
441 See sec. 4.2.1, pp. 149-50. 
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4.3.1: Contextualising John’s thought  
 
The label body politic essentially covers a range of metaphors which draw parallels of 
one kind of another between the structure and nature of human communities and the 
human body.  This idea has its roots in classical Greek philosophy.  For instance, 
Plato famously drew a parallel between the healthy human body, as he understood it, 
and the healthiness of his ideal community [πόλις: polis; cf. politics 442 ] in the 
Republic: Aristotle made a similar comparison in his Politics.443  Importantly, the two 
most common themes in western body politic metaphors are health and the location of 
mental faculties, both of which apply to John’s formulae.   
John’s body politic metaphors concern the relationship between the secular 
and ecclesiastical institutions of the kingdom or state [regnum], and in particular the 
need to maintain a healthy relationship between them.  Health [sanitas] is a crucial 
aspect to this in that the state can be construed as healthy or sick [morbus] depending 
on how the metaphor is applied: hence a healthy body is like a healthy state and vice 
versa.444   However, the metaphor leads us to the seemingly intuitive conclusion, 
doubtless informed by our experiences of healthy and diseased bodies in the world, 
including our own, that a healthy state is inherently more desirable than a sick one 
(i.e. for similar reasons to healthy bodies being valued over sick bodies).  Another 
important aspect of this metaphor is the diversity of the parts of the body and state 
and, more to the point, the extent to which their functions mutually benefit each other 
and by extension the body or state as a whole (i.e. harmony among the parts).445  It 
will be seen in the following two excerpts that John uses the head [caput] to stand as 
the primary member of the state (viz. the Church according to his perspective) and the 
limbs [membra] to stand for other parts of the state which should be subordinate to the 
                                                 
442 This etymology should warn us that by “politic”, we should not necessarily be thinking in terms of 
modern states (certainly not modern, secular, nation states).  To be sure, John’s body politic metaphors 
are about the state as he understood it: however, the focus of premodern body politic metaphors is often 
on communities rather than states.   
443 For example, see Plato, Republic, 462c-d and 464b and Aristotle, Politics, trans. H. Rackham 
(Cambridge Mass., 1932), 1253a.  Furthermore, Plato’s Republic draws a parallel between the structure 
of an ideal community and the mind in which respect it is similar to, but not quite an example of, the 
body politic metaphor.  
444 The themes of sickness and health are explored further in Chapter Five, secs 5.1-2.  
445 By contrast, as was seen in sec. 4.1, disharmony or dispersal of the parts of the body can lead to 
sickness and death: see pp. 144-6 above.  
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principal member (i.e. the head: regarding which it should be noted that his use of 
membra is a pun). 
The key points of interest in John’s body politic metaphors are how he maps 
the mind onto the body (i.e. where he places different cognitive faculties in the body) 
and what significance he saw in this.  It will be seen that John splits the mind mainly 
between the head and the heart and, in doing so, identifies this split as a potential 
source of conflicts within the mind and thus, according to his metaphor, diseases of 
the state.  John’s thinking in these respects is clearly indebted to ancient Greek 
philosophy and medicine: especially Plato.446  Accordingly, attention is given below 
to the influence of these disciplines on John and the ways in which human existence 
was conceptualised and understood in the medieval west.   
 
As noted previously, by the standards of his time John was exceptionally well-read in 
classical and contemporary philosophical works.447  It can be demonstrated from his 
surviving writings that he was familiar with Aristotle’s six logical works and his 
Politics.448  He also knew Plato’s Timaeus and, by reputation, the Republic.449  In fact, 
it has been suggested that John’s interest in body politic metaphors may reflect the 
influence of the broad influence of the Timaeus on scholasticism during the first half 
of the twelfth century.450  Furthermore, in his treatise on education and the liberal arts, 
the Metalogicon, John shows some understanding of the three major branches of 
classical philosophy (i.e. the Academics, Peripatetics, and Stoics), at least to the 
extent that he was able to ascribe different views to them.451  This is not to mention 
his extensive knowledge of the Bible, Latin Patristics, pagan Roman authors 
(although perhaps largely through florilegia), and the works and thought of his 
contemporaries or near-contemporaries in the west (especially the group of teachers 
                                                 
446 See Chapter Three, sec. 3.1.1, pp. 78-80.  
447 For details and relevant notes on John’s learning see the section on the sources in the Introduction to 
Part II: pp. 68-9 below.  
448 See the index of McGarry’s edition of the Metalogicon, pp. 297-8, in which he has noted hundreds 
of citations or references to Aristotle throughout the work.  For details on the use of Aristotle in the 
Policraticus see Nederman’s edition, pp. xx-xxi. 
449 John cites the Timaeus in the Metalogicon (see iv: 17) and alludes to aspects of it in the Policraticus 
(vii: 1-2 and 5).  Nederman notes that John knew some of the Timaeus in the introduction to his edition 
of the Policraticus (p. xx).  This was mostly likely Calcidius’ translation, on which see Somfai, 
‘Reception of Plato’s Timaeus’.  
450 See Gregory, ‘The Platonic Inheritance’, pp. 56-7: Gregory draws a link between the Timaeus and 
the Policraticus, vii: 5.     
451 See John, Metalogicon, ii: 2 and 7, iii: 7, iv: 31 and 36 and John, Policraticus, vii: 1-2.  
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associated with the school at Chartres in the early twelfth century).452  Therefore, in 
these and other respects, John offers a good opportunity, albeit an atypical one given 
the extent of his reading at that time, to discuss how literacy and access to ancient and 
contemporary wisdom through texts could influence attitudes towards human 
existence in the medieval west.   
Meanwhile, by the mid-twelfth century, original Greek and Roman 
philosophical and medical texts, as well as the works of Arabic and Persian 
intermediaries, were becoming increasingly available and well-known among 
Western European scholars.453  From these traditions medieval Europeans inherited 
inconsistent and to some extent clashing wisdom on the respective natures and 
functions of the heart and head, as organs, and in relation to the body as a whole.  In 
particular, they inherited conflicting views from Greek thought on whether human 
reason resided in the heart or the head.  These two positions can be broadly identified 
with Aristotle and Plato respectively (which is not to say that these views were 
original to them): that is, Aristotle located reason in the heart whereas Plato located it 
in the head.454  With the exception of the Timaeus, which survived in two partial Latin 
translations, Plato’s works were almost entirely unknown until the later middle 
ages.455  Nevertheless, the Timaeus was widely read in the west from the ninth century 
onwards and many scholars would have known from it that Plato located reason 
firmly in the head.456  Some of Aristotle’s logical works (collectively known as The 
Organon [i.e. “the tool”]457) survived antiquity through Latin translations by the late 
Roman scholar and author, Boethius.  However, his natural scientific works, in which 
medieval readers would have found him locating reason in the heart, were not widely 
                                                 
452 On John’s sources for pagan authors see Nederman’s introduction to his edition of the Policraticus, 
p. xx. John was well-acquainted with the works of many of his contemporaries, including Peter 
Abelard and the masters associated with Chartres: see John, Metalogicon, i: 5 and 24.  Also see 
Wetherbee, ‘Philosophy, Cosmology, and the Twelfth-Century Renaissance’, pp. 34-5 and 48 and 
Mews, ‘Philosophy and Theology’, pp. 173-80.   
453 Basic information about this can be found in Siraisi, Medieval and Early Renaissance Medicine and 
on philosophy, Marenbon, Medieval Philosophy.  More references will be given on these topics as this 
chapter progresses.   
454 For instance, see Plato’s Timaeus, 44d-45e: for a summary of Aristotle’s views on the location of 
reason in the body see Donini, ‘Psychology’.  
455 On the translations of the Timaeus see Somfai, ‘Reception of Plato’s Timaeus’.  The Timaeus was 
discussed in detail previously in Chapter Three, sec. 3.1.1.  
456 See Plato, Timaeus, 44d-45a.  
457 Cf. ὄργανον: see Liddell and Scott, s.n. organon (accessed 04 / 06 / 2010)  
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known by western scholars until the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries (none of 
these seem to have been known by the authors relevant to this study).458   
The Platonic view on the location of reason in the human body was certainly 
dominant towards the end of antiquity, not least thanks to the second-century Greek 
physician and writer, Galen, who, in spite of his reverence for Aristotle’s scientific 
writings, strongly sided with Plato on the matter.459  Galen’s writings were crucial to 
the survival and authority of Greek medicine into the middle ages.  Most of his works 
were lost in the west following the collapse of Roman civilisation.  However, some 
did survive and many more were preserved in the Greek and Islamic worlds and 
gradually reintroduced to the west, particularly during the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries.460  In addition to Galen, the surviving writings of other classical authors 
were also important to the transmission of ancient wisdom about the natures of the 
heart and head into the medieval west.  The most notable among these for present 
purposes is Isidore of Seville’s Etymologiae (particularly books four and eleven 
which respectively focused on medicine and the human organism).  It will be seen 
below (see items 6-7 below) that Isidore understood the functions of the head and 
heart and their relationship to the human organism as a whole in a similar fashion to 
John (at least as he presented things in his body politic metaphors).     
 
4.3.2: Mapping the mind onto the body 
 
Consider the following excerpts from two of John’s letters: 
 
1. When the members of the Church are united in loyalty and love, when princes 
show due reverence to priests, and priests render faithful service to princes, 
then do kingdoms enjoy true peace and tranquillity that must always be the 
goal of our desire…For it [the Church of Canterbury] is the head of all your 
                                                 
458 On the transmission and reception of Aristotle’s works in the twelfth-century west, see Jacquart, 
‘Aristotelian thought at Salerno’, Maccagnolo, ‘David of Dinant and the beginnings of Aristotelianism 
in Paris’, and Marrone, ‘Medieval philosophy in context’, pp. 32-6.  For more general discussions of 
the translation and transmission of Greek learning to the west see Lindberg, ‘The Transmission of 
Greek and Arabic Learning to the West’ and Williams, ‘Transmission and  Translation’.  On Boethius’ 
translations of the works of the old logic see Marenbon, Boethius, pp. 17-18.  John is the only author 
studied here who shows any substantial knowledge of Aristotle’s works (mainly those of the old logic). 
459 See Donini, ‘Psychology’.   
460 On the transmission and reception of Galen’s works see Talbot, ‘Medicine’ and Siraisi, Medieval 
and Early Renaissance Medicine, pp. 78-114.  
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realm, and for yourself and all your realm it is the mother of the faith of 
Christ.  Whatever loss it suffers will besmirch your honour; for honour due to 
the head will never equally befit the other limbs. 
 
Illa est regnorum vera pax et semper optanda tranquilitas, cum in fide et 
dilectione sibi cohaerent membra ecclesiae, et sacerdotibus debitam 
reverentiam principes et principibus plenae fidelitatis obsequium exhibent 
sacerdotes…Ipsa est enim caput regni vestri, et vobis et toti regno fidei parens 
in Christo.  Quicquid autem ei detractum fuerit vestrum deturpabit honorem, 
eo quod honor capitis aeque nunquam cetera membra decebit.461 
 
2. Unless the limbs are joined to the head, the body cannot survive in sound 
condition and everyone who is set against the Church’s successes is rightly 
branded a public enemy.  Since I am agreed to be a member of the church of 
Canterbury, though a small one, I must join my voice to the common wish as 
best as I can and with full zeal pursue the end to which I see the energies of its 
more potent limbs directed.  
  
Nisi membra capiti cohaeserint, corporis incolumitas non subsistit et merito 
publicus hostis arguitur quisquis ecclesiae profectibus adversatur.  Quia ergo 
me sanctae Cantuariensis ecclesiae membrum, licet, modicum, esse constat, 
necesse est ut votis communibus pro facultate feram fuffragium et tota 
diligentia prosequar id in quod se ostendunt studia potiorum.462 
 
Item 1, taken from a letter addressed from Theobald to Henry II, concerns the papal 
schism of 1159.  Theobald is urging Henry to reach a decision on whether to 
recognise Victor or Alexander (the latter of whom eventually became Alexander III) 
as the legitimate pope.  Meanwhile, item 2, addressed to Archbishop William of Sens 
(1168-76), was written after the assassination of Thomas Becket and concerns the 
                                                 
461 John, Letters, i: 116.  
462 Ibid., ii: 314.  
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election of a new Archbishop of Canterbury to the then vacant see.  Now John is 
recommending Richard Pont l’Évêque to William as Thomas’ successor.463  
The body is represented in both examples by the head [caput] and the limbs 
[membra], while the body [corpus] itself is mentioned in item 2.  As previously noted, 
the head is given precedence over the limbs, although the precise nature of this 
precedence is not stated.  This view of the head, and how it contrasts with the 
alternative view in ancient thought that the heart is the principal organ of the human 
body (perhaps reproduced in item 3 shortly), will be discussed further below with 
reference to the most sophisticated body politic metaphor penned by John in the 
Policraticus (see item 3).  For present purposes, items 1 and 2 illustrate that concepts 
of well-being and an overseeing organ or place played important roles in how John 
conceptualised and understood the nature of the human body.  Moreover, as with the 
excerpts discussed in sec. 4.1, cohesion and harmony among the parts of the body are 
key elements in the concept of health underpinning items 1 and 2.464   
The excerpt which follows is part of the best known and most detailed of 
John’s body politic metaphors.  John invented an almost certainly bogus source for 
this: supposedly a pamphlet by the Greco-Roman author, Plutarch, entitled The 
Instruction of Trajan.  This, he claims, came attached to a letter sent by Plutarch to 
the Emperor Trajan, which, as John puts is, ‘describes the idea of a certain sort of 
political constitution.’465  It is tempting to view it as a nod towards the classical roots 
of the body politic metaphor.  But whatever the case, John seems to have felt more 
comfortable ascribing this metaphor to a classical author than to himself.   
Thus, consider the following passage, in which John relates the functions of 
the heart and head to parts of the state: 
 
3. The position of the head in the republic is occupied, however, by the ruler 
subject only to God and to those who act in His place on earth, inasmuch as in 
                                                 
463 A good account of the difficulties encountered in electing a new archbishop after the assassination 
of Thomas Becket, and on the character of Richard of Dover can be found in R. Foreville, L’Eglise et 
la Royauté en Angleterre sous Henri II Plantagenet (Paris, 1943), pp. 368-88.   
464 That is items 1 and 2 in sec. 4.1.  The idea that harmony among the parts of the body and mind 
engender health is derived from Greek philosophy, and in particular, Platonic philosophy.  For a brief 
explanation of Plato’s views on harmony see Andrew Gregory’s introduction to the Oxford edition of 
the Timaeus, pp. xxviii-xxxii.   
465 John, Policraticus, v: 1-2.  Nederman notes that this method of lending credibility to an original 
argument was not uncommon during the middle ages: see ibid., p. xxi.  On bogus sources see R. Morse, 
Truth and Convention in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 231-48.  
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the human body, the head is stimulated and ruled by the soul.  The place of the 
heart is occupied by the senate, from which proceeds the beginning of good 
and bad works.   
 
Princeps vero capitis in Republica obtinet locum, uni subjectus Deo, et his qui 
vices illius agunt in terris, quoniam et in humano corpore, ab anima vegetatur 
caput et regitur.  Cordis locum senatus obtinet, a quo bonorum operum et 
malorum procedunt initia.466 
 
This can be compared to items 1 and 2, in which John ascribes primacy to the head 
over the body but no functions to the heart.  Again, the head is identified as the 
principal member, although this point is now qualified further as it is clear that the 
head is the principal member by virtue of it being the bodily location or housing for 
the soul.467  In contrast, the heart is identified as the senate [senatus], which, we are 
told, is the source of good and bad deeds [bonorum operum et malorum procedunt 
initia], regarding which it might be thought of as being like a debating chamber for 
the good and bad aspects of itself or alternatively the person to whom it belongs.  In 
this way, John gives an appreciably ambiguous account of the functions and 
relationship between the head, heart, body, and individual as a whole.  On the one 
hand, the head rules over the body, while on the other, the heart has the power to 
make the body perform good or bad deeds, which, presumably by association at least, 
have consequences for the person.  So in short, it is not at all clear whether the head 
has any direct control or influence over the heart and therefore whether the head 
should be seen as the effective or merely titular ruler of an otherwise cognitively 
devolved entity.    
It is probably significant that elsewhere in his writings John seems to have 
specifically associated the emotions, but not necessarily reason, with the heart.  For 
instance, consider the following excerpt from one of his letters: 
 
4. He who searches out our hearts knows the sadness and continuing sorrow I 
feel in my heart to see foreigners alone bring us help when our ship foundered, 
while you slept on in peril of your life.  
                                                 
466 John, Policraticus, v: 2. 
467 Cf. Plato, Timaeus, 45a-b.  
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Novit inspector cordium quia michi tristicia est dolor continuus cordi meo 
quod, vobis dormientibus in periculo vitae, soli alieni naufragio nostro ferunt 
opem.468  
 
Hence it is worth considering at this point in what ways John distinguished between 
the emotions and reason and their relationship with the body.  As the latter excerpt 
shows, he certainly found it meaningful to ascribe emotional states like sadness 
[tristicia] to the heart.  Among other things, this may help to shed light on why John 
(or perhaps Theobald) represented the latter’s gesture to Henry II, discussed 
previously in sec. 4.2, in terms of him bowing his heart before Henry’s feet.  It is also 
worth referring to the brief discussion in Chapter Three of the Greek term, phrên, best 
translated as midriff [cf. praecordia], in regard to which it was noted that in early 
Greek psychology the emotions were often believed to emanate from the fleshy areas 
enclosed within the central torso (so the heart, lungs, liver, and so forth).  
Accordingly, we should be mindful that these archaic beliefs are possibly the source 
of the association in western psychology between the heart and certain emotions 
(especially love and anger).469            
The emotions were treated by most schools of classical philosophy as distinct 
from reason and mostly with distrust in as much as they were viewed as unpredictable 
and potentially dangerous by virtue of their freedom from reason.  This was especially 
true of Platonism and Stoicism.  Although direct access to the views of adherents to 
these schools of classical philosophy was limited in John’s time (minimal in the case 
of Stoicism), nuggets of their wisdom could be gleaned from a variety of texts.470  
And indeed, certain aspects of their morality were absorbed into Christian thought in 
late antiquity.471  For example, Augustine gives a significant summary of aspects of 
Stoic attitudes towards the emotions, via Aulus Gellius, in City of God (the chapter 
                                                 
468 John, Letters, II: 243.  
469 For the earlier discussion of phrên see Chapter Three, sec. 3.1.1, pp. 76.  
470 See Gregory, ‘The Platonic inheritance’ and Lapidge, ‘The Stoic inheritance’.  Very few western 
intellectuals read any Greek in the twelfth century, and accordingly, had very little access to the most 
important works of Plato and his followers.  Likewise, some of the more important Stoic texts to have 
survived antiquity, such as Marcus Aurelius’ Meditationes, were written in Greek and simply not 
known in the Christian west.  However, there were some exceptions, including the works of the 
Pseudo-Dionysius, which were translated by Eirugena in the ninth century, and also Latin 
commentators such as Augustine (as will be seen shortly: see the following quotation).  For more detail 
on the transmission of Platonism see Chapter Three, sec. 3.1.        
471 Again see Chapter Three, sec. 3.1.  
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subtitle is: ‘The opinions of the Peripatetics and Stoics about the feelings [De 
perturbationibus quae animo accidunt, quae sit Peripateticorum Stoicorumque 
sententia]’)472: 
   
Gellius tells us that he read in the book that the Stoics had concluded that there 
are certain mental phenomena [quod animi visa], to which they give the name 
“fantasies” [phantasias], which we cannot control.  We cannot decide when 
this will happen or when they will happen…It is as if these passions are too 
quick for the functioning of his [i.e. a hypothetical Stoic philosopher] intellect 
and reason [tanquam his passionibus praevenientibus mentis et rationis 
officium]…The soul [animus] of the fool gives way to these passions 
[passiones] and accords them the consent of his mind, while the wise man’s 
soul [animus], although it cannot help experiencing these emotions 
[passiones], still keeps its mind [mens] unshaken and holds firmly to its right 
decision about what aims it ought, in reason [rationabiliter], to pursue, and 
what it should reject.473 
 
John surely could have pieced together from passages like this, among other things, 
an understanding of the principles of ancient, but especially Stoic, psychology, which 
influenced many late-antique Christian writers, Augustine included.   
In fact, much like in the book of which Augustine provides a third-hand 
account, while John grants the soul, residing in the head, stewardship of the body, it 
may nonetheless be led astray by whatever happens in the heart to cause good or bad 
deeds.  Thus, in contrasting John’s account of the roles of the head and heart in 
directing human behaviour with those ascribed to the soul [animus] and emotions 
[passiones] in Augustine’s report of Gellius’ work, it is worth considering two points: 
firstly, whether John followed his classical pagan and Christian predecessors in 
viewing reason as a discrete faculty of the mind which often falls into conflict with 
the others (especially the emotions); and secondly, whether he believed that the mind, 
even if not the soul, was spread across different parts of the body so that, in this case, 
                                                 
472 Note Bettenson translates sententia as passions: this does not seem quite right to me so I have 
altered it to read “feelings” which I believe gives a better sense of what Augustine meant in this context 
by sententia; see next note for reference to City of God.     
473 Augustine, City of God, ix: 4. 
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reason could be located in the head and other cognitive faculties, such as the 
emotions, in the heart.      
First, given his discussion of reason [ratio] in the Metalogicon, it seems 
probable that John did view it as a highly distinct cognitive faculty: 
 
5. Stimulated by sense perception, and keyed up by the solicitude of prudence, 
the conscious soul [anima] exerts itself.  Summoning its strength, it 
endeavours strenuously to avoid errors arising from sense perceptions and 
opinions [sensus et opinio].  By dint of its intensified effort, it sees with 
greater clarity, holds with greater security, and judges with greater accuracy.  
This more perspicacious force [vis] is called “reason” [ratio], which is 
spiritual nature’s power to discriminate and distinguish material and 
immaterial entities [discretiva rerum corporalium et incorporalium], in order 
to examine things with sure unvitiated judgement.474   
     
This passage unquestionably shows that John saw reason, qua a faculty or “force” 
[vis] of the soul, as something distinct from other faculties of the mind: namely 
“sensation and cognition” [sensus et opinio].  Moreover, the translator of this passage, 
Daniel McGarry, suggests two points of comparison with Calcidius’ translation of the 
Timaeus.475  This is important because this passage strongly echoes the Platonic view, 
expressed in the Timaeus and elsewhere, that there is a rational part of the soul which 
is drawn away from material reality towards the transcendent and eternal reality of the 
“forms” [εἴδοι / ἰδέαι] which, Plato tells us in the Timaeus, were used by God to 
fashion the universe: in a Christian context, if John thought anything of the Platonic 
forms, then he may have associated them with the Word of God [Verbum Dei].476   
Second, there were clear precedents in ancient and medieval thought for 
ascribing different cognitive faculties to different areas or parts of the body.  Although 
Plato’s account in the Timaeus of the spread of the soul and thus cognitive faculties 
through the body was not available to John, similar accounts or ideas on the soul-body 
                                                 
474 John, Metalogicon, iv: 15: cf. Policraticus, vii: 1-2.  
475 See ibid., nn. 161-2.  
476 See Plato, Timaeus, 28a-b.  The link between the Platonic forms and Word of God was made by a 
number of Jewish and Christian scholars in later antiquity, but perhaps most significantly Philo: see 
Marenbon, Medieval Philosophy, pp. 25-6.   
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and thus mind-body relationship certainly were. 477   For instance, consider the 
functions ascribed to the head and heart by Isidore in book eleven of the Etymologiae: 
 
6. The primary part of the body is the head [caput], and it was given this name 
because from there all sense and nerves [sensus omne et nervi] originate, and 
every source of activity [vigendus] arises from it.  In it, all sensations [sensus] 
become evident.  Whence it plays the role, so to speak, of the soul itself, 
which watches over the body.478 
 
7. The word heart [cor] is either derived from a Greek term, because they call it 
καρδία, or from care [cura], for in it resides all solicitude and the origin of 
knowledge [scientiae].479 
 
The significance of this is that Isidore is doing more or less what John does in item 1: 
that is, ascribing different cognitive functions to different body parts.  There is no 
suggestion here that John derived his views on the head and heart directly from 
Isidore, although he certainly could have known the passages from the Etymologiae 
cited above.  There are some noteworthy similarities between John’s and Isidore’s 
accounts of the head and heart, such as both associating the soul with the head.  But 
there are also some significant differences.  For example, Isidore names the head as 
the source of action [vigendus: cf. vigeo] whereas John seems to locate this in the 
heart (qua the source of good and bad deeds).  Nevertheless, the crucial point stands 
that an influential medieval thinker like John did locate different cognitive faculties or 
facets of the mind in different body parts and, moreover, that he very possibly 
believed that this view reflected, with some degree of accuracy, the realities of the 
mind-body relationship.    
The idea that the whole of human mental life must be locatable in a single, 
discrete organ or area of the body is inextricably entwined with the modern western 
brain and medical sciences.  It does not necessarily follow in premodern western 
contexts.  Moreover, it was noted in Chapter Two that this idea has recently come in 
for some criticism in neuro- and cognitive science where the reciprocal influence of 
                                                 
477 For Plato’s account of the distribution of the soul around the body see Timaeus, 69d-71e.  
478 Isidore, Etymologiae, xi: 1 (25). 
479 Ibid., xi: 1(118).  
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the body and environment on the brain and hence mental life have become important 
topics of research and discussion.480  Some scholars have disparagingly described the 
tendency in modern western science to confine mental life to the brain as 
“embrainment”. 481   To be sure, none of this lends any retrospective support to 
premodern western psychology: nobody, for instance, is arguing that certain aspects 
of mental life can be attributed to the heart and others to the brain.  What it does 
highlight, however, is the problematic nature of the assumption that mental life is 
confined to the brain or any other circumscribed parts or areas of the body.  At the 
very least, the brain needs sense organs, a body, and external stimuli to function as the 
brain.  More speculatively, cognition may also extend into the environment, as Andy 
Clark has argued, in various non-biological forms.482     
 
4.3.3: Conclusion 
 
Three conclusions can be drawn from this section.  First, even though the mind and 
body were typically thought of as discrete and separable entities in premodern western 
thought, in so far as they merged to form individual people, it made sense to think of 
how they mapped on to each other: or in other words, whereabouts the parts of the 
mind could be located in the body.  John’s body politic metaphors should not be 
viewed as mere metaphors (in the traditional sense of linguistic tropes or rhetorical 
devices).483   As I have argued above, they probably also reflect the influence of 
ancient ideas about the locations of faculties of the mind, especially reason and the 
emotions, in the body: a trend of thought that can be traced back to Plato and Homer, 
among others.484  Accordingly, it is very possible that John intended these metaphors 
to be partially accurate statements about the nature of the mind-body relationship.   
Second, this section has highlighted a significant difference between the ways 
in which the mind-body relationship is conceptualised in premodern and modern 
                                                 
480 For the relevant discussion see Chapter Two, sec. 2.1. 
481 See Damasio, Descartes’ Error, p. 118 and Murphy and Brown, Did My Neurons Make Me Do It?, 
p. 12. 
482 See ibid. or for direct reference, Clark, Being There, chapter 3.  
483 As noted in Chapter Two, the opposing non-traditional theory of metaphor which I am using 
throughout this study is provided by Lakoff and Johnson in Metaphors We Live By (see sec. 2.2).  
Lakoff’s and Johnson’s theory of metaphor was contrasted with a more conventional western view of 
metaphor, grounded in classical rhetoric and widely accepted in the medieval west, in sec. 2.2.5.   
484 Plato’s theory of the mind was discussed in Chapter Three, sec. 3.1.1.  The concept of the mind in 
Homer and archaic Greek thought has been widely discussed by classicists.  For a brief summary of the 
relevant issues see Lloyd, Cognitive Variations, pp. 116-19.  
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western thought.  In the modern era, particularly since the twentieth century with the 
fast development of the sciences of the brain and mind, human mental life has 
increasingly come to be understood as the product of one particular bodily organ: 
namely the brain (a view which, as noted previously, has recently come under some 
criticism within neuro- and cognitive science).485  By contrast, in the premodern west 
different faculties of the mind could be associated with different parts of the body.  
Premodern western thinkers were not beholden to any definitive proof of which part 
of the body produces and maintains mental states hence they were not committed to 
placing the mind in a single distinct part of the body.  Therefore, we should be open to 
the possibility that the relevant question for a thinker such as John was not so much 
whether the mind was in the head or heart, but rather how its parts were distributed 
around the body.   
Finally, it should be kept in mind that cultural and embodied factors are again 
at play in John’s body politic metaphors.  As noted in sec. 4.3.1 above, there is a clear 
cultural background to John’s reasoning in his body politic metaphors, but we should 
not lose sight of the fact that if John himself had not been subject to embodied 
experiences of the kinds of mental faculties that he names in the metaphors then it 
would be hard to make any sense of why he penned them or engaged with the relevant 
cultural background in the first play.  As is being argued throughout Part II of this 
study, the representation of human existence in the sample of source texts is best 
accounted for in terms of the interplay between cultural and biological factors.  John’s 
body politic metaphors do not just involve inherited cultural preconceptions about the 
nature of the mind-body relationship: they involve modes of reasoning which are, or 
were, inherently grounded in the embodied conditions of his existence.  As argued in 
Chapter Three, sec. 3.3 previously, inherited cultural wisdom can only make sense if 
people are able to relate it to their immediate sensory experiences of the world.  This 
follows for John’s metaphors above in that he must have found correspondences 
between the ideas he inherited from the classical past about the mind-body 
relationship and his everyday sensory experiences of the world. 
 
* * * 
 
                                                 
485 See pp. 166-7 above.  
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4.4: The face 
 
This section explores the significance of the ways in which the face and its parts (i.e. 
“facial features”) are represented in the sample of source texts.486  Sec. 4.2 touched on 
the face’s importance in social life.487  This issue is explored further below with 
particular regard for the ways in which it functions as a communicative medium.  
Furthermore, this section discusses the role of the face in social life as an identity-
marker and also the sense of direction and orientation that it gives people: especially 
front-back.  Lakoff’s and Johnson’s theory of metaphor is also relevant here in that 
the face and its parts form the basis of a wide variety of metaphors in the sampled 
source texts. 
Importantly, the status of the face as a body part is somewhat ambiguous.  On 
the one hand, it may be viewed as a distinct bodily organ in as much as it seems to 
perform distinct functions in social life (e.g. communication and identity).  However, 
on closer inspection it can be seen to consist of a series of smaller and more 
functionally discrete organs and tissues: the eyes, nose, mouth, skull, muscles, and so 
on.  Given these difficulties, it is worth stressing that a particularly remarkable feature 
of the face is that it is experienced as the face in individual phenomenology: i.e. it is 
typically perceived as a structured and functionally discrete body part as opposed to 
an unstructured mass of cohering sense organs and tissues.488  Although the causes of 
this phenomenon are unclear, the wealth of perceptual experiences that the face can 
                                                 
486 There is a historiography on the theological significance of the faces of revered persons: especially 
Christ and Mary.  Of particular relevance on this is a special 2007 issue of the art history journal, 
Gesta, (46: 2), subtitled ‘Contemporary Approaches to the Medieval Face’.  Several articles from this 
are referenced below.  There is also a modest discourse on how physiognomy, or the science of 
discerning somebody’s character from their appearance, which often placed especial emphasis on the 
interpretation of the face, was understood and used in the medieval west: for instance, see P. Squatriti, 
‘Personal appearance and physiognomics in early medieval Italy’ in Journal of Medieval History, 14 
(1988), pp. 191-202, J. Ziegler, ‘Text and Context: On the Rise of Physiognomic Thought in the Later 
Middle Ages’ in De Sion exibit et verbum domini de Hierusalem: Essays on Medieval Law, Liturgy, 
and Literature in Honour of Amnon Linder, ed. Y. Hen (Turnhout, 2001), pp. 159-82, Perkinson, 
‘Rethinking the Origins of Portraiture’ in Gesta, 46: 2 (2007), pp. 136-8, and T. Dale, ‘Romanesque 
Sculpted Portraits: Convention, Vision, and Real Presence’ in Gesta, 46: 2 (2007), pp. 105-7. 
487 See the discussion of item 3, sec. 4.2, pp. 151-4.  
488 Again, this may reflect the human tendency, noted in Chapter Two, sec. 2.2.1 to view the world as 
inherently structured. 
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elicit in human observers (e.g. visual recognition, identity, expression, or symmetry) 
is certainly suggestive of its importance to human mental and social life. 489 
The most prominent features of the face as people experience it are probably 
the surface features of the series of sense organs that are spread across it: the eyes 
[oculi], ears [aures], nose [nasus], mouth [os] and tongue [lingua].  These are among 
the most common body parts to recur throughout the chosen source texts.  A variety 
of examples of their use, mostly in metaphors, will be discussed in this and the 
following section.490  A significant corollary of this is that four of the five senses, as 
noted in antique and modern medicine, are confined to the face, or more broadly, the 
head: vision [visus], hearing [auditus], smell [olfactus], and taste [gustus].491  The 
fifth sense, touch [tactus], is also sensed on the face via the skin.  By contrast, facial 
features that are not in some sense connected to the four sense-faculties bound to the 
head are rarely used, if at all, in the chosen source texts.  For example, it is hard to 
find any examples of hair [capillus, crinis], cheeks [genae], lips [labra], the chin 
[mentum], and brow [frons], being used descriptively or as metaphors.492        
It was noted in sec. 4.3 that Isidore viewed the head as the principal part of the 
body.493  This can be expanded further with reference to his views on the face: 
 
The word for face comes from visible likeness [effigie], for all of the 
characteristic form of a human being and the ability for every person to be 
recognised resides in the face.494  [My italics] 
 
Thus, Isidore acknowledges the role of the face as an identity-marker.  However, he 
does not discuss which features of it, or faculties of human mental life, make this 
possible.  Additionally, he goes on to explain the utility of facial expressions [vultus] 
in social life: 
 
                                                 
489 On symmetry, Dennett notes the possible survival value of being able to pick out symmetrical 
patterns in the natural environment in Consciousness Explained, pp. 179-80.       
490 That is sections 4.4.1-2 and 4.5.  
491 For example, Isidore notes this in Etymologiae, xi: 1 (18-25). 
492 A cursory glance through any of the chosen source texts will throw up numerous examples of the 
sense organs, including the mouth and ears, being used descriptively and metaphorically. The same is 
not true of the other body parts noted in the texts.  Incidentally, this may be a quirk of Latin texts: I 
cannot comment to what extent, if at all, this follows for medieval vernacular literatures.       
493 See items 6 and 7 in sec. 4.3.2, p. 166 above.  
494 Isidore, Etymologiae, xi: 1 (33).  
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But facial expression [vultus] is so called because the inclination of the will 
[animi voluntas] is displayed [ostendo] by it.  The expression changes in 
various movements according to the will, whence the two terms for face 
[facies] differ from each other, for while the face refers simply to someone’s 
natural appearance [naturalis aspectus], facial expression [vultus] reveals what 
he has on his mind [animus].495 
 
It is noteworthy that the Latin word which now tends to be identified with the modern 
English term, “facial expression”, namely vultus, shares its root with the verb to will 
or wish, volo. 496  Isidore highlights this connection in his etymology by pointing out 
that vulti show the “will of the soul [animi voluntas]”.  Hence in this regard Isidore 
appears to have viewed facial expressions, to use the jargon of current analytical 
philosophy, as “intentional” phenomena, which is to say he viewed them as outwardly 
directed expressions of mental states.497    
 Isidore’s evaluation of the face is helpful here to the extent that it shows us 
that the appearance of the face was viewed as significant by well-educated people in 
the late antique and medieval west: at least as an identity-marker and according to its 
“expression” [vultus] in response to differing circumstances, and surely in other 
unnoted ways.  Furthermore, in making these connections Isidore draws attention to 
the relationship between the face and the mind, both in the package of the individual, 
and more broadly in the outward world where there are many people, all with faces 
and minds, connected in innumerable ways through the channels of the human social 
world.  In this way, the face can be seen to act as a communicative medium, whereby 
aspects of people’s mental lives are represented, intentionally or not, in a fashion 
which may be observed and interpreted by other people in the world.  
In regard to all this, I will argue in this section that the face and its parts 
(especially the sense organs) tend to assume symbolic, including metaphorical, 
significances, in medieval cultures, as will be seen in this and the following section 
                                                 
495 Ibid., xi: 1 (34).  
496 Vultus may also be taken to mean likeness or portrait (cf. simulacrum): see Lewis and Short, s.n. 
vultus (accessed 22 / 09 / 09): Burrow notes that “expression” first began to be used in English to 
describe the appearance of the face in the early modern period; see Looks and Gestures, p. 82. 
497 For a now classic discussion of the importance of intentionality to human mental and social life see 
J. R. Searle, Intentionality: an essay in the philosophy of the mind (Cambridge, 1983): Searle has 
recently iterated his previous views on intentionality in Making the Social World: The Structure of 
Human Civilisation (Oxford, 2010), pp. 25-41.  
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(4.5), because of the intimacy between its expression and the state of the mind and 
also its prominence in the visual aspect of human phenomenology.  The basic 
tendency that people have to form ideas about what is going on in other people’s 
minds by observing their faces is probably innate.  But this still leaves plenty of room 
for variation in the more specific significances that people draw from the appearance 
of the face in a wide-range of socio-cultural settings.   
The interpretation of specific facial expressions offers a case in point.  Since 
the nineteenth century western scientists and anthropologists have been studying how 
people, as well as some primates and higher order mammals, respond to their peers’ 
facial expressions.  From an outsider’s perspective, it seems that there is a broad 
consensus in these fields that at least some human and animal facial expressions are 
“hard-wired”, both in their physiological performance and interpretation by observers 
of the same species: the most common example invoked to demonstrate this is 
smiling, not least because smiles are notoriously hard to fake. 498   This seems a 
reasonable, but also limited conclusion, not least given the infamously “artificial” 
settings in which research of this sort has often been undertaken (as well as the 
Eurocentric assumptions directing the course of most such studies).499  It is entirely 
conceivable that smiles automatically connote happiness or pleasure of some sort 
throughout the human world: but this has nothing to say about the place and timing of 
smiles, nor variation in what counts as “happiness” and “pleasure”, and thus the 
reasons why people may smile, and the kinds of responses that smiles are likely to 
elicit from observers, in a potentially infinite range of socio-cultural circumstances.   
In short, the probable innateness of the performance and superficial 
interpretation (i.e. smile = happiness / pleasure) of some, but certainly not all, facial 
expressions provides only a limited account of the importance of the face in human 
mental and social life.  It seems absolutely necessary to augment this with a culturalist 
understanding of the circumstances in which performance and interpretation occur 
(including in laboratory conditions).  But if this is so, then as noted above, should we 
                                                 
498 On the interpretation of smiles, there is the matter of “fake smiles”: see Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 
pp. 141-2 and Pinker, How the Mind Works, pp. 414-16.  The importance of the difficulty of faking 
smiles is that it gives an indication of how strongly connected to hardwired physiology certain facial 
expressions are.  For some more relevant discussions of facial expressions among humans and primates 
see Argyle, Bodily Communication, pp. 35-7, 41-2, and chapter 8 (especially pp. 124-5); Pinker, How 
the Mind Works, pp. 272-4 and 365-6; additionally, Smail’s comments on facial expressions in chapter 
four of Deep History and the Brain, although brief, raise important caveats: see pp. 114-15 and 130-1. 
499 Lloyd discusses issues raised by this kind of research throughout Cognitive Variations: chapter three 
is especially instructive.   
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be maintaining two discrete modes of explanation for phenomena such as the face?  
That is, is it really helpful to think of the biological basis of the face and its cultural 
effects as belonging to separate logical or ontological domains, or would it be better 
to collapse the difference?  I shall postpone providing an answer to this until the 
conclusion to this section: suffice to say for now the face is an excellent example of a 
phenomenon which can only be properly explained in terms of the interacting 
influences of mind, body, and culture.           
Finally, as the most important and widely read text in the medieval west, it is 
important here to take account of the Bible as a potential source of facial metaphors 
available to the relevant authors.  For example, consider the following excerpts taken 
from Psalm 16 only: 
 
• O Lord, my justice: attend to my supplication. Give ear unto my prayer, 
which proceedeth not from deceitful lips. 
 
[A]udi Deus iustum intende deprecationem meam auribus percipe orationem 
meam absque labiis mendacii.  [Ps. 16: 1] 
 
• Let my judgment come forth from thy countenance: let thy eyes behold the 
things that are equitable. 
 
[D]e vultu tuo iudicium meum prodeat oculi tui videant aequitates.    
[Ps. 16: 2] 
 
• That my mouth may not speak the works of men: for the sake of the words 
of thy lips, I have kept hard ways. 
 
[C]ogitationes meas transire os meum in opere hominum propter verbum 
labiorum tuorum ego observavi vias latronis.  [Ps. 16: 4] 
 
• From them that resist thy right hand keep me, as the apple of thy eye. Protect 
me under the shadow of thy wings. 
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[A] resistentibus dexterae tuae custodi me quasi pupillam intus in oculo in 
umbra alarum tuarum protege me.  [Ps. 16: 8] 
 
• From the face of the wicked who have afflicted me. My enemies have 
surrounded my soul. 
 
[A] facie impiorum vastantium me inimici mei animam meam 
circumdederunt.  [Ps. 16: 9]500 
 
I quote these passages as general examples showing how frequently ideas about the 
face occur in the Bible.  A specific example of one of the relevant authors, namely 
Peter, echoing a biblical passage is discussed below in sec. 4.4.2.501  For now, as 
discussed elsewhere in this study, it should be noted that the Bible was of crucial 
importance in the literate cultures of medieval Europe.502  The Bible can be credited 
with some degree of influence on many, if not most, aspects of the conceptual 
reasoning of the authors relevant here, including how they thought and wrote about 
the face. 
 
4.4.1: Facial expressions 
 
The following excerpt, taken from Guibert’s De Vita Sua, gives some idea of how he 
experienced and understood the value of the face in a socio-religious context: 
 
1. Thereupon we saw the face of the Holy Mother changed to a tranquil 
expression. 
 
 [I]llico piae Matris faciem in serenum versam vidimus.503 
 
Guibert is here describing a change in the face of a statue of the Virgin Mary that 
immediately followed an act of divine punishment meted out to the community of the 
                                                 
500 All translations taken from www.LatinVulgate.com (accessed 10 / 01 / 10) 
501 See sec. 4.4.2, p. 184.  
502 This is discussed in particular detail in Chapter Five, sec. 5.2.1.  
503 Guibert, De Vita Sua, i: 23.  
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monastery of St Germer-de-Fly, and in particular, three monks of apparently dubious 
character who were killed by the event.504   
Firstly, there is a significant conceptual difference between how Guibert and 
Benton, the translator of the above passage, construe the relationship between the face 
and its appearance in item 1.  In contrast to the immediacy of the relationship between 
the face and its appearance in Guibert’s text, which has the sense that Mary’s face 
turned or became serene [faciem in serenum versam], Benton adds an additional 
object, viz. “facial expression”, which stands in itself for the face’s appearance.  
Taking account of this, I propose an alternative translation: 
 
Immediately we saw that the face of the holy mother had become tranquil. 
[My translation] 
 
Thereupon we saw the face of the Holy Mother changed to a tranquil 
expression.  [Benton’s translation] 
 
The change that Guibert describes, using versam, is more direct than Benton’s 
translation: hence my suggestion, “become”, to describe the transition (“Mary’s face 
becomes tranquil” as opposed to “changes to a tranquil expression”).  Benton’s 
translation unnecessarily imposes a different conceptual structure on the sentence in 
that the quality of tranquillity is ascribed to an aspect or possession of the face rather 
than the face itself.  This is as opposed to Guibert’s Latin, in which tranquillity is 
construed as a quality directly pertaining to the face.   
Guibert could conceivably have used vultus to express a change to Mary’s face 
(e.g. Illico piae Matris faciem in vultum serenum versam vidimus).  However, he did 
not.  Therefore, it can be seen that there is nothing about Latin, or indeed modern 
English, that forces its users to conceptualise the appearance of the face as an object 
in itself: either way, the face may become tranquil just as easily as it may adopt a 
tranquil expression.  Of course, to some extent, it is reasonable to think about what 
Guibert represents as a change in the appearance of Mary’s face as a “facial 
expression”, providing, however, we acknowledge this as an inference from the text, 
and more importantly, that it changes the conceptual structure and thus meaning of 
                                                 
504 Ibid., i: 23.  
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Guibert’s Latin, ostensibly, it seems, to satisfy a conceptual understanding of the face 
now common among modern English-speakers.   
Guibert clearly believed that changes in Mary’s mental state were sufficient to 
cause changes to the appearance of her face: hence there is an explicitly 
acknowledged link between qualitative states of the mind and body.  In this way, 
Mary’s face is important both for its changing form and the symbolic value of the 
change in its form as perceived by Guibert and his fellow monks in relation to a 
complex socio-religious setting.  Accordingly, the change to Mary’s face is seen by 
Guibert and the monks, not merely in terms of its superficial content as “serene”, but 
more powerfully as an expression of the God’s omniscience and will as regards the 
behaviour befitting the monks of a religious community (according to medieval 
Western European stereotypes of monasticism).505   
Furthermore, Guibert employs a telling facial metaphor to describe how he 
and the monks were provoked by the miraculous punishment to reflect on their own 
consciences and state of the community: 
 
2. When we had recovered from the amazement which had fallen on us through 
this event, after making confession, we sadly began to consider why we had 
suffered for our sins beyond human expression, and, being brought by God 
face to face with ourselves, by looking into our consciences we discovered 
how justly we had been punished. 
 
Postquam autem a stupore, qui ex eventu illo acciderat, experrecti sumus, et 
confessione facta, quid pro peccatis nostris passi eramus, supra quam dici ab 
homine potest, tristes pensare coepimus, et statuti a Deo contra facies nostras 
ex respectu conscientiarum nostrarum didicimus quam juste 
pertulerimus…506 
   
It seems fairly clear that by contra facies nostras, Guibert meant “face-to-face” in 
abstraction as opposed to reflection (hence this is taken here as an explicit metaphor).  
Nevertheless, it is worth flagging up the possibility that to some degree this might 
                                                 
505 Burrow provides a wide overview of the functions and significances ascribed to the face in Western 
European medieval literature in Gestures and Looks, pp. 69-113.  
506 Ibid., i: 23.  
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have been informed by embodied experiences of seeing one’s own face in reflection.  
This point is not intended to take any force away from the metaphor.  In fact, it sits 
quite happily with Lakoff’s and Johnson’s theory of metaphor, which, as explained, 
proposes that metaphors are informed by sensorimotor experience.  Accordingly, in 
highlighting this possible source of sensorimotor input for Guibert’s facies-ad-faciem 
formula, there is no need to propose that Guibert saw the metaphor strictly in terms of 
a particular kind of sensorimotor experience.  It is simply a matter of highlighting one 
of many possible sensorimotor inputs, which may help to account for the sense of the 
metaphor in embodied terms.    
 This is closely followed by another metaphor, which carries an even stronger 
basis in embodied experiences of sight and gaze: ex respectu conscientiarum 
nostrarum.  Importantly, this expands on the former metaphor in so far as by naming 
the conscience [conscientia] as the object of Guibert’s and the monks’ gazes, it 
provides by inference the probable object of sight beyond the face in the previous 
metaphor.  That is, when Guibert says that he and his fellow monks were brought up 
against their faces [contra facies nostras], given what he then goes on to say, it seems 
clear that “face-to-face” is intended here as a metaphor for introspection, specifically 
on a supposed facet of the mind, the conscience.507   
This is illustrative of the strength of the perceived link between the face and 
mind in human phenomenology in an important way.  Metaphor is often understood 
as a linguistic process whereby something complex is represented as something 
simpler in order to render the complex referent of the metaphor more easily 
understandable.  Yet in a sense Guibert’s face-to-face metaphor does the opposite: 
that is, it illustrates something very simple, or better, more direct (i.e. pure mental 
self-examination), in terms of something less direct (i.e. looking at one’s own face, 
presumably because the appearance of the face provides understanding of the current 
mental state of the person to whom it belongs).  So we must consider in what way 
inserting the face into the mind as a barrier illuminates, rather than obscures, what 
Guibert intended to express through his face-to-face metaphor.     
I would argue this does two important things, the first informed by how people 
experience themselves as conscious beings, while the second reflects deeply-rooted 
                                                 
507 Medieval and ancient theories involving the partition of the mind into distinct parts were discussed 
in the previous chapter: see 3.1.1 and 3.3.1. 
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suspicions in Western Christian theological discourse about the kind of self-
understanding which may be achieved directly through consciousness.   
Firstly, it makes the process of introspection more easily understandable by 
pushing the powerful illusion of the internal observer, or in different words, the so-
called homunculus or audience in the “Cartesian theatre”, into the foreground.508  
Hence instead of the object of self-inspection being the continuously changing mass 
of evanescent mental states, many of which are only ever experienced on the 
periphery of consciousness, which form the phenomenon called “the mind” in western 
cultures, it is the rather more consistent body part that people recognise, perhaps 
innately, as sharing an intimate link with the mind, namely the face.  Therefore, 
Guibert’s face-to-face metaphor serves both to reflect the illusion that our bodies 
apparently create for us of there being an observer of the mind in the mind, and also to 
give this observer a reasonably stable object over which to cast its gaze.  In these 
ways, the metaphor reflects not so much a linguistic stab at making the phenomenon 
of introspection easier to understand, but rather the body’s own physiological 
mechanism for making our own minds more easily understandable to ourselves.     
      Secondly, there is element of force here in that Guibert and the monks need to 
be brought by God to stand against their faces (as the Latin more literally reads).  
That is, to draw the obvious inference, it was not enough simply for Guibert and the 
monks to have knowledge of their sins immediately available to them in their 
conscious minds: their awareness of it needed to be forced by God via a miracle 
which made examples of the worst offenders (the three monks who died).  So the 
potential immediacy of self-knowledge through consciousness is not in itself a 
guarantee that people will be self-aware of what they ought to be (things can always 
be “repressed”), nor that being self-aware of what one ought to be will necessarily 
lead one to the right conclusions about oneself (in this context, according to Western 
Christian morality): the latter distinction presumably marks the difference between 
mere awareness of sins and genuine contrition.509  Ideas such as these are prevalent 
throughout Augustine’s Confessions and elsewhere in the corpus of Western Christian 
theological discourse, in which there is always the sneaking suspicion that conscious 
self-awareness may not be what it seems: to use St Paul’s pithy metaphor, self-
                                                 
508 For earlier discussions of this see Chapter Two, sec. 2.1, pp. 39-41: for direct reference see Dennett, 
Consciousness Explained, pp. 101-11. 
509 On the nature of contrition, particularly as opposed to mere confession, see Cohen, The Modulated 
Scream, pp. 29-31.  
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awareness is like seeing through a glass darkly [per speculum enigmate], at least until 
the dark is dispelled by the light of God.510         
Finally, I turn to another excerpt from Guibert’s vita in which he describes 
how his mother presented her face in the social world (i.e. for other people to 
observe): 
 
3. The seriousness of her manner was such as to make evident her scorn for all 
vanity; the gravity of her eyes, the restraint of her speech, and the modesty of 
her expression [or “face”] gave no encouragement to light looks. 
 
[I]llius enim habitudinis gravitas totius vanitatis poterat insinuare 
contemptum, oculorum namque pondus, raritas eloquendi ac faciei motuum 
difficultas, minime levitatibus intuentium obsecundat. 511 
 
Guibert here uses a series of concepts grounded in sensorimotor experience to 
represent the way in which his mother presented her face and body in the social 
world, her habitus, and the kind of attention this invited: most significantly, weight 
[gravis], lightness [levitas], motion [motuum], and difficultas, which is perhaps best 
taken here to mean exertion (i.e. the use of force to achieve some kind of effect in the 
world). In this way, we can clearly see that Guibert was able to draw on his embodied 
experiences of apparently unremarkable physical phenomena to represent various 
aspects of the social world of northern France as he knew it.     
 Additionally, this excerpt presents a somewhat different understanding of how 
the face may function in social and mental life to that seen above in items 1 and 2.  In 
item 1 Mary’s face merits attention because of its remarkable expressivity and thus 
the access it granted into the Will of God.  Similarly, the face is important in item 2 
because it potentially grants access to the mind.  In contrast to all this, Guibert’s 
mother’s face in item 3 is supposedly significant for its lack of expressivity and so, we 
might be led to infer, the lack of access it granted observers into her mind.  Yet lack 
of expressivity, both on the face and body, is in fact construed here as an oblique form 
of non-verbal communication, whereby Guibert’s mother projects signals in the social 
world that actively discourage certain forms of undesirable attention: namely, “light 
                                                 
510 Paul, I Cor. 13: 12.  
511 Ibid., i: 2. 
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looks” [levitates intuentium].  What is more, Guibert represents the opposition 
between his mother’s habitus and the kind of attention in the social world it was 
calculated to repel in terms of the two opposing qualities of the phenomenon of 
weight [pondus]: heaviness [gravis] and lightness [levitas].   
This gives us a particularly good illustration of the problems inherent in 
separating the biological nature of human life from the socio-cultural effects brought 
about by it.  There is a clear cause-effect relationship between human biology and 
culture and society and it is not at all clear how we are supposed to draw an analytical, 
or logical, line between them.  This is one example among many highlighted in this 
study: but all the same, it is particularly striking that embodied experiences of an 
unremarkable phenomenon such as weight can provide so much insight into the nature 
of the complex social environments that human beings navigate on a daily basis.   
 
4.4.2: The face and its effects in the world 
 
Of the sample of source texts, the letters of John of Salisbury and Peter of Celle offer 
some particularly vivid examples of the face and parts of it being used in metaphors.  
Thus, consider the following two excerpts, which are conceptually similar in many 
respects: 
 
1. For I only saw the face, for which I longed, by night and scarce even then, and 
that evil fortune which is so often mine, stole it from me all too swiftly, so that 
I could not see it again in the morning to salute it, when I departed all the more 
anxious for the sight. 
 
Cum enim desideratam facie vestram nocturno tempore et ad modicum et vix 
viderim, eadem michi solito infortunio cito nimis subtracta est ut eam nec ad 
salutandam michi discedenti et eo magis cupienti mane licuerit revidere.512 
 
2. You have with you those intermediaries by whose intervention friendship 
sprang between us, on whose love your soul depends as much as mine.  
                                                 
512 John, Letters, i: 97.  
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Behold in them and from them our face, and consider what affection we have 
towards you. 
 
Mediatores illos quorum interventu familiaritas inter nos oborta est penes vos 
habetis, de quorum amore tam vester quam noster animus pendet.  In ipsis et 
ex ipsis faciem nostram aspicite, et quam habeamus erga vos affectionem 
pensate.513 
 
In both items the face functions as a point of social contact between individuals, in 
spite of the circumstances related in each example.   
Firstly, item 1 is taken from a letter by John to an unknown addressee.514  John 
laments the limited contact that he had had with the face [facies] of the person to 
whom the letter was addressed while staying somewhere on official business, and 
more so because he was not able to bid him farewell upon leaving.  In this case, the 
face functions as a metonym for this person and also as a point of social contact and 
communication between them.  Furthermore, in representing the person in this way, 
John draws attention to certain aspects of his being as a person: he is associated with 
his face and thereby whatever functions or qualities his face, and faces in general, 
were understood to perform or carry in the twelfth-century west.  Clearly the 
communicative functions of the face are relevant in this respect.  John may also have 
had in mind the qualities of the face that make it suitable as an identity-marker.  But 
in any case, what is evident from this is that there are no clear boundaries between the 
biological and socio-cultural significances of the face.  We may choose to analyse it 
in these terms, but then the distinction between biology and society and culture is 
imposed rather than inherent in the text.    
Meanwhile, item 2 is taken from a letter by Peter, addressed to Abbot Hugh of 
Bury St Edmunds.  The face again serves as a metonym, but this time for a group 
rather than an individual: specifically the community of Celle, of which Peter was 
then abbot (note he instructs Hugh to see “our”, rather than his, face [faciem noster] in 
the messengers).  Once again, the face is construed as a point of social contact and 
thus communication between the two communities: Bury is asked to discern the 
affection [affectio] in which it was held by Celle.  However, this involves effacement 
                                                 
513 Peter, Letters, 117.  
514 Millor and Butler rule out Peter of Celle as a possible recipient: see John, Letters, i., p. 149 (n. 2).   
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of the identities and mental lives of the messengers, from whose faces Bury is 
supposed to discern Celle’s affection for it.  Haseldine suggests that the intermediaries 
in question are John of Salisbury and his kinsman, Geoffrey of St Edmund’s.515  
Whoever they were, they were probably more than mere messengers, not least as 
Peter describes them as mediatores rather than the more common nuntii [messengers].  
Still, the point stands that their identities and personal mental lives are subsumed 
under the “public face” of Celle (so to speak), even though they were probably not 
members of that community. 
Again, this demonstrates the difficulty in separating the body from its socio-
cultural effects since the way in which the face is represented in this excerpt can be 
seen to be influenced by, first, the literary conventions which constrained the style of 
Latin letters in twelfth-century Europe, second, how its appearance was interpreted in 
socio-cultural circumstances familiar to Peter, and third, Peter’s immediate embodied 
experiences of the face (be that his own and other people’s faces).  Therefore, in short, 
there is no clear separation between the biological face and its socio-cultural effects: 
they are surely continuous.    
Another important way in which the face is represented in the sample of 
source texts is by the ascription of functions or capacities to its parts (especially the 
sense organs).  For instance, consider the following two examples, taken from Peter’s 
letters, in which the eyes [oculi], mouth [os], and tongue [lingua] are used to represent 
reading and writing:  
 
3. The heights, my dearest one, of your letters recede, raised up into such a 
density of the clouds that they scarcely admit by any means, even the most 
strenuous efforts, the gaze of my eyes…Certainly I do not by any means envy 
you with a mean eye, but I still pity myself because the more brightly your 
fortune, the neighbour of mine shines out, so the more dimly this one 
glimmers.  So as long as you closed the bolts of your mouth, as long as you 
allowed your eyes to sleep, as long as you did not lay your hand on the quiver, 
I spoke with greater fluency and greater words… 
 
                                                 
515 See Haseldine, n. 1, to Peter, Letters, 117.  
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Cacumina, dilectissime, litterarum tuarum in tantum nubium densitatem 
sublevata sese recipient quod vix conatibus difficullimis acumen luminum 
meorum quoquomodo admittant…Tibi quidem oculo nequam nequaquam 
invideo, attamen michi condoleo quia quanto sors tua mec vicina relucet 
splendidior tanto ipsa sublucet obscurior.  Dum ergo repagula ori induxisti, 
dum oculis dormitationem indulsisti, dum manum ad pharetram non adduxisti, 
magna maiorum celeritate verborum effabar…516     
 
4. The eye cannot see so let the pen speak.  I cannot go but at least I have the 
strength to write [alt. I hasten to come by written parchment as my limbs are 
presently hampered by my decrepit body].  Let parchment report back what 
the tongue cannot.  Let the dead image make up for what the living and true 
one lacks the strength to do.  Let syllables give word of our circumstances 
because utterance from the mouth cannot.  I long to see you. 
 
Cernere non potest oculus, alloquantur stilus.  Currat in membranis littera 
quia in membris suis retardatur corporalis praesentia.  Referat carta quod 
non potest lingua.  Suppleat imago mortua quod non valet viva vera.  Syllabe 
fortunam nostram nuntient quia eloquia oris nequeunt.  Desidero vos 
videre.517 
 
Most obviously, in both excerpts the eyes, mouth, and tongue act as metonyms for the 
senses and abilities they make possible.  Bearing this in mind, it seems noteworthy 
that the hands [manūs] don’t get a mention here as they are surely also integral 
components in the production of written verbal communication: more so in fact than 
the mouth and tongue.  The manual tools of writing, pens [pharetra and stilus] and 
parchment [membranum], are noted, but the greater weight of representation and 
understanding is nevertheless placed on the aforesaid parts of the face.   
This may reflect, as noted above, an uneven distribution of bodily-awareness 
in human consciousness and phenomenology.518  The sensory faculties of the body are 
more concentrated in and around the head than any other part of the body.  Four of the 
                                                 
516 Peter, Letters, 50.  
517 Peter, Letters, 100.  I have switched the first two clauses of the translation to the order in the Latin.   
518 See sec. 4.4, pp. 169-70 above.  
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five conventional senses are sensed only around the head.  While people’s conscious 
awareness of themselves and the outside world may be informed by feelings 
originating throughout the body, the great majority of these feelings originate from 
the sense organs of the head (most of them positioned at its “front”).519  Therefore, as 
argued above, if human reason is earthed in the conditions of human embodiment and 
sensorimotor experiences then it is important to give some consideration to the 
differing degrees of sympathy with which people experience the different parts or 
areas of their bodies.520  The senses of the head dominate human consciousness and 
phenomenology, and so by virtue of this, it seems, they may exert a disproportionate 
influence over human reason (when considered in light of the complexity and extent 
of the rest of the body).  The head is also the external source of spoken language, so in 
addition to the communicative functions performed by the face the capacity to speak 
may also be located in the head.  This connection is made by Peter in items 3 and 4.  
However, he also draws attention to the ineffectiveness of the body’s immediate 
capacities to make sensorimotor contact with people over long distances: that is, 
seeing, speaking to, and hearing them.  It is in regard to this that he refers to pens, 
parchment, and the general activity and culture of letter-writing that he knew.  It is 
also very likely that Peter was influenced in this regard, as his letters so often are, by 
the content of the Bible.  For instance, the remarkably similar idea about the nature of 
writing is expressed by the following extract from the Book of Psalms: My tongue is 
the pen of a swift scribe [[L]ingua mea stilus scribae velocis].521 
At this point, it is worth returning to Andy Clark’s views on the relationship 
between the human organism (mind and body) and its cultural effects. 522   Peter 
represents the activity and products of letter-writing in items 3 and 4 as though he 
conceived of them as extensions of his biological mechanisms for making visual and 
                                                 
519 The fact that people experience the faceward side of their bodies as its front offers a case in point.  
This idea is based on how people experience their bodies rather than the faceward side of the body 
carrying the intrinsic property of “frontness”.  I would hazard that this is how Lakoff and Johnson 
would set out the point in Philosophy in the Flesh: for a discussion of the content of this work and 
relevant notes see Chapter Two, sec. 2.1, pp. 44-7.  
520 It is worth bearing in mind the etymology of our word sympathy.  It comes from the Greek, 
συµπάθεια, defined in Liddell and Scott as “fellow-feeling” (or more obliquely, “affinity”), which itself 
can be broken into its roots, σύν [with], and πάσχω [to suffer or be affected by anything whether good 
or bad]: see Liddell and Scott, s.n. sumpaqeia, sun, and pasxw (accessed 19 / 06 / 2010).  The point in 
noting all this is that the concept of sympathy, which, in many ways, has changed little since antiquity, 
has its roots in sensory experience: it is not quite as abstract an idea as modern usage may often suggest 
(not least as it is often confused with “empathy”).       
521 Ps. 44: 2: my translation.  Augustine uses this in Confessions, xi: 2.  
522 See Chapter Two, sec. 2.1, pp. 47-9.  
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verbal contact with people.  More specifically, by conceit of the pen and parchment 
Peter is able to overcome the limitations of his body: there is a relevant pun in item 4, 
which cannot be translated into English; parchments [membrana] do the work that 
Peter’s membra [limbs] cannot. 
Clark’s analysis exposes the difficulties inherent in drawing anything more 
substantive than an arbitrary, albeit, in some ways logically helpful, distinction 
between the sensorimotor capacities of the biological body and its effects in the 
world.  As the present example shows, this insight may be usefully applied to 
premodern texts.  The continuity between Peter’s body and its effects, viz. written 
letters, is explicitly described in items 3 and 4, for example.  This seems best 
exemplified by his membra-membrana pun, which absolutely begs to be read in terms 
of parchment functioning as an extension or enhancement of the limbs.  Furthermore, 
although, as argued above, the sensory organs of the head and face provide the most 
explicit reference points in both items because they feature so strongly in human 
consciousness, the motor functions of the body are implied throughout.  The limbs 
and particularly hands are necessary to write letters, and the locomotive capacity of 
the body may be inferred from Peter’s claim in item 4 that decrepitude prevented him 
from travelling.   
 
4.4.3: Conclusion 
 
This section has highlighted the importance of the face to how several of the authors 
relevant to this study, namely Guibert, John, and Peter, experienced the body, and via 
the body, the world.  It seems that the face features more prominently in human 
consciousness and phenomenology than any other localised part or area of the body.  
The intensity with which people experience, and thereby sympathise, with their faces 
is unquestionably a result of it being the only part of the body through which all five 
of the conventional senses are experienced, four of which are experienced only via the 
face (or perhaps head in the case of the ears).  Hence, considered from an embodied 
perspective, it is not surprising that the face is afforded so much significance in 
human social life and the production of cultural media in the excerpts considered in 
this section (as well as item 3 in sec. 4.3): nor that John, and many other premodern 
   
 
187 
 
western intellectuals, saw the head as the principal member of the body, as was seen 
in sec. 4.3. 
There is also a strong element of conventionality in how the face may be 
represented and conceptualised.  While embodied experiences of the face place it in a 
prominent position in human consciousness and phenomenology, socio-cultural 
pressures can be seen to modify how people experience and interpret its importance in 
their mental lives.  This can be seen in various ways in the excerpts examined above.  
For instance, Guibert’s claim that his mother’s lack of expression repelled the “light 
looks” of undesirable observers is clearly informed by his own experiences of the 
nature of human social life.  Peter’s view that written letters could serve as substitutes 
for the limited effectiveness of vision and the spoken word is obviously informed by 
letter-writing customs and Latin literary culture in twelfth-century Europe as well as, 
presumably, by his own immediate experiences of reading and writing letters: as 
noted above, Peter’s thinking in this regard may also have been influenced by the 
content of the Bible.  Accordingly, the key conclusion here is that neither strictly 
embodied nor culturalist approaches to the face are sufficient to account for its 
observable complexity as a phenomenon: rather, understanding is needed of how the 
face reflects the interplay between mind, body, and culture.     
 
4.5: Compound metaphors 
 
This section is concerned with metaphors that combine two or more ostensibly 
clashing ideas to form coherent propositions about some other thing that is not 
directly referred to (i.e. “compound metaphors”).  The three examples given below, 
taken from John’s and Peter’s letters, follow a similar formula in that they all combine 
an idea about a part of the face or head, and another about some other body part 
(bearing in mind that the body part featured in item 3, the heart, may also be seen as a 
cognitive phenomenon), to provide understanding of mental states.523  In this respect, 
they should be viewed as a specific kind of compound metaphor rather than as a 
representative sample of the full range of compound metaphors to be found in the 
sampled texts.  A full analysis of compound metaphors as they occur in the relevant 
                                                 
523 The status of the heart as a cognitive phenomenon or faculty of the mind was discussed in sec. 4.3. 
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texts is beyond the scope of this study.  However, for present purposes, the following 
examples serve to illustrate their broad significance:  
 
1. [Y]ou first tickled my ears with sweet words… 
 
[A]ures michi ante dulciloquio perfricuisti…524 
 
2. [S]preading the snares of daily concerns beneath my feet so that I have made 
void what issued from my lips. 
 
[E]xpandentes retia cotidianarum sollicitudinum pedibus meis ut quod 
egressum est de labiis meis facerem irritum.525 
 
3. When I saw your letter my heart was filled with rejoicing, my mouth with 
laughter. 
 
Vt uidi litteras tuas cor meum iubilo, os meum impletum est risu.526 
 
In item 1, John conceptualises the hollow pleasures of being subject to flattery 
in terms of hearing through his ears [aures] and his ears being tickled or rubbed 
[perfrico]: being tickled or rubbed presumably involves a set of hands or some other 
limb or object that can be used for these purposes.527  Thus, the sense of item 1 is 
something like being flattered is like having one’s ears tickled.  Item 2 provides 
understanding of the frustration caused to Peter by the daily concerns of his abbey in 
terms of standing on his feet [pedes], speaking through his lips [labia], and his words 
being ineffective or unable to achieve their desired purpose.  And finally, in item 3 
Peter links the pleasure elicited by reading a letter sent by a close friend to his heart 
[cor] acting as a container for joy and his mouth [os] as a vent for laughter: perhaps 
because the joy, overflowing from his heart, has risen up to his mouth and overflowed 
in the form of laughter.   
                                                 
524 John, Letters, i: 110.  
525 Peter, Letters, 59.  
526 Ibid., 63.  
527 John is rebuking an unnamed “man of Lisieux” for tarnished his reputation hence being tickled in 
this context refers to disingenuous flattery: See John, Letters, i: 110.  
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These excerpts each demonstrate in analogous ways how people may construct 
logically mixed reasoning strategies from their embodied experiences of the world.  In 
each case, mental states (e.g. suspicion, anxiety, and happiness), behaviours (e.g. 
speech and laughter), and complex socio-cultural phenomena (e.g. flattery, the day-to-
day management of a monastic estate, and friendship) are conceptualised and 
represented, by way of networks of experiential and logical entailments, in terms of 
each other.528  It seems reasonable enough to assume that there is no direct qualitative 
sense in which being flattered by means of words feels at all like having one’s ears 
tickled: likewise, the anxieties caused by running a monastic estate without doubt 
cannot feel, in any immediate qualitative sense, like having one’s feet ensnared.  But, 
nevertheless, the conceptual links between sensorimotor experiences, on the one hand, 
and subjectively-felt mental states, on the other, are there and can be interpreted by 
other people, in whose mental lives the links may not have been made previously.     
Item 3 is slightly more problematic as while we in the present can be certain 
that mental states such as joy are certainly not felt in the heart (although they may be 
influenced by its behaviour), Peter certainly could have believed this to be the case.529   
Still, it is instructive that he demonstrates some degree of appreciation for the 
continuity between the mind and the body, for the state of his heart, filled with joy, is 
clearly linked to the behaviour of the mouth and its resulting effect, viz. laughter.  
There is some ambiguity about whether cor is merely a passive container for joy 
(hence Φ2), or instead a location at which it is felt (so Φ1).
530  Yet when it came to 
understanding the causal relationship between human behaviours and mental life, 
Peter evidently could not help but conceptualise the mind and body as continuous 
phenomena, regardless of whatever he formally believed about their ontological and 
logical relationship.  In any case, item 3 draws a clear conceptual link between a 
qualitative experience, joy, and a related behaviour, laughter.   
The causal link between joy and laughter, as it is construed in item 3, is 
stronger than those drawn in item 1 between hearing and being tickled and in item 2 
between anxiety and being ensnared.  This is to say, item 3 highlights a more 
plausible connection than items 1 and 2 between mental life and behaviour or 
                                                 
528 My thinking is heavily influenced by Lakoff’s and Johnson’s views on conceptual systems and 
entailments, coherence, and consistency between metaphors in Metaphors We Live By: for relevant 
discussion sand notes see Chapter Two, sec. 2.2.   
529 On the possible cognitive functions of the heart in premodern western thought see sec. 4.3.  
530 The symbols used here were defined and discussed previously in Chapter Three, sec. 3.2.  
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sensorimotor experiences: i.e. laughter seems a “natural” behavioural response to 
pleasure; joy causes laughter.  However, the ostensible “realism” of the conceptual 
link between laughter and joy in item 3 does not detract from the key argument being 
made here: namely that sensorimotor experience informs abstract reasoning.  In fact, 
the link in item 3 between joy and laughter sheds stronger light on the basis of this 
link since it draws attention to a circumstance in which a behavioural motor response 
seems to follow, quite “naturally”, on the feeling of a certain kind of mental state.  It 
is perhaps clear cases like this, in which the mind and body are so obviously 
connected, that provide the foundations for more adventurously abstract associations 
between sensorimotor experiences and mental life, such as those to be found in items 
1 and 2.               
 
4.6: Final Conclusion 
 
This chapter has consistently highlighted the interplay between mind, body, and 
culture in the sample of source texts.  It has been shown above that the representation 
and conceptualisation of the body in the relevant texts invariably raises questions 
which cannot be ignored about the mind and culture.  The body is never just the body, 
be it in the world or as it is represented and conceptualised in verbal media.  Bodies 
are cognitive agents which interact with one another in ways that produce the wide 
variety of phenomena which we in the west subsume under the labels, “society” and 
“culture”.  Although it is conceptually convenient to distinguish between mind, body, 
and culture for the purposes of academic discourse, we must accept that in the world 
the phenomena to which these labels relate share the same plain of existence and are 
in many ways barely distinguishable.   
This leads on to the point made at the beginning of this chapter about the 
pressing need, raised by Lloyd in his recent book, Cognitive Variations (2007), to 
problematise the sharp distinction, widely held in western thought since classical 
antiquity, between nature, on the one hand, and culture or society on the other.  Lloyd 
highlights the deep roots of the idea of “nature” in certain strains of western thought, 
which he contrasts with the apparent lack of an analogous concept in ancient Chinese 
thought.  Moreover, he notes the presence of ideas about group-being and belonging 
in both western and eastern thought.  From these observations, Lloyd draws the eye-
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opening conclusion that some idea of group-being (i.e. “society” or “culture”) is more 
necessary, or at least more prevalent, than a concept of nature in human thought: that 
is, whereas people will very likely conceptualise the world as containing relatively 
homogenous human groups (e.g. cultures, societies, tribes, or communities) they will 
not necessarily see human groups or their cultural effects as being ontologically or 
categorically distinct from the non-manmade contents of the world (i.e. nature).531  In 
this way, Lloyd’s analysis instructively problematises the long-standing distinction in 
western thought between nature, as well as biology, and culture and society by 
showing that there is no innate imperative for human beings to see the products of 
human groups as being distinct from everything else, living and nonliving, in the 
world.532   
The analysis of the sample of source texts in this chapter lends support to 
Lloyd’s views on the nature-culture distinction by highlighting the interplay between 
embodied reasoning and socio-culturally constructed attitudes towards the body.  This 
also gels with the findings of cognitive science discussed in Chapter Two: especially 
Clark’s analysis of the relationship between biology and culture.533  Thus, it can be 
concluded here that the analysis of the sample of source texts in this chapter supports 
the view that human biology and its effects in the world, whether we call them 
society, culture, or whatever else, are observably entwined in a cause-effect feedback 
loop, and moreover, that there is nothing necessary about the nature- or biology-
culture distinction which has long pervaded western science and philosophy.  This 
distinction may be logically cogent in abstract thought, but abstract thought only ever 
provides a dim reflection of the complexity of the world, and, as argued by Lakoff 
and Johnson, certainly does not reach out directly to a transcendent reality of absolute 
truths.534  Therefore, as seen in this chapter, the nature-culture distinction does not do 
justice to the complex relationship underpinning how medieval writers experienced 
and conceptualised their minds and bodies.   
 
 
 
                                                 
531 Lloyd, Cognitive Variations, pp. 150.  
532 For Lloyd’s full argument see ibid., chapter seven.  
533 See the discussion of Clark’s work in Chapter Two, sec. 2.1, pp. 47-9. 
534 See the discussion of Lakoff’s and Johnson’s work in Philosophy in the Flesh in Chapter Two, sec. 
2.1, pp. 44-7. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Mind, Body, and Culture 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight how the mind, body, and culture underpin 
the existence and mutually reinforce the development of certain aspects of human life.  
I shall argue that neither biological, psychological, nor culturalist views are enough in 
themselves to provide well-rounded accounts of them.  Instead, what is required is an 
appreciation of the complex interplay between the human mind, body, and culture, 
and the specific circumstances in which this relationship was configured in twelfth-
century Western Europe.  The aspects of human life which are explored in this 
chapter as the are represented in the sample of source texts are, in order, pain and 
suffering (sec. 5.1), aging (sec. 5.2), and sex and excretion (sec. 5.3).  These topics 
have been selected for discussion because of their prominence in the relevant texts.  
Furthermore, there are existing bodies of secondary literature covering each of these 
topics to which this chapter will give some consideration as well as offering new 
perspectives.   
 
5.1: Pain and suffering 
 
The term pain, dolor in Latin (cf. cognate verb doleo), may be used to describe a wide 
variety of changes to the body and mind.  Like its English equivalent, it is very 
flexible in the range of sensations it may be used to describe.  It may just as easily 
refer to the pain caused by tissue damage or mental distress (indeed, dolorous in 
modern English typically refers to the latter kind of pain).535  There is a tension 
between what, qualitatively speaking, counts as a painful sensation and the ways in 
which socio-cultural attitudes towards pain influence how people experience and 
                                                 
535 See Lewis and Short, s.n. dolor (accessed 4 / 7 / 2010).  Medieval words for pain are discussed by E. 
Cohen in ‘Naming Pains: Physicians Facing Sensations’ in In Laudem Hierosolymitani: studies in the 
crusades and medieval culture in honour of Benjamin Z. Kedar, ed. I. Shagrir et al (Aldershot, 2007), 
pp. 245-62 and The Modulated Scream, chapter five.  
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respond to painful sensations.  These are both aspects of the phenomenon of pain and 
will be discussed here.   
As Esther Cohen’s recent book, The Modulated Scream (2010), attests, while 
there is plenty of surviving evidence showing how pain was interpreted and expressed 
in medieval European cultures and societies, the immediate sensuality of pain as it 
was experienced by medieval people is a far harder topic to discuss.536  Cohen writes 
off this possibility at an early stage in her book, declaring that her interest is instead in 
how pain was interpreted in a series of discourses of late medieval European societies: 
medicine, law, and theology.537  I take a different approach here by attempting to 
relate the ways in which pain is conceptualised and interpreted in the relevant source 
texts to their respective authors’ embodied experiences of it, specifically in light of 
Lakoff’s and Johnson’s theory of metaphor and the embodied view of the mind (both 
discussed in Chapter Two).   
It is noteworthy in this regard that recent advances in medical science have 
helped to bring this area of medieval life partially into view: for instance, 
osteoarchaeology has improved historians’ understanding of the dietary and health 
problems commonly faced by medieval people and, as highlighted in Chapter One, 
Kroll and Bachrach have made use of neuro- and medical science in The Mystic Mind 
to shed light on the likely effects of acestic practices and lifestyles on the psychology 
of medieval mystics.538  Of course, there is no way to fully compensate for the loss of 
the conditions, bodily and environmental, in which medieval people individually 
experienced pain.  Cohen is right in this respect to point out that historians cannot 
have any direct access to how medieval people experienced pain.  Nevertheless, I aim 
to show in the subsections which follow that grasping some of the more immediate 
personal conditions in which medieval people experienced pain is not out of the 
question for historians.   
                                                 
536 As Cohen states in the introduction to The Modulated Scream, ‘[t]his book is not about pain in the 
Middle Ages, for pain itself cannot be known’: p. 3.  This book reflects Cohen’s long running work on 
pain in the medieval west.  She has also published on the topic ‘An Animated Pain of the Body’ 
American Historical Review, 105: 1 (2000), pp. 36-68, ‘The expression of pain in the later Middle 
Ages: deliverance, acceptance, and infamy’ in Bodily Extremities: Preoccupations with the Human 
Body in Early Modern European Culture, ed. F. Egmond et al (Aldershot, 2003), pp. 195-219, and 
‘Naming Pains’.  Much of the content of these articles is repeated in The Modulated Scream.   
537 See Cohen, The Modulated Scream, p. 3.  
538 For example see R. Fleming, ‘Bones for Historians: Putting the Body back into Biography’ in 
Writing Medieval Biography, ed. D. Bates et al (Woodbridge, 2006), pp. 29-48 and Kroll and 
Bachrach, The Mystic Mind.  
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Cognate to pain is the notion of suffering which was typically covered by the 
Latin word passio, from the verb to suffer, patior (itself derived from the Greek 
πάσχω [paschô]).  In the medieval west, this word was invariably associated with the 
sufferings and crucifixion of Jesus Christ, so it had a strong theological dimension and 
hence, by extension, was often used to describe the sufferings and deaths of Christian 
saints and martyrs. 539   This idea will be of particular concern in regard to the 
sufferings of Christina of Markyate (the only saint of immediate concern here), 
discussed below in sec. 4.1.2.  As this word had such powerful Christological 
connotations in the medieval west, it is worth stressing that medieval writers often 
used dolor in ways that would more naturally correspond in modern English to 
suffering (i.e. undergoing or experiencing pain over a protracted period rather than the 
immediate sensation of pain).  This word was obviously less loaded with religious 
significance than passio and hence more widely used.           
 
5.1.1: Transferred pain 
   
The following passage, taken from De Vita Sua, provides significant insights into how 
Guibert experienced and understood pain:  
 
1. When my studies, such as they were, had come to an end about the time of 
vespers, I went to my mother’s knee after a more severe beating than I had 
deserved.  And when, as often happened, she began to ask me repeatedly 
whether I had been whipped that day, I, not to appear a telltale, entirely denied 
it.  Then against my will she threw off my inner garment (which is called a 
shirt or chemise) and saw my little arms blackened and the skin of my back 
everywhere puffed up with the cuts from the twigs.  Grieved to the heart by 
the very savage punishment inflicted on my tender body, troubled, agitated, 
and weeping with sorrow, she said: “You shall never become a clerk, nor any 
more suffer so much to get an education.” At that, looking at her with what 
reproach I could, I replied: “If I had to die on the spot, I would not give up 
studying my lessons and becoming a clerk.” 
 
                                                 
539 For a discussion of the theological significance of passio see Cohen, The Modulated Scream, 
chapter seven.  
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Soluto igitur vespertinis quibusdam horis qualicunque illo studio, ad materna 
genua graviter etiam paeter meritum caesus accesseram.  Quae cum an eo 
vapulassem die, ut erat solita, rogitare coepisset, et ego, ne magistrum 
detulisse viderer, factum omnino negarem ipsa, vellem nollem, reiecta 
interula, quam subuculam, imo camisiam vocant, liventes attendit ulnulas 
dorsiculi ex viminum illusione cutem ubique prominulam.  Cumque meae 
teneritudini ad nimium saeve illatam visceraliter doluisset, turbulenta et 
aestuans, et oculos moerore suffusa:  Nunquam ait “deinceps clericus fies, nec 
ut litteras discas ulterius poenas lues.” Ad haec ego eam cum qua poteram 
animadversione respiciens: Si, inquam, proinde mori contingeret, non 
desistam quin litteras discam, et clericus fiam.540 
 
In this excerpt Guibert explicitly ascribes the sensation and experience of pain [doleo] 
to his mother, but not to himself even though he had been afflicted with bodily 
injuries which presumably were in some sense painful.  So, notwithstanding Guibert’s 
bodily injuries, the feelings of pain in response to them were more strongly felt by his 
mother than himself.   
The likelihood here, as regards Guibert’s apparent lack of expressivity in 
response to his bodily injuries (nothing can be said about what he felt), is not that he 
intended to portray himself as impassible to pain, but rather that he wished to show 
his resolve to become a cleric in spite of the ostensible hardships he faced in pursuit 
of that goal.541  Considered in this light, Guibert’s lack of response to his injuries may 
be viewed as a conspicuous performance of fortitude, calculated to elicit certain 
emotions in his mother.  It is also likely that Guibert, by this statement of his 
determination to become a cleric, aimed to impress the projected readership of De 
Vita Sua (most probably other monks).  Hence within the context of De Vita Sua, 
Guibert’s behaviour in response to his injuries is perhaps most significant as an 
exercise in identity-making or “self-fashioning” in a society in which pain-sensation, 
                                                 
540 Guibert, De Vita Sua, i: 6.  
541 Cohen has argued that the possibility of impassibility was not widely accepted in the late middle 
ages, particularly because by that period (c. eleventh century onwards) the passion of Christ had 
become one of the central foci of Western Christian theology and piety.  Unlike in late antiquity, 
impassibilty was not widely ascribed to martyrs as pain had moral value in late medieval thought.  By 
contrast, perhaps the only group of people genuinely believed to be capable of impassibility, at least 
towards the end of the medieval period, were witches: hence if anything, impassibility had sinister 
connotations.  See Cohen, The Modulated Scream, chapter eight.  
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especially when linked to religious ideals, was often valued as being morally 
instructive.542   
Whatever might be speculated about how Guibert experienced his bodily 
injuries, he ascribes the sensuality of pain in this excerpt entirely to his mother.  What 
is more, the description he gives of his mother’s pain is highly metaphorical:  
 
Cumque meae teneritudini ad nimium saeve illatam visceraliter doluisset, 
turbulenta et aestuans [erat].  
 
And grieved to the guts by the great cruelty inflicted on my tender body, [she 
was] disturbed and seething.543 
 
The key point here is that Guibert modified the verb to feel pain, doleo, with the 
adjective, turbulentus, and participle, aestuans [ff. aestuo].  These words both mean 
disturbance, disruption, or agitation, but in significantly different ways.  Turbulentus 
can also have the sense “stormy”.  On the other hand, aestuans implies heat and 
particularly the disturbance caused to water by heat, in which respect it has additional 
riders in boiling and also anger.  Accordingly, aestuans can also be translated as 
burning, boiling, or perhaps best of all, seething which carries over the senses of 
boiling and anger.544   
These words offer significant insights into Guibert’s conceptual understanding 
of pain.  Their clearest contribution here is to add a sense of disturbance and heat to 
doleo, in respect of which pain can be viewed as a form of disturbance to bodily or 
mental order and also as cause or consequence of heat and anger.545  Lakoff’s and 
Johnson’s theory of metaphor is highly relevant here and, in particular, their argument 
that the entailments which form between metaphors are based on similarities in the 
                                                 
542 On the moral value of pain in late medieval Europe see Cohen, The Modulated Scream, chapter one.  
As noted in Chapter One, the term “self-fashioning” is Stephen Greenblatt’s: see Greenblatt, 
Renaissance Self-Fashioning.  For a discussion of this idea in a medieval context see Rubin, 
‘Identities’, pp. 395-402.  
543 My translation: cf. Benton’s translation in item 1: ‘Grieved to the heart by the very savage 
punishment inflicted on my tender body, [she was] troubled [and] agitated.’ 
544 See Lewis and Short, s.n. turbulentus and aestuo respectively (accessed 30 / 09 / 09) 
545 Pain was often defined as being a result of change or rupture in the continuity of the body.  This was 
noted previously in Chapter Four, sec. 4.1, pp. 143, in regard to Theobald’s aged body.  For more on 
this see Cohen, The Modulated Scream, pp. 1-2 and 88.    
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ways in which people experience the world.546   In this respect, Guibert’s use of 
turbulentus and aestuans to modify the sense of doleo suggests that he understood 
pain as a form of disturbance similar to that caused by storms or the application of 
heat to water.  This seems particularly plausible in light of the Galenic idea that pain 
and illness are caused by disturbances to the humoural balance of the body, which 
was widely held as a truism by western physicians from the twelfth century at least.547   
Although as far as we know Guibert underwent no medical training, it is certainly not 
implausible that he had come across this view in the course of his studies, or that he 
had received some basic education in medicine.548  In any case, the key point is that 
Guibert’s evident idea that pain is a form of disturbance of the mind and / or body 
(see next paragraph) may be accounted for in terms of a complex interaction between 
his embodied experiences of physical disturbances in the world, such as storms or 
boiling water, and a learnt predisposition to view pain as a physical rupture or 
disturbance of a balance between the humours of the body.      
It is important to stress that Guibert’s choice of words in describing his 
mother’s pain strongly suggest the embodiment of her pain.  There is no easy way of 
translating his phrase, visceraliter doluisset (Benton gives “grieved to the heart”).549  
The adverb, visceraliter, is derived from viscus, or plural viscera, which 
unambiguously refers to any soft or fleshy matter of the body, especially around the 
chest or midriff so as to include the internal organs.  This may perhaps seem 
somewhat unexpected given the often dualistic bent of premodern western 
psychology.  Benton evidently interpreted this phrase as reflecting the conceptual 
association between the heart and midriff and facets of the mind, as discussed 
previously.550   This is a fair extrapolation.  However, it probably misses another 
possible connotation of this phrase: namely Guibert’s flesh and blood link with his 
mother.  Guibert was quite literally a product of his mother’s viscera: the “fruit of her 
                                                 
546 See Chapter Two, sec. 2.2.4 and for direct reference Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 
chapters 15-17.  
547 Cohen, The Modulated Scream, pp. 88-9.  
548 Edward Kealey has stressed the role that monastic, clerical, and lay physicians played in the 
provision of health-care in late eleventh and twelfth century England in Medieval Medicus (Baltimore, 
1981), chapters 1-2.  
549 The sense of this phrase is apparently omitted from an alternative published translation of De Vita 
Sua by Paul Archambault: cf. ‘My mother groaned when she saw how cruelly I had been treated at 
such a tender age.  She was disturbed and quite agitated, and her eyes filled with tears.’  P. J. 
Archambault, A Monk’s Confession: the memoirs of Guibert of Nogent (University Park Penn., 1995), 
p. 20.   
550 See Chapter Three, sec. 3.1.1, pp. 76 and Chapter Four, sec. 4.3.2, pp. 163. 
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womb” [fructus utris].551  Accordingly, Guibert may have thought of his mother’s 
pain as being more closely linked to his bodily injuries than we might immediately 
assume reading the text with current western assumptions about the nature of pain, be 
it corporeal, mental, or otherwise.   
Cohen makes the point in The Modulated Scream that pain is 
untransferable.552  This is surely correct in the superficial sense that one person cannot 
feel another’s pain precisely, in a qualitative sense, as they do.  However, this does 
not preclude the possibility of empathy (towards which Cohen gives some modest 
attention in The Modulated Scream), nor even that Guibert believed there to be an 
unusually strong bond between himself and his mother, such that she could 
sympathise, in the strongest sense of the word, with his pain.553       
The upshot of this discussion is that the phenomenon of pain, as it is 
represented in Guibert’s text, cannot be ascribed solely to Guibert’s or his mother’s 
mind or body, or the socio-cultural niceties that held between the young Guibert and 
his mother.  In spite of Guibert’s silence on the matter, it seems fair to say that the 
immediate causes of pain in this episode were Guibert’s bodily injuries.  Pain is felt 
most clearly and intensely by Guibert’s mother, on to whom Guibert’s pain had in 
some sense been transferred, presumably via the sense of sight [attendo].554  And 
there is a strong socio-cultural dimension to this all in that Guibert’s lack of 
expressivity in response to his pain, at least before his mother, was clearly a form of 
expression in itself: namely, a means of asserting in his text his resolve from a young 
age to enter into the vocation to which he had been vowed by his father at birth.555  
Additionally, Guibert’s mother gives her own performace in response to the pain she 
felt for her son, specifically by weeping and vocally challenging the wisdom of the 
vow made during her labour that, should Guibert be delivered safely, he would be 
given over as a youth to religious service (the significance of Guibert’s and his 
                                                 
551 “Fruit of the womb” is given by Lewis and Short as a secondary sense of viscus: see Lewis and 
Short, s.n. viscus (accessed 30 / 09 / 09)  
552 Cohen, The Modulated Scream, p. 113.  
553 The notion of sympathy was discussed in the previous chapter: see sec. 4.4.2, n. 121.  Cohen 
discusses empathy in The Modulated Scream, particularly in regard to mystics suffering in imitatione 
Christi:  see pp. 124-5 and 130.  
554 The translation of the attendo in the text is problematic.  Benton makes the inference, “saw”, which 
seems reasonable enough.  However, it should at least be noted that Guibert is silent as to exactly how 
his mother sensed his pain: attendo does not necessarily imply sight.         
555 Guibert, De Vita Sua, i: 3.  
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mother’s weeping as a form of pain expression will be explored further in the next 
subsection).556   
 
5.1.2: Weeping and tears 
 
A further aspect of item 1 from the previous section which can be explored here is the 
importance of weeping and tears.  Guibert’s mother is clearly represented as weeping 
in item 1: ‘[E]t oculos moerore suffusa [And her eyes welled-up with sorrow].’  In 
addition to this, Guibert uses the adverb paeter [paetus / -tulus] in a manner which 
suggests that the severity of his beating could be seen from the appearance of his eyes 
(or in different terms, his eyes were an expressive outlet for his pain): ‘[A]d materna 
genua graviter etiam paeter meritum caesus accesseram [I went to my mother’s knee 
with the undeserved violence of the beating cast in my eyes].’557  Paetulus could also 
be taken to mean “squinting” hence this sentence may well have been intended to 
imply that Guibert was close to tears when he approached his mother.  Thus, this 
sentence seems to have the sense, firstly, that the appearance of Guibert’s eyes 
reflected the injustice and violence of his punishment, and secondly, that their 
appearance at that moment was modified by the effusion of tears from them.     
Weeping is clearly a physiological phenomenon, yet it is strongly linked to the 
mind (as with the rest of the face).558  Moreover, as was highlighted in regard to 
Guibert’s mother in the previous section, weeping may be a calculated performance as 
much as a raw expression of pain or emotions.  Weeping may be an uncontrolled 
outburst in response to whatever stimuli, but it may also be feigned or suppressed as 
in Guibert’s case (see previous paragraph).  It may be hidden, but also advertised in 
numerous ways in response to different kinds of social space and often with 
knowledge of who is watching.  Perhaps most important of all, it is another way in 
which the face may act as an expressive medium, which is to say it may serve a 
                                                 
556 That is, he would be made a child oblate: on this practice, which was becoming rare by Guibert’s 
time see M. de Jong, In Samuel’s Image: Child Oblation in the Early Medieval West (Leiden, 1996). 
557 My translation: also see Archambault, A Monk’s Confession, p. 20: ‘I had come to sit at my 
mother’s feet.  I had just received a worse beating than I had deserved.’  And on paeter see Lewis and 
Short, s.n. paetulus (accessed 1 / 09 / 09)         
558 See the earlier discussion of the face in Chapter Four, sec. 4.4.  
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variety of expressive and communicative purposes.559  In short, the significance of 
weeping is confined neither to physiology nor internal mental states nor the effects 
that it achieve in the social world, intended or not: it reflects complex interactions of 
all three spheres of human life.560         
Weeping is used fairly widely in the sampled source texts to express or 
represent pain, suffering, distress, sorrow, or discomfort.  For instance, consider the 
following excerpt taken from Orderic’s Epilogue: 
 
2. So weeping, he [Orderic’s father] gave me, a weeping child, into the care of 
the monk Reginald, and sent me away into exile for love of Thee and never 
saw me again.    
 
Rainaldo igitur monacho plorans plorantem me tradidit, et pro amore tuo in 
exilium destinavit, nec me unquam postea vidit.561 
 
Orderic describes here how he and his father wept in response to his departure to the 
Norman abbey of Saint-Évroul as a child oblate at the age of ten [decennis] (this 
practice was fairly common in western Europe until the twelfth century).562  Orderic 
clearly intended weeping to signal something important about his and his father’s 
mental states at this moment and presumably also about the nature of their 
relationship as father and son.  
As Orderic continues it becomes clear that he viewed the distress caused by 
severance from his homeland [patria] and kin [parentes] as the chief cause of his 
weeping, and likewise, anticipation of his permanent departure to Normandy as the 
cause of the weeping [ploro] or tears shed [lacrimans] by his father and kin:  
 
3. So this pact made freely between me and Thee, for whom my father spoke, I 
abandoned my country and my kinsfolk, my friends and all of whom I was 
                                                 
559 For a wide-ranging discussion of the socio-cultural importance of weeping see G. L. Ebersole, ‘The 
function of ritual weeping revisited: affective expression and moral discourse’ in History of Religions, 
39: 3 (2000), pp. 211-46. 
560 Note I do not include in this weeping caused by physiological reflexs, such as when the eyes water 
in response to dirt.  This is not relevant to my discussion, but should be noted as sometimes physiology 
overrides conscious action.   
561 Orderic, Epilogue.  
562 Again, on the practice of child oblation see de Jong, In Samuel’s Image. 
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acquainted, and they, watching me well, with tears commended me in their 
kind prayers to Thee, O almighty God. 
  
Grantanter facta inter me et te genitore meo proloquente conventione 
huiuscemodi, patriam et parentes omnemque cognationem notos et amicos 
reliqui, qui lacrimantes et salutantes benignis precibus commendaverunt me 
tibi O summe Deus Adonai.563 
 
Furthermore, it is significant here that Orderic describes his residence in Normandy as 
his “exile” [exilium].  This point is strongly reinforced by his use of the term, patria, 
to describe England, which in turn suggests that he had a strong sense of ethnic or 
perhaps even “national” identity.564  It is particularly clear from ploro that Orderic 
associated sadness or distress with both his and his father’s weeping in items 2-3.  
Ploro primarily indicates a noisy display of grief or sorrow (i.e. “lament” or 
“bewail”), of which weeping may also be a part.565  Thus the emphasis in item 2 is on 
weeping as a conspicuous display of sadness.   
As with the episode from Guibert’s De Vita Sua discussed in the previous 
section, Orderic’s account of his departure from England involves a grieving parent.  
Hence in this case Orderic’s father may be seen as weeping in grief over the loss of a 
child.  To be sure, this is complicated by the fact that Orderic, like Guibert, was made 
an oblate at his father’s will and also, again like Guibert, that the events in question 
were already in the remote past at the time of writing.566  Accordingly, we may 
wonder over the intensity of Orderic’s father’s grief and also whether Orderic’s 
memory of his father at the time of his departure from England had become modified 
by his later development as a monk in a Norman abbey.  There is also the matter of 
Orderic’s weeping, which contrasts sharply with Guibert’s suppressed tears discussed 
at the beginning of this section.567  Perhaps above all else, this point of comparison 
                                                 
563 Orderic, Epilogue.  
564 For an account of Orderic’s life and times see Chibnall, The World of Orderic Vitalis, pp. 3-41.  
Chibnall discusses Orderic’s “English” identity at pp. 10-11.  On the connotations of the term, patria, 
within the context of twelfth-century England, see J. Gillingham, ‘Henry of Huntingdon and the 
twelfth-century revival of the English nation’ in The English in the Twelfth Century: Imperialism, 
National Identity and Political Values, by John Gillingham (Woodbridge, 2000), pp. 123-44.   
565 Lewis and Short, s.n. ploro (accessed 02 / 10 / 09) 
566 By Orderic’s own calculations (as noted in the epilogue) he was sixty-six at the time of writing, 
putting the events discussed here fifty-six years in the past: see Orderic, Epilogue. 
567 See pp. 198 above.  
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underlines a significant difference between Guibert’s and Orderic’s personalities: that 
is, on the one hand, Orderic seems to have been more comfortable in recording his 
youthful anxieties at the prospect of becoming an oblate whereas, on the other, 
Guibert clearly preferred to draw attention to his resolve to become a cleric, even as a 
young boy.   
It is also important to consider whether, to use Esther’s Cohen’s phrase, the 
way in which Orderic represented himself and his father in items 2 and 3 was genre 
scripted as well as determined by his memory of the events and whatever socio-
cultural and personal pressures influenced the relevant actors behaviour at the time: 
that is, more specifically, whether Orderic’s ascription of tears to himself, his father, 
and other unnamed family members, was a literary invention, or more likely, 
exaggerated to accord with the highly emotional style of the Epilogue.568  Orderic’s 
liberal use of verbs for crying or weeping in the Epilogue may in fact reflect his 
rhetorical needs at the time of writing rather than the realities of his departure from 
England at the age of ten.  Orderic’s use of verbs like ploro and lacrimo, or exilium 
for his residence in Normandy and patria for England, and also, as Majorie Chibnall 
has pointed out, the unusual verb, abdico [to resign] to describe his father’s decision 
to commit him as a child oblate to Saint-Évroul suggest that Orderic was aiming for a 
dramatic style as much as an accurate rendering of that moment in his life.569  As a 
well-educated individual and competent Latinist, Orderic would have had a good 
understanding of the literary and dramatic connotations of these words. 
Latin provides a good range of verbs to describe weeping, all with slightly 
different, but largely negative connotations.  Lacrimo and fleo primarily mean to form 
or shed tears, although they may also carry connotations of pain, sadness, or 
suffering.570  Ploro has the stronger sense of crying out loud, bewailing, or mourning, 
while defleo and deploro (cf. “deplore”) have still stronger senses: defleo is typically 
to weep in mourning for someone, and deploro, to weep bitterly, moan, or 
complain.571   Bearing this in mind, it may thus have been the case that Orderic 
                                                 
568 Cohen uses this phrase in The Modulated Scream, p. 129.  Cohen has much to say about male and 
female pain behaviour that is relevant here in chapter four of the aforenoted book: however, she 
stresses the difficulty of uncovering the extent to which gendered codes of pain behaviour existed and 
were observed in medieval European societies: see ibid., pp. 128-9.  
569 See Chibnall, The World of Orderic Vitalis, pp. 9-10.  
570 Lewis and Short, s.n. lacrimo (it is noted that lacrimo can be used to mean bewail or lament, but 
very rarely) and fleo (accessed 02 / 10 / 09) 
571 Ibid., s.n. ploro, defleo, and deploro (accessed 02 / 10 / 09) 
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selected ploro to represent himself and his father weeping because it carries a 
moderately strong sense of pain, distress, sadness, or mourning (as opposed to the 
stronger senses of defleo or deploro and the weaker lacrimo and fleo).  This fits with 
the text, firstly, in the respect that Orderic’s departure was planned by his father, and 
secondly, in that Orderic viewed his entry into monastic life as a bar to the sins of the 
secular world.572  Hence the rationale for ploro in this passage may have been to 
indicate moderate feelings of pain or sadness rather than outright grief: by contrast 
Guibert uses the far more emotive phrase, et oculos moerore suffusa [and her eyes 
welled-up with sorrow], to describe his mother’s weeping.573     
The association between weeping and pain, suffering, and sadness can be 
explored further with the following excerpts, taken from The Life of Christina and 
Peter’s letters respectively:                     
         
4. Then, heaving deep [lit. “high”] sighs, she broke into floods of tears and, 
with sobs punctuating her laments, she bewailed her lot over and over again 
as the most wretched and abandoned of all. 
 
Post hec trahens alta suspiria in profusionem lacrimarum erupit, et singultu 
querimonias interrumpente: se miserrimam, sese orphanum sepius 
conclamavit.574 
 
5. Now the matter in hand, which is the transfer to you of our dearest son, urges 
me to remain ever silent, or to weep more vehemently, rather than to write, 
but holy and proper reverence demands it. 
 
Et materia quidem que est karissimi filii nostri translatio ad vos potius semper 
silere vel instantius flere quam scribere admonet, sanctitatis autem vestre 
reverentia sancta et digna exigit.575 
 
There are significant differences between the representation and sense of weeping in 
these excerpts which can be seen to fit the circumstances to which they relate: item 4 
                                                 
572 Orderic, Epilogue.  
573 This was discussed above in the first paragraph of the present section: pp. 198. 
574 The Life of Christina, ¶ 13.  
575 Peter, Letters, 58.  
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describes Christina’s reaction to her family’s persistent efforts to obstruct her desire to 
remain a virgin; item 5 concerns the transfer of a monk from the Benedictine 
community at Celle to the recently established Carthusian priory of Mont-Dieu.  Thus 
item 4 relates to a very personal set of circumstances whereas item 5 deals with the 
ostensibly business-like transfer of a monk between foundations and orders (i.e. from 
the Benedictine abbey at Celle to the Carthusian priory at Mont-Dieu).  Incidentally, it 
is known that Peter maintained a strong relationship between Celle and Mont-Dieu 
during his abbacy and also that he took an unusually positive view for a twelfth-
century Benedictine abbot of transfer from one monastic order to another: hence we 
may reasonably wonder to what extent Peter’s weeping in item 5 reflects a literary 
formality rather than a genuine sense sorrow over the transfer of the said monk.576     
 There is a strong contrast between the expressive purposes of weeping in these 
two excerpts.  Christina’s tears [lacrimae] are part of a much broader response 
towards the injustice of her circumstances.  Her tears are accompanied by sighs 
[suspiria], sobs [singulti], laments [querimoniae], and bewailing [conclamo], all of 
which she seems to have released in a violent or uncontrolled fashion.  Again, it 
should be stressed that Christina’s biography was written by a male monk whose 
views on Christina’s spirituality are likely to have been influenced by gender 
stereotypes. Cohen notes the tendency of male biographers of female saints and 
mystics to rationalise the spirituality of their subjects in terms of bodily suffering, 
even when writings by the women themselves survive in which no mention of bodily 
suffering is made.  However, surviving sources suggest that intense displays of 
emotions were not uncommon among either men or women in the later middle 
ages.577  Therefore, Christina’s forceful display of grief should not be seen strictly 
through a lense of gender stereotypes: more is at stake. 
By contrast, even though Peter claims to be aggrieved by the loss of one of his 
brethren to another monastic community, he is known to have encouraged the transfer 
of monks to Mont-Dieu.578  Given this context, Peter’s supposedly vehement weeping 
[instantius fleo] could reasonably be read as lacking any strong sense of pain or 
                                                 
576 Haseldine discusses Peter’s attitude towards the new monastic orders of the twelfth century in his 
edition of his Peer’s letters, pp. xxv-xxvii.  A number of Peter’s surviving letters are addressed to the 
community at Mont-Dieu and / or its prior, Simon: see Peter, Letters, 52-60. 
577 For a discussion of relevant issues see Cohen, The Modulated Scream, p. 128.-9  
578 This is discussed by Haseldine in the introductory matter to Peter, Letters, pp. xxv-xxvii.  
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sorrow.  Yet the letter from which it is taken is written in a highly emotive style.  In 
several places, Peter casts himself as the father of the monk in question: 
 
Certainly I have offered in this trade not gold but a man after my own heart, 
certainly not silver but him whom I was regarding as my only begotten, 
certainly not precious stones but a stone which I had set up myself for a title of 
particular love.   
 
Certe non aurum sed virum secundum cor meum, certe non argentums sed 
quem habebam quasi unigenitum, certe non lapides pretiosos sed lapidem 
quem michi erexeram in specialis amoris titulum in hoc proposui 
commercio.579  
 
[I]n the midst of my discourse, I have unfolded by miseries at such length 
before the eyes of the most merciful God, assuredly so that you may see, that 
you may understand what pain it is to lose the son of the right hand...so that 
you may pray on my behalf more kindly and more resolutely to ‘the God of all 
comfort,’ feeling for my sorrows. 
 
[E]t sic in mediis sermonibus cum tanta mora meas miserias misericordissimi 
Dei conspectibus explicui certe ut videatis, certe ut intelligatis quis sit dolor 
filium dextere amiterre...ut ‘Deum totius consolationis’, meis compatiendo 
meroribus dulcius et obnixius pro me exoretis.580  
 
Peter casts himself as a father to the unnamed monk three times in the letter, thereby 
suggesting that the bond between them was especially strong.  Although the father-
son metaphor echoes the institutional hierarchy of a monastic community, for a father 
has authority over his sons as an abbot has authority over his monks, it also makes the 
relationship more intimate, for a father’s authority over his son(s) is grounded in a 
more unique set of circumstances, biological and socio-cultural, pertaining between 
fathers and sons, than may ostensibly exist between abbots and monks.  So even 
though Peter’s letter relates to a business-like transfer of a monk from Celle to Mont-
                                                 
579 Peter, Letters, 58.  
580 Ibid. 
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Dieu, it is composed in such a highly emotive rhetorical style that it is hard not to 
extrapolate a sense of genuine pain or sorrow on Peter’s part.   
  
The interpretations given in this subsection on weeping and tears are dependent on 
four key factors.  First, the emotional tone or content of each excerpt must be 
considered.  As explained above, the common theme linking the excerpts discussed 
above is pain, suffering, or, to add some additional labels, sadness and distress.  
Second, it is necessary to take account of socio-cultural pressures which, as far as 
surviving evidence shows, influenced how, why, and when people wept in response to 
pain in twelfth-century Europe as well as how this act was interpreted by observers.  
Third, some consideration must be given to people’s personal or individual reasons 
for weeping as a form of pain expression.  And finally, it must be kept in mind 
throughout these considerations that weeping is at root a physiological function of the 
body: that is, weeping is an inherently embodied act which, even when represented in 
abstract media, cannot be separated from the biological realities which underpin, at 
some basic level, everybody’s understanding of weeping. 
By taking account of these four aspects of weeping, as it occurs in the excrepts 
examined above, it is again possible to discern the interaction of mind, body, and 
culture in the sample of source texts.  The tearful people in each excerpt cannot be 
reduced to any of these factors, but rather must be understood in terms of how they 
interact.  For each case, personal and broader socio-cultural pressures may be posited 
as causes for the shedding of tears.  For instance, Christina’s tearful response to being 
temporarily thwarted in her aim to become a nun, related in item 4 above, may be 
understood both in terms of her personal desire to achieve this goal and the values 
instilled in her by the sections of twelfth-century English society which viewed being 
a nun as a praiseworthy occupation.  Alternatively, the tears shed by Orderic and his 
father may be seen as personal responses to the severance of a bond between a father 
and son as well as a reflection of linguistic and literary conventions tied to the 
composition of Latin literature in twelfth-century Europe.     
 Finally, all of this pivots around the biological body, without which there 
would be no weeping in the first place.  The authors of the relevant source texts 
without doubt had experienced tears and weeping in their lives coming from their own 
or other people’s bodies.  Furthermore, as can be seen from the excerpts discussed 
above, they all very clearly recognised causal relationships between weeping and 
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certain emotional states: that is, they understood that certain emotional states were 
sufficient to cause the body to weep.  It is noteworthy that the only person discussed 
above who suffered from bodily injuries, namely Guibert, is also the only person to 
have not wept, or at least to have held back his tears.  By contrast, everybody who 
wept did so in response to emotional rather than physical states: Guibert’s mother in 
sympathy for her son’s injuries; Orderic and his father in response to physical 
separation from each other; Christina because she had been hindered in achieving her 
aim of becoming a nun; and Peter for the loss of one of his brethren to another 
monastic community.   
Above all else, this serves to highlight the crucial importance of the body in 
colouring people’s experiences of the world.  The examples of pain discussed cannot 
be merely mental because in each case they find expression through an aspect of 
human physiology: namely weeping.  Guibert is somewhat exceptional, but only in 
the respect that he needed to exert especial control over his body in order to stop it 
from overtly expressing his pain.  On the other hand, the subjective content of his pain 
states was related to the condition of his body following a beating.  In any case, it can 
be seen from the above discussion that the body has an active role in colouring and 
facilitating the expression of emotional states such as pain.  
 
5.1.3: Self-imposed pain and suffering  
 
Self-imposed suffering is a common theme in the religious literature of medieval 
Europe (particularly biographies).  This has attracted a good amount of interest among 
modern scholars perhaps not least because modern western attitudes to bodily 
suffering and health are in many, if not most respects, at odds with those enshrined in 
the religious literature and culture of Western Christianity during the middle ages.581  
Self-imposed suffering is a recurring theme in The Life of Christina.582   In this 
                                                 
581 For example, see G. Constable, Attitudes Towards Self-Inflicted Suffering in the Middle Ages 
(Brookline Mass., 1982), Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast, especially pp. 189-218 and 
Fragmentation and Redemption, especially pp. 181-238, C. Marshall, ‘The politics of self-mutilation: 
forms of female devotion in the late Middle Ages’ in The Body in Late Medieval and Early Modern 
Culture, ed. D. Grantley (Aldershot, 2000), pp. 11-21, Kroll and Bachrach, The Mystic Mind, especially 
pp. 66-104, and Cohen, The Modulated Scream, pp. 120-31. 
582 Elsewhere in the chosen source texts, Guibert describes his mother’s relatively modest asceticism 
following the death of his father in De Vita Sua, i: 12-14 (especially 14).  In addition to this, Peter 
warns against excessive ascesticism in a number of his letters.  For instance see his letters to Abbot 
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respect, Christina, or at least her vita, can be identified with the so-called culture of 
“heroic asceticism” which became increasingly widespread among laymen and the 
clergy in Western Europe from the twelfth-century onwards. 583  Additionally, the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries witnessed the inception and growth of a series of new 
monastic orders in which greater value was placed on the personal piety of individual 
monks than in the Benedictine monasticism of the time.584  Christina’s behaviour, as it 
is related in her vita, needs to be viewed in this context.   
The following excerpt relates to Christina’s confinement in a cell at the 
hermitage of the Roger named in the text, shortly after she had fled from her family:               
 
1. What trials she had to bear of cold and heat, hunger and thirst, daily fasting!  
The confined space would not allow her to wear even the necessary clothing 
when she was cold.  The airless little enclosure became stifling when she was 
hot.  Through long fasting, her bowels became contracted and dried up.  There 
was a time when her burning thirst caused little clots of blood to bubble up 
from her nostrils.  But what was more unbearable than all this was that she 
could not go out until the evening to satisfy the demands of nature.  Even 
when she was in dire need she could not open the door for herself, and Roger 
did not come till late.  So it was necessary for her to sit quite still in the place, 
to suffer torments, and keep quiet… 
 
O quantas sustinuit illic incommoditates frigoris et estis, famis et sitis, 
cotidiani ieiunii.  Loci angustia non admittebat necessarium tegumentum 
algenti.  Integerrima clausula nullum indulgebat refrigerium estuanti.  Longa 
inedia, contracta sunt et aruerunt sibi intestina.  Erat quando pre ardore sitis 
                                                                                                                                            
Berneredus of Saint-Crépin numbered 130-1 in Haseldine’s edition.  Otherwise, self-injurious 
behaviour and asceticism are relatively uncommon topics in the source texts chosen for this study.    
583 The term, “heroic asceticism”, has used by various scholars to describe the forms of self-injurious 
asceticism which became popular in late medieval Europe.  For example, see Constable, Attiudes 
Towards Self-Inflicted Suffering and Kroll and Bachrach, The Mystic Mind.  While self-injurious 
behaviour was certainly practiced by Christian ascetics in antiquity and the earlier medieval period, 
such behaviour appears to have been less tolerated by the institutional Church than was the case in the 
later medieval period.  For a brief overview of this area see Kroll and Bachrach, The Mystic Mind, pp. 
17-36.  This should also be viewed within the context of the development of new monastic orders in the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries.  Bynum and Bell have argued that self-injurious asceticism was most 
commonly practiced by women in the later middle ages: see Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast and R. 
Bell, Holy Anorexia (Chicago, 1985).        
584 Good overviews of the development of Western Monasticism in this period include C. H. Lawrence, 
Medieval Monasticism, second ed. (London, 1989), and H. Leyser, Hermits and the New Monasticism: 
a study of religious communities in Western Europe (London, 1984). 
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naribus ebullirent frusta coagulati sanguinis.  Hiis omnibus illi erat 
intollerabilius, quod exire foras non nisi sero licebat, ad alia quedam 
necessaria que natura postulabat.  Nimirum instante necessitate nequibat ipsa 
sibi aperire et Rogerus de more tardabat, ad illam venire.  Itaque necesse fuit 
immobiliter eam in loco sedere, torqueri et tacere.585 
 
It is noteworthy that the author of this passage shows a relatively sophisticated 
understanding of the anatomy of the human digestive system and the effects of 
malnutrition upon it: ‘Through long fasting, her bowels became contracted and dried 
up [Longa inedia, contracta sunt et aruerunt sibi intestina].’  It does not seem 
controversial to assert that Christina’s biographer did not need to be learned, either in 
medicine or Latin, to understand the basic reasons for and causes of ingestion, 
excretion, malnutrition, and possibly also digestion.  However, it is clear that the 
biographer was well-educated by the standards of twelfth-century England in that he 
could read and write Latin competently and, furthermore, several passages in the life 
of Christina, including item 1, suggest that he had some knowledge of classical 
medicine.    
His assertions that Christina’s bowels [intestina] contracted [contracta sum] 
and dried up [areo] suggest that he had some understanding of humoural theory.  The 
heat produced by the human body was thought in humoural medicine to be a major 
cause of aging and illness in as far as it dried out the body.  The moisture provided by 
food and drink was believed to counterbalance the natural tendency of the body 
towards being hot and dry, to which extent eating and drinking were viewed as 
important ways of maintaining the balance of humours in the body and thus health.586  
It is possible that Christina’s biographer viewed the drying out of Christina’s bowels 
in these terms: that is, the heat of her body caused her bowels to dry out due to a lack 
of moisture from food and drink.  This may also be significant in the respect that he 
ascribes the quality of fieriness or burning to Christina’s thirst (i.e. “burning thirst” 
[ardore sitis]), which, he goes further, caused blood to “bubble” or “boil up” [ebullio] 
through her nose.  Hence at the very least, heat, fire, and dryness are all clearly 
associated with ill-health in this passage.   
                                                 
585 The Life of Christina, ¶ 39. 
586 See McVaugh, ‘The ‘humidum radicale’’, especially p. 71.  
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It should be noted that between the ninth and twelfth centuries, medical 
learning in the Westen Europe was dominated by a handful of institutions 
(particularly Salerno in Italy).  These centres exerted a significant influence on the 
development and dissemination of medical learning and training in the Christian west 
as they could provide exceptionally good access to relevant texts and expertise 
(including people who understood Greek and Arabic). 587   Medical training was 
available elsewhere in the twelfth century.  Monastic foundations often held 
collections of medical texts which were used to provide in-house training for the 
monks.588  However, this would have been considerably more basic than what was on 
offer at, say, Salerno or Montpellier.  It is possible that Christina’s biographer 
received some such in-house training, either at the school in St Albans or some other 
centre of learning (although so little is known about him that it is impossible to make 
any confident assertions on the matter).589   
At any rate, the statements highlighted from item 1 strongly suggest that he 
had at least a perfunctory understanding of humoural theory.  And this impression is 
strengthened by a later passage in which he describes Christina’s symptoms while she 
was suffering from an apparently life-threatening fever, alleviated only by divine 
intervention: 
 
2. The malady, which they call paralysis, attacked one half of her body, 
spreading from her lower limbs to the top of her head.  As a result of a recent 
illness the cheeks of the patient were already swollen and inflamed.  Her 
eyelids were contracted, her eyeball bloodshot, and underneath the eye you 
could see the skin flickering without stopping, as if there were a little bird 
inside it striking it with its wings.  For this reason experienced physicians were 
sent to her and to the best of their power they practised their craft with 
medicines, blood-letting, and other kinds of treatment. 
 
Igitur passio quam paralysin vocant: illam invasit que ab imis partibus usque 
supremum capud repens tocius corporis alteram medietatem sibi vendicavit.  
Ex morbo adhuc recenti tumebant iam atque rubebant gene pacientis.  
                                                 
587 On these institutions see Siraisi, Medieval and Early Renaissance Medicine, pp. 55-65.  
588 Siraisi has noted that medical texts were collected at monastic libraries largely for the purposes of 
providing in-house medical training: see Medieval and Early Renaissance Medicine, pp. 50-5.    
589 On Christina’s biographer see the introduction to Talbot’s edition of the Life of Christina, pp. 5-10 
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Contrahebantur palpebre, turbabatur oculus, sub ipso oculo videres cutem ita 
sine intervallo moveri: ac si eam intus lateens avicula iugi volatu percuteret.  
Quamobrem probati medici ei missi sunt, et stadium suum antidotis, 
diminucione sanguinis, aliisque medicandi generibus in eam solerter 
exercuerunt.590 
 
It is significant here that Christina’s biographer describes the symptoms of her illness 
(i.e. swollen cheeks and bloodshot eyes) and also provides a diagnosis [paralysin].  
Moreover, he shows some understanding of the treatments given to Christina by the 
physicians [medici].  It seems reasonably clear from this that Christina’s biographer 
had some knowledge of contemporary medicine.  It is not possible to say whether this 
extended to any kind of formal training in either classical medicine or something 
more colloquial (or a mixture of both).  However, it is certainly possible that he had 
undergone some basic training as part of his education as a monk, and even if not, 
nuggets of information about classical medicine were freely available in texts like 
Isidore’s Etymologiae.   
For instance, Christina’s biographer could have extracted the following 
definition of paralysis from the Etymologiae: 
 
Paralysis is so called from damage to the body caused by excessive chilling 
[facta ex multa infrigidatione], occurring either in the entire body, or in one 
part.591 
 
In regard to items 1 and 2, it is also worth considering Isidore’s entries on fever 
[febris] and phlegm [phleumon]: 
 
Fever is named from heat, being an abundance of heat [Febris a fervore dicta 
est, est enim abundantia caloris].592 
 
Phleumon is a heat in the stomach [fervor stomachi] accompanied by swelling 
and pain [cum extensione et dolore], (or φλεγµονή [phlegmonê] is feverishness 
                                                 
590 The Life of Christina, ¶ 48.  
591 Isidore, Etymologiae, iv: 7 (25).   
592 Ibid., iv: 4 (2).  
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accompanied by flushed skin, pain, spasms, hardness and wasting away).  
Fever [febris] follows the onset of phleumon whence it is called φλεγµονή, 
from φλέγειν, that is “causing inflammation [inflammare].593 
 
What this shows is the extent to which basic information about humoural theory and 
classical medicine were available in Western Europe prior to the thirteenth century 
(i.e. before Galenic and Arabic medical texts became widely available in translation 
across Western Europe).  Taken together, these extracts provide consistent 
information about the effects that excessive cold or heat were believed to have on 
different parts of the body.  An excess of cold [frigidatio], we learn, causes paralysis 
while an excess of heat [calor or fervor] can cause things such as swelling and pain 
[extensio et dolor].  
Although there is no direct correspondence between these extracts and items 1 
and 2, it is at least clear that Isidore and Christina’s biographer thought about illness 
[morbus] and health [sanitas] in similar terms.  Heat is a key aspect of the accounts of 
Christina’s health given in items 1 and 2 in the respect that it is construed both as a 
cause or symptom of her ailments: it is the cause of her bowels drying up in item 1 
and seems to be a symptom of paralysis in item 2 in as much as her cheeks were 
swollen [tumeo] and reddened or “inflamed” [rubeo] (this is assuming that heat is 
implied by these verbs).  Thus, there is a clear correspondence between this and 
Isidore’s entries on febris and phleumon [φλεγµονή] in the limited sense that both 
viewed temperature and more speficially heat as a cause and symptom of illness.  On 
the other hand, coldness is not noted in item 2 as either a cause or symptom of 
paralysis (indeed, the symptoms seem to be caused by heat).  Nevertheless, the key 
point here is that the understanding of illness and health given by Christina’s 
biographer in items 1 and 2 reflects relatively common wisdom about the relationship 
between these phenomena and temperature, moisture, and so forth (i.e. humoural 
theory).  Therefore, while it is an open question as to whether Christina’s biographer 
underwent any medical training, it is at least clear that his understanding of illness and 
health was rooted in the basics of humoural theory.   
It should be stressed that items 1 and 2 give more detail on Christina’s bodily 
health and the causes of her suffering than is typically the case in her vita. 594  
                                                 
593 Ibid., iv: 4 (7). 
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Christina’s sanctity is the key theme of The Life of Christina, and it is to this end that 
her biographer worked his accounts of her pain and suffering.  The representation of 
Christina’s experiences of pain and suffering in her vita serve the purposes of 
highlighting her faith and piety in as much as the focus is squarely on her tolerance of 
them as opposed to their qualities qua sensations and experiences.  This aspect of the 
text is especially clear in item 2, in which her life-long tolerance and faith are 
appropriately rewarded with a miraculous cure (the miraculousness of which is 
underscored by the futile efforts of the—one presumes—secular physicians, who are 
unable to restore her to a state of good health).595   
 
The attitudes towards health and bodily suffering ascribed to Christina in her vita can 
be viewed in the broader context of Christian asceticism and spirituality from late 
antiquity onwards.  Avoidance of wordly pleasures is an important aspect of 
Christina’s life as it is related in the vita, particularly in the respect that her pain and 
ill-health are often brought about as a result of this: 
 
3. She violently resisted the desires of her flesh, lest her own members should 
become agents of wickedness against her.  Long fastings, little food, and that 
only a few raw herbs, a measure of water to drink, nights spent without sleep, 
harsh scourgings.  And what was more effective than all these…[sic] trials 
which tore and tamed her lascivious body.  She called upon God without 
ceasing not to allow her, who had taken a vow of virginity and had refused the 
marriage bed, to perish forever. 
 
Violenter respuebat desideria sue carnis ne propria membra exhiberet 
adversum se arma iniquitatis.  Protracta ieiunia, modicus cibus isque 
crudarum herbarum, potus aque ad mensuram, noctes insomnes, severa 
verbera.  Et quod prestat his omnibus…[sic] contribulaciones que lacivientem 
carnem lacerabant et edomabant.  Deum in vocabat assidue qui non sinat 
                                                                                                                                            
594 For instance compare ¶ 39 and 48 with ¶ 23 and 44. 
595 Kealey notes the popularity of stories about inept physicians and miraculous cures in eleventh and 
twelfth century England in Medieval Medicus, pp. 21-4. 
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illam post virginitatis votum et thori contemptum tam interminabiliter 
interire.596 
 
This is analogous to the reported behaviour of early Christians living in the urban 
environments of late antiquity.  Peter Brown has noted the impact of individual or 
small groups of Christians who practiced various kinds of world-renouncing 
asceticism (especially sexual abstinence) on the development of the Western and 
Eastern Churches.  The behaviour of these people towards themselves, each other, and 
the non-Christian or secular Christian communities gradually led to the development 
of two distinct traditions of Christian asceticism: eremitic (or “hermetic”) and 
coenobitic (i.e. monasticism).597   
It is significant that Christina’s life falls into both of these traditions at least as 
it is represented in The Life of Christina.  Over the course of the vita, Christina goes 
from being a notionally isolated ascetic (firstly in the secular community and secondly 
at a hermitage outside of Huntingdon) to a founder and prioress of a female religious 
community at Markyate, as well as the confidante of Geoffrey de Gorham, abbot of St 
Albans.  Viewed from a slightly different angle, her life also represents a rejection of 
the secular community, its values, and pleasures in favour of a form of voluntary exile 
in a religious community.598  It is also important to read this in relation to the rapid 
growth in participation in religious life in Western Europe in the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries.  This period witnessed the foundation of a series of new monastic orders, all 
of which in some sense claimed to represent a return to the monasticism of the early 
Church, as well as a dramatic growth in lay piety.599  Christina’s life, or at any rate, 
her vita can be seen as an expression of these trends both in the sense that she enters 
                                                 
596 The Life of Christina, ¶ 44. 
597 See Brown, The Body and Society.  Brown makes his case throughout in great detail: the conclusion 
provides a helpful summary (see pp. 428-47).   On the development of monastic regula see the first two 
chapters of Lawrence, Medieval Monasticism (pp. 1-40) which gives a brief account of the 
development and foundation of regularised forms of monasticism in late antiquity.     
598 These circumstances are related in detail throughout The Life of Christina.  Talbot gives a summary 
in his edition of The Life of Christina at pp. 10-20.  For a brief and more recent summary see The 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, s.n. Christina of Markyate http://0-www.oxforddnb.com 
accessed (06 / 09 / 09) 
599 For a broad summary of the development of monasticism over this period see Lawrence, Medieval 
Monasticism, chapters 8 and 9.  Although mostly concerned with late medieval England, Edden, ‘The 
devotional life of the laity’ touches on the development of lay piety in twelfth-century England.  Also 
noteworthy is Cohen’s discussion of pain expression among laypeople seeking miraculous cures at 
religious sites in late medieval Europe: The Modulated Scream, pp. 133-8.   
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into coenobitic religious life and in that she began her religious life as a pious 
laywomen. 
This environment exerted a strong influence on the ways in which Christina 
and her biographer understood pain and suffering and particularly their consequences 
for personal health and well-being.  The pain and general discomfort experienced by 
Christina are running themes throughout her vita.  In the earlier part of her life, these 
are mostly caused by the circumstances surrounding the attempts of her family to 
marry her off to a wealthy nobleman.  However, after she achieves her goal of 
entering a religious life, they are more often self-inflicted (see item 3) and result in 
long-term health problems: 
 
4. After suffering these and many other discomforts for a long time, she became 
subject to a variety of ailments, which gathered such strength from day to day, 
that they became incurable.  Yet she to whom no human medicine could bring 
relief was, as we saw many years later, cured by an unheard of grace from 
God. 
  
Talia et alia tanto tempore pacientem: dura corripuit morborum varietas que 
de die in diem tantum invalescebat: ut fieret eciam immedicabilis.  At tamen 
cui nulla medicina subvenire poterat humanitas impensa: vidimus post multos 
annos divinitus inaudita gracia cura tam.600 
 
It should be stressed that Christina’s pain and ill-health are not represented in her 
biography as though they were trivial or unimportant to her general well-being.  
However, there is a clear conceptual disjunction in the work between the concepts of 
health and well-being.  For most of the work, Christina is not healthy [sanitas] in the 
ordinary sense of the word.601  But she is “well” in the sense that she has attracted 
significant divine patronage to herself by her ostensibly self-destructive behaviour.  
This is most clear from items 2 and 4, in which faith in God is elevated above secular 
medicine as the most efficacious means of pain-relief, discomfort, and disease (the 
truth of which is demonstrated in item 2: see ¶ 48-50).  Accordingly, Christina’s 
                                                 
600 The Life of Christina, ¶ 40 (cf. ¶ 48).  
601 The notion of sanitas is discussed further in the next paragraph. 
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tolerance and even her active pursuit of her pain and ill-health can be viewed as 
expressions of faith in God and his healing power. 
It is noteworthy that medieval Europeans inherited a secular notion of health 
and well-being from Greek medicine, σῶς [sôs], literally meaning safe or whole, from 
which the Latin words, sanus and sanitas are derived.602  Isidore defines sanitas and 
its relationship with illness [morbus] thus:  
    
Health is the integrity of the body [Sanitas est integritas corpori] and a 
balance of its nature with respect to it heat and moisture [calidus et humidus], 
which is its blood—hence health is so called, as if it were the condition of the 
blood [quasi sanguinis status].   
All the sufferings of the body [corpus] are covered by the general term 
illness [morbus], because the ancients used the term illness in order to point 
with this word to the power of death, which is born from illness.  The mean 
between health and illness is treatment, and unless it fits the disease it fails to 
bring health [Inter sanitatem autem et morbum media est curatio, quae nisi 
morbo congruat, perducit ad sanitatem].603       
 
This is a strongly secular notion of health and well-being, based on the state of the 
body.  As far as this explanation goes, individual morality and faith do not have any 
obvious consequences for bodily health or well-being.  This notion of health is 
certainly present in The Life of Christina, although it should not necessarily be viewed 
as commensurate with Christina’s personal well-being.   
For instance, consider the following passage in which the biographer shows an 
understanding of the relationship between health and illness that fits nicely with 
Isidore’s view that ‘[t]he mean between health and sickness is treatment’604: 
 
5. Indeed the malady, which they [the physicians noted in item 2] ought to have 
cured, became on the contrary so irritated and inflamed that she suffered from 
it for five whole days without ceasing, so that what her health had been in 
                                                 
602 See Liddell and Short, s.n. sws and Lewis and Short, s.n. sanus and sanitas (accessed 07 / 10 / 09) 
603 Isidore, Etymologiae, iv: 5 (2-1).  
604 Ibid., iv: 5 (2).  
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comparison with her sickness before treatment, now her sickness became in 
comparison with the maladies that followed. 
 
Quippe morbus ille quem perimere debuerant econverso hiis irritatus et 
exacerbatus in tantum illam absque remissione quinque continuis diebus 
afflixit, ut quod fuerat ei sanitas respectu egritudinis ante medicamenta: hoc 
eidem fuerint ipse egritudines respectu passioneis que post est subsecta.605 
 
Note that sickness [egritudo and passio] is construed here as the opposite state to 
health [sanitas].  It is highly significant that passio is used to describe Christina’s 
maladies (or suffering) as a result of her illness [egritudo].  This gives Christina’s 
suffering a stong religious and theological dimension, not least in that the word passio 
is commonly used in Western Christianity since the second century to describe the 
suffering of Christ between his betrayal and death on the cross as a discrete event in 
his life.606  The faith-based aspects of her illness and suffering are also made clear by 
the impotence of the physicians to cure or even alleviate her suffering, which becomes 
worse in spite of their efforts.  It takes the ministrations of the Virgin Mary, acting in 
this instance as a physician, to cure Christina’s illness.607 
It should be acknowledged here that the ultimate goal of Christina’s self-
injurious behaviour and tolerance of her pain and ill-health was to secure for herself 
(and also for her close friend, Abbot Geoffrey 608 ) a favourable afterlife.  Her 
biographer makes this very clear: 
 
6. For no matter at what hour she was released from the prison-house of her 
flesh, who could doubt that her spouse would come and lead her with Him to 
the nuptials?  
 
                                                 
605 The Life of Christina, ¶ 48.   
606 Passio is used to describe Jesus’ suffering twice in the New Testament: Acts 1: 3, Hewbrews 2: 10.  
It was commonly used in the writings of the Church Fathers to describe Jesus’ betrayal, suffering, and 
crucifixion as a discrete event.  Although passio is not used in the Gospels, the Greek πάσχω [see 
Liddell and Scott, s.n. pasxw] is generally translated as patior [to suffer].  For a brief overview of the 
use of this word and the perception of the passion in early Christian theology see www.newadvent.org, 
s.n. Devotion to the Passion of Christ (accessed 07 / 10 / 09).  For an important discussion of the 
significance of changing attitudes towards the life of Christ for how medieval people understood and 
expressed pain see Cohen, The Modulated Scream, chapters seven and eight.    
607 The Life of Christina, ¶ 49.   
608 See Ibid., ¶ 69 (also see ¶ 65).   
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Nam quacumque hora desereret carnis sue angustias carcerales cui dubium 
erat quod veniente sponso non statim introiret cum eo ad nupcias?609 
 
The sentiment expressed here is strongly analogous to that of item 1 in chapter three, 
sec. 3.1, in which Theobald construed the departure of the spirit [spiritus] from the 
body as a cause or consequence of death.610  The sense here seems stronger in that 
Christina’s body is said to be “the narrow prison of her flesh” [carnis sue angustias 
carcerales]: or put differently, she is trapped by her own body.  In any case, the point 
is that Christina’s life was in effect a prelude to her afterlife and hence that the 
sufferings she imposed on herself were intended to set her on the path to Heaven 
rather than Hell. 
Esther Cohen has recently drawn attention to debates among scholastic 
theologians regarding whether the body was present or needed for suffering in Hell.611  
What she shows is a strong trend towards viewing post mortem pain in Hell as 
disembodied: that is, felt by the soul in the absence of the body.612  Given the view of 
death offered by the latter excerpt, it seems fairly likely that the author of Christina’s 
biography understood post mortem suffering to be disembodied.  He may thus also 
have held the Augustinian view that pain was felt by the living in the soul rather than 
the body.613  Yet as can be seen from the excerpts examined above, he was hardly able 
to ignore the bodily causes of Christina’s suffering during her life.  Christina’s life, as 
narrated in her vita, is not a story of disembodied suffering.  Her mental turmoil and 
the sensuality of pain, as she experienced it in her mind, are both important aspects of 
it.  Nevertheless, they are clearly coupled with her body, which at the very least can 
be viewed as acting as a medium for aspects of her pain and suffering in the respect 
that it qualified them.  For instance, harsh scourgings (see item 3 above) presumably 
caused Christina pain because, even if it was her soul rather than her body that was 
ultimately subject to the sensation of pain, its causes were nevertheless locatable on 
her body.  Even if her biographer ultimately located the sensuality of pain in the soul, 
he still clearly viewed the body as a medium through which certain kinds of pain and 
suffering were felt.               
                                                 
609 The  Life of Christina, ¶ 48 / pp. 122-5.   
610 See chapter three, sec. 3.1, pp. 91 above.  
611 Plato’s portrayal of Socrates’ in the Phaedo was noted previously in Chapter Three, sec. 3.1.1, pp. 
78-9.  
612 Cohen, The Modulated Scream, pp. 180-6.  
613 Augustine, City of God, xxi: 3: discussed by Cohen in The Modulated Scream, p. 183.  
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Finally, this must all be viewed in relation to socio-cultural attitudes towards 
pain and suffering in twelfth-century Europe, particularly among religious ascetics 
and mystics.  As noted above, Christina’s life and behaviour correspond with broader 
trends in religious life and behaviour in the later medieval period, both among the 
clergy and laity (bearing in mind that Christina’s transition from laity to clergy is 
covered by her life).  This has all been discussed widely by historians over the past 
few decades.614  For present purposes, what needs to be stressed is the extent to which 
mental and bodily suffering can be situated within this cultural context.  Although it 
might reasonably be thought that pain and suffering exist independently of culture, 
they are nevertheless experienced within it.  Furthermore, as can be seen from the 
case of Christina, cultural context influences not only how pain and suffering are 
experienced, but also people’s propensity towards them.  As a case in point, Christina 
evidently found pain and suffering to be sufficiently beneficial to her spiritual well-
being to be worth inflicting on herself.  Certainly, she was not alone in this respect.  
As Cohen has recently pointed out, pain was consistently viewed in Western Christian 
theological discourse, from late antiquity up to the late medieval period, as a means 
towards salvation.615      
       
5.1.4: Conclusion 
 
Pain and suffering must be understood not merely as sensations, locatable in the body 
or mind, or as socio-cultural constructs, but rather as composite phenomena brought 
about by the ways in which three facets of human existence interact with one another: 
namely mind, body, and culture.  Although pain and suffering exist, in the most 
immediate sense of the word, in the mind and body, the influence of socio-cultural 
pressures on people’s conscious experiences of and behavioural responses to them can 
hardly be in doubt.  The pain-seeking behaviour of Christina and other medieval 
ascetics and mystics cannot be accounted for without some understanding of the 
socio-religious culture of Christian Western Europe during the medieval period.  
Likewise, this culture cannot be properly understood if we ignore the significance of 
the body as a medium onto which pain and suffering can be voluntarily inflicted and 
                                                 
614 See above n. 65.  
615 See Cohen, The Modulated Scream, p. 4: it is a running theme through chapters one, four, and six-
eight.   
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the mind as the facet of human life in which the sensuality of pain and suffering 
become conscious.   
Similar patterns follow for the other topics discussed in this section.  For 
example, we cannot fully appreciate the significance of Guibert’s lack of expressivity 
towards his bodily injuries without some knowledge of the clerical culture into which 
he had been initiated as a boy, his relationship with his mother, or his literary 
intentions in describing the event long after it had occurred.  But neither does it make 
much sense to discuss all of this without acknowledging Guibert’s embodiment and 
thereby his capacity to consciously feel pain and suffering via injuries to his body.  In 
short, mind, body, and culture must all be taken into account in order to account for 
the wide range of instantiations of the phenomena of pain and suffering as they may 
potentially exist in the human world.  
 
5.2: Aging and “old age” 
 
Old age is an important theme in several of the texts considered here, in which it tends 
to be associated with sensations and experiences of pain, suffering, and general 
discomfort.  Accordingly, this section expands on some of the themes explored in the 
previous section of this chapter.   
There are two distinct aspects to the phenomenon of age as it relates to 
humanity.  Firstly, there is the biological process of aging, whereby bodies mature 
and eventually decay over time at variable rates and in response to innumeranble 
embodied and environmental factors.  Humans share this in common with all other 
living beings.  The second covers the broad sweep of specifically human responses to 
the first: that is, the ways in which people experience and conceptualise biological 
aging and the socio-cultural constructs that form in response to it and influence how 
people experience and conceptualise it.   
Recent literature on old age and “the aging-process” in medieval Europe has 
drawn attention to socially-constructed attitudes towards these phenomena.616  Joel 
Rosenthal is remarkable for making an issue of their roots in a biological process: 
                                                 
616 For example see S. Shahar, ‘The old body in medieval culture’ in Framing Medieval Bodies¸ ed. S. 
Kay et al (Mancehster, 1994), pp. 160-87 and G. R. Overing, ‘A body in question: aging, community, 
and gender in medieval Iceland’ in The Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies, 29: 2 (1999), 
pp. 211-25.   
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Like gender and race and colour, it [old age] seems a part of the “natural 
world” around which society has been constructed as a gloss, a reading.  And, 
as we are now apt to say, old age is in some part a social construct, a web of 
behavioural patterns woven around a biological phenomenon.617   
 
Biological aging clearly affects society and culture.  Perhaps most obviously, it leads 
people to view the general course of human life as a progression, which is often 
conceptualised, at least in western cultures, as a series of discrete stages: e.g. infancy, 
adulthood, and old age.  In turn, socio-cultural construsts like these, not to mention 
living and working conditions in any given society, affect how people experience the 
biological aging process.  For example, depending on when the body is viewed as 
“old” in a given socio-cultural context, people may experience themselves as “old” by 
the age of 40, 50, or 60 (and conversely, they may experience adulthood at 14, 16, 18, 
21, etc.).  Therefore, it can be said that while biological aging is a universal and 
ultimately inexorable process, most concepts about age or aging are arbitrary, 
including conventions for measuring “age” (by the solar year in western cultures) and 
notions like youth, adulthood, old age, and so forth.     
Medieval Christians received a relatively coherent notion of old age [senex 
and senectus] from antiquity.  The transmission of this into the intellectual and literary 
cultures of medieval Europe is particularly apparent through popular tropes involving 
old age: particularly the puer senex (i.e. boy with the wisdom of an elderly man), and 
the Millennerian notion of senectus mundi (“old age of the world”), most notably 
developed by Augustine from the Old Testament prophecies of Daniel and Paul’s first 
letter to the Corinthians (I Cor. 10: 11).618  Senex and senectus appear in the Latin 
Vulgate, albeit, sparingly619:   
 
• Now Abraham was old, and advanced in age: and the Lord had blessed him in 
all things.  
 
                                                 
617 J. T. Rosenthal, Old Age in late Medieval England (Philadelphia Penn., 1996), p. 1.   
618 On the puer senex see Curtius, European Literature, pp. 98-101.  For Augustine’s Millennerianism 
see City of God, book xx (especially chapter 23).  For some examples of the use made of the senectus 
mundi topos by medieval authors see Constable, ‘Medieval Latin Metaphors’, pp. 10-11.   
619 Senex occurs 28 times throughout the Vulgate, and senectus, 5 times: see http://www.drbo.org/lvb/ 
(accessed 02 / 04 / 09) 
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Erat autem Abraham senex dierumque multorum et Dominus in cunctis 
benedixerat ei. [Gen. 24: 1] 
 
And if they live long, they shall be nothing regarded, and their last old age  
• shall be without honour.  
 
Et si quidem longae vitae erunt in nihilum conputabuntur et sine honore erit 
novissima senectus illorum. [Wis. 3: 17] 
 
• For venerable age is not that of long time, nor counted by the number of years: 
but the understanding of years is grey hairs.  And a spotless life is old age.  
 
Senectus enim venerabilis est non diuturna neque numero annorum conputata 
cani sunt autem sensus hominibus.  Et aetas senectutis vita inmaculata. [Wis. 
4: 8-9]620 
  
Nevertheless, precisely what counted as senex in medieval Europe varied widely.  
Shulamith Shahar has shown that old age, as defined by a range of medieval texts, 
could fall anywhere between around 35 and 70 years.621  She has also drawn attention 
to the variety of stereotypes about old age and old people in the late medieval west 
and how these coloured people’s experiences of oldness and old people. 622  
Furthermore, Gillian Overing has pointed out that old age was defined in some socio-
cultural contexts (specifically in medieval Iceland) according to the capacity of the 
individual to perform certain social functions or manual tasks, in which case the 
harshness of the local environment and individual wealth and status can be counted as 
significant determinants of the notion of old age.623  Therefore, it should be stressed 
that even in spite of common terms like senex or senectus, the concept of old age 
varied widely within and between medieval societies, influenced by a mixture of lived 
conditions and inherited wisdom.     
                                                 
620 All translations taken from http://www.latinvulgate.com/ (accessed 09 / 10 / 09) 
621 S. Shahar, ‘Who were old in the middle ages?’ in Social History of Medicine, 6: 3 (1993), pp. 313-
41.  
622 Shahar, ‘The old body in medieval culture’.  
623 Overing discusses how these issues were related to aging and the old body in medieval Iceland in ‘A 
Body in Question’.  
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5.2.1: Experiences of aging and Stereotypes of old age 
 
The following two excerpts have already been discussed in Chapter Four (sec. 4.1) in 
regard to Theobald’s understanding of the components of his body.  Here the focus is 
on the representation of old age: 
 
1. [F]or by reason of my age and infirmity, I shall not be able to wait for your 
coming that I yearn for, “for my flesh is wasted and my bone cleaves to my 
skin”; my spirit threatens its departure, yet still cleaves to my limbs in the 
desire and hope of your coming.   
 
[Q]ui prae aetate et aegritudine desideratum adventum vestrum diu non 
potero expectare.  “Pelli meae consumptis carnibus adhaesit os meum” [cf. 
Job, 19: 20]; recessum minatur spiritus, haeret tamen membris in desiderio et 
spe adventus vestri.624 
 
2. My flesh is worn away and my limbs are exhausted by age and toil, while long 
and grievous sickness tells me that my end is very near. 
 
Attrita est caro ea et tam aetate quam laboribus prefatigati sunt artus, et 
aegritudo gravis et diuturna dierum meorum finem in brevi adesse 
denuntiat.625 
 
In items 1 and 2 age [aetas] is construed as a cause of exhaustion [prefatigus sum] and 
probably also death to the extent that the departure of the spirit [recessum minatur 
spiritus] can be taken to mean the death of the body.626  Moreover, it is equated with 
sickness or disease [aegritudo] in item 1 and hard work [labor] in item 2.  It is 
important to note that aetas does not necessarily mean old age in either of these 
excerpts.  It certainly implies being older to the extent that people’s bodies necessarily 
                                                 
624 John, Letters, i: 121.  
625 Ibid., i: 135. 
626 This aspect of item 1 was discussed previously in chapter three, sec. 4.1, pp. 139-40 above.   
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mature and decay with the passing of time, but this is not quite the same thing as old 
age.   
Importantly, Theobald need not necessarily have viewed the consequences of 
aging [aetas] for his body in a strictly negative light.  As Shahar has noted, old or 
aged bodies could be viewed in negative and positive ways by medieval Europeans: 
 
Aging was considered conducive to increased wisdom, and spiritual growth, as 
well as liberation from passions and earthly ambitions.  But it was also a time 
of development of negative traits of character, and even vices, as well as of 
mental deterioration.  In other words there are two stereotypes of the old 
person—positive and negative.627   
 
The English historian, poet, and near-contemporary of Theobald, Henry of 
Huntingdon (c. 1080-1160) offers a more positive view of the aged body in his short 
book, De Contemptu Mundi [On Contempt of the World], written c. 1135: 
 
3. From boyhood almost all the vices—except concupiscence—put forth their 
shoots.  The hardest one, that rears itself up the highest and dominates the rest, 
is excessive love of the present world.  When, however, the natural 
improvement of maturity clears away the many evils of boyhood, such as 
ignorance, levity, changeableness, and so on, this one evil, which is more 
pleasing than the rest and is seasoned with poisoned sweetness, remains and 
develops.  But with advancing age, what was once soothing becomes abrasive, 
what tasted sweet becomes bitter.  Minds almost inextricably caught in bad 
habits, as if trapped by a hook, are held fast by riches and fleeting delights.  
This I have learned from my own experience. 
 
Igitur a puericia omnia fere preter luxuiram pullulant.  Inter que cacumen 
erigit rigidissimum et principatur nimius amor presentium.  Cum autem etatis 
naturali bono mala multa puericie vacuentur, velut inscientia, levitas, 
mutabilitas, et alia, hoc predictum, quod iocundius est ceteris, et melle 
venenato conditur, remanet et crescit.  Etatis tamen magno processu, pungere 
                                                 
627 Shahar, ‘The old body in medieval culture’, p. 160 and 169-70.  
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videntur que mulcebant, et amaricare que indulcabant.  Vsu tamen mali, velut 
hamo fere inextricabili, capte mentes diviciis et deliciis fugientibus retinentur.  
Quod a me ipso didici.628 
 
Contemptus mundi was an established literary genre and trope in the scholastic culture 
of late antique and medieval Europe.  Other notable works by twelfth-century authors, 
also entitled De Contemptu Mundi, include those of Anselm of Canterbury (who 
wrote two works with that name) and Bernard of Cluny (these are included among the 
eight works in J. P. Migne’s Patrologia Latina entitled De Contemptu Mundi).629  
Henry’s characterisation of the relative merits of the aged body in item 3 must be 
viewed in this context.630  As he saw it, the passing of time could bestow positive 
qualities on the individual that had been lacking in their younger selves unless, 
perhaps, they were the proverbial puer senex.  And likewise, the vices of youth 
[puericie] (i.e. ignorance [inscientia], fickleness [levitas], and inconstancy 
[mutabilis]) wane with the passing of time.631  Therefore, it should be noted that 
Henry’s positive view of old age is informed as much by negative stereotypes of 
youth as by positive stereotypes of old age.   
Age-related stereotypes clearly contributed to the ways in which the old body 
is represented in the excerpts considered so far.  It is also important to consider how 
these stereotypes corresponded to Theobald’s and Henry’s direct experiences of age 
on their own and other people’s bodies, for as Henry himself points out in item 3: 
‘This I have learnt by myself [Quod a me ipso didici]’.632  At the very least, it is 
difficult to account for stereotypes if they do not in some sense fit how people 
experience the world.  Consider, for instance, the age-related stereotype, being old is 
being physically weak [i.e. “prefatigus sum”], which appears in items 1 and 2.  It 
seems reasonable to hazard that this has a fairly sound basis in Theobald’s immediate 
experiences of the effects of age on his body.  This is not to say that all stereotypes fit 
                                                 
628 De Contemptu Mundi is included in Henry, Archdeacon of Huntingdon, Historia Anglorum, trans. 
D. Greenway (Oxford, 1996), pp. 584-7.   
629 The authors of two of those works are unknown.  The other, identifiable, authors are Eucharius of 
Lyon, Odo of Cluny, Roger of Bec, and Innocent III.  Also see Shahar, ‘The old body in medieval 
culture’, pp. 164-5. 
630 Moreover, Henry's fondness for Contemptu Mundi is apparent throughout his best known surviving 
work, the Historia Anglorum: Nancy Partner discusses this in Serious Entertainments: the writing of 
history in twelfth-century England (Chicago, 1977), pp. 11-48.  
631 The puer senex trope was noted above at pp. 220.  
632 My translation.  Haseldine gives: ‘This I have learned from my own experience.’ 
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the world in quite such a direct manner, or even reflect reality.633  However, for 
present purposes Theobald’s negative stereotype of the old body has a credible basis 
in the realities of aging in medieval Europe as suggested by recent studies on living 
and working conditions and life expectancy in medieval Europe.634  
This highlights the necessity of maintaining a balanced approach in this study 
towards the contributions made by society and culture, on the one hand, and the 
natural world (including the biological body) on the other, to how people experienced 
and understood human existence in twelfth-century Europe.635  In regard to this, the 
historian, Mary Garrison, has made some helpful comments: 
 
[L]iterary conventions and ritual gestures alike can be construed as the 
meeting point of emotional experience and cultural constraints, shaping and 
enabling the externalisation of emotional experience in culturally familiar 
patterns, effective for communication even when not “authentic”…If 
Christianity can be seen as providing conditions capable of fostering self-
awareness and narratives of self-disclosure, it also provided theological 
perspectives which gave medieval people their own framework for articulating 
and evaluating emotional states.636  [My italics] 
 
Garrison points out that people express themselves and communicate with each other 
in terms of received socio-cultural constraints and their immediate emotional 
responses to the world (this fits nicely with Lakoff’s and Johnson’s experiential view 
of metaphor). 637   Elsewhere in the same article, she also draws attention to the 
importance of Ernst Robert Cutrius’ argument in his now classic work, European 
Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, that throughout the middle ages, well-educated 
Western Europeans shared a common literary and intellectual heritage, grounded in 
                                                 
633 It is worth noting Pinker’s discussion of stereotypes in How the Mind Works, pp. 12-13.  This is 
related more broadly to his discussion of categorisation in the same work, pp. 306-13.  
634 In regard to this, it is worth noting R. Fleming, ‘Bones for Historians: Putting the Body back into 
Biography’ in Writing Medieval Biography, ed. D. Bates et al (Woodbridge, 2006), pp. 29-48.  
Fleming discusses the impact of working and living conditions, among other things, on health and life-
expectancy in Anglo-Saxon England.  
635 Scholars involved in the so-called “history of emotions” debate have acknowledged similar 
obstacles to understanding the emotions of medieval people: see the contributions by B. Rosenwein, S. 
Airlie, M. Garrison, and C. Larrington in Early Medieval Europe, 10: 2 (2001).  Garrison’s article is 
quoted and discussed shortly.  
636 M. Garrison, ‘The study of emotions in early medieval history’ in Early Medieval Europe, 10: 2 
(2001), p. 244.  
637 See Chapter Two, sec. 2.2.4. 
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the Greek, Roman, and Jewish past.  She goes on to argue that this afforded them a 
degree of “privileged access” into each other’s emotional (or mental) lives in that it 
provided them with common ways of understanding their experiences of the world 
and expressing them.638  
 This can be related back to a point made previously in sec. 4.1 regarding 
Theobald’s paraphrase of Job 19: 20 (see item 1 in the present section): ‘For my flesh 
is wasted and my bone cleaves to my skin [Pelli meae consumptis carnibus adhaesit 
os meum].’  Garrison’s suggestions are highly relevant here: ‘[Christianity] provided 
theological perspectives which gave medieval people their own framework for 
articulating and evaluating emotional states.’639  This applies to Theobald’s use of 
Job, by which he can be seen to be tapping into the language and tropes of Old 
Testament theology, as received through Western Christianity, to express an 
emotional response to the effects of the passing of time on his body.  Similarly, the 
contemptus mundi genre provided Henry with a literary model, rooted in Judaeo-
Christian eschatology and moral values, by which he could articulate and evaluate (to 
use Garrison’s terms) his experiences of the effects of aging on the body.  
These points can be explored further with reference to the following extract 
from Orderic’s Epilogue: 
 
4. Now indeed, worn out with old age and infirmity, I hope to bring this book to 
an end, and it is plain that many good reasons urge me to do so.  For I am now 
in the sixty-seventh year of my life and service to the Lord Jesus Christ, and 
while I see the princes of this world overwhelmed by misfortunes and 
disastrous setbacks I myself, strengthened by the grace of God, enjoy the 
security of obedience and poverty. 
 
Ecce senio et infirmitate fatigatus librum hunc finire cupio, et hoc ut fiat 
pluribus ex causis manifesta exposcit ratio.  Nam sexagesimum septimum 
aetatis meae annum in cultu Domini mei Iesu Christi perago, et dum optimates 
huius seculi gravibus infortuniis sibique valde contrariis comprimi video, 
gratia Dei corroboratus securitate subiectionis et paupertatis tripudio.640 
                                                 
638 Garrison, ‘The study of emotions’, pp. 245-7.  
639 Ibid., p. 244.    
640 Orderic, Epilogue.  
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Orderic’s impression of the effects of age [aetas] on his body is similar to that given 
by Theobald in items 1 and 2.  The passing of sixty-seven years has left him weak or 
sick [infirmitas] and tired [fatigatus].641  It is also significant that Orderic describes 
himself as “old” in this excerpt [senium] and states his age as 67 [sexagesimus 
septimus].  This gives the fairly clear impression that he viewed the mid-sixties, at 
least, as being firmly within a period of “old age” or senex in the progression of his 
life and presumably also in other people’s lives.642   
There are a number of issues which should be raised in regard to the influence 
of literary and religious exempla or topoi on this passage.  Again, it should be noted 
that Orderic’s Epilogue clearly apes the epilogue to the model for his Historia 
Ecclesiatica: namely Bede’s Historia Ecclesiastica.  Bede closed his historia with a 
brief account of the course of his life and his devotion to the Christian faith.  
Although Orderic’s Epilogue is much longer and more detailed, it is clearly based on 
the model supplied by Bede.643  Secondly, Orderic’s Epilogue is as devotional as it is 
autobiographical.  Thus, note how by giving his age, Orderic makes it very clear that 
he had spent each year of his life in the service of Jesus Christ: ‘For I am now in the 
sixty-seventh year of my life and service to the Lord Jesus Christ [Nam sexagesimum 
septimum aetatis meae annum in cultu Domini mei Iesu Christi perago].’644  And to 
strengthen this point, he goes on to draw a contrast between the good fortune and 
happiness that befell him through his obedience and poverty, and the misfortunes 
suffered by the secular princes [optimates] of his time, presumably in spite of their 
power and wealth.   
In item 4, Orderic can be seen to be evaluating the course and outcomes of his 
life in strongly theological terms.  This is particularly clear from the virtues he 
ascribes to a life lived in poverty and obedience to God and the contrast he draws 
between the outcomes of this kind of life and the life of a secular prince.  This can be 
                                                 
641 Cf. Theobald acribes sickness [aegritudo] and exhaustion [prefatigus sum] to his old body in items 
1-2 above (p. 222).  
642 On quantitative definitions of old age in medieval medical texts see Shahar, ‘Who were old in the 
middle ages?’ 
643 The influence of Bede’s Historia Ecclesiastica on Orderic’s Historia has already been noted in the 
Introduction to Part II (pp. 67).  It is discussed by Chibnall in The World of Orderic Vitalis, pp. 177-80 
and p. 216.  Although Bede’s epilogue is much briefer than Orderic’s, some clear parallels can be 
drawn between the two: cf. Bede, Historia Ecclesiastica, xxiv / Colgrave et al, pp. 566-7 and Orderic, 
Epilogue.  
644 Orderic, Epilogue.    
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related to Augustine’s famous exegesis of the story of Cain and Abel, the sons of 
Adam and Eve (Gen. 4: 1-16), in his City of God:   
 
When those two cities started on their course through the succession of birth 
and death, the first to be born was a citizen of this world [civis huius saeculi], 
and later appeared one who was a pilgrim and stranger in the world 
[peregrinus in saeculo], belonging as he did to the City of God.  He was 
predestined by grace, and chosen by grace, by grace a pilgrim [peregrinus] 
below, and by grace a citizen [civis] above.645 [My italics] 
 
Augustine’s reading of the lives of Cain and Abel was largely intended for Christian 
readers living in the religiously-mixed cities of late antiquity.646  This aspect of the 
text was lost to Augustine’s medieval readership.  However, the distinction he makes 
between the citizens of the world [saeculum] and of heaven or the “City of God” 
[Civitas Dei] would have been more pertinent to them, not least in that it reflected the 
distinction observed in the societies of medieval Europe between the clergy and laity, 
and the Church and state.  But perhaps most importantly, Augustine’s reading of Cain 
and Abel highlights what for him, and medieval Christians, would have seemed a 
fundamental and necessary life-choice faced by everybody between living either for 
the immediate pleasures of the world or in anticipation of those promised by God.   
The point here is not necessarily that Orderic specifically had Augustine’s 
reading of the story of Cain and Abel in mind when he was composing the epilogue to 
his Historia (although is it certainly possible).  Rather, it is that Orderic was using 
similar language and ideas about life and morality as those employed by Augustine to 
understand the consequences of his life, as he had lived it, for his posthumous 
existence.  In this way, Orderic can be seen to be casting a positive spin on his old age 
[senium], in spite of his feelings of sickness and fatigue, through a specifically 
Christian understanding of the nature of individual human well-being.  More to the 
point, given his devotion to God throughout his life, Orderic was able to equate 
nearness to death with nearness to Heaven and thus God.    
                                                 
645 Augustine, City of God, xv: 1.  
646 For an outline of the historical circumstances in which Augustine wrote City of God, see Evans’ 
introduction to Bettenson’s translation, pp. xxxiii-xl.  
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Peter of Celle also made use of religious language and biblical exempla to 
structure and express his views on old age.  Consider the following extract from a 
letter to Pope Alexander III, in which he cites old age [aetas annosa] as the main 
reason for why he could not attend the then forthcoming Third Lateran Council 
(March 1179):  
 
5. I proffer an excuse—not a frivolous one, like one of the perfunctory excuses in 
the Gospels with which those invited to the last supper accuse themselves of 
making excuses, but one which is, by clear proofs, demonstrable and true.  
There is in me indeed a willing devotion to every kind of obedience, but my 
weak performance sinks down on account of my infirmity.  The will is present 
but weakness hampers it; “the spirit is indeed willing but the flesh weak” 
[Matt. 6: 30].  Therefore let old age, a long journey, the brief span of life, and 
tired limbs be the demonstrable and necessary grounds of our excuse before 
the fatherly clemency and most equitable judgement of the apostolic wisdom, 
which would rather have an absent son alive than one present who is half 
dead, or expired for sure. 
 
[E]xcusationem prefero, non frivolam de perfunctoriis evangelicis aliquam 
quibus ad cenam invitati se excusando accusant, sed manifestis documentis 
probabilem et veram.  Prompta siquidem est in me ad omnem obedientiam 
devotio sed succumbit propter invaletudinem languida executio.  Inest 
voluntas sed impedit infirmitas; “spiritus quidem promptus est, caro autem 
infirma”. 647  Apud igitur paternam clementiam et equissimam apostolice 
discretionis censuram etas annosa, longa via, brevis vita, fessa membra sint 
nostre excusationis probabilia et necessaria argumenta.  Mauult habere filium 
absentem vivum quam secum semimortuum, vel certe extinctum.648 
 
The extent to which Peter employs the language of the Bible in his letters to express 
himself should be noted.  As Julian Haseldine observes:  
  
                                                 
647 Cf. Matt. 26: 41: Spiritus quidem promptus est caro autem infirma.  Mark 14: 38: Spiritus quidem 
promptus caro vero infirma.   
648 Peter, Letters, 80.  
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No amount of footing can capture the extent to which the Vulgate moulds and 
informs Peter’s thoughts and expression; to attempt to disentangle it would 
risk reducing to a string of references what is a complex and subtle response to 
the central text of the Latin West.649  
 
It is in this manner that Peter uses the language and contents of the Bible to excuse 
himself from attending the Lateran council.  Incidentally, Haseldine’s translation of 
cenam as the Last Supper seems inappropriate here as Peter is surely referring to the 
parable of The Unwilling Guests (Matt. 22: 1-10; Luke 14: 15-24) rather than the Last 
Supper.650  Also noteworthy is the use Peter makes of Matthew’s famous dictum, 
“The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak”, to express his predicament: 
namely, that although he wished to go, the state of his body prevented him from doing 
as much.651  
Peter continues this letter in a similar vein, employing a further series of 
biblical images to express his experiences of old age:  
 
6. I am smitten as grass which now has withered [cf. Ps. 101 (102): 5, 128 (129): 
6], ‘which is today, and tomorrow’ shall not be cast ‘into the oven’ but into the 
bier [cf. Matt. 6: 30, Luke 12: 28], and how, like ‘a wain that is laden with 
hay’ [Amos 2: 13] shall I be able to follow those travelling on horses or flying 
on the wings of health and of sturdy age? 
 
Percussus sum ut fenum quod iam exarvit, ‘quod hodie est, et cras’ non ‘in 
clibanum’ sed in feretrum mittetur, et quomodo tanquam ‘plaustrum onustum 
feno’ prosequi potero ambulantes in equis et volantes in pennis sanitatis et 
robuste etatis? 
   
The compound metaphor that Peter creates in the first two clauses of item 6, whereby 
he likens himself to withered grass and a wain laden with hay, is clearly intended to 
                                                 
649 See introduction to Haseldine’s edition of Peter’s letters, p. xxiii.  
650 Haseldine’s translation of cenam as “Last Supper” seems doubtful given that none of the gospels 
report anybody making excuses for non-attendance at the event.  By contrast, guests making excuses 
for non-attendance at a banquet are the explicit topic of both Matthew’s and Luke’s so-called parables 
of The Unwilling Guests.    
651 Significantly, Cohen highlights other letters in which pain is used an excuse for various things: The 
Modulated Scream, pp. 116-118.  
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highlight a correlation between age and proximity to death.  Furthermore, it is a 
strongly seasonal metaphor as the common element bridging its two parts is the 
agricultural practice of haymaking (typically carried out in late summer in Northern 
Europe).  In regard of this, the first point to make is that Peter is presenting himself as 
being past his best (so to speak): that is, he is too withered (i.e. it is too late in the 
season) to be harvested for good hay and so he is thus destined for the bier rather than 
the oven.  Hence considered in this light, he is suggesting not only that he is nearing 
the end of his life (i.e. as though nearing the end of the seasonal cycle of the solar 
year), but also that he is past the point of being useful (i.e. withered grass is no good 
for making hay): a message that fits the purpose of his letter.652 
 The second point relates to the hay wain.  Firstly, the image of the wain can be 
related back to the qualities that Peter ascribed to his aged body earlier in the letter 
(see item 5): infirma, infirmitas and languida.  These terms can be seen to fit Peter’s 
image of a heavily-loaded wain, which we might reasonably expect to move slowly 
and inelegantly (from which we might also infer weakness [infirma]).  Furthermore, 
Peter places this image in contrast to that of younger men, mounted and unmounted, 
whose movements will be swifter and more elegant because they are young and 
healthy: ‘flying on the wings of health and of robust age [volantes in pennis sanitatis 
et robuste etatis].’  This may reflect an intended social contrast between the low status 
wain (with accompanying draught horses) and the horses of the young men, which, 
we may surmise, are supposed to be more valuable, and thus of higher-status by the 
standards of twelfth-century French society.   
There is a degree of inconsistency between the images of the wain and 
withered grass as they are used in item 6, for on the one hand Peter construes himself 
as a bulky, load-bearing, vehicle, intended to carry hay, while on the other he claims 
to be like withered grass, which is to say characterised by loss of mass and unsuitable 
for haymaking.  Moreover, considered in light of the draught horses needed to pull it 
or its load-bearing capacity, the wain could be viewed as a symbol of power or 
fortitude rather than age-induced exhaustion.  Nevertheless, taken together for Peter’s 
                                                 
652 Cf. Matthew 6: 30: ‘And if the grass of the field, which is to day, and to morrow is cast into the 
oven, God doth so clothe: how much more you, O ye of little faith? [si autem faenum agri quod hodie 
est et cras in clibanum mittitur Deus sic vestit quanto magis vos minimae fidei]’; Luke 12: 28: ‘Now, if 
God clothe in this manner the grass that is to-day in the field and to-morrow is cast into the oven: how 
much more you, O ye of little faith? [si autem faenum quod hodie in agro est et cras in clibanum 
mittitur Deus sic vestit quanto magis vos pusillae fidei].’  Translations from www.latinvulgate.com 
(accessed 22 / 10 / 09) 
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purposes in this letter, they provide a reasonably coherent image of old age, 
characterised by proximity to death, slowness, and weakness.653   
Again, this can be related to Garrison’s point about the influence of 
Christianity on the ways in which medieval people expressed and understood their 
experiences of the world.654  Here and elsewhere we can seen that the Vulgate Bible 
provided Peter with an extensive repertoire of terms, concepts, phrases, metaphors, 
and stories to which he could relate, inter alia, his experiences of his aged body.  In 
this way, the language and content of the Vulgate provided Peter with understanding 
of this aspect of hiself and a means of expressing it that would have been familiar to 
other well-educated people in Western Christian Europe during the twelfth century.  
Importantly, however, this does not mean that the realities of Peter’s experiences and 
understanding of the effects of age on his body were hopelessly veiled in biblical 
language and metaphor.  The use made of the Bible by Peter in his writings was a 
creative process, on his part involving active evaluation and restructuring its contents 
to fit his literary purposes.   
 
5.2.2: Conclusion 
 
The excerpts examined in this section go some way towards exploring the mutual 
interplay between the realities of the biological aging process to which everybody is 
subject and the personal and socio-cultural significances that may be drawn from this.  
As with the earlier discussion of pain, the immediate realities of bodily aging and 
mental and socio-cultural responses to this phenomenon are not easily distinguishable.  
Although at the beginning of this section I made the observation that the “natural” 
aging process is a discrete phenomenon in itself, I would now add that as it relates to 
the human world the aging process is hardly distinguishable, if at all, from how 
people experience and interpret it and wider socio-cultural responses to it.  Regardless 
of the universality and inexorability of this phenomenon, it is invariably experienced 
by everyone from their own personal perspectives and in relation to whatever socio-
cultural contexts.   
                                                 
653 On the partial coherence of metaphors see Chapter Two, sec. 2.2.2: for direct reference see Lakoff 
and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, chapters 9-11.  
654 See p. 225 above.  
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In the above discussion, it has been seen that the relevant authors experienced 
the aging process through a range of socio-culturally transmitted positive and negative 
stereotypes, as well as in regard to their immediate experiences of their own, and 
presumably also other people’s, decaying bodies.  While old age could be lamented 
for the pain and discomfort it eventually brings, it might also be welcomed as a less 
sinful state of the body, as indeed Henry of Huntingdon saw it, or as an apt moment 
for self-reflection, both on the rights and wrongs of one’s past life and the coming 
afterlife, as I would argue Orderic was mainly thinking of it when composing the 
epilogue to his Historia.  Moreover, the Vulgate Bible provided the authors relevant 
here with a catalogue of terms and ideas with which to interpret their experiences of 
aging and other streams of inherited wisdom on it.  As highlighted above, this can be 
seen most clearly in the writings of Peter whose ability to weave multiple biblical 
citations and allusions into his Latin prose was nothing short of vituose.   
 
5.3: Sex and excretion; digust and humour  
 
This section is intended to explore how mind, body, and culture interact via two kinds 
of emotional response to the human anatomy and physiology of sex and excretion in 
Guibert’s De Vita Sua and Walter’s De Nugis: namely disgust and humour.  As with 
the subject matter of the previous section the anatomy and physiology of sex and 
excretion are necessary parts of human life.  Everybody excretes waste and everybody 
has sexual organs, be they male, female, or transex, although their experiences of 
them may vary considerably as they can be used, or not used, for a variety of sexual 
and non-sexual practices.  By contrast, people have less control over how their bodies 
excrete waste, although even so, as has been seen in the case of Christina’s self-
imposed suffering, they may alter this by modifying their diet or refusing to eat and 
drink at all.655  Furthermore, several body parts function both as sexual organs and 
excretory orifices hence people’s embodied experiences of sex and excretion are 
notably close.656   At any rate, the upshot of all this is that everybody has some 
experience and understanding of sex and excretion, even if they abstain from the 
former and try to control the latter through diet and regimen.  As above, what is of 
                                                 
655 This was discussed above in sec. 5.1.3.  
656 This is noted in by the anthropologist, J. B. Loudon, in ‘On body products’, in The Anthropology of 
the Body, ed. J. Blacking (London, 1977), p. 164.  
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interest about this here is the variety of possible responses to sex and excretion, 
among individuals and societies and cultures, and, most importantly, what this 
suggests about the interplay between mind, body, and culture in human life.         
The contents of De Vita Sua and De Nugis which are relevant in this section 
may be studied under the rubric of “obscenity” hence some thought is given below to 
the value of this concept for understanding Guibert’s and Walter’s specific responses 
to sex and excretion.  Guibert’s and Walter’s are the only texts from the sample used 
in this study which are relevant in this respect.  The anatomy and physiology of sex 
and excretion are not mentioned at all in John’s and Peter’s letters or in Orderic’s 
Epilogue.  Excretion is suggested once in The Life of Christina (see sec. 5.1.3, item 1 
above), while sex, which is to say the carnal realities of sex, is not mentioned at all 
(which is appropriate as Christina remained a virgin throughout her life).657  Thus, De 
Vita Sua and De Nugis are best suited to the purposes of this section.     
 There is an extensive discourse on the notion of obscenity in medieval studies 
and elsewhere in the humanities.658  The term itself covers a wide range of responses 
to potentially anything, although the link between obscenity and sex and excretion is 
especially strong in western cultures.  The medievalist, Leslie Dunton-Downer, has 
summarised the breadth and difficulties inherent in controlling the coverage of this 
concept nicely:    
 
[T]he obscene is an oddly plastic category of discrimination, uniquely 
predicated on complicated variables of aesthetic reception.  The obscene not 
only describes the qualities of cultural materials and behaviours, but also 
captures what we understand to be the effects produced by virtually anything: 
cultural objects, gestures, historic events, even natural phenomena.659 
 
In different words, obscenity varies according to what is being experienced by whom 
as obscene.  Thus, obscenity is best understood as a category of experiences, or 
                                                 
657 Excretion is suggested in The Life of Christina at ¶ 39 (this is cited as item 1 in sec. 5.1.3 above).   
658 For major discussions of obscenity in medieval studies see the edited collections Obscenity, Social 
Control and Artistic Creation in the European Middle Ages, ed. J. M, Ziolkowski (Boston, 1998) and 
Medieval Obscenity, ed. N. MacDonald (Woodbridge, 2006).  Taken together, these collections cover a 
huge amount of ground and thus give some sense of how widespread notions of obscenity were in the 
medieval west.     
659 L. Dunton-Downer, ‘Poetic language and the obscene’ in Obscenity, Social Control and Artistic 
Creation in the Europe Middle Ages, ed. J. M. Ziolkowski (Boston, 1998), p. 19. 
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maybe better, emotional states, which varies according to the interplay between 
people’s sensory perceptions of the world and the ways in which their upbringing and 
currently prevailing socio-cultural norms influence how they interpret those 
perceptions (keeping in mind that socio-cultural norms change over time and that 
personal tastes or standards of morality may transgress any such norms): it cannot be 
reduced either to rigid socio-cultural norms, purely subjective experiences, or hard-
wired sensory access to the world.  It is well-documented that attitudes towards sex, 
excretion, and obscenity (or offensiveness) vary among different societies, cultures, or 
communities.  It can be seen from this discourse that there is nothing necessarily 
obscene, disgusting, humorous, or offensive about sex and excretion.660   As just 
stated, if people experience aspects of the world as obscene, digusting, funny, 
offensive, or whatever else, then this must be accounted for in terms of the interacting 
influences of the mind, body, and culture.   
One way in which the obscenity of sex and excretion is interpreted in western 
societies involves the relationship between the body and built environment.  This 
relationship has been explored extensively in academic literature.661  There have long 
been designated spaces in western societies in which the bodily acts of sex and 
excretion are supposed to be performed and the excreta resulting from either activity 
deposited out of sight (or any of the other senses).  In this way, boundaries and 
barriers, physical and conceptual, have gradually been erected in the west, inter alia, 
between people performing these activities and society in general.  In modern western 
societies, sex and excretion are not normally accepted in public, but when people do 
so (i.e. in the “public gaze”) they tellingly risk being perceived as acting in obscene 
                                                 
660 One of the most important contributors in this regard has been Mary Douglas, particularly in her 
now classic work, Purity and Danger (discussed below at pp. 242-3).  For an anthropological 
perspective on varying attitudes towards human excreta see Loudon, ‘On Body Products’.  Pinker has 
recently discussed the psychology of obscenity, especially sexual and scatological obscenity, and 
swearing in The Stuff of Thought, chapter seven.  Again, it is also worth consulting the articles 
collected in Obscenity, Social Control and Artistic Creation in the European Middle Ages and 
Medieval Obscenity (full references given in n. 124 above), which taken together show that attitudes 
towards sex and excretion in the medieval west were highly variable across time and geography.  Also 
see the references in the following note. 
661 Mikhail Bakhtin famously posited the carnival as a social space in which conventional socio-
political mores break down allowing for public displays of normally illicit (or “obscene”) behaviour 
and language: see M. M. Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, trans. Hélène Iswolsky (orig. Moscow, 
1965: Bloomington Ind., 1984).  Baktin’s thesis has been rethought by P. Stallybrass and A. White, The 
Politics and Poetics of Transgression (London, 1986).  Stallybrass and White have also discussed the 
relationship between filth and the built environment in Britain between the eighteenth and early 
twentieth centuries: see ibid., chapter three.  The place of waste (especially faeces) in medieval life has 
recently been discussed by Susan Signe Morrison under the rubric “waste studies” in Excrement in the 
Late Middle Ages (Basingstoke, 2008): see chapters five, eleven and twelve.   
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ways by their peers and thereby inviting public opprobrium and even prosecution 
under secular obscenity laws.  Similar circumstances apply in Guibert’s and Walter’s 
texts, in which sex and excretion are construed as disgusting, or even obscene, by 
virtue of being placed or performed within the public gaze.  It will be seen in the next 
subsection (5.3.1) that one way of understanding this is in terms of self- and social 
control: and in the subsection which follows (5.3.2) as a focus of defamatory humour.   
Another matter which needs to be dealt with here is transgression of socio-
cultural norms and personal moral standards relating to sexual and excretory 
behaviour.  As just noted, sex and defecation within the public gaze are forms of 
transgression according to Guibert’s and Walter’s moral standards.  A number of 
other ways in which sex and excretion transgressed Guibert’s and Walter’s moral 
standards will also be highlighted and discussed in this section.  A particular point of 
interest will be how, by drawing attention to specific acts of sexual and excretory 
transgression, Guibert and Walter aimed in their texts to cast more broadly significant 
aspersions on groups of people.   
 
5.3.1: Digusting sex and excretion 
 
Book iii of Guibert’s De Vita Sua contains two very similar anecdotes in which men 
attacking the interests of the local church in Laon are suddenly afflicted, evidently by 
God, with a complete loss of bowel control: 
 
1. At Compiègne a royal prévôt opposed the church of Notre-Dame and Saints 
Cornelius and Cyprian.  When the clergy met in the middle of the market 
place and in the names of such a great Lady and such great patrons ordered 
him to cease, he showed no respect for the names and distressed his petitioners 
with his foul curses.  In the midst of his speech, he fell from his horse and in a 
moment found his breeches badly fouled beneath him by loosening of the 
bowels.  [My italics]  
 
Apud Compendium quidam praepositus regius adversabatur ecclesiae beatae 
Mariae, et beatorum Cornelii et Cypriani. Quem cum foro medio clerici 
convenirent, et ex nomine tantae Dominae, tantorumque patronorum, ne id 
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faceret denuntiarent, ille sacris in nullo deferens nominibus, foede rogantium 
ora exprobrando confudit; sed inter ipsa verba, cum equo insideret, ruit, et 
sordidissimas bracas, quibus cingebatur, ventris profluvio mox sub se 
respexit.662 
 
And shortly thereafter: 
 
2. When an insurrection was stirred up in this town [Saint-Just] and the dregs of 
the populace were running riot with the townsmen in outrageous insolence, the 
clergy of the boy martyr St Just brought out the relics in the feretory to quiet 
the people.  Some servant, more ready than the rest, stood in their way and 
irreverently and wickedly aimed a blow with his sword at the most holy 
feretory.  Sooner than one could say it, he fell to the ground and, like the man 
just mentioned [i.e. the royal prévôt], became putrid with the stinking efflux of 
his excrement.  [My italics]    
 
Et quia de reverentia sanctis exhibenda dicere coepimus, municipium est in 
eodem pago Belvacensis episcopii, quod Sancti Justi vocatur. In quo, cum 
seditio mota fuisset, et enormi insolentia viles quique clientuli cum 
burgensibus baccharentur, clerici sancti pueri ac martyris Justi reliquias ad 
sedendum populum in loculo detulerunt. Cui quidam opportunior caeteris 
revera parasitus cum se retulisset obvium, gladium irreverens et nequam 
sacratissimo loculo intulit. Qui dicto citius in terram ruens, fetida, ut ille 
superius, alvi manatione computruit.663 
 
Guibert draws a clear link in both excerpts between the anti-clerical sentiments and 
behaviour of the relevant individuals and loss of bowel control.664  His descriptions of 
the respective acts of defecation are similarly graphic in items 1 and 2: Guibert uses 
                                                 
662 Guibert, De Vita Sua, iii: 18.  Archambault’s alternative translation of the underlined sentence is: 
‘Sitting on his horse as he screamed, he suddenly fell to the ground, and his bowels gave way beneath 
him, so that at once he found his breeches as messy as can be’; Archambault, A Monk’s Confession, p. 
201.  
663 Ibid., iii: 18.  Again, for the underlined sentence, Archambault gives: ‘Faster than it takes to say the 
words, he fell to the ground and, like the man just mentioned, there issued from him the stink of his 
own excrement’; Archambault, A Monk’s Confession, p. 201.  
664 Benton notes this in Self and Society, p. 14.  
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vocabulary suggestive of liquidity, flow, and uncleanliness in both cases.  Thus, in 
item 1, after falling from his horse, the royal prévôt’s underwear is seen to be 
“unclean” or “filthy” [sordida] on account of an “outpouring of the bowels” [ventris 
profluvius].  And likewise, in item 2 the “parasite” [parasitus: Benton interprets this, 
perhaps correctly, as “servant”] who attempts to strike the relics of St Just falls to the 
ground, stinking [fetida], because “he was made putrid by an outpouring of his 
stomach” [alvi manatione computruit].665  
  One might imagine that easier options were open to Guibert in both cases to 
describe the act of defecation.  He could, for instance, have given more 
straightforward descriptions of the relevant events by using the verb, caco [to 
defecate].  It it thus of some interest that he used broadly the same notion of an 
“outflow of the bowels” to describe the act of defecation.  There is surely a high level 
of word-to-world fit in Guibert’s phrases, ventris profluvius and alvi manatio, which I 
take to reflect Guibert’s embodied experiences of excretion (they also show a certain 
amount of biological knowledge and understanding in that Guibert is able to connect 
the external act of excretion with internal bodily organs).666  That is, these phrases 
clearly express an understanding of excretion as a process involving the flow of a 
substance(s) (i.e. excreta) from a source (e.g. the stomach) or along a channel (e.g. the 
bowels) to an exit point (in this case, the anus).  I suggest that this may be viewed, to 
adapt Lakoff’s and Johnson’s expression, as a metaphor by which Guibert lived: or 
put differently, these phrases need to be viewed as metaphors conditioned by 
Guibert’s everyday experiences of the world.667   
It seems possible that Guibert intended these anecdotes to raise laughs among 
whoever he thought might read his work (presumably literate monks and clerics).  
Considered in a certain light, there is perhaps something comical, not to mention 
ironic, about public displays of impiety or anti-clerical feelings resulting in public 
humiliation through loss of bowel control.  This would certainly fit with the theme of 
book iii of De Vita Sua, in which Guibert criticises the formation of the Laon 
commune in 1115 amidst an outburst of popular anti-clericalism among the secular 
                                                 
665 Computro may be a compound of com- and putreo [to decay / rot / putrify] or alternatively, a 
corruption of computresco [approx. putreo]: see Lewis and Short, s.n. putreo and computresco 
(accessed 1 / 11 / 09).   
666 Cf. with the previous discussion of Christina’s bowels in sec. 5.1.3, pp. 207-8 above.  
667 For relevant discussion and notes see Chapter Two, sec. 2.2.4.  
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community and the failure of the corrupt local bishop to prevent it from happening.668  
Granting this possibility, it may thus have been that Guibert intended his phrases 
(ventris profluvius and alvi manatio) to carry a weight of humour or irony that he did 
not associate with more direct forms of expression (e.g. using caco).   
In any case, both excerpts are clearly intended to invite the reader to feel a 
sense of digust towards the men in question, firstly, because they showed themselves 
to be impious in public by attacking the Church and clergy, and secondly, because 
they had been defiled, by Divine fiat, with their own excrement.  Excrement and the 
act of excretion are not in themselves the immediate objects of digust in these 
passages: it is rather the impiety of the relevant men as well as, presumably, impiety 
in general.  Nevertheless, Guibert clearly intended excrement and excretion to be 
symbolic of the moral deficiencies of both men.  This is best understood in terms of 
the places in which the events described occurred.  Both men exhibited their impiety 
by attempting to defile sacred places and relics in public and so their ritualesque 
defilement also occurred in public.  Given that everybody is subject to the realities of 
excretion, it seems reasonable to assume that Guibert was not thinking of excretion in 
general as being symbolic of moral deficiency, but rather excretion in inappropriate 
places.  In short, excretion is symbolic of moral deficiency in both excerpts in so far 
as it occurs when and where it shouldn’t (according to contemporary attitudes towards 
when and where excretion should take place and how excreta should be disposed). 
Furthermore, neither man was in control of his bowels at the moments in 
question.  In this respect, it is important to acknowledge that the sense of digust 
carried by both excerpts rests not just on place but also control or rather lack of 
control.669  That is, it is bad enough that the men had soiled themselves in public, but 
even worse that they had failed to exercise control over their bodies.  The fact that this 
misfortune befell two mature and apparently healthy men while in public was 
evidently reason for disgust and, in a sense, ill-omened of those men, for, as Guibert 
interpreted the events they had received not merely an immediate form of Divine 
punishment but also a socially- and religiously-stigmatising one.  By way of contrast, 
                                                 
668 In fact, Guibert draws up a historical case in which he links the causes of the formation of the 
commune to the behaviour of a number of the bishops of Laon since the eleventh century (De Vita Sua, 
iii: 1). He later goes on to give a damning verdict of the commune at iii: 7. Again, for a recent analysis 
of the contents and purposes of book iii of De Vita Sua see Blurton, ‘Guibert of Nogent and the Subject 
of History’.  
669 Bodily discipline is an important topic in the relevant literature: for a brief digest of the most 
important literature see Morrison, Excrement in the Late Middle Ages, p. 5-7.  
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there is some evidence in De Vita Sua to suggest that Guibert found uncontrolled 
emissions of bodily fluids more acceptable among the sick and dying.  For instance, 
he relates the case of an impious monk, Otmund, whose death was brought on by his 
lack of dress when visiting the privy late during a cold winter night.  Otmund later 
vomited the contents of his stomach, but miraculously not the Eucharistic wafer that 
he received, and so soon after died.  Guibert clearly disapproved of much about this 
monk but, nevertheless, it is not clear that Guibert intended any moral connotations to 
drawn from the connection between his death, the privy, and vomiting.  Indeed, 
Guibert’s concluding statement to the anecdote is notably ambiguous on Otmund’s 
post mortem fate:  
 
Now, I have related this not because I believed that he departed to the abode of 
the wicked but to remind all men to reflect with me that the prince of this 
world once came to the Son of God, against whom he had no claim.670   
 
Thus, the key point of contrast in all this is between, on the one hand, the immorality 
connoted by two healthy men soiling themselves in public after having committed 
equally public acts of impiety and, on the other, the seemingly more neutral moral 
connotations of a sick man evacuating his bowels and stomach in a relatively private 
setting shortly before his death. 
Similarly negative attitudes towards sex and excretion in more private settings 
can be found in Walter’s reports of a supposed sect of English heretics, which he 
identifies as the Paterini, in De Nugis: 
 
3. Men and women live together, but no sons or daughters issue [from] the 
union…each family sits waiting in silence in each of their synagogues, and 
there descends by a rope which hangs in the midst a black cat of wonderous 
size.  On sight of it they put out the lights, and do not sing or distinctly repeat 
hymns, but hum them with closed teeth, and draw near the place where they 
saw their master, feeling after him, and when they have found him they kiss 
him.  The hotter their feelings, the lower their aim: some go for his feet, but 
most for his tail and privy parts.  Then, as though this noisome contact 
                                                 
670 Guibert, De Vita Sua, i: 25.  
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unleashed their appetites, each lays hold of his neighbour and takes his fill of 
him or her for all his worth. 
 
Viri et femine cohabitant, nec apparent inde filii vel filie…expectantes in 
singulis sinagogis suis singule in silencio familie, descenditque per funem 
appensum in medio mire magnitudinis murelegus niger, quem cum viderint, 
luminibus extinctis ymnos non decantant, non distincte dicunt, sed ruminant 
assertis dentibus, acceduntque ubi dominum suum viderint palpantes, 
inuentumque deosculantur quisque secundum quod ampliore feruet insania 
humilius, quidam pedes, plurimi sub cauda, plerique pudenda; et quasi a loco 
fetoris accepta licencia pruriginis, quisque sibi proximum aut proximam 
arripit, commiscenturque quantum quisque ludibrium extendere prevalet.671 
 
Perhaps as might be expected, Walter does not dwell on the abstract theology of this 
group.  Rather, he focuses attention on the esoteric sexual rites that they practised 
(reportedly or in Walter’s imagination) among each other and with the demon.  The 
willingness among the members of the sect to make direct contact with each other’s 
and the demon’s genitalia are important indicators of their depravity.  Indeed, the 
greatest cause for anxiety about this group, as Walter saw them, was that they 
subverted the prescribed sexual norms of Western Christianity.  In particular, they 
violated marital norms in two ways: firstly, by copulating freely among one another 
(i.e. not strictly between husband and wife); and secondly, by not bringing forth any 
children from their unions.  In this respect, the moral message of this story is 
conventional: people should not physically engage with each other’s genitalia, at least 
for the purposes of pleasure, unless they are married and open to having children (it 
seems reasonable here to allow for exceptions such as between mother and child or 
physician and patient), and that to behave otherwise is intrinsically immoral, bad, and 
worthy of our digust. 
Continuing further on the Paterini, Walter notes the effect that some 
consecrated salt has on food served by an unnamed member of the sect to his uncle 
Incidentally, Walter tells us that the latter was not an initiate of the sect, but rather 
suspected his nephew of being so and thus wished to expose him as such: 
                                                 
671 Walter, De nugis, i: 30  
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4. They duly supped together.  The nephew, ignorant of what was afoot, had 
served his uncle a whole mullet in a dish, pleasant to the eyes and good for 
food, as it seemed.  The knight sprinkled the salt on it; the fish vanished in a 
moment and left in the dish what looked like little pellets of hare’s dung.  
 
Cenantibus illis rite simul, ignorante nepote quid ageretur, fecit avunculo suo 
mullum integrum in disco apponi, pulcrum visu et ad vescendum suauem, ut 
videbatur.  Apposuit ergo miles sal, et disparuit subito piscis, et reliquid in 
disco quasi pilulas fimi leporini. 672 
 
In this case, the focus of anxiety his shifted somewhat from contact with genitalia to 
contact with animal excreta.  Walter does not say whether the substance that the 
nephew served his uncle was in fact excreta.  However, its resemblance to hare’s dung 
was clear enough to be damning of the nephew’s intentions towards his uncle.  Again, 
the dung is not in itself reason for digust or symbolic of depravity.  It is mainly the 
nephew whose behaviour is intended to invite digust.  By contrast, the dung is only 
disgusting in so far as the nephew put it somewhere where it shouldn’t be: i.e. on a 
serving dish.   
Mary Douglas’ definition of dirt as matter out of place is highly relevant here.  
As she pointed out in her now classic work, Purity and Danger (1966), people define 
different substances as “dirt” or “dirty” in relation to how they conceptualise the order 
of the world: hence the same substance can be both dirty and, if not clean, then at 
least not dirty depending on its place in the world.673  This can also be related to 
Lakoff’s and Johnson’s contention that conceptual systems and metaphors reflect how 
people see the structure of the world. 674   In short, dirt is dirt in so far as it is 
experienced and understood as such in response to people’s structured experiences of 
the world.  The key point to be made here in relation to item 4 is that the hare’s dung 
is digusting because it was out of place on a serving dish and, worse still, deceitfully 
disguised as the opposite of what it was: food rather than disgeted food waste.  This 
clearly raises anxieties about pollution, both of vessels intended to contain food and 
                                                 
672 Ibid., i: 30.  
673 Douglas, Purity and Danger, pp. 44-40.  
674 See Chapter Two, sec. 2.2.1 and also n. 44 in which the parallel between Lakoff’s and Johnson’s 
and Douglas’ respective views on human perception of the world is noted.   
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the body which is supposed to ingest food and excrete waste: by ingesting waste, the 
apparent “natural” order of human consumption seems to be violated.675 
 
5.3.2: Sex, excretion, and humour in Walter Map’s De Nugis Curialium 
 
Among the miscellany of the first distinction of Walter’s De Nugis can be found a 
lengthy critique of the Cistercians, or “white monks”, subtitled, Incidencia magistri 
Gauteri Mahap de monachia (translated as “A Digression on Monkery” by James et 
al).676  Walter reports a number of scurrilous stories or rumours about the English 
Cistercians of his day, among which the following is particularly arresting: 
 
1. Now in this regulation about clothing I find cause for surprise in regard of the 
breeches, in that they are obliged to wear them at the service of the altar, and 
they are taken off when they go thence.  This is the privilege of the sacred 
vestments; but this garment is not sacred, it is not reckoned among those of the 
priests or Levites, and it is not blessed.  It has, however, its meanings: it hides 
that which is better hid: ‘tis Venus’ privy seal, her barrier against publicity.  
A reason why the Cistercians wear it was given me by someone, namely, to 
preserve coolness in that part of the body, lest sudden heats provoke 
unchastity.  But I say, No.  It would be better to shorten the inner tunic from 
the belt downwards, keeping the upper part, and not discarding the breeches, 
which are a respectable garment and approved by every other order, from the 
privy regions.  
 
Et in hac districionne vestium de femoralibus admirandum duco, quod eis uti 
oportet in altaris obsequio, et cum inde recesserint deponuntur.  Sacrarum 
vestium hec est dignitas; hec autem sacra non est, nec inter sacerdotalia vel 
levitica computatur, aut benedicitur; typica vero est et pudenda contegit, 
venerisque secreta signare videtur et castigare ne prodeant.  Cur ab illis 
                                                 
675 Pinker discusses the views of the psychologist Paul Rozin on the fear of polluting the body in How 
the Mind Works, pp. 379-83.  For discussion of the fear of contagion through touch and gaze in 
nineteenth-century Britain see Stallybrass and White, The Politics and Poetics of Transgression, pp. 
134-6.  
676 On Walter’s satire on monasticism in England see E. Coleman, ‘Nasty habits—satire and the 
medieval monk’ in History Today, 43: 6 (1993), pp. 36-42.  
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abstinendum sit quidam michi racionem dedit, ut scilicet circa loca illa 
frigeant, ne prosiliat ardor vel fiat impetus incestum.  Absit hoc! et 
decurtentur interiores a zona tunice, manente suprema, et non decaluentur a 
veste venerabili et ab omni alias approbata religione loca celanda.677 
 
All of which is shortly followed by an anecdote in which the inadequancies of the 
Cistercians’ unorthodox dress code, at least as Walter saw it, becomes plain to see: 
 
2. The lord king, Henry the Second, of late was riding as usual at the head of all 
the great concourse of his knights and clerks, and talking with Dom Reric, a 
distinguished monk and an honourable man.  There was a high wind; and lo!  
A white monk [i.e. a Cistercian] was making his way on foot along the street 
and looked round, and made haste to get out of the way.  He dashed his foot 
against a stone and was not being borne up by angels at that moment [cf. Ps. 
90 (91): 11-12], and fell in front of the feet of the king’s horse, and the wind 
blew his habit right over his neck, so that the poor man was candidly exposed 
to the unwilling eyes of the lord king and Reric.  The king, that treasure-house 
of politeness, feigned to see nothing, looked away and kept silence; but Reric 
said, sotto voce, “A curse on this bare-bottom piety!”  I heard the remark and 
was pained that a holy thing was laughed at, though the wind had only 
intruded where it was rightfully home.  However, if spare diet and rough 
clothing and hard work (and all these they claim) cannot tame them, and if 
they must have ventilation too to keep Venus at bay, let them go without their 
breeches and feel the draught.  I know that our flesh—and not heavenly 
though it be—does not need such defences: with us, Venus, apart from Ceres 
and Bacchus, is cold [Terence, Eun., 732]: but perhaps the enemy attacks 
those more fiercely whom he knows to be more stoutly fenced in.  Still, the 
monk who tumbled down would have got up again with more dignity had he 
had his breeches on.’   
 
Dominus rex Henricus secundus nuper, ut ei mos est, totam illam infinitatem 
militum et clericorum suorum precedens, cum domino Rerico monacho mango 
                                                 
677 Walter, i: 25: cf. with Guibert’s explanation for the need to cover genitalia in his De Incarnatione, 
PL  vol. 156, cols 496-7.  
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et honesto viro verbum faciebat, eratque eis ventus nimis, et ecce monachus 
albus in vico pedes negociabatur, respiciensque divertere properabat.  
Offendit ad lapidem, nec portabatur ab angelis tunc, et coram pedibus equi 
regii corruit; ventus autem vestes eius in collum propulit, ut Domini Regis et 
Rerici oculis invitis manifesta fieret misera veritas pudendorum.  Rex, ut 
omnis facecie thesaurus, dissimulans vultum avertit, et tacuit; Rericus autem 
intulit secreto “Maledicta religio que develat anum!”  Ego verbum audivi, et 
dolui, quod derisa est sanctitas, licet ventus non iniuste in loca sibi concessa 
impegerit.  Verumptamen si cibi parcitas et vestis aspera gravisque labor, 
qualia describunt hec singular, modum carni sue ponere non possunt, 
desideratque ventus pro freno Veneri, bonum est ut braccis careant et 
insufflentur.  Scio quod caro nostra, mundane scilicet non celestis, tantis non 
eget ad hec bella clipeis, quia sine Cerere et Baco nostra friget Venus; sed 
forsitan forcior in eos insurgit hostis, quo firmius novit clausos.  Monachus 
tamen qui cecidit honestius surrexisset, si corporaliter clausus fuisset.678 
 
There are sexual and scatological aspects to the monk’s humiliation in item 2.  Firstly, 
in item 1 Walter notes that his chief concern with regard to the Cistercians’ dress code 
is that their sexual organs [pudenda] are more vulnerable to exposure.  The breeches 
are, as he says, Venus’ privy seal [veneris secreta signare].  He strengthens this 
connection between the body parts covered by the breeches and Venus further 
towards the end of item 2 where he essentially argues that the Cistercians’ motivation 
for not wearing breeches should be obsolete given a modest intake of food (i.e. Ceres) 
and wine or alcohol (i.e. Bacchus).  This all has several implications: firstly, good diet 
and alcohol encourage sexual virility; secondly and thirdly, the Cistercians are 
hypocrites because they preach austerity while living in luxury and thus need to take 
unnecessary measures to quell their sexuality which would be unnecessary in the first 
place if they were as austere as they claimed.679  In any case, it is clear that Walter had 
the sexual organs in mind when complaining of the Cistercians’ dress code, and 
perhaps more specifically, the penis.       
                                                 
678 Walter, i: 25.   
679 The second implication comes out more clearly elsewhere in Walter’s critique of the Cistercians.  In 
particular, he regularly refers to them as the biblical Egyptians: see Walter, De Nugis, i: 25. 
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Accordingly, it seems somewhat anomalous that Walter reports that only the 
monk’s anus [anus] received exposure as a consequence of not wearing breeches.  
Given the general tone and content of De Nugis, it seems reasonable to assume that 
Walter was prepared to exaggerate, misreport, or invent stories in order to illustrate a 
point, moral, humorous, or otherwise: that is to say, even if the episode in question 
happened as Walter related it, there are good reasons to believe that he would have 
added additional details to illustrate the moral that he drew from it more clearly.680  
Walter could have illustrated the points he makes in item 1 and repeats towards the 
end of item 2 more consistently in the latter if he reported that the monk’s penis had 
been exposed.  Considered in a certain light, the anus may of course be viewed as 
erotic and a sexual organ.  Nonetheless, Walter was apparently more interested here 
its scatological functions, quite possibly because he felt that he could construct a 
better joke out of the anecdote if he cast the monk’s anus as its focal point.  This 
would certainly accord with the ironic tone Walter sets by drawing a contrast between 
the monk’s fall and the content of Psalm 90 (91), which states: ‘he who dwells in the 
shelter of the most High [qui habitat in abscondito Excelsi]’ (1) will be lifted up by 
angels so that he does not strike his foot against a stone (11-12).681  Bearing this in 
mind, it also seems that Walter intended to suggest that the Cistercians did not dwell 
in the shelter of God: this is consistent with the rest of his diatribe against them.        
It is also worth pointing out that the monk’s anus is significant because it is 
exposed to the public gaze: particularly the gaze of the monk’s superior, the king.  
The humour of the episode revolves at least in part around the inappropriate 
circumstances in which the anus came to be exposed.  It is not the anus in itself, or 
exposed anuses per se, that is humorous.  It is rather the socio-cultural connotations of 
a lowly monk, by an infortuitous mistep, having his backside exposed to the public 
view of, among others, the head of the kingdom.  This is comparable to the previous 
discussion of the significance of defecation in public gaze in Guibert’s De Vita Sua.682        
Walter uses the human anatomy of sex and excretion in a number of other 
anecdotes in De Nugis, ostensibly for the purposes of making jokes as well as casting 
                                                 
680 For a discussion of Walter’s reasons for writing De Nugis, see Watkins, History and the 
Supernatural, pp. 203-8.  
681 The Latin in Ps. 90 (91): 11-12 is: [Q]uia angelis suis mandabit de te ut custodiant te in omnibus viis 
tuis; in manibus portabunt te ne forte offendat ad lapidem pes tuus [For he hath given his angels charge 
over thee; to keep thee in all thy ways.  In their hands they shall bear thee up: lest thou dash thy foot 
against a stone.].  Translation taken from www.latinvulgate.com (accessed 25 / 07 / 2010)   
682 See sec. 5.3.1. 
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aspersions on people or institutions that he viewed as disreputable.  For instance, 
consider the following excerpt in which Walter uses cunnus [vagina] and anus as 
pejoratives in reference to a fictitious Roman emperor: 
 
3. They therefore suggested to their lord the emperor Cunnanus (of whom a nun 
seeing his ugliness once said “Dominus Cunnanus nichil est nisi cunnus et 
anus”) [sic.] that Rome was of right the head of the world and mistress of all 
lands.   
 
Suggerunt ergo domino suo imperatori Cunnano (de quo monialis videns eum 
deformem dixerat “Dominus Cunnanus nichil est nisi cunnus et anus”) quod 
Roma merito caput orbis est et domina terrarium omnium.683 
  
Item 3 is taken from Walter’s pseudohistorical report of the invasion of England by a 
Roman emperor named only as Cunnanus [“Cunt-arse”], supposedly during the reign 
of Offa (king of Mercia c.757-796).  The offending sentence has been left 
untranslated in the amended Oxford edition of De Nugis: thus ‘[d]ominus Cunnanus 
nichil est nisi cunnus et anus’ can be translated as ‘[l]ord Cunt-arse is nothing but a 
cunt and an arse.’  This seems a straight-forward case of labels for sexual and 
excretory organs being used as pejoratives.684  
 Importantly, Walter probably intended Cunnanus as a cipher for the people of 
Rome in his own day, and perhaps more specifically, the papacy.  This is made fairly 
clear in the sentences immediately preceding item 3: 
 
4. Romans had often come there [England] as ambassadors from the Emperor to 
Offa, and had gone back enriched by him and full of praises of the king and 
kingdom, and when Rome beheld them glittering in raiment and gold, its 
native covetousness was straightway rekindled.  No wonder, for this very 
                                                 
683 Walter, ii: 17: Note that the Latin remains untranslated in James’ English translation. 
684 Not much seems to have been written on swearing or the use of pejoratives in medieval language 
and literature (perhaps as the focus tends to be on obscenity rather than swearing per se): Ziolkowski’s 
articles, ‘Obscenity in the Latin grammatical and rhetorical tradition’ in Obscenity, Social Control and 
Artistic Creation in the Europe Middle Ages, ed. J. M. Ziolkowski (Boston, 1998), pp. 41-59 and ‘The 
obscenities of old women: vetularity and vernacularity’ in Obscenity, Social Control and Artistic 
Creation in the Europe Middle Ages, ed. J. M, Ziolkowski (Boston, 1998), pp. 73-89 are helpful 
regarding the use of Latin (although they do not directly address pejoratives).  
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name of Rome [original italics] is made up out of the letters of avarice and the 
definition goes with it: Radix Omnium Malorum Avaricia [sic.: The root of all 
evils and greed]. 
 
Venerant Romani frequenter ad Offam ab imperatore missi, ditatique abipso 
recesserant cum multa laude regis et regni; quos ut Roma vidit vestibus et 
auro lucidos, innata statim exarsit avaricia.  Nec mirum; hoc enim nomen 
Roma ex avaricia sueque diffinicionis formatur principiis, fit enim ex R et O et 
M et A et diffinicio cum ipsa, radix omnium malorum avaricia.685   
 
Assuming that Cunnanus was thus intended as a cipher for the people of Rome or the 
papacy, Walter’s use of cunnus and anus as pejorative labels for people whom he 
viewed as innately [innatus] evil [malus] and greedy [avaricia] is possibly telling of 
his broader attitudes towards the vagina, anus, and perhaps the human pudenda in 
general.  In this case at least, Walter seems to have viewed the vagina and anus as 
sufficiently “bad” or “not good” for them to be used as straightforward pejoratives or 
insults.  The relevant statement in item 3 is hardly nuanced in this respect.  Walter 
clearly means to say that it is a bad thing to be compared to, or like, a vagina or anus.  
Moreover, cunnus and anus are explicitly linked with ungliness [deformus] in item 3.  
Furthermore, there may be some underlying misogyny in this, firstly, in that Walter 
uses the specifically female genital, cunnus (which is, albeit, a masculine noun in 
Latin), as a label for, and attribute of, Cunnanus, and secondly, in that cunnus can also 
be used as a misogynous label for an “old women”.686    
It cannot be said for certain whether Walter consistently looked on the vagina 
and anus as intrinsically bad or ugly things.  He may well have exaggerated his 
strength of feeling towards them in the satirical literary context of De Nugis.  As a 
celibate clerk Walter may have had very little, if any, direct experience of the human 
vagina during his life, although this cannot be taken for granted.  In any case, his 
                                                 
685 Walter, De Nugis, ii: 17.  
686 Jan Ziolkowski discusses prejudicial attitudes towards old women in medieval Latin literature in 
‘The obscenities of old women’, pp. 74-5.  Walter’s misogyny has been widely commented on.  His 
tract against marriage in De Nugis, subtitled Dissuasio Valerii, was circulated separately from De 
Nugis.  James describes it as ‘one of the most brilliant anti-feminine satires produced in the Middle 
Ages,’ noting also that it was often wrongly or spuriously ascribed to Jerome and as such, circulated 
with his writings: see introduction to De Nugis, p. xxi and for the tract, iv-3-5.  On Walter’s misogyny 
see N. Cartlidge, ‘Misogyny in a medieval university? The "Hoc contra malos" commentary on Walter 
Map's Dissuasio Valerii’ in Journal of Medieval Latin, 8 (1998), pp. 156-91.  
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understanding of the vagina can be linked to his entry from a young age into a clerical 
culture which, among other things, is known for its misogyny.  Walter himself has 
gone down in literary history as an exponent par excellence of the misogyny of the 
Western Christian clergy during the middle ages.687  Taking account of this, Walter’s 
negative attitudes towards the vagina may be understood as the outcome of whatever 
experiences he had of the vagina in the flesh, if any, as well as the expectations of it 
that a clerical education had instilled in him.  Considered in this light, his attitudes 
towards the vagina quite possibly had little, if anything, to do with the biological 
realities of the organ and everything to do with his clerical upbringing.   
By contrast, Walter undoubtedly had direct experiences of the anus hence his 
negative attitudes towards it must be understood partly as responses to how he 
experienced it.  Furthermore, as discussed above Walter viewed excrement as a 
potential pollutant, when out of place, and thus an appropriate object of digust.688  
Therefore, it is important to note that Walter’s attitudes towards the anus, as 
expressed in items 3-4 and elsewhere, must be understood in terms of his embodied 
experiences of the anus and excretion and contemporary so-called fecal discourse (i.e. 
the body of socio-culturally constructed and transmitted wisdom on the nature of 
excretion and excrement: their uses, benefits, dangers, and so forth).  Walter clearly 
found the anus to be offensive in certain respects and contexts, but not so offensive 
that it couldn’t be a source of humour as in the case of the Cistercian related in item 2.  
Depending on context, the anus could be potentially offensive or funny or both (the 
latter option probably being the case in item 2).  In addition to this, it seems 
reasonable to assume that Walter would have granted circumstances in which there 
was nothing offensive, and perhaps funny, about the anus and excrement: i.e. when 
being used or deposited properly and out of the public gaze.  Once again, Walter’s 
attitudes towards the anus and excretion, inter alia, need to be understood in terms of 
the complex interplay between his immediate embodied experiences of these things 
and his exposure to contemporary conventional attitudes towards them.  
 
* * * 
                                                 
687 As stated in the previous note, Walter’s tract against marriage, Dissuasio Valerii, which survives 
separately from De Nugis in more than fifty manuscripts, has ensured that Walter is now remembered 
as a famous misogynist.  Also see the entry for “Walter Map” by C. N. L. Brooke in The Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography: http://www.oxforddnb.com/ (accessed 25 / 07 / 2010) 
688 See sec. 5.3.1, pp. 242-3 above.  
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5.3.3: Conclusion 
 
The key finding of this section is that Guibert’s and Walter’s attitudes towards sex 
and excretion, as they represented them in their respective texts, should be understood 
as net products of the interplay between the biological realities of the human body, 
both men’s personal experiences of those realities, and the socio-cultural norms and 
wisdom which affected how they interpreted the aforesaid experiences.  By taking this 
approach to Guibert’s and Walter’s texts it is possible to develop an understanding of 
the importance of sex and excretion to both men in which the biological body is a 
central concern. This in no way reduces their experiences and ideas about sex and 
excretion to hard-wired biological drives.  As this chapter has shown, there is no need 
to be biased in favour of either biologically or culturally-informed analytical 
perspectives.  To the contrary, it is greatly preferable to allow for a balance between 
both perspectives, specifically, as has been shown above, by being sensitive to the 
interplay between mind, body, and culture. 
 
5.4: Final conclusion 
 
Throughout this chapter I have argued that mind, body, and culture interact and that 
appreciating this is crucial to understanding how the authors relevant to this study 
represented human life and existence.  In order to demonstrate this, I have focused on 
several aspects of human life which are described in enough detail in the sample of 
source texts to be worth examining in light of the insights provided by neuro- and 
cognitive science into the relationship between mind, body, and culture.   It is 
possible, in each case, to identify distinctly mental, bodily, and cultural aspects of 
these phenomena as they apply to the human world.  For example, pain involves a 
mental response to a bodily stimulus, some form of conscious appreciation that the 
stimulus is painful, and socio-culturally constructed pressures and biases affecting 
how people experience and respond to painful sensations and to what extent they seek 
or avoid pain.  These three facets of human existence, namely mind, body, and 
culture, do not exist in isolation from each other.  They share the same conditions of 
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existence (i.e. the basic fact of human existence) and, as such, interact and affect the 
development and outcomes of each other.       
 By taking this approach throughout this section I have been able to highlight 
the significance of the biological body in the clerical culture of twelfth-century 
Western Europe.  Far from being otherworldly or excessively abstract, as has often 
been thought by modern scholars about medieval churchmen and women, the mental 
lives of the men discussed here and in previous chapters can be seen to have been 
heavily influenced by the realities of their embodied existences.  The body was central 
to how these people experienced, conceptualised, and behaved in the world and also, 
as was seen in Chapter Three, influenced the beliefs and ideas they entertained about 
the nature of reality beyond the material world.689  Importantly, as has been shown 
throughout Part II of this study, by taking account of the interplay between mind, 
body, and culture it is possible to account for the influence of the body on how people 
such as the authors relevant to this study experienced, conceptualised, and behaved in 
the world without reducing these phenomena to crude biologically-determined drives.       
Finally, there has been a heavy focus in this chapter on negative perceptions of 
human existence: pain, suffering, the discomfort of old age, and the potential of sex 
and excretion to elicit disgust and derogatory humour.  This should not be read as 
symptomatic of the general content of the source texts.  Happiness and pleasure often 
also feature in the texts, although, significantly, they tend to be described in more 
disembodied terms.  Indeed, as has been seen elsewhere in the previous two chapters, 
there is a marked tendency among the authors relevant to this study to describe 
happiness and pleasure in strongly metaphysical terms: especially proximity to God.  
This is not problematic for the argument made in this chapter because, as was seen 
earlier (especially in Chapter Three), conceptualisation and understanding of 
metaphysical existence is inextricably anchored to the physical realities of human 
embodiment and the world.690  This again serves to illustrate the influence of the 
interplay between mind, body, and culture on people’s experiences of the world and 
the abstract ideas they derive from them.    
  
 
   
                                                 
689 In particular see Chapter Three, sec. 3.2.  
690 For example, in Chapter Three see sec. 3.2.3, items 1-3, and sec. 3.3.1, item 10.  
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Conclusion 
 
There are five main points which need to be dealt with in this conclusion.  Four 
correspond to the aims of this study as they were outlined in Chapter One, which, to 
recap, were: 
 
1. To make use of theories and methods from the modern discourses of neuro- 
and cognitive science to shed light on how the authors relevant to this study 
experienced and conceptualised themselves and the world around them. 
 
2. To problematise the existing discourses on “individuality”, “the self”, and 
“subjectivity” in medieval studies by focusing on new methods for exploring 
the ways in which, as just stated, medieval people experienced and 
conceptualised themselves, their bodies, other people, and the world around 
them. 
 
3. To explore the issues raised by neuro- and cognitive science for how we relate 
the phenomena of society and culture to the embodied existence of medieval 
people. 
 
4. To show that Latin was an adequate language of self-expression for those 
twelfth-century writers who were able to use it.691 
 
As noted in Chapter One, the first three points are related and have been of utmost 
concern throughout the analysis of the sample of source texts in Part II of this study.  
Accordingly, I shall address them together in sec. 6.1 below.  The fourth point will be 
dealt with as a discrete issue in sec. 6.2.  Finally, the fifth point which needs to be 
addressed here corresponds to the questions I raised in Chapter Two, sec. 2.3.6, 
regarding the possibility that the body or parts of it are frequently conceptualised in 
the sample of source texts in gender-neutral terms.  I will deal with this matter lastly 
in sec. 6.3.     
 
                                                 
691 These points were listed thus in Chapter One, sec. 1.1.  
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6.1: Revisiting the individual through neuro- and cognitive science 
 
This study has shown that theories and ideas from neuro- and cognitive science have 
valid applications within studies of medieval languages and literatures.  Specifically 
in the case of this study, neuro- and cognitive science have helped to shed fresh light 
on a sample of twelfth-century Latin texts by showing how their content and style are 
likely to have been influenced by the embodied and environmental conditions of their 
respective authors’ existences.  This, in turn, has served the purpose of problematising 
the existing discourses in medieval studies on the individual, self, and subjectivity in 
two key ways.  First, whereas in the aforesaid discourses the individual, self, or 
subject have been frequently conceived as abstract or mainly mental objects of 
introspection or self-awareness, neuro- and cognitive science shift focus towards a 
more broadly situated understanding of human mental life in which the biological 
body and its effects in the world (especially culture) play key roles.  Second, the view 
that the twelfth-century witnessed the development of advanced forms of self-
awareness or appreciation for individual being as distinct from group being, as 
expressed in various forms since the nineteen-fifties by, among others, Southern, 
Dronke, Morris, and Spence, needs to be rethought in light of neuroscientific research 
which strongly suggests that self-awareness is an ordinary, albeit highly variable, 
feature of human consciousness.692     
 As has been seen throughout Part II of this study, it is possible to shed light on 
the sample of source texts by exploring their content and style in terms of reciprocal 
relationships between the mind, body, and culture.  Instead of examining in isolation 
the individual impacts of mental, bodily, and cultural factors on the relevant texts, this 
study has examined the relationship between these three aspects of human existence 
through the aforesaid texts.  The major innovation of this approach as it relates to the 
existing literature is to incorporate some understanding of the biological body into the 
account given of the mental lives and socio-cultural backgrounds of the authors 
discussed throughout Part II of this study.693  To be sure, the body is identified as an 
explicit topic of discussion in so-called body history, but more often than not what is 
                                                 
692 For instance, see the discussions of “the self” in Dennett, Consciousness Explained, pp. 412-30, 
Damasio, Descartes’ Error, pp. 236-44 (also see pp. 226-35 for relevant background information), and 
Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, pp. 267-89.  These three works were all discussed 
previously in regard to the embodied view of the mind in Chapter Two, sec. 2.1.  
693 The relevant literature was noted and discussed in Chapter One, secs. 1.2-3.  
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meant by the body in this context is discourse relating to it rather than its biological 
realities.  In contrast, by adopting ideas and methods from neuro- and cognitive 
science, as explained in Chapter Two, this study has been able to address the 
importance of the embodied biological conditions of human existence experienced 
and lived by a group of medieval people without reducing the discussion to crude 
distinctions between nature and nurture or biology and culture.  By following this 
approach it has been possible to gather an understanding of how the embodied 
conditions, within which this group of medieval people lived and experienced the 
world, influenced how they thought and acted and thus why they wrote the kinds of 
texts that are now available to be studied in the present.    
The importance afforded to the biological body in this study draws into 
question the view that the twelfth-century witnessed an awakening of some kind of 
specifically Western European form of self-awareness or appreciation for individual 
being, at least among well-educated churchmen.  As stated above, recent research in 
neuroscience suggests that conscious self-perception, at least in some basic form, is an 
ordinary part of human consciousness which develops from the ways in which the 
human organism (i.e. mind and body) interacts with the environment (which contains, 
inter alia, the cultural products of human thought and behaviour).694   Given this 
knowledge as well as the findings of this study, it is best to rethink the rapid 
developments in the expressive range of European literatures during the twelfth 
century, not in terms of a sudden discovery of something new, but rather of different 
ways of appreciating and exploiting something which was always part of conscious 
human phenomenology.   
Put bluntly, self-awareness was probably always present in the minds of 
Western Europeans throughout the early medieval period as an ordinary feature of 
their conscious phenomenology: what changed in the twelfth century was how they 
perceived the importance and possibilities of this facet of their minds and wrote about 
it.  It is these changes which led to the development, through positive reinforcement, 
of an identifiably Western European culture of making self-awareness a central object 
of artistic representation, academic endeavour, identity-making, and self-promotion or 
“-fashioning”.695  It is not that Western Europeans, since the twelfth century or at any 
                                                 
694 See n. 2 above. 
695 The term self-fashioning was coined by the early modernist, Stephen Greenblatt, the significance of 
whose work was discussed in Chapter One, sec. 1.2, p. 20. 
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other time, have enjoyed a unique sense of their own being: it is that they have 
interpreted their sensory access to themselves and the world around them differently 
from other people and also felt more inclined to write about it.  Furthermore, the 
debate between Morris and Bynum, documented in Chapter One, regarding the 
relative importance of the group and individual in the twelfth century west is 
ultimately a source of confusion because it clouds-over the fact, even though both 
scholars would surely acknowledge it, that group-membership and individuality are 
not mutually exclusive states of being: it is perfectly possible to be concurrently an 
individual and member of a group. 696   The significant question to ask about 
individuality in the twelfth century is not whether such a state of being existed but 
instead how it was valued in itself and relative to group membership.     
Finally, instead of focusing on the sample of source texts as examples of high-
end literary production, this study has mainly focused on what their more banal 
contents suggest about the mental lives of their respective authors.  This is perhaps the 
most compelling reason for making use of neuro- and cognitive science in studies of 
medieval texts and languages.  It has been shown throughout Part II of this study that 
by applying relevant theory from neuro- and cognitive science to small portions of 
text it is possible to tease out more information about the everyday experiences and 
thought processes of authors than would usually be attempted by medievalists.  In 
short, by following this method it is possible to gather some sense of how medieval 
people experienced and reasoned about themselves and the world around them.   
 
6.2: Latin as a mode of self-expression in twelfth-century Europe 
 
The analysis of the source texts in Part II of this study has shown that Latin was a 
perfectly adequate medium of self-expression for the relevant authors.  As argued in 
Chapter One, the view held by some historians and literary critics that by the 
medieval period Latin was ill-suited for the purposes of self-expression is based on a 
teleological view of the development of Western European languages, literatures, and 
cultures from antiquity up to the twentieth century.697  There can be little doubt from 
the discussion of the sample of source texts in this study that for their respective 
authors Latin was a perfectly adequate medium of self-expression.  As may be seen 
                                                 
696 On this debate see Chapter One, sec. 1.3, pp. 29-30. 
697 See Chapter One, sec. 1.1.   
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from the various extracts discussed in Part II, all of the relevant authors were able to 
use Latin sufficiently well to describe and represent various aspects of themselves and 
other people including their mental lives and physical experiences.  The views that by 
the early medieval period Latin was either a throw-back to classical Roman 
civilisation or an exclusive language of ritual, administration, and power simply do 
not stand up to scrutiny when considered in light of the highly complex and 
emotionally sophisticated Latin texts written during the twelfth century (only a 
sample of which have been studied here).698   
 Furthermore, taking stock of the conclusions in the previous section, I would 
argue that during the twelfth century Latin, alongside vernacular languages, was 
harnessed for the purposes of expressing and interpreting changing attitudes towards 
self-awareness.  Latin was emphatically part of this much wider cultural shift which 
began to take root in Western Europe around the beginning of the twelfth century.  To 
be sure, by the end of the century vernacular languages had overtaken Latin as the 
most popular media of literary expression, but this in no way detracts from the content 
and quality of sophisticated Latin texts such as those examined in this study.  In so far 
as medieval writers were able to make competent use of Latin to express whatever 
views they had on themselves and other people, as has been shown to be the case in 
Part II of this study, Latin must be considered a perfectly adequate medium for the 
expression of those ideas.   
 
6.3: Working without gender in body history 
 
The final conclusion which I will draw for this thesis relates to how the body has 
often been conceptualised and studied over the past three decades in body history.  
Due to the influence of feminist critiques of gender on the development of body 
history during the nineteen-eighties and nineties, sex and gender have often been 
crucial conceptual tools among historians of the body in medieval studies.  As can be 
seen from a wide range of studies published over the past three decades, issues 
relating to sex and gender have consistently driven the discipline.699  In the argument 
                                                 
698 For authors who have expressed these views in one form or another see Auerbach, Mimesis, pp. 88-
90, Baswell, ‘Latinitas’, Spence, Texts and the Self, p. 2, and Haidu, The Subject, p. 11. 
699 Much of the relevant literature was noted in Chapter One of this study: see sec. 1.2.  For direct 
reference see Bynum, Jesus as Mother, Holy Feast and Holy Fast, and Fragmentation and 
Redemption, Partner, ‘No Sex, No Gender’, ‘The family romance of Guibert of Nogent’, and ‘The 
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which follows I do not wish to challenge the importance of sex and gender as 
conceptual tools in body history.  Instead, I aim to highlight a different set of 
possibilities about how people conceptualise and reason about the human body which, 
at present, is not clearly appreciated or acknowledged in body history.    
In Chapter Two of this study (see sec. 2.2.6) I drew attention to the possibility 
that many of the ideas or concepts that the authors relevant to this study have about 
human existence are not sexed or gendered even though sex and gender impinged in 
some way on all their lives.  I based this view on the concept of prototypes, as 
described by Lakoff and Johnson in Metaphors We Live By.700  In light of the analysis 
of the source texts in Part II of this study, it seems reasonable to conclude that there 
may have been many aspects of how the relevant authors reasoned about and 
understood the human body which were, on some level, independent of ideas relating 
to sex and gender: for example, the authors examined here were able to use labels 
relating to the body, such as “hand” or “face”, free of any connotations about sex or 
gender.701  The notion of prototypes adds to this view in as far as it hints at how this 
may be possible in human cognition.  
To recap briefly, prototypes are strictly conceptual mental representations of 
typical members of categories whereby things in the world may be judged to be 
members of those categories or not.  So, for example, a prototypical seat, at least in 
western societies, would be something like the concept of a raised solid platform, 
capable of supporting the weight of somebody reclining on it in a particular way (i.e. 
according to conventional understandings of a “sitting posture”).  In this way, a 
potentially enormous range of objects could be categorised as seats providing they 
conform to some such prototypical concept of a seat.  In principle this kind of 
conceptual reasoning could apply to how people understand certain aspects of the 
human body and existence in general.  To pick a fairly strong example, people could 
conceivably come to understand human hands by referring their experiences of hands 
in the world to a prototypical concept of a hand in their minds.  This prototype does 
                                                                                                                                            
hidden self’, Rubin, ‘The person in the form’, ‘The body, whole and vulnerable’ and ‘A decade of 
studying medieval women, 1987-97’, van Houts, Memory and Gender, and the three articles collected 
under the title, ‘Historicizing Sex and Gender’ in Writing History, ed. N. Partner (London, 2005).  Also 
outside of medieval studies, but highly relevant, see Brown, Body and Society. 
700 See Chapter Two, sec. 2.3.6 and for direct reference see Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live 
By, pp. 122-4.  
701 For relevant examples on the hands see item 1 in sec. 3.2.2, p.108 and on the face, Chapter Four, 
sec. 4.4 and subsections. 
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not need to be intrinsically sexed or reliant on peripheral gender concepts. It could 
just be a general concept of a hand by which anybody’s hands, be they male, female, 
or transsex could be defined as hands.  In fact, it is difficult to imagine how this could 
not be the case.  The concept, hand, covers all instances of hands in modern English 
language and discourse.  The concepts, male hand, female hand, or transsex hand are 
surely extensions of the basic gender-neutral concept, hand, rather than prerequisites 
for it.  Given the material discussed in Part II of this study, it seems reasonably clear 
that this argument also works for Latin: e.g. the feminine noun, facies, can be used to 
refer to anyone’s face, whatever their sexual and gender characteristics.702   
This argument may also be extended to cover the body as a whole.  The 
discussion of John of Salisbury’s body politic metaphors in Chapter Four is 
instructive on this point. In these, John compares aspects of the English state and 
Church to the head [caput], heart [cor], and limbs [membra].703  Gender concepts do 
not play any obvious role in these metaphors.  There is no clear reason for us to think 
that John specifically had a male, female, or mixed-gender head in mind, or heart, and 
so forth: hence these metaphors suggest that John was able to entertain a reasonably 
gender-neutral concept of the human body.  There is nothing to stop sexual or gender 
characteristics being applied to the concept of the body that John develops in these 
metaphors.  However, the metaphors would need to be extended somehow in order to 
accommodate these additions in any meaningful way (e.g. a male body is like one 
kind of state and a female body like another).  As John’s metaphors stand, the idea of 
prototypes offers us a way of understanding what gender-neutral concepts of the body 
and human existence might be and thus how and why he was able to construct what 
are evidently gender-neutral representations of the body in language.  
The broad significance of this argument is that people often conceptualise the 
body, or parts of it, in abstraction as a gender-neutral or asexual object.  If this is the 
case then the relationship between the concepts of the body, sex, and gender needs to 
be rethought to take account of the possibility that it may be a perfectly normal part of 
human reason to develop gender-neutral or asexual concepts of the body in response 
to everyday experiences of it in the world.  This is even in spite of the fact that “real-
life” bodies are invariably sexed and perceived through socio-culturally constructed 
gender concepts and stereotypes.  Put bluntly, it seems that the ideas of sex and 
                                                 
702 The face was discussed in Chapter Four, sec. 4.4. 
703 John’s body politic metaphors were discussed in Chapter Four, sec. 4.3.   
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gender may often function in human reason as embellishments to gender-neutral or 
asexual body concepts.  This argument may be seen to lend support to established 
feminist critiques of sex and gender since it further highlights the fluidity of these 
concepts as aspects of how people experience and understand the nature of the body 
and its significance for human life.  In any case, the possibility that a large portion of 
human thought about the body may not involve concepts of sex or gender needs 
further investigation in body history.    
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